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1 
CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In 343, the town of Sardica,
1
 in the northwestern reaches of the imperial province 
of Thrace, was host to a synod of bishops who had assembled to address a number of 
questions that had arisen in the troubled wake of the Council of Nicaea. This was not out 
of the ordinary. That great council which had gathered in Bithynian Nicaea in 325 to 
condemn Arius
2
 had proved something of a stumbling block in the life of the Church. In 
its effort to describe the ontological status of the Son relative to the Father it had included 
in its doctrinal statement a term, the homoousios, which had not to that point enjoyed 
universal usage and was open to a variety of interpretations. This move had been met 
with great reservation from a significant sector in the Church, and thus many local 
councils, assemblies, synods, and state interventions would be required in the fifty or so 
years that followed Nicaea before a broad consensus on its precise meaning could be won 
and peace finally be restored in the Church. Sardica simply was one of these councils. 
What makes it special for this study, however, is that, in affirming Nicaea and rebuking 
the “madness of the Arians,”3 it also issued statements that bitterly denounced the 
“blasphemous and perverse” opinion that the Gospel passage, “I and My Father are 
                                                 
1
 Today’s Sofia, Bulgaria. 
2
 The matter of Arius was the chief but not the only question on the agenda at Nicaea. Other items had 
included the issue of the Melitian schism in Alexandria, a common timing of the Christian Pascha, and 
certain administrative and disciplinary matters.  
3
 What had sharpened the hostility was the fact that the Sardican council had initially been intended to be a 
more all-encompassing assembly comprising both Nicaea advocates and skeptics. But the tension between 
the two camps was such that the anti-Nicene party quickly withdrew, even before the council had 
commenced, and held its own separate meeting in nearby Philippoupolis.  
2 
one,”4 really referred to the oneness of “concord and harmony”5 that supposedly united 
the Father and the Son.
6
 In the same vein, the council went on to upbraid the “ignorance 
and mental darkness” of those who took the words of Jesus’ prayer to the Father—viz. 
“As Thou and I are one, that they may be one in us”7—as evidence that people could be 
one “in the same way” that the Son and the Father are one.8 Thus Sardica denounced the 
view that there was an analogy between the oneness that could be achieved among 
humans, which inevitably was volitional, and that between the divine Persons in the 
Trinity. 
Sardica attributed these offending views that it condemned to a certain Valens and 
Ursacius.
9
 However, there is little doubt that they saw the real origin of these opinions in 
something that yet another council, this one held in Antioch but two years earlier (341), 
had articulated in its second epistle to describe the relationship between what it termed 
the three hypostases of the Trinity. This council had promulgated the formula: three 
according to hypostasis, one according to concord.
10
 Antioch had not been the first to use 
the language of concord,
11
 but its statement marked the first time it had been put forward 
by a synod. Its hope had been to gain support for a method of describing the unity of the 
Father and the Son (and, of course, the Holy Spirit)
12
 that avoided the language of 
                                                 
4
 John 10:30. 
5
 Apud Theodoret, Hist. eccl. 2.6 (NPNF
2
 3:71 [PG 82:1016A]): “...διὰ τὴν συμφωνίαν καὶ τὴν ὁμόνοιαν...” 
6
 Apud Theodoret, Hist. eccl. 2.6 (NPNF
2
 3:71). 
7
 John 17:21. 
8
 Apud Theodoret, Hist. eccl. 2.6 (NPNF
2
 3:72). 
9
 Theodoret, Hist. eccl. 2.6 (NPNF
2
 3:71). 
10
 As preserved in Athanasius’ Syn. 23 (NPNF2 4:461 [PG 26:724A]): “ὡς εἶναι τῇ μὲν ὑποστάσει τρία, τῇ δὲ 
συμφωνίᾳ ἕν.” The fact that Antioch used the term hypostasis to describe each of the divine persons would 
itself be cause for confusion given that Sardica would choose to speak only of one hypostasis. 
11
 We find it also, for example, in Asterius the Sophist. See, e.g., Fr. 39 (in Markus Vinzent, Asterius von 
Kappadokien: die Theologischen Fragmente [Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1993]):: “διὰ τὴν ἐν ἅπασιν οὖν λόγοις τε καὶ 
ἔργοις ἀκριβῆ συμφωνίαν ὁ σωτὴρ λέγει, <<ἐγὼ καὶ ὁ πατὴρ ἕν ἐσμεν>> (Jn. 10:30).” 
12
 The fact that Antioch talked of the three hypostases in its formulations, i.e. including the Holy Spirit, put 
it very much ahead of developments. In most instances at this early point, most efforts were concerned with 
3 
coessentiality (homoousion) that Nicaea had insisted on but which had provoked such 
confusion and alarm in many, especially in the Church in the eastern parts of the 
Empire.
13
 Antioch’s step back from the homoousios was seen by those at Sardica as an 
attempt to subvert the good work of Nicaea and surreptitiously to reintroduce the 
poisonous doctrines of Arius which it had condemned. Ironically, to its own bemusement 
and frustration, Antioch itself had had to respond to an earlier charge of Arianism that 
had been made against many of its own members,
14
 and it took great care to declare, from 
the very opening lines of its statements, that it had nothing to do with Arius.
15
 But this 
was not enough to convince the Sardican fathers of its good intentions. For not only had 
it cast doubt on Nicaea by attempting to revise its formulations, now it had begun to talk 
of the will in connection with the oneness between the persons in the Trinity, which was, 
as far as Sardica could see, exactly what Arius had done. 
It was true, as we shall see in the fifth chapter of this study, that one particular 
strand of Arius’ early thought, quite possibly an unchecked statement made in the heat of 
                                                                                                                                                 
establishing the nature of the relationship between Father and Son. Only once this was resolved was the 
ontological status of the Holy Spirit clarified fairly quickly. 
13
 G.L. Prestige (St. Basil the Great and Apollinaris of Laodicea [London: SPCK, 1956] 3) makes the point, 
very relevant to our times, that part of the opposition to the homoousios was an unwillingness among many 
to allow its supporters “to employ the language of the scientific thought of their age to explain or defend 
their convictions.”  
14
 The synodal history here is quite complicated. Antioch had been the epicenter of the counterattack of the 
anti-Nicene camp following its humiliation at Nicaea. A local synod in 328 managed to dismiss the fervent 
Nicene, Eustathius, as bishop of the city (Socrates, Hist eccl. 1:24). This was followed by a council in Tyre 
(335) which removed Athanasius from Alexandria (ibid. 1.28), and one in Constantinople (336) which 
expelled Marcellus from Ancyra (ibid. 1.36). Constantine died in 337 and, following a brief period of 
instability with the deaths of some of his appointed successors, the realm eventually fell to his sons 
Constantius, who was unsympathetic to Nicaea, in the East, and Constans, a supporter of the great Council, 
who took the West. Following his banishment from Alexandria, Athanasius eventually took refuge in the 
West, where imperial sympathy for Nicea was high, and he presented his opponents to Julius, the bishop of 
Rome, as partisans of Arius. Julius then sent an epistle to those close to Eusebius (apud Athanasius, Apol. 
sec. [Apol. c. Ar.] 20-35) who had been behind Athanasius’ expulsion, protesting their actions and 
insinuating that they were supporters of Arius. These were the accusations to which Antioch (341) 
displayed such sensitivity. 
15
 Athanasius, Syn. 22 (NPNF
2
 4:461): “We have not been followers of Arius—how could Bishops, such as 
we, follow a Presbyter?...” 
4 
debate, had indeed presented the oneness of Father and Son as a theoretically contingent 
union between two discrete volitive agents.
16
 It brought together a Christology that 
lacked a conception of a human soul in Christ—and thus attributed all signs in Scripture 
of his frailty and finitude back to the Son’s pre-incarnate nature—with an inherently 
stratified cosmology that perceived reality as an ontologically gradated hierarchy at 
whose summit rested the transcendent and unoriginate Father. This was but a facet of a 
broader theology that had the will as its motor. All creatures existed at the will of the 
Father, and hence, as created from nothingness and therefore mutable, related back to the 
Father through a relationship of volition. Thus, Arius viewed the Son’s sonship to the 
Father in a way that laid all emphasis on perceptions of fairness, meritocracy, and 
exemplariness because, at bottom, it assumed the Son’s ontological non-parity with the 
Father. As kin to the creatures, this theory ran, the Son’s sonship became paradigmatic of 
the kind of relationship with God that humans could aspire to as well. Thus, Arius began 
to link the exemplariness and meritoriousness of Christ’s work with the supposed 
contingency of the Son’s virtue. All parties agreed that Christ’s life was exemplary and 
meritorious, but for Arius this merit lay specifically in the fact that the pre-existent Son, 
as the intellective principle in this Arian Christ bereft of a human soul, supposedly could 
have lapsed from the path of virtue but chose not to. To be sure, this was Arius at his 
most extreme, articulating positions that he would distance himself from. But Sardica 
would view all talk of will in this context with horror and as on a par with this extreme 
                                                 
16
 See, for example, Alexander of Alexandria’s testimony in his Epistle to the Hierarchs Everywhere that 
“Some one accordingly asked them [Arius and his cohort] whether the Word of God could be changed, as 
the devil had been? And they feared not to say, ‘Yes, he could; for being begotten, he is susceptible of 
change.’” (Socrates, Hist. eccl. 1.6 [NPNF2 2:4]). In his Epistle to Alexander (apud Theodoret, Hist. eccl. 
1.3 [NPNF
2
 3:36]), Alexander stated that of Christ that “though mutable by nature, his painstaking 
character suffered no deterioration.” If a Peter or Paul did the same thing, he added, their sonship would 
have been the same as the Son’s. 
5 
Arius. It was unable to see the inclusion of will in the intra-Trinitarian discussion as 
anything other than a pole of contingency and instability: 
“We, as Catholics, unanimously condemned this foolish and lamentable opinion: 
for just as mortal men on a difference having arisen between them quarrel and 
afterwards are reconciled, so do such interpreters say that disputes and dissension 
are liable to arise between God the Father Almighty and His Son; a supposition 
which is altogether absurd and untenable. But we believe and maintain that those 
holy words, ‘I and My Father are one,’ point out the oneness of hypostasis 
(ὑπόστασις) which is one and the same in the Father and in the Son.”17 
Sardica was acting on the strong impulse automatically to correlate the will with inherent 
contingency, and thus to position the concept of volitive oneness as antipodal to oneness 
according to essence, which was seen by many as the only safe way of talking of the 
Trinity without being led to a concept of potential conflict within it. Conflict in the divine 
sphere was what characterized the religion of the pagans, and this specter of incipient 
polytheism had struck fear in those gathered at Sardica. 
 
THE PROBLEM 
We cannot help but note that Sardica also condemned articles of belief that had 
not been articulated by Antioch. To what degree these were the embellishments made by 
Valens and Ursacius, or what Sardica viewed were fair extrapolations from the premises 
laid out by Antioch, is difficult to gauge. Nevertheless, it is not difficult to imagine that 
some disputants, taking their inspiration from such passages as John 17:22b (“...that they 
may be one, even as we are one”) and Antioch’s references to a oneness according to 
                                                 
17
 Theodoret, Hist. eccl. 2.6 (NPNF
2
 3:71). 
6 
concord, remained wedded to the kerygmatic power of Arius’ early line of thinking. Even 
in our time, the conviction that the Trinity can serve as a model to which human 
interactions should aspire has been the inspiration behind a whole body of theology 
known as Social Trinitarianism.
18
 According to how Sardica saw the issue, however, such 
a social reading of the Trinity, that was based on a sense of concord and volitive 
harmonization, and understood the relations between the divine Persons as analogous to 
interpersonal ties in the human sphere, could not be applied to the Godhead. Human 
relations, it argued, were too erratic and prone to conflict to be a true reflection of the 
inner life of the Trinity. To be sure, although it is not clear that this is what Antioch was 
preaching—I will argue it was not—this social question that had so discomfited Sardica 
was but one aspect of a larger and very basic matter that lay at the heart of the Trinitarian 
disputes of the fourth century: whether and how one could refer to the will at all when 
talking of the internal relations in the Trinity. 
This was a particularly important question, for the issue of the will made 
Christianity stand apart from its pagan-philosophical surroundings, and it made appeal to 
it in a number of ways. On the one hand, it had inherited the Hebraic vision of the 
supreme principle as a personal deity possessed of will, in accordance with which it 
created the universe and invested it with purposeful direction. Again, as a matter of its 
own inscrutable will, this deity chose to make itself known to humans through a process 
of revelation. Thus, the Church, in line with this revelation, also propounded a belief in 
the end of the world, the return of the Messiah, and a final reckoning by which the degree 
                                                 
18
 A study that highlights the centrality of will to theories of Social Trinitarianism is Peter Forrest’s “Divine 
Fission: A New Way of Moderating Social Trinitarianism,” in RelS. 34: 281-297. Also important is the 
work of Sarah Coakley (“Re-thinking Gregory of Nyssa: Introduction—Gender, Trinitarian Analogies, and 
the Pedagogy of The Song” [Modern Theology 18(4):431-443]) and others in this volume, who take on the 
question of personhood, substance, and will in light of modern claims to a social Trinitarianism. 
7 
of conformity of each person’s deeds to the absolute, good, and just will of God would be 
judged. Such was the centrality of the will to the basic theological architecture of 
Christianity that modern studies like those of Albrecht Dihle
19
 and especially Michael 
Frede
20
 have argued that the question of will, particularly that of free will, became a 
major issue in the philosophical circles of late antiquity, and that the rapid spread of 
Christianity beyond the ethnic confines of Judaism was a major contributing factor. As 
Michael Frede states, late antiquity became a time when there was a general concern for 
justice and the intentionality by which the virtue or not of one’s actions could be 
appraised.
21
 In the past, scholars tended to assume the acceptance of free will among even 
the earliest of theorists.
22
 Dihle and Frede, however, saw it as a much later phenomenon. 
Dihle dated it to Augustine, but Frede, crucially, rejected this and put it much earlier, to 
the Stoics. The matter for Frede became very delicate, and the question hinged on 
whether the will was understood as a purposeful movement of mind that necessarily was 
the consequence of cognizance—and whether there was an attendant act of actual assent 
here would determine whether we were talking of free will—or an act of mind that was 
theoretically independent of anything, even of cognizance. This latter instance would 
probably coincide with most popular perceptions of free will, which Frede considered a 
disastrous misconception first codified by Alexander of Aphrodisias. In the Christian 
sphere, at least in this period and especially as it is applied to describing the inner life of 
the Trinity, the will will remain a fairly straightforward category, namely a purposive 
                                                 
19
 Albrecht Dihle, The Theory of Will in Classical Antiquity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1982). 
20
 Michael Frede, A Free Will: Origins of the Notion in Ancient Thought (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2011). 
21
 Frede, A Free Will, 98. 
22
 See, e.g., W.D. Ross (Aristotle [London; New York: Routledge, 1995], 209), who believed that, “on the 
whole,” Aristotle “shared the plain man’s belief in free will but that he did not examine the problem very 
thoroughly, and did not express himself with great consistency.” 
8 
movement of mind informed by understanding. Only in Origen will we see the inklings 
of a more autonomous will, though only as it pertained to created beings, and not to the 
life in the Godhead. We will, of course, have sufficient opportunity to examine these 
questions in the pages below. What we will note for now, however, is that the importance 
of this shift in dominant worldview which begins to take hold in late antiquity, from one 
that accepted the logical necessity of the unchanging “way that things are” to one calling 
for the transformation of the self in light of the coming eschaton, cannot be 
underestimated, and it is in this light that the will, as a buttress against necessity, became 
a key element in how one understood freedom, compulsion, and justice. 
The focus in this study, though germane in a broad sense to the work of Dihle and 
Frede on free will, will be quite different. What drives this investigation is how this wider 
concern with the will was integrated into the Christian doctrine of a Triune God, which 
itself was complicated further by the attendant belief that one of the Persons in this deity 
became human and lived a life of obedience “unto death, even the death of the Cross.”23 
The scenario at Sardica that I presented in my opening sketch was simply one aspect of 
the problem. The more basic difficulty lay in the fact that natural to the notion of the 
Trinity was the need among the theologians and hermeneutes for a sense of proper order 
among the divine Persons. The revelation of a Father, and of a Son begotten of the 
Father, gave rise to a host of perceptions and questions, some of which instinctively saw 
this article of doctrine in subordinate or ontologically gradated terms. 
One such question, key to our purposes, was the crucial matter of whether there 
existed an act of volition in the Father that was precedent to and causative of this 
begetting of the Son. Certain passages in Scripture were vaguely patient of such an 
                                                 
23
 Phil. 2:8. 
9 
interpretation,
24
 but the question was chiefly philosophical: in line with this emergent 
appreciation of the will as bulwark against compulsion, the proponents of precedent will 
saw it as a statement of divine freedom and a vital check against the kinds of notions of 
necessity in the Father’s begetting of the Son that one might find in certain philosophical 
schools such as that of the late Plotinus.
25
 However, to its detractors, who in the fourth 
century came mainly from the Nicene camp, besides the fact that the mere notion of an 
act of will prior to the begetting framed the conversation in temporal terms that were 
unacceptable when talking of the Godhead, the idea of precedent will came to be viewed 
as the premise that enabled the relation between Father and Son to be understood in 
solely volitional terms. Arius’ insistence that the Son existed at the will of the Father was 
proof in point. They understood the will instinctively as the mode by which God acted 
outside of, and not within, the Godhead. To be sure, by making the cosmos the product of 
an act of God’s will, which he could have chosen not to exercise, Christian thinkers were 
able to affirm the sovereignty of God and head off claims of the necessity and eternity of 
creation. But by contending that the Son, too, was begotten by the will of God, the result 
was automatically to assume ontological parity between the Son and creation.
26
 This may 
have been a source of delight to certain of the more extreme elements in the anti-Nicene 
party that believed in the Father’s ontological superiority over the Son, but it struck fear 
in the Nicene party. The will had emerged as the bulwark against necessity, but in the 
process it had come to be branded by some as the pole of a dangerous contingency. By 
                                                 
24
 E.g. Prov. 8:22 (LXX), although this rested more on the verbal construction “ἔκτισέ με,” which was taken 
to imply the Son’s kinship with the κτίσματα and thus was suggestive of a precedent volitive act only in a 
secondary sense. Williams’ remark (Arius, 111) that this passage “affirm[ed] that the mediator is created by 
God’s will,” is too strong a characterization, given that the passage makes no mention of the will. 
25
 Cf. Arius’ view that the Son “existed at the will of the Father” (Apud Athanasius, Syn. 15 [NPNF2 
4:457]). 
26
 We note Athanasius: “He who says, ‘The Son came to be at the divine will,’ has the same meaning as 
another who says, ‘Once he was not,’ and ‘He is a creature’” (C. Ar. 3.59 [NPNF2 4:426]). 
10 
talking of the Father’s willing to beget the Son, or of volitional harmony between Father 
and Son, both the Son’s existence and his continued closeness to the Father became for 
this party matters of choice. In the worst instance, Christian Trinitarianism would be 
reduced to the polytheism of old, characterized by strife and discord in the divine realm. 
It was in this light that Sardica rejected the will, and this would be the theological 
line that many in the pro-Nicaea camp would uphold throughout the conflict that 
followed the great Council. They could not forget Arius’ claim that the Son’s sonship to 
the Father was a matter of continued obedience and volitive effort against potential lapse. 
Yet Antioch, with its doctrine of three hypostases that were one according to symphonia, 
clearly had no reservations about invoking concord and the harmony of wills between the 
divine Persons. Was it preaching an hypothetical chance of discord in the Godhead? 
Prima facie, the fact that even Arius himself had jettisoned that offending view at least 
gave an air of implausibility to Sardica’s claim that Antioch aimed to reintroduce a theory 
of potential conflict. It would be hard to imagine Antioch casting itself as more Arian 
than Arius when it had made such an effort to distance itself from him. Yet, while we 
dare here to suggest what Antioch’s formula could not have meant, expatiating positively 
on how the Antiochene fathers did imagine the place of the will in an oneness according 
to symphonia was uncertain and will require examination. 
On the other hand, Sardica’s views were not without their problems. Her 
references to a single hypostasis—which she no doubt intended as a synonym for ousia, 
but which, in the general confusion over terminology that racked the period, the 
Antiochenes would have read as person—must have been taken as confirmation of 
11 
Antioch’s worst phobias regarding Nicaea’s latent Sabellianism (i.e. Modalism).27 After 
all, Sardica was simply repeating the conventions laid out at Nicaea,
28
 and her rejection 
of the will would have been interpreted in this light, with the notion of symphonia being 
perceived as offensive only to those who held that the Trinity was in fact three 
manifestations of one and the same divine Person. We know from later conciliar history 
that it would be the language of three hypostases that would be accepted by the Church at 
large and that on this point Antioch seemed to be vindicated over Sardica, at least 
lexically.
29
 Moreover, the indications are that over time the question of the will in the 
Trinity came also to be talked of, at least among individual commentators of undisputed 
orthodoxy who were central to the proceedings of the Council of Constantinople, in a 
way that again stood at variance from Sardica’s hostility. However, a final statement on 
the question of will in the Trinity was never enshrined in the doctrinal statement of that 
same council, which conventionally is seen as bringing to a close the Trinitarian disputes 
of the fourth century. Finally, in considering the implications of both Antioch and 
Sardica’s positions, our curiosity cannot but be piqued as to how the question of the will 
in the tri-hypostatic Godhead was eventually resolved, and where, in the theological 
whole that would emerge, the matter of the will would fit relative to those other 
categories, such as hypostasis and nature and ousia etc., whose precise meaning was also 
still fluid. Of course, the next great difficulty that the Church would wrestle with, in the 
                                                 
27
 We must also note that one of Sardica’s first complaints against Valens and Ursacius was that “they 
pertinaciously maintain, like the heretics, that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost are of diverse and 
distinct hypostases” (Apud Theodoret, Hist. eccl. 2.6 [NPNF2 3:71]). 
28
 In its doctrinal statement, Nicaea used ousia and hypostasis as synonyms: “Τοὺς δὲ λέγοντας ‘ἦν ποτε ὅτε 
οὐκ ἦν’ καὶ ‘πρὶν γεννηθῆναι οὐκ ἦν’ καὶ ὅτι ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων ἐγένετο, ἢ ἐξ ἑτέρας ὑποστάσεως ἢ οὐσίας, φάσκοντας 
εἶναι ἢ τρεπτὸν ἢ ἀλλοιωτὸν τὸν Υἱὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ, τούτους ἀναθεματίζει ἡ καθολικὴ καὶ ἀποστολικὴ ἐκκλησία” (see 
Norman P. Tanner, S.J. Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils [London & Washington D.C.: Shead & Ward 
and Georgetown University Press, 1990], 5:20-27). Sardica followed the same convention 
29
 In its doctrinal epistle to the Church in the West, the Council of Constantinople (381) would state: “ἐν 
τρισὶ τελειοτάταις ὑποστάσεσιν, ἤγουν τρισὶ τελείοις προσώποις” (See Tanner, Decrees, 28:25-27). 
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5th century and for two centuries following, would have to do with the two natures, and 
famously the two wills, of the singular hypostasis of the incarnate Son of God.
30
 It simply 
behooves us then to see how this first great dispute on the will was settled. 
 
PROPOSAL AND THESIS 
The very fact that this dispute on the will even arose—as an important aspect of 
the wider dispute on the ontological status of the Son that was provoked by Arius—
prompts me to turn to the doctrinal tradition of the Church itself, as it had manifested 
itself to that point, in order to gauge to what extent the disputants were working within 
doctrinal precedent on the matter of the will in the theology of the Trinity. Unfortunately, 
little systematic work has been done in this direction, and it is in this light that the 
purpose of this study begins to take form. I propose to develop a general picture of this 
doctrinal patrimony by examining in depth the Trinitarian theology of a selection of early 
Christian authors starting from Justin. This will be complemented by a concomitant focus 
on selected non-Christian authors as well, specifically the Valentinians and Plotinus, 
which will serve as helpful points of contrast with the exponents of Christian teaching. 
This will be a diachronic study, which means that the selected authors will be arranged in 
roughly, though not strictly, chronological order. Chronological order will be broken only 
if certain authors need to be grouped together according to theological type. I am loath to 
call this a study that traces the development of the doctrine of the will in the Trinity only 
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 Of course, we know that the question of Monotheletism in the seventh century would be resolved through 
appeal to a correlation between will and nature (which itself had come to correlate with essence). Thus the 
affirmation of the doctrine of Christ’s two wills at the Sixth Council (681)—along with the clarifications 
from Maximus that Christ’s human will was never gnomic, or deliberative, and from John Damascene, that, 
although there were two wills, there remained but one and the same willer, viz. the Incarnate Son, thus 
precluding any conflict between the two wills—was simply an extension of the doctrine of his two natures 
which had been expounded at Chalcedon (451).  
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because it is not possible to talk of a clearly discernible, linear, and causally consecutive 
progression in the matter of will in the Trinity over the first three centuries of the 
Church’s doctrinal tradition. At this point, I will prefer to present this study as a selection 
of theological vignettes that help us to approximate the allowable bounds of theological 
discourse on our question, and thus to appraise the origins of the various streams that 
emerged in the fourth century within the theological patrimony of previous centuries as 
we have mapped it out. 
I believe that this kind of study is required primarily because I have yet to find a 
satisfactory account of the question of will in the Trinitarian theology of this period. 
Apart from the lacuna in our knowledge and the general inclarity on this central doctrinal 
question that this has created, this lack has also contributed, I believe, to the overly-
polarized understanding of the disputes in the fourth century which has traditionally 
characterized scholarship on this matter, and which unwittingly has reinforced the, to my 
mind, skewed perception of a Christianity that was so confused over its own beliefs that it 
found itself quarreling over even the most basic of its tenets, namely the true divinity or 
not of its object of worship. Moreover, the fact that there has been little critical focus on 
the will in the Trinity cultivates the presumption that Sardica’s criticism is automatically 
true, and that the parties who invoked the will did so with the understanding that these 
volitive actions were contingent. Thanks to modern scholarship, the overly simplified 
view of the fourth century disputes in general has begun to recede, and it is among the 
academic efforts in this direction that this study hopes to take its place, focusing on one 
particular aspect thereof. 
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I also must mention that the fact that the disputes were largely though not 
completely brought to a close with the Council of Constantinople, which articulated the 
faith using the language of three hypostases, has in certain modern theological circles 
given birth to a supposedly patristic social Trinitarianism whose assertiveness has been 
met with both enthusiasm and frustration.
31
 By focusing on the question of will, including 
Sardica’s negative reaction to what it thought was a theory of social Trinitarianism, I 
believe that this study can thus also shed some light on this question as well. 
This study takes much of its initial inspiration from the more recent scholarship 
on Arius and Arianism that has helped us to discern the degree of polyphony that existed 
within what traditionally were perceived as the two main camps in the Trinitarian 
disputes of the fourth century. The work of Rowan Williams has been monumental in this 
direction, and has done much to dismantle the perception of Arianism as a monolithic 
movement of clergy and laity who were under the spell of the heresiarch Arius, whose 
individual teaching supposedly had come to dominate the eastern Church in the mid-
fourth century. On the contrary, what came to be known as “Arianism” throughout most 
of that century “was in fact a loose and uneasy coalition of those hostile to Nicaea in 
general and the homoousios in particular.”32 This allows us to see that not all the 
accusations of Arianism were being applied accurately, and it prompts us, in the same 
vein, to question whether all mention of the will in the Trinity had ultimately to be 
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 I am referring to the work of Metropolitan John Zizioulas (Being as Communion [London: Darton, 
Longman and Todd, 1985]). Whether Zizioulas’ account is a true reflection of the Patristic mind, and not a 
projection of much later thought, has been a sharp point of contention. Illustrative is Sarah Coakley’s (“Re-
thinking Gregory of Nyssa: Introduction—Gender, Trinitarian Analogies, and the Pedagogy of The Song,” 
in Modern Theology 18:4 [Oct 2002], 434) criticism of what she call this “so-called ‘social Trinity of the 
East,’” where she remarks that “to have the ‘West’ attacked by the ‘East’ on a reading of the Cappadocians 
that was ultimately spawned by a French Jesuit is a strange irony.” One of the fullest treatments of 
Zizioulas’ thought is the collection of essays to be found in The Theology of John Zizioulas: Personhood 
and the Church (ed. Douglas H. Knight [Hampshire, England: Ashgate, 2007]). 
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 Rowan Williams, Arius: Heresy and Tradition (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdman’s, 2001 [rev. ed.]), 165-6. 
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sourced back to Arius and reduced to the kind of unavoidable contingency that he had 
preached. For, as R.P.C. Hanson has observed, Arius theologically was quite the loner, a 
thinker of an eclectic pedigree who could not easily be categorized as a devotee of any 
particular school of thought,
33
 and Lewis Ayres has in more recent times gone as far as to 
declare that “while much revisionary scholarship has focused on Arius himself, Arius’ 
own theology is of little importance in understanding the major debates of the rest of the 
century.”34 My general position in the fifth chapter will be that, although it was the 
actions of Arius—specifically his dispute with his bishop, Alexander of Alexandria—that 
set off the chain of events that led to the Council of Nicaea, it was Arius himself who 
would have, ironically, to adjust his theological posture in order to come into closer 
alignment with the coalition of those who had been disillusioned by the outcome of that 
council. 
On the specific question surrounding the place of the will in the dispute, less 
significant work has been done, and what little there is has focused most of its attention 
on the disputes provoked by Arius, not earlier. Among these I include Thomas Kopecek’s 
important study on the second generation of the extreme anti-Nicene party,
35
 which could 
be described as an historical narrative of the disputes that stayed faithful to the 
chroniclers such as Socrates Scholasticus, Sozomen, and the others. In this context, he 
made intermittent references, as the sources dictated, to the invocation of the will in the 
doctrinal statements that were issued by the various anti-Nicene parties among which was 
Antioch. As a useful overview of the Arian dispute, I must confess that it was this work 
                                                 
33
 R.P.C. Hanson, Search for the Christian Doctrine of God: The Arian Controversy, 318-381 (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2005), 98. 
34
 Lewis Ayres, Nicaea and its Legacy: An Approach to Fourth-Century Trinitarian Theology (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2004), 56. 
35
 Thomas A. Kopecek, A History of Neo-Arianism (Philadelphia Patristic Foundation Ltd.: 1979). 
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that initially sensitized me to the matter of the will in the Trinitarian disputes, not just 
because it made reference to our particular question but precisely because, as primarily an 
historical work that did not have the leisure of looking in depth at the theological themes 
it touched on, it impressed on me the need for this question to be explored further. 
In a slightly different direction, Gregg and Groh
36
 focused on that particular and 
most controversial aspect of Arius’ teaching that he himself eventually jettisoned, namely 
his contingently volitional relationship with the Father, and they suggested that his early 
theology was born, in the main, of soteriological concerns: Christ, burdened, in this view, 
by the same volitive contingencies as were his fellow creatures, assumed the role of their 
salvific exemplar. While it is a captivating study, the problem with it was that it laid 
disproportionate emphasis on what was probably a heedless statement of Arius’, or of one 
of his followers, and lost sight of what was really Arius’ more crucial concern with 
preserving what he considered to be proper theological order in the Trinity.
37
 Besides, 
because, as we noted, Arius abandoned this line of thought very early in the dispute, 
after, I suspect, he had established extensive personal contact with other anti-Nicene 
churchmen, there is no evidence that his views on this point had widespread resonance.
38
 
Joseph Lienhard went in a more constructive direction, piecing together a theory 
of two divergent theologies that had come to a head in the fourth century. On the one side 
was the dyohypostatic understanding of the Godhead in the anti-Nicene camp, as opposed 
to the miahypostatic thought of its opponents. Lienhard made some mention of the will in 
the dyohypostatic model, although he limited himself to the Arian disputes without 
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 Robert C. Gregg and Dennis E. Groh, Early Arianism: A View of Salvation (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 
1981). 
37
 R.P.C. Hanson (Search 97) notes some of the internal difficulties with the thesis of Gregg and Groh. 
38
 We do see Asterius, who also wrote early in the disputes, espousing something close to a theory of the 
Son’s mutability and contingent virtue. But even he seems to have undergone an evolution. 
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treating of it in any notable depth.
39
 Nevertheless, his categories were helpful in gaining a 
quick grasp of some of the fourth century issues, provided that one did not take his lines 
of distinction too rigidly. In his subsequent work, however, which was centered on 
Marcellus of Ancyra,
40
 Lienhard went slightly further with the question of will in the 
Trinity, especially when he examined how Marcellus’ foe, namely the early extreme anti-
Nicene, Asterius of Cappadocia, understood it.
41
 One of Lienhard’s specific claims was 
that for Asterius the oneness of the Father and the Son, which was talked of in Jn. 
10:30,
42
 referred “only to a harmony of wills.”43 In this, Lienhard argued, Asterius was 
supposedly following Origen. To my reading, Asterius was quite fluid on the matter of 
the will, swinging between a position of contingency and potential conflict as the early 
Arius had done
44
 to one that talked of an ever-identity of will and absolute agreement 
between Father and Son.
45
 This might suggest an evolution in his position of the sort that 
Arius had undergone as well, which would not be unlikely, given that he wrote very early 
in the dispute, and died in 341, but five years after Arius. However, to suggest that 
Asterius was somehow “following” Origen on this point was simply not the case. To be 
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 Joseph Lienhard, S.J., “The ‘Arian’ Controversy: Some Categories Reconsidered.” TS 48 (1987): 429: 
“...the dyohypostatic tradition sees salvation in the order of will: Christ is essentially a revealer and 
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 Joseph Lienhard, S.J., Contra Marcellum: Marcellus of Ancyra and Fourth Century Theology 
(Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1999). 
41
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(Frs. 39-40) (in Markus Vinzent, Asterius von Kappadokien: die Theologischen Fragmente [Leiden: E.J. 
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 “I and the Father are one.” 
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 Joseph Lienhard (Contra Marcellum, 94). 
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 See, e.g., Fr. 43 (in Markus Vinzent, Asterius von Kappadokien: die Theologischen Fragmente [Leiden: 
E.J. Brill, 1993]): “τῇ μὲν φύσει τρεπτός ἐστι, τῷ δὲ ἰδίῳ αὐτεξουσίῳ ἕως βόυλεται μένει καλός· ὅτε μέντοι θέλει, 
δύναται τρέπεσθαι καὶ αὐτὸς ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ πάντα. διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ προγινώσκων ὁ Θεὸς ἔσεσθαι καλὸν αὐτόν, 
προλαβὼν ταύτην αὐτῷ τὴν δόξαν δέδωκεν (cf. Jn. 17:5), ἣν ἂν καὶ ἐκ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἔσχες μετὰ ταῦτα, ὥστε ἐξ 
ἔργων αὐτοῦ, ὧν προέγνω ὁ Θεός, τοιοῦτον αὐτὸν νῦν γεγονέναι.” 
45
 E.g. Fr. 39 (ibid.): “διὰ τὴν ἐν ἅπασιν οὖν λόγοις τε καὶ ἔργοις ἀκριβῆ συμφωνίαν ὁ σωτὴρ λέγει, <<ἐγὼ καὶ ὁ 
πατὴρ ἕν ἐσμεν>> (Jn. 10:30);” and Fr. 40: “ἐπεὶ ἃ θέλει ὁ πατὴρ ταῦτα θέλει καὶ ὁ υἱὸς καὶ οὔτε τοῖς νοήμασιν 
οὔτε τοῖς κρίμασιν ἀντίκειται, ἀλλ’ ἐν πᾶσίν ἐστι σύμφωνος αὐτῷ τὴν ταυτότητα τῶν δογμάτων καὶ τὸν ἀκόλουθον 
καὶ συνηρτημένον τῇ τοῦ πατρὸς διδασκαλίᾳ ἀποδιδοὺς λόγον· διὰ τοῦτο αὐτὸς καὶ ὁ πατὴρ ἕν εἰσι (cf. Jn. 10:30).” 
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sure, in the Cels. 8.12, which Lienhard cited,
46
 Origen took the oneness in Jn 10:30 to 
refer to oneness “in unity of thought, in harmony and in identity of will.”47 But Origen 
did not talk about a oneness only of will between Father and Son but also of a oneness of 
nature and substance.
48
 And never did he suggest the mutability of the Son, qua Son, and 
the potential for him to lapse if he wanted, in the way that Asterius (Fr. 43) did. To 
intimate then that Asterius was somehow following Origen on this point is incorrect. In 
fairness to Fr. Lienhard, whose work I have found most enlightening and useful in this 
study, the Asterius-Origen connection was quite extraneous to his general thrust. 
Nevertheless, it impressed on me the need for a study that looks at the matter of the will 
in Trinitarian theology in the centuries prior to Nicaea in order to gain a fuller insight on 
this question. Apart from the gap in our knowledge that the absence of such a study has 
produced, the general silence on the question only encourages the perception of general 
assent to the Nicene party’s accusation that its opponents were wedded to a notion of 
contingent volition. This is simply untenable. 
In this light, I will argue that, pace the early Arius, there are no grounds for 
accepting that the notion of the contingent will of the Son, qua divine Son, with respect to 
the Father had any wide acceptance. Not only so, neither was there in any of the fathers 
from the earlier periods whose theology I will present as much as a hint of such a 
contingent understanding of the symphonic connection between the Father and the Son. 
In the earliest writers that we will tackle, the Son is an extension of the will of the Father 
and in himself he makes known God’s will to creatures, eliciting from them their own 
volitional response of submission and obedience. Even when the knowledge (and 
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therefore volition) centered theology of Gnosticism rocked both the Church and the 
philosophical world with its message of a divine conflict of which the material world was 
a by-product, the response from both was decidedly damning. In Plotinus we will see his 
abandonment of an early experimentation with the will as the explanatory device behind 
the movement from primordial monality to plurality in the divine sphere, and, as a direct 
result of the danger posed by the Gnostic theology of volitional conflict, a subsequent 
steering toward the safer and philosophically more traditional waters of a system 
circumscribed by the dictates of rational necessity. In the Christian sphere, conversely, 
the reaction will vary between downplaying the question of will altogether, as in the case 
of Irenaeus, and, in Origen, propounding a theology that, in a quest to fight the 
determinism posed by both Gnosticism and philosophy, explicitly will embrace the will 
as none other had ever before done. 
In both the above instances, however, there will never be the hint of possibility 
even of potential conflict between the divine hypostases. This was so because of the way 
in which the will in the divine sphere had come to be understood among Christian divines 
simply did not allow for such a possibility. In the fathers that I will examine, I will make 
the case that the understanding of will was fairly straightforward: a purposeful movement 
of mind informed by knowledge. This was never defined explicitly, but it was something 
that can be extrapolated from their works without force. As a theory of will it never 
reached the kind of depth that we might find in Aristotle’s Eth. nic. or Alexander of 
Aphrodisias, who worked with the subtlety of human volition and intentionality. Rather, 
it will always remain at the level of the ontologically inferior outsider observing the 
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absoluteness of God in whom there is no place for the fragmentation and complexity of 
purpose that characterized the psychology of fallen humanity. 
The will here was understood as being directly connected to knowledge and 
degree of rationality, which was in line with the Greek notion of sin, or mis-willing, as a 
function of ignorance.
49
 Where cognizance was absolute, as in the case of God, there the 
will, too, was absolute, serving as the standard against which all willing was measured. 
Where there was cognitive disparity between agents, there could one talk about the 
potential for volitive conflict. In the Christian framework, the limited cognition of the 
inferior agents, namely the creatures, was both ontological—i.e. they were finite, created 
beings that simply could not have infinite knowledge—but also a result of the ravages of 
the Fall, which clouded their already limited intellective capacity. The exertion of will in 
this context could go two ways: either toward virtue, if the movement of mind in the 
inferior agent was founded on a correct extrapolation from its inferior and limited 
knowledge. This movement, which we might name faith, could be aided by revelation. 
On the other hand, volitive exertion could move one toward sin and disobedience against 
God if one acted on a misextrapolation from one’s limited knowledge. In this scheme, 
few were they, besides the early Arius, who were willing to say that the Son—the 
Logos!—had limited knowledge. Even the Arian historian Philostorgius would note that 
Arius’ earliest allies did not accept his claim that the Son knew not the Father. Thus, the 
possibility of a widespread belief in the Son’s being united to the Father solely by 
contingent will appear remote. In this light, I will argue that Antioch’s oneness according 
to symphonia formula can only be taken as pointing to sameness of will, not as a 
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statement on the contingent volitional union between Father and Son, but as an index of 
an underlying oneness that they were prepared to describe phenomenologically only; the 
absolute oneness of purpose of Father and Son pointed to an oneness between the two 
that could not otherwise be described, certainly not with what Antioch saw as 
problematic formulae such as the homoousion.
50
 
Conversely, the question of the Father’s antecedent will in begetting the Son 
would prove more intractable. It had been both a mainstay in theology even of the earliest 
Fathers and was deemed logically essential to guard against God the Father’s reduction 
into an impersonal deity who was subject to external dictates. In order to differentiate the 
Son from the creatures, we will see a concerted effort, from the earliest Fathers onward, 
to present this precedent will behind the generation of the Son as unlike the will by which 
God created the world. In the fourth century, although the Nicene party was initially at 
odds with even the notion of precedent will in the Father, eventually it was integrated 
even into their theology in a way that ensured that it did not lead to the ontological 
diminution of the Son (and Spirit) compared to the Father. 
Thus, in the earliest fathers whom we will examine in the chapter that will follow 
this one, namely Justin and Tertullian, we see the will treated as the natural auxiliary to 
the process of revelation in a basic paradigm of exit from the Godhead and return thereto. 
Here, a psychological paradigm will be established, in which the Father first wills and 
then generates the Son as Logos in a way that is analogous to the manner in which the 
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human mind puts forth a word. This antecedent act of volition on the part of the Father to 
generate the Son will not, as will happen in Arius, be viewed as evidence of the Son’s 
inferiority, but will be part of an overall scheme whose aim it to stress the uniqueness of 
the Son’s generation and his inimitable closeness to the Father. As the perfect 
externalization and hypostatization of the wisdom and will of the Father, the Son will 
become the outward expression of the Godhead whose purpose it will be to make the 
identity and will of the Father known to a world that is possessed of mere seeds of truth. 
This will be a passing on of saving knowledge, and it will be up to rational creation to 
respond to this revelation through its free assent. Though there is a hierarchy and distinct 
order in their theology, there will never be a sense of the Son’s relative ignorance or 
responsive will back toward the Father in obedience and faith—a paradigm strengthened 
by the fact that neither Justin nor Tertullian develop a notion of a human mind in Christ 
that might be misconceived into a scheme of volitional bi-directionality. This would risk 
violating what Tertullian will call the monarchy in the Godhead. On the contrary, the 
paragon of submission will be not the Son but the Virgin Mary. Both Justin and 
Tertullian’s theological plan will be one based on knowledge enlightening ignorance. The 
absolute will of God, as expression of his omniscience, will be made known to creatures, 
which are naturally possessed of but partial knowledge, so that they might respond in 
faith and obedience. In Tertullian, who will criticize the Gnostic view of divine begetting 
as putting the generate hypostases at a distance from their generator—which in turn will 
lead to volitive conflict—, we will also see a fitting prelude to the next chapter. 
In the third chapter we will witness a marked shift from this theological 
architecture with the emergence of the belief system of the Valentinian Gnostics, which is 
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highly dependent on a strong sense of will as a function of knowledge. These believers, 
whose precise connection to Christianity remains enigmatic, will provoke a reaction in 
both Church and philosophical circles, putting forward a system where the primordial 
arena of the struggle between ignorance and knowledge was put not in creation but inside 
the divine sphere itself. Here we will see an account of origins that begins with a primal, 
supreme hypostasis that wills into existence a host of lesser divine hypostases that, owing 
to their own ignorance and hubris, create unrest in the primordial realm. From this 
conflict the material world comes into being. Order is restored only through the final 
enlightenment of the offending parties of their true, lower status. To be sure, this theory 
of divine conflict draws bitter criticism from such parties as Plotinus and, famously, 
Irenaeus, and the telling result is, as we shall see in the same chapter, a de-emphasis of 
will in their own theologies. In Plotinus the shift is most palpable, and, as a direct result 
of his polemics with the Gnostics, we will find him moving away from his early theories 
of tolma as the engine of differentiation from the primordial Hen to a vision of divine 
movement born of the necessity of rational dictate. In Irenaeus, one cannot necessarily 
talk of a discernible shift in his own theology, but one will note that his theology is 
distinct from that of Justin and Tertullian in that there is little room for a concept of the 
will in the inner life of the Trinity. Whether this is the direct result of his engagement 
with Gnosticism can only be a matter of speculation. Plotinus clearly was influenced, so 
it is not unlikely that Irenaeus was too. In this respect, Irenaeus, whose concern it will be 
to return the Gnostics back from a theology that has lost its sense of divine unity, will 
stand in contrast with Tertullian, for whom the main project will be to defend the 
threeness of the Godhead against Praxeas and other modalists. In this light, we might 
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look on the reactions of Irenaeus and Tertullian against Gnosticism as precursors to the 
two general reactions to the theological postulations of Arius. 
Chapter Four will deal with Origen. Here, in the wake of the Gnostic challenge 
based on will and the subsequent contraction of the scope of the same on the part of both 
Plotinus and Irenaeus, we will see a many-fronted reaffirmation of it on the part of 
Origen. Clearly frustrated by what he perceived was the encroachment of materialism and 
metaphysical compulsion in theological discourse, Origen will reiterate the pure non-
materiality of the Godhead and reinstate the will as rampart against the forces of 
necessity both in the divine sphere and creation. His theology will be one that is centered, 
from top to bottom, on the will. Whom he sees as the culprit behind this turn toward this 
materialist theology of necessity that he is warring against is more difficult to discern. It 
could be the generally Stoic milieu of late antiquity, the Gnostics, or even styles of 
theology akin to that of Tertullian, who had promoted a thoroughgoing materialism. In 
any case, such will be Origen’s embrace of the will that it will reach beyond the Greek 
norms, which view will as a function of rationality, to a phenomenon of pure volition that 
in its essence will lie beyond rational modulation. Nevertheless, in all this there is never 
the suggestion in Origen of a conflict of purposes in the Godhead, namely between Father 
and Son. On the contrary, even here the notion is that Father and Son are of one will and 
purpose, a reality anchored in the fact of the commonality of nature between the two. 
However, in Origen’s consideration of the Incarnation, he puts forward the soul of Jesus 
as possessed of contingent will which never lapses in its devotion to God, and in this 
respect he will become precursive of Nestorianism. More dangerously, a likely rhetorical 
flourish that likens the oneness of the soul of Jesus with God and the oneness of the Son 
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with the Father might be seen as the inspiration behind the early Arius’ theory for the 
contingent will of the Son. 
In the fifth chapter we will look at the origins of the dispute surrounding Arius. I 
will demonstrate the classically volitional character of Arius’ early theology, and how it 
departs from the norms established by the theological tradition. His crucial shift away 
from his controversial position very early in the piece has to do both with his 
condemnation at Nicaea but also his contact with parties within the anti-Nicene 
movement that are more theologically attuned than he. In this context, I will advance the 
view that the position of symphonia (concord) that Antioch articulated was not one of a 
contingent ambidirectional volitional movement between Father and Son, but a 
phenomenological index that, while avoiding the language of the homoousion, seeks to 
point to an underlying oneness that is unlike that between humans. This position will 
seem to be vindicated as the debates continue, with the commonality of will being 
correlated to the identity of nature and ousia. Similarly, the question of contingent 
precedent will, which had formed the basis of Arius’ volitional theology, is also rejected, 
and the accent is put on perceiving the Son’s begetting as a completely different process 
from how the creatures were generated. Thus, although the Father will be said still to 
have willed the Son’s begetting, he will be said to have done it without interval, without 
mediation, without remove, before all ages, and without this in any way implying the 
Son’s ontological inferiority. 
We turn now to our first authors: Justin and Tertullian. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
JUSTIN, TERTULLIAN, KNOWLEDGE, AND WILL 
 
The uniform goal of the Christian exegetes that we will look at throughout this 
study was to organize the various facets of the received teaching and Scriptural witness 
into a coherent narrative. In most instances, the fruits of this effort were not highly 
systematic treatises, but occasional, often polemical writings that were put together to 
respond to specific questions or provocations that had arisen in the life of the Church, 
either from without or within. In this mission, the earliest fathers without doubt had the 
most daunting task before them because, apart from perhaps the hermeneutic corpus of 
Philo Judaeus, which of course had been written for the benefit of the Hellenized Jewish 
community of Alexandria and not the Christians, there was little else in the more purely 
Christian sphere, besides collections of epistles and other intermittent writings, that these 
pioneers could use as models of the exposition of doctrine. Thus it fell to them to lay 
down the foundation on which subsequent generations would build. In this respect, Justin 
(d. 165) stood out as one of those earliest theologians who contributed to the basic 
framework on which much of the subsequent systematic theology of this period would 
rest. To what extent later generations were directly dependent on him is difficult to 
pinpoint, though we know with certainty that Irenaeus (d. 202) had read him and so had 
Eusebius of Caesarea. Tertullian (c. 160—c. 225), too, although considerably later than 
Justin, and later than even the celebrated Irenaeus whom, against strictly chronological 
order, we shall examine in the next chapter, has still come to be known as the father of 
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Latin theology. More importantly for this study, however, was the fact that both Justin 
and Tertullian shared a theological method that this study will view as laying down 
foundational principles that will prove enduring in how later theology would come to 
view the question of will in Trinitarian discourse, and which I believe warrants Justin and 
Tertullian being placed together in this early chapter of this inquiry. 
The first axiom that these authors will put in place is the imperative of the 
Father’s precedent will in the act of generation of the Son. This will be viewed as a 
statement on God’s sovereignty and freedom from the powers of cosmic compulsion and 
necessity, and will prove an abiding principle in much of the theology in the centuries 
that will follow. In attempting to describe this act of generation, both authors, without 
doubt inspired by the Son’s Scriptural status as Logos, will advance the processes of 
mind as the paradigm. This invocation of the act of intellection will in both authors serve 
as the basis for a correlation, in very Greek wise, between knowledge and will that will 
put forward the Son, as Logos of the Father, as the externalized and personalized 
expression of the Father’s perfect knowledge and will. He will be envisioned as the one 
who comes to enlighten a fallen and benighted world and through education to elicit a 
penitent and obedient act of will on the part of humans back toward God. In this respect, 
although both authors will also be champions of the free-will of humans to choose to 
heed the salvific message of the Christ, there can be no sense of contingency of will in 
the Son on which one might construct a theory of Christ as soteriological hero who 
overcomes his own theoretical weaknesses to live a life of paradigmatic and vicarious 
virtue as fully one of the creatures. For the mission of the incarnate Logos, as a 
movement outward from the Godhead, into the world, and leading it by elucidation and 
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free-will back to the divine source, will be, as far as it concerns the divine persons, 
volitionally unidirectional. This scheme will be reinforced by the fact that neither author 
will ever articulate a notion of the Son taking on a human mind in the Incarnation that 
might blur the lines of volitional agency and serve as the seat of contingency and 
potential opposition to the will of God. In this wise, both authors will instead put forward 
the Virgin Mary as the exemplar of obedience, and anti-paradigm of the disobedient Eve. 
To be sure, Tertullian, as the considerably later author, will take this basic scheme that 
both authors share into more nuanced directions, and even touch on matters that have to 
do with the threat that the Gnostics would pose, and thus he will act as a fitting 
bridgehead into the next chapter. 
We turn now to our first author, Justin. 
 
JUSTIN 
Born in Flavia Neapolis in Palestine of pagan parents,
51
 Justin, remembered in 
history as both the Philosopher and the Martyr, wrote from the perspective of a believer 
who had spent much of his former life seeking the truth, testing the various philosophical 
schools of thought of his time. According to his own testimony, he had spent time with 
the Stoics, the Peripatetics, the Pythagoreans, and the Platonists, before coming finally to 
Christianity.
52
 Although contemporary evidence indicates that he was a prolific writer, 
only three of his works have come down to us: his two Apologies and his Dialogue with 
Trypho. The first of the Apologies was addressed to the emperor Antoninus Pius, and the 
second, to judge from its title, to the Roman Senate. These were at once an aggrieved 
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 1 Apol. 1 (ANF 1:163). 
52
 Dial. 2-3 (ANF 1:195-6). 
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appeal to the justness of the rulers, an exposition of the beliefs of the Christians, and a 
demonstration of the falsity of the popular accusations made against them, starting with 
their supposed atheism, which had all lain behind their unfair persecution and 
maltreatment by the authorities.
53
 The Dialogue, on the other hand, was the record of a 
long conversation, argumentative in nature, that Justin had had with a Jewish rabbi, 
Trypho, which according to Eusebius took place in Ephesus.
54
 Unlike the Apologies, 
whose main thrust was to demonstrate to pagans that their beliefs, though in some 
respects similar to those of the Christians, were the malformed product of demonic 
disinformation, the Dialogue had as its primary focus to prove from Scripture the divinity 
of the Son, the fulfillment of the Law in his person, the truth of Christian theology, and 
the succession of Christians as the new Israel. 
All these three works were apologetic in character and limited in scope, yet they 
are comprehensive and systematic enough that we can glean from them enough material 
to reconstruct Justin’s views on our question of the will in Trinitarian discourse. On this 
matter, I will argue that Justin’s work put together theological conventions that were to 
prove both persistent and formative in the Christian theology of the period. First, he will 
map the widely accepted Platonic division of reality between the incomprehensible, 
absolute, invisible, and unchanging nature of the highest principle and the transient and 
mutable realm of the visible phenomena onto the Christian vision of the omniscient and 
omnipotent creator who with purpose had brought into existence the ontologically 
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 1 Apol. 1-5 (ANF 1:163-4). 
54
 Hist. eccl. 4.18.6 (NPNF
2
 1:196): “He composed also a dialogue against the Jews, which he held in the 
city of Ephesus with Trypho, a most distinguished man among the Hebrews of that day. In it he shows how 
the divine grace urged him on to the doctrine of the faith, and with what earnestness he had formerly 
pursued philosophical studies, and how ardent a search he had made for the truth.” Justin himself reported 
that at the time of their meeting Trypho had fled the war (probably the insurrection of Bar Cochba) and was 
spending his days “in Greece, and chiefly at Corinth” (Dial. 1 [ANF 1:194]). 
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inferior world of creatures. The inscrutability of the purposes behind the actions of God 
the creator will be bound up intimately with the absoluteness of his goodness and 
omniscience. In line with the Greek precept of evil never being a deliberate course of 
action but a function of ignorance, human sin and contrariety to the will and purposes of 
God will in this scheme be conceived of as a matter of a lack of understanding that was 
exacerbated by the wiles and exhortations of the devil.
55
 Here Justin will lay down a 
correlation between willing and knowing that will prove a mainstay in the conversation 
on the will. 
Second, Justin will mount the argument that this obvious cognitive disparity 
between God and creatures was bridged by the work of the Son as mediating revelatory 
principle between God and creatures. Thus the Son himself will be both the divine 
progeny of a special act of the Father’s precedent will, and, in his movement from the 
Father, the natural extension of the Father’s will outward from the Godhead. Justin will 
present him as the one who brought the world out of inexistence, and made known the 
Father in creation so as to elicit the natural volitive response back toward the Father from 
creatures that had been made privy to the saving knowledge that the Son brings. Third, 
there will be in Justin no suggestion of a possible conflict between Father and Son—a 
dictum that will be reinforced by the fact that Justin communicates no theory of a human 
mind in Christ.
56
 The Son, as we said above, is the perfect expression of the Father’s will. 
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 Poignant in this regard is Justin’s description of the persecutors of Christianity: “...yielding to 
unreasoning passion, and to the instigation of evil demons, you punish us without consideration or 
judgment” (1 Apol. 5 [ANF 1:164]). 
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 As L.W. Barnard (Justin Martyr: His Life and Thought [Cambridge, UK: Cambridge at the University 
Press, 1967] p. 119) observes, “Justin was not worried, as was Apollinaris, by the question how two 
separate minds, wills, and principles of action could co-exsist in a single living being. For him Christ was 
the one, whole logos—whether in his pre-incarnate or incarnate state—and he does not work out the logical 
implications of this belief.” 
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The paradigm of perfect, though theoretically contingent, obedience in this divine scheme 
will be the Virgin Mary, not the Son. 
 
THE DIVINE HIERARCHY 
Addressing the well-known charges of atheism in the opening chapters of his first 
Apology, Justin conceded that Christians did not worship the gods of paganism, whom 
rather they considered demons,
57
 but held as the object of their adoration the true God 
who was “the Father of righteousness and temperance and the other virtues, who is free 
from all impurity,”58 and “maker of this universe.”59 In their view, God was the 
unbegotten,
60
 the ineffable,
61
 the nameless,
62
 the impassible,
63
 the immutable,
64
 the 
omnipotent,
65
 and the utterly transcendent.
66
 This was in close keeping with the 
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 1 Apol. 21 (ANF 1:170). 
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 1 Apol. 6 (ANF 1:164 [PG 6:336C]): “πατρὸς δικαιοσύνης καὶ σωφροσύνης, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν, 
ἀνεπιμίκτου τε κακίας Θεοῦ.” 
59
 1 Apol. 13 (ANF 1:166 [PG 6:345B]): “τὸν δημιουργὸν τοῦδε τοῦ παντός.” 
60
 E.g. I Apol. 49 (ANF 1:179 [PG 6:401A]): “τῷ ἀγεννήτῳ Θεῷ.” 
61
 2 Apol. 12 (ANF 1: 192 [PG 6:464B]): “the unbegotten and ineffable God (Θεὸν τὸν ἀγέννητον καὶ 
ἄῤῥητον).” 
62
 1 Apol. 63 (ANF 1:184 [PG 6:424A]): “τὸν ἀνωνόμαστον Θεόν.” 
63
 1 Apol. 25 (ANF 1:171 [PG 6:365B]): “we…have dedicated ourselves to the unbegotten and impassible 
[ἀγενήτῳ καὶ ἀπαθεῖ] God.” 
64
 1 Apol. 20 (ANF 1:169 [PG 6:357C]): “The Stoics teach that even God Himself shall be resolved into 
fire…and that the world is to be formed anew by this revolution; but we understand that God, the Creator 
of all things, is superior to changeable things (τῶν μεταβαλλομένων).” 
65
 1 Apol. 18 (ANF 1:169 [PG 6:356B]): “For we maintain that with God nothing is impossible (ἀδύνατον 
μηδὲν εἶναι τῷ Θεῷ).” 
66
 Dial. 127 (ANF 1:263 [PG 6:772B-773A]): “For the ineffable Father and Lord of all neither has come to 
any place, nor walks, nor sleeps, nor rises up, but remains in His own place, wherever that is, quick to 
behold and quick to hear, having neither eyes nor ears, but being of indescribable might; and He sees all 
things, and knows all things, and none of us escapes His observation; and He is not moved or confined to a 
spot in the whole world, for He existed before the world was made. How, then, could He talk with any one, 
or be seen by any one, or appear on the smallest portion of the earth, when the people at Sinai were not able 
to look even on the glory of Him who was sent from Him; and Moses himself could not enter into the 
tabernacle which he had erected, when it was filled with the glory of God; and the priest could not endure 
to stand before the temple when Solomon conveyed the ark into the house in Jerusalem which he had built 
for it? Therefore neither Abraham, nor Isaac, nor Jacob, nor any other man, saw the Father and ineffable 
Lord of all...” (“Ὁ γὰρ ἄρρητος πατὴρ καὶ κύριος τῶν πάντων οὔτε ποι ἀφῖκται οὔτε περιπατεῖ οὔτε καθεύδει, οὔτε 
ἀνίσταται, ἀλλ’ ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ χώρᾳ, ὅπου ποτέ, μένει, ὀξὺ ὁρῶν, καὶ ὀξὺ ἀκούων, οὐκ ὀφθαλμοῖς οὐδὲ ὠσίν, ἀλλὰ 
δυνάμει ἀλέκτῳ· καὶ πάντα ἐφορᾷ καὶ πάντα γινώσκει, καὶ οὐδεὶς ἡμῶν λέληθεν αὐτόν· οὔτε κινούμενος ὁ τόπῳ τε 
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dominant, largely Platonist views on the inscrutability of the metaphysical first 
principle.
67
 For Justin, the fact that the Father had no cause on which his existence 
depended was the underlying reason for his transcendence and ineffability: 
                                                                                                                                                 
ἀχώρητος, καὶ τῷ κόσμῳ ὅλῳ, ὅς γε ἦν καὶ πρὶν τὸν κόσμον γενέσθαι. Πῶς ἂν οὖν οὗτος ἢ λαλήσειε πρός τινα, ἢ 
ὀφθείη τινί, ἢ ἐν ἐλαχίστῳ μέρει γῆς φανείη; Ὁπότε γε οὐδὲ τὴν δόξαν τοῦ παρ’ αὐτοῦ πεμφθέντος ἴσχυεν ὁ λαὸς 
ἰδεῖν ἐν Σινᾶ, οὐδ’ αὐτὸς Μωυσῆς ἴσχυσεν εἰσελθεῖν εἰς τὴν σκηνήν, ἣν ἐποίησεν, εἰ μὲν ἐπληρώθη τῆς παρὰ τοῦ 
Θεοῦ δόξης· οὐδὲ μὴν ὁ ἱερεὺς ὑπέμεινε κατενώπιον τοῦ ναοῦ στῆναι, ὅτε τὴν κιβωτὸν Σολομὼν εἰσεκόμισεν εἰς τὸν 
οἶκον τὸν ἐν Ἰερουσαλήμ, ὃν αὐτὸς ὁ Σολομὼν ᾠκοδομήκει. Οὔτε οὖν Ἀβραὰμ οὔτε Ἰσαάκ, οὔτε Ἰακώβ, οὔτε ἄλλος 
ἀνθρώπων εἶδε τὸν Πατέρα καὶ ἄρρητον Κύριον τῶν πάντων ἁπλῶς...”). 
67
 The discussion of the One in Plato’s Parm. (137c-142a) is most illustrative. Because this question of the 
privative nature of the knowledge we have of God will be a recurrent theme throughout this study, it 
behooves us here to examine this Platonic syllogism at length. Here Parmenides argued that the One was 
not divisible into parts (μέρη) nor could it be considered a whole (ὅλον—i.e., a collection of parts). Since it 
had no parts, it had no beginning, middle or end and was therefore without limit (ἄπειρον) or shape (ἄνευ 
σχήματος—given that shape is born of limit). Consequently it followed that the One was nowhere (οὐδαμοῦ) 
because its containment would suggest its limitation either by another or itself: in the first case, it would be 
contained all around (κύκλῳ που ἂν περιέχοιτο) by the thing in which it was, and in the second, it would be its 
own container, which effectively made the One two—container (περιέχον) and contained (περιεχόμενον). 
Neither were categories such as motion (κινεῖσθαι) or rest (ἑστάναι) applicable to it. If by motion was 
understood alteration (ἀλλοίωσις), then the One would no longer be itself; if taken to mean movement 
(φέρεσθαι), then we would be talking about rotation (περιφέροιτο κύκλῳ) or translation (μεταλλάττοι χώραν). 
Rotation would mean motion about its center—an indefensible proposition, requiring the division of the 
One into its center and non-center—whereas translation would mean its movement to somewhere it was 
not, which again suggested limit. Rest (ὰκίνητον), on the other hand, suggested location and containment, 
which we saw was untenable. Furthermore the One was neither the same (ταὐτὸν) as itself or another thing, 
nor different (ἕτερον) from itself or another thing. If it were different from itself then it would be many—
clearly an unsustainable statement—and if it were the same as another, then it would be that other and not 
itself. Neither was it different from another, because “the One cannot be other than anything; only Other, 
and nothing else, can be other than another.” Thus, because the One’s oneness formed no reason for it to be 
different from something, then the One could not be different from anything given that oneness was what 
the One is [The argument here, though unclear, seems to be that the One’s difference from another would 
suggest that the One is composite, because it would have to contain aspects that make it differ from 
something else]. Finally, it could not be the same as itself, because something being the same as something 
does not mean being one with it (rather, sameness implies otherness). Therefore, if the One were the same 
as itself, the One would become more than one. In similar wise, neither can the One be like (ὅμοιον) or 
unlike (ἀνόμοιον), nor equal (ἴσον) or unequal (ἄνισον), with itself or something else because the properties of 
likeness and unlikeness, equality and inequality would necessarily compound with the One’s property of 
oneness, making it no longer One. For the same reasons the One could not be older (πρεσβύτερον) or younger 
(νεώτερον) than itself or another, and thus lay outside of time. If this were true, then it was impossible to say 
that “it has at one time come to be, was coming to be, or was; or now has come to be, comes to be, or is; or 
will hereafter come to be, will be coming to be, or will be.” Since something partook of being in one of the 
above ways it must follow that the One did not partake of being (οὐδαμῶς ἄρα τὸ ἓν οὐσίας μετέχει)—it could 
not be said to be, or even said to be One. “Therefore,” Parmenides concluded, “no name belongs to it, nor is 
there an account or any knowledge or perception or opinion of it…It is not named (ὀνομάζεται) or spoken of 
(λέγεται), nor is it the object of opinion (δοξάζεται) or knowledge (γιγνώσκεται), nor does anything that is 
perceive it (αἰσθάνεται).” in which he concluded of the One that “no name belongs to it, nor is there an 
account or any knowledge or perception or opinion of it…It is not named (ὀνομάζεται) or spoken of 
(λέγεται), nor is it the object of opinion (δοξάζεται) or knowledge (γιγνώσκεται), nor does anything that is 
perceive it (αἰσθάνεται).” Notably, Aristotle (Metaph. 1.5 [986b18-25]) informs us that Parmenides was the 
first to identify the One with God. 
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But to the Father of all, who is unbegotten there is no name given. For by 
whatever name he be called, he has as his elder the person who gives him the 
name. But these words Father, and God, and Creator, and Lord, and Master, are 
not names, but appellations derived from His good deeds and functions…“God” is 
not a name, but an opinion implanted in the nature of men of a thing that can 
hardly be explained.
68
 
The Father was beyond any proper name because humans had no inkling of his nature.
69
 
Only that which stood causally above something else could be in a position to name it 
because it knew its nature.
70
 He was named Father and creator of all
71
 and source and 
principle from which the Son has his existence
72
 only on the basis of the things that 
revelation told that he had done, and not because one had special insight into his inner 
being that one might apply names to him properly. 
In light of the Father’s ineffable transcendence, the Jewish view that the 
theophanies in the Hebrew Bible were appearances of the Father was mistaken. For to 
accept that it was the Father who appeared to Abraham and Sarah at the Oak of Mamre, 
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 2 Apol. 6 (ANF 1:190 [PG 6:453AB]): “Ὄνομα δὲ τῷ πάντων Πατρὶ θετόν, ἀγεννήτῳ ὄντι, οὐκ ἔστιν. ᾯ 
γὰρ ἂν καὶ ὀνόματι προσαγορεύηται, πρεσβύτερον ἔχει τὸ θέμενον τὸ ὄνομα. Τό τε Πατήρ, καὶ Θεός, καὶ Κτίστης, 
καὶ Κύριος, καὶ Δεσπότης, οὐκ ὀνόματά ἐστιν, ἀλλ’ ἐκ τῶν εὐποιϊῶν καὶ τῶν ἔργων προσρήσεις...καὶ τὸ Θεὸς 
προσαγόρευμα οὐκ ὄνομά ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ πράγματος δυσεξηγήτου ἔμφυτος τῆ φύσει τῶν ἀνθρώπων δόξα.” Cf. Philo’s 
Leg. 3.73.206: “Who can assert of the First Cause, either that It is without body [ἀσώματος] or that It is a 
body [σῶμα], that it is of such a quality [ποιὸν] or without quality [ἄποιον]? In a word, who can make any 
positive assertion concerning His essence [οὐσίας] or quality [ποιότητος] or state [σχέσεως] or movement 
[κινήσεως]?” 
69
 This notion of unnameability was a reflection of the Aristotelian concept of the name of a thing being the 
verbal definition of its essence. For Aristotle, the definition of a definition (ὅρος) was “a phrase signifying a 
thing’s essence [τὸ τί ἦν]. It is rendered in the form either of a phrase in lieu of a name, or of a phrase in 
lieu of another phrase; for it is sometimes possible to define the meaning of a phrase as well.” (Top. 1.5 
[102
a
2f.]).  
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 Cf. e.g., the Gnostic Apocryphon of John (4:19) (Berlin Codex): “(It is) the one whose name cannot be 
spoken because no one exists before It to name It.” In Karen L. King’s Secret Revelation of John 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006), p 30. 
71
 1 Apol. 8 (ANF 1:165). 
72
 I Apol. 59 (ANF 1:182). 
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or who wrestled with Jacob, or who was seen by Moses at the burning bush, or who came 
as archestrategos to Joshua inter alia led to two insurmountable difficulties, the one 
rational, the other hermeneutical. The first was that it fundamentally misunderstood the 
transcendent, increate, and unfathomable nature of the Father. Justin remarked at length: 
“Wherever God says, ‘God went up from Abraham’ [Gen. 18:22], or, ‘The 
Lord spake to Moses’ [Ex. 6:29], and ‘The Lord came down to behold the 
tower which the sons of men had built’ [Gen. 11:5], or when ‘God shut 
Noah into the ark’ [Gen. 7:16], you must not imagine that the unbegotten 
God Himself came down or went up from any place.
73
 For the ineffable 
Father and Lord of all neither has come to any place, nor walks, nor 
sleeps, nor rises up, but remains in His own place, wherever that is, quick 
to behold and quick to hear, having neither eyes nor ears, but being of 
indescribable might; and He sees all things, and knows all things, and 
none of us escapes His observation; and He is not moved or confined to a 
spot in the whole world, for He existed before the world was made. How, 
then, could He talk with any one, or be seen by anyone, or appear on the 
smallest portion of the earth, when the people at Sinai were not able to 
look even on the glory of Him who was sent from Him; and Moses 
himself could not enter into the tabernacle which he had erected, when it 
was filled with the glory of God; and the priest could not endure to stand 
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 These were, he will argue, manifestations of the Son. 
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before the temple when Solomon conveyed the ark into the house in 
Jerusalem which he had built for it?
74
 
The Father was by nature beyond any notion of space and time, so the idea that he was 
seen by or appeared to people was for Justin preposterous. Such an infinite, transcendent 
being could not have direct contact with the world because the finite nature of the latter 
made such contact impossible. If there was to be any rapport between God and humans, it 
was necessary that there be a mediating principle that bridged this ontological and 
epistemological divide. 
The second obstacle was so bound up with the first that it is difficult to determine 
which of the two was the anterior in Justin’s thinking.75 This argued that not only was it a 
rational necessity that there be a mediating principle between God and the world, there 
was plentiful evidence in Scripture and the Prophets of one who could be such a 
mediator. Scripture pointed to the existence of a being that was numerically distinct from 
God yet was at all times with God. It sometimes even referred to this being as God, 
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 Dial. 127 (ANF 1:263 [PG 6:772B-773A]): “ὅταν μου ὁ Θεὸς λέγῃ· Ἀνέβη ὁ Θεὸς ἀπὸ Ἀβραάμ, ἢ Ἐλάλησε 
Κύριος πρὸς Μωυσῆν, καὶ Κατέβη Κύριος τὸν πύργον ἰδεῖν ὃν ᾠκοδόμησαν οἱ υἱοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἢ ὅτε Ἔκλεισεν ὁ 
Θεὸς τὴν κιβωτὸν Νῶε ἔξωθεν, μὴ ἡγεῖσθε αὐτὸν τὸν ἀγέννητον θεὸν καταβεβηκέναι ἢ ἀναβεβηκέναι ποθέν. Ὁ γὰρ 
ἄρρητος Πατὴρ καὶ Κύριος τῶν πάντων οὔτε ποι ἀφῖκται οὔτε περιπατεῖ οὔτε καθεύδει οὔτε ἀνίσταται, ἀλλ’ ἐν τῇ 
αὐτοῦ χώρᾳ, ὅπου ποτέ, μένει, ὀξὺ ὁρῶν καὶ ὀξὺ ἀκούων, οὐκ ὀφθαλμοῖς οὐδὲ ὠσὶν ἀλλὰ δυνάμει ἀλέκτῳ· καὶ πάντα 
ἐφορᾷ καὶ πάντα γινώσκει, καὶ οὐδεὶς ἡμῶν λέληθεν αὐτόν· οὔτε κινούμενος, ὁ τόπῳ τε ἀχώρητος καὶ τῷ κόσμῳ 
ὅλῳ, ὅς γε ἦν καὶ πρὶν τὸν κόσμον γενέσθαι. πῶς ἂν οὖν οὗτος ἢ λαλήσειε πρός τινα ἢ ὀφθείη τινὶ ἢ ἐν ἐλαχίστῳ 
μέρει γῆς φανείη, ὁπότε γε οὐδὲ τὴν δόξαν τοῦ παρ’ αὐτοῦ πεμφθέντος ἴσχυεν ὁ λαὸς ἰδεῖν ἐν Σινᾶ, οὐδ’ αὐτὸς 
Μωυσῆς ἴσχυσεν εἰσελθεῖν εἰς τὴν σκηνήν, ἣν ἐποίησεν, εἰ μὲν ἐπληρώθη τῆς παρὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ δόξης, οὐδὲ μὴν ὁ 
ἱερεὺς ὑπέμεινε κατενώπιον τοῦ ναοῦ στῆναι, ὅτε τὴν κιβωτὸν Σολομὼν εἰσεκόμισεν εἰς τὸν οἶκον τὸν ἐν 
Ἰερουσαλήμ, ὃν αὐτὸς ὁ Σολομὼν ᾠκοδομήκει;” I note that the examples he calls on of Sinai and the 
Tabernacle, which, as we shall see, are appearances of the Son, are intended to form an a fortiori argument: 
if even the Son, viz. “He who was sent from Him,” cannot in all his glory be comprehended, how much 
more the Father? 
75
 Because the first criterion expresses a cosmological objection and the second a hermeneutic one, it is not 
clear whether Justin has been moved to seek this mediator out of a prior philosophical (e.g. a neo-Platonist 
theory of divine hypostases) conviction that there be one, or whether he is finding a suitable theological 
place for his prior exegetical discovery that there is another person beside God in the godhead, or a 
combination of both. It is difficult to make a final judgment from his limited corpus. In support of his 
theological claims, Justin quotes Scripture only which ostensibly suggests he is working from it first. 
However, he also attributes any similarity between his conclusions and pagan thought to the philosophers’ 
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which made clear its divine provenance and closeness to God, but at other times it 
identified it by such titles as God’s Angel, or Word, or Wisdom, which all denoted its 
role as an intermediary between the un-begotten God and creation.
76
 
The conclusion that Justin drew from this was that this necessary mediating 
principle and the one whom Scripture numbered alongside the Father were one and the 
same person: the Son. Thus, he argued, it was not God the Father and ineffable Lord of 
all whom Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, or any other human saw, but “Him who was 
according to His will His Son, being God, and the Angel because He ministered to His 
will; whom also it pleased Him to be born man by the Virgin; who also was fire when He 
conversed with Moses from the bush.”77 
Building from what Scripture revealed, Justin maintained a view of the Son as 
God’s first-birth (πρῶτον γέννημα),78 born of God in a manner that was peculiar (ἰδίως),79 
non-sexual (ἄνευ ἐπιμιξίας),80 ineffable,81 and different from ordinary generation (παρὰ τὴν 
κοινὴν γένεσιν).82 He was with God before creation,83 was the means through which God 
created the world,
84
 and, as God’s Word and first begotten, was himself God.85 As such, 
Justin had no difficulty in declaring that, along with God, Christians also “worship and 
adore” the Son, “who came forth from him [the Father] and taught us these things,” and 
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the “prophetic Spirit.”86 The primary role of the Son was to act as God’s divine mediator 
and messenger, whom throughout salvation history the Father would send into the world 
in order to make God known among humans. The Son always had been God’s point of 
contact with the world, and as was evident his appearances dotted the whole of salvation 
history, overcoming, as we shall see in more detail below, human ignorance by stages as 
they escalated and culminated finally in the fullest possible divine manifestation: the 
incarnation of God’s Son, in which humans were given the entirety of the revelation of 
the nature of God and salvation. 
We should make clear that the Son’s status as epistemological bridge between the 
ineffable Father and creation cannot be taken as an indication of his inferiority relative to 
the Father. To be sure, Justin had no hesitation in arranging the three divine persons into 
a hierarchy—with God the Father at the pinnacle, the Son of God in the second place, and 
the prophetic Spirit, of whom Justin barely treats, in the third
87—but this was more a 
logical ordering than an ontological one. For never did Justin present the Son as a type of 
creature, neither as acting in the name of creation as though he were a part of it. On the 
contrary, Justin implied that the Son was begotten of the Father’s essence88 and was in 
fact God—a point that Justin made repeatedly and explicitly. God’s revelatory process 
therefore consisted simply of the otherwise unknowable Father sending forth the Son into 
the world to make God known to humans. As we shall see, for Justin the Son was the 
perfect image of the Father. As only it could have, the revelatory initiative came entirely 
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from the side of the God. That God chose to reveal himself through the Son was a matter 
of God’s own prerogative, which had been revealed in Scripture beforehand. 
 
THE SON AS HYPOSTATIZED WISDOM AND WILL OF GOD 
We gain a fuller understanding of the Son’s divinity when, in line with the 
purposes of this study, we draw attention to the centrality of the divine Will in Justin’s 
hierarchical system, and examine how it shaped not only his Trinitarian theology but also 
his understanding of the divine economy and Christian soteriology. From there, we will 
be in a position to trace the theological trajectories relating to will that he bequeathed to 
later theology. To begin with, his Trinitarianism—and I use this term very loosely given 
his relative silence on the Spirit—was centered on a strong sense of the Father’s primacy 
as expressed in the sovereignty and initiative of his will. The Father was absolutely 
supreme: he had created the world and continued to govern it by his will; all that 
happened did so in accordance with his will, and one could never suppose that there was 
anything that God could not will.
89
 Everything that had existence was contingent on the 
prior will of God. This included the Son of God, whose generation, too, was an act of the 
Father’s precedent will.90 As “a beginning,” he said, and “before all creatures” had come 
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into being,
91
 God by will begot “from himself” [ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ] the Son as like a “certain 
rational power.”92 
To be sure, Justin’s interest in affirming this sense of the Father’s precedent will 
in all divine action, both in creation but also within the Godhead, was to confirm his 
sovereignty and freedom from any notion of necessity. At the same time, however, we 
also see another purpose, namely to put forward a particular understanding of the relation 
of the Father with the Son that drew its inspiration from human psychology: 
“He was begotten of the Father by an act of will; just as we see happening among 
ourselves: for when we give out some kind of word, we beget the word; yet not by 
abscission, so as to lessen the Word [that is] in us, when we give it out.”93 
The Father generated the Son in a way that Justin likened to the volitional and rational 
process by which humans articulate a word. In speaking, he explained, one wills to 
“beget” or to put forth a word that previously has existed only in one’s mind. He stressed, 
however, that this word is neither cut-off from its generator nor diminished as though 
produced by a process of abscission [ἀποτομήν]. Rather, after it is put out, the word that 
the generator “begets” remains of equal standing with that word which has remained in 
him, “just as we see happening among ourselves.”94 We note that Justin’s idea of parity 
between an idea that exists in the human mind and the closely related form it assumes 
                                                 
91
 Dial. 61 (PG 6:613C): “ὅτι ἀρχὴν πρὸ πάντων τῶν κτισμάτων ὁ θεὸς γεγέννηκε δύναμίν τινα ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ 
λογικήν.” This idea that somehow the Son is a beginning, yet before and presumably not a part of creation—
a formulation he repeats in Dial. 62 (PG 6:617C): “τὸ τῷ ὄντι ἀπὸ τοῦ Πατρὸς προβληθὲν γέννημα πρὸ πάντων 
τῶν ποιημάτων συνῆν τῷ Πατρί...”, and Dial. 62 (PG 6:620A): “ἀρχὴ πρὸ πάντων τῶν ποιημάτων τοῦτ’ αὐτὸ 
καὶ γέννημα ὑπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐγεγέννητο”—displays the delicate tension that is inherited from Prov. 8:22 ff. in 
which interpreters make every effort to differentiate the Son from creatures, without suggesting the Son is 
begotten in order for God to create the world. 
92
 Dial. 61 (ANF 1:227). 
93
 Dial. 61 (ANF 1:227 [PG 6:613C-616A]): “ἐκ τοῦ ἀπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς θελήσει γεγεννῆσθαι ἀλλ’ οὐ τοιοῦτον 
ὁποῖον καὶ ἐφ' ἡμῶν γινόμενον ὁρῶμεν; λόγον γάρ τινα προβάλλοντες, λόγον γεννῶμεν, οὐ κατὰ ἀποτομήν, ὡς 
ἐλαττωθῆναι τὸν ἐν ἡμῖν λόγον, προβαλλόμενοι.” 
94
 Dial. 61 (ANF 1:227). 
40 
once one wills to verbalize it
95
 becomes more palpable when we consider that, in the 
Greek, logos can refer both to the act of reasoning and of speaking. 
Justin then went on to explicate further this paradoxical notion of a non-abscissive 
generation, which produced genuine distinction yet without reduction, by invoking his 
beloved example of the fire that kindles another fire: 
“...and just as we see also happening in the case of a fire, which is not lessened 
when it has kindled [another], but remains the same; and that which has been 
kindled by it likewise appears to exist by itself, not diminishing that from which it 
was kindled.”96 
And again: 
“[He] was begotten from the Father, by His power and will, but not by abscission, 
as if the essence [οὐσία] of the Father were divided; as all other things partitioned 
and divided are not the same after as before they were divided: and, for the sake 
of example, I took the case of fires kindled from a fire, which we see to be distinct 
from it, and yet that from which many can be kindled is by no means made less, 
but remains the same.”97 
By the sheer power and will of the Father, this was a begetting like no other. It was, as he 
stated earlier, ineffable and inexplicable. It was not an abscission, yet it engendered 
individuation and distinction without diminution of either the generator or the generated. 
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The Son was not, as some imagined him, an impersonal extension of the Father that he 
deployed and withdrew as he saw fit,
98
 but was numerically distinct from the Father, like 
the flame “exist[ing] by itself,”99 without being ontologically the lesser. Something 
begotten was perforce “numerically distinct from that which begets.”100 In Trinitarian 
terms, however, the implication of Justin’s placement of the precedent word in the 
generator and the spoken word as outside of him was that the Father had his own proper 
mind, from which the Son, as externalized hypostatic Logos, was distinct; two Logoi, as 
it were. Although it is not clear that Justin really wanted to go this far, the conclusion that 
there are two Logoi would remain an attractive though not unproblematic chain of 
reasoning for later theologians who pursued this psychological paradigm.
101
 
Be that as it may, this strong sense of numerical distinctness could never be taken 
as an indication of a divergence in purpose and will between Father and Son. As we saw 
above, the Son was the offspring both of the will of the Father and the innate word that 
was located in him. As externalized and hypostatized Word, the Son, Justin insisted, was 
equipotent in all ways with that original word that resided primordially inside the Father. 
On this basis, one might be tempted to take the argument further and posit that, given that 
the Son was offspring both of God’s own word and God’s will, the Son could also be 
viewed as the externalized, hypostatized will of God as well, which was ever in harmony 
with its source and ever aligned to it. Justin never put it quite in these terms, but 
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nevertheless talked unambiguously of the will of the Son being indistinct from that of the 
Father: 
“He who is to have appeared to Abraham, and to Jacob, and to Moses, and who is 
called God, is distinct from him who made all things—numerically, I mean, not 
[distinct] in will. For I affirm that he has never at any time done anything which 
He who made the world—above whom there is no other God—has not wished 
him to do and to engage himself in.”102 
Elsewhere, he was even more graphic: 
“God begat before all creatures a Beginning, [who was] a certain rational power 
[proceeding] from Himself, who is called by the Holy Spirit, now the Glory of the 
Lord, now the Son, again Wisdom, again an Angel, then God, and then Lord and 
Logos; and on another occasion He calls Himself Captain, when He appeared in 
human form to Joshua the son of Nave (Nun). For He can be called by all those 
names, since He ministers to the Father’s will, and since He was begotten of the 
Father by an act of will.”103 
Being distinct in number but not will, the fact that the Son always performed God’s will 
confirmed for Justin why Scripture called this second divine person God’s Glory, Son, 
Wisdom, an Angel, Lord, Logos and God.
104
 The fact that he was begotten of the Father 
and thus causally secondary, and was even enumerated, as we saw above, in the second 
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place, did not diminish his ontological status as God. On the contrary, to Justin’s mind 
the fact that the Son had, as Logos, perfect knowledge and understanding and, as a result, 
ever and so perfectly performed God’s will was rather the decisive proof of his divinity. 
In line with Greek norms, understanding and willing were intimately bound up. For the 
Son, therefore, who as Logos had no less knowledge than the Father, to be at cross-
purposes with the Father would be have been impossible, and as nonsensical as the 
kindled flame of the example above behaving unlike a flame because he was the 
hypostatized volitive extension of the Father, possessed of one and the same will as the 
Father. There was no room for a vision of volitional contingency here, where the Son 
would act as the kind of paradigm whose moral exemplariness for creatures rested on the 
possibility of him lapsing. Such a scenario for Justin even conceptually would have been 
an ontological absurdity. Rather, he envisaged a unidirectional, top-down movement 
from the Father, in which the Son was the perfect and unique offspring and hypostatized 
image of the Father’s omniscience and will, and ever worked one and the same will as his 
own. He was begotten before time
105
 by a special act of God’s will in such a way that he 
was the personalized and perfect expression of the will, power, and wisdom of God. 
 
THE SON AS REVEALER OF THE DIVINE WILL 
The importance of will in Justin’s view of the internal relations of the Godhead 
had important ramifications for how he understood what we would call the divine 
economy, or God’s outward movement from the Godhead. We have already confirmed 
the Son’s mediating role between God and creation, but the specific nature of that 
mediating role still remains to be clarified. For a start, we see that Justin was not focused 
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on formulating a strong sense of the Son’s mediating work in the act of the creation and 
maintenance of the world. Apart from mentioning that the Son was begotten before all 
creation, that creation itself was brought into being Λόγῳ Θεοῦ,106 and that God created 
and arranged all things by Him,
107
 Justin did not otherwise dwell at length on the Son’s 
mediating work in the creative act.
108
 There was little expansion on the kind of scientific 
theology that we find in Philo,
109
 in which God’s Logos was portrayed as the 
personification of the complex of cosmic Laws that God externalized from his own mind 
in order to fashion and govern the world. Similarly, we do not see Justin laboring to 
construct a sophisticated theology of Christ as vicarious redeemer. While he remarked 
that Christ partook of our sufferings that he might also bring us healing,
110
 that our sins 
were forgiven through his blood,
111
 and, in a revealing passage on early Christian beliefs 
toward the Eucharist, that Christ had “both flesh and blood for our salvation” so that “the 
food which is blessed by the prayer of His word, and from which our blood and flesh by 
transmutation are nourished, is the flesh and blood of that Jesus who was made flesh,”112 
there seemed to be little willingness on Justin’s part to move beyond these inherited 
articles of faith to a more systematic theology of Christ as the one who atoned for human 
sin. These limitations may well be due to the fact that but a fraction of his work has come 
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down to us. Nevertheless, the fact remains that the most salient feature in what remains of 
his writings was the notion of Christ as revealer and educator. Justin seemed to be at his 
most constructive when he was expatiating on the Son as the one whose mediating work 
was to show to the world the nature of God, and more specifically God’s will for the 
world, and to lay down the terms of the requisite human response to this revelation. As 
the Son was the unique offspring of the Father’s will, and ever served it, his purpose was 
to make that will known. To know Christ became the equivalent of knowing the will of 
God: 
“He who knows not Him knows not the will of God; and he who insults and hates 
Him, insults and hates Him that sent Him. And whoever believes not in Him, 
believes not the declarations of the prophets, who preached and proclaimed Him 
to all.”113 
Justin’s understanding of human history was a corollary to this primary 
theological datum of the Son as the revealer of the divine. Until God’s disclosure by the 
Son, the state of the world was one of ignorance and consequent disobedience to God’s 
will. This recalcitrance toward God took root in the world through the unprovoked, 
primordial apostasy of the devil from the will of God
114—in fact, etymologically, his 
name Satanas declared his apostate nature outright.
115
 Since their rebellion, the devil and 
his minions had been beguiling humans into eschewing their innate, God-given 
rationality and espousing all manner of wickedness. For Justin, who in his writings 
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inclined toward a certain humanism, the devil, not humans, was the primary cause of 
discord in the world. Like Socrates,
116
 he understood the commission of sin and 
disobedience toward God as matters of ignorance. But he also saw that the demons 
compounded this ignorance through their deliberate efforts to “deceive and lead astray 
the human race,”117 taking in this quest “as their ally the lust of wickedness which is in 
every man, and which draws variously to all manner of vice.”118 
Yet, in what was a testament both to humanity’s intrinsic rationality and its 
responsiveness to God’s call, in history there always had been those who lived by the 
Word and allowed true reason to guide their lives. First and foremost, of course, were the 
Hebrews, whose ancestors Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob were the “first of all men to busy 
themselves in the search after God.”119 In their father, Moses, God had inspired a 
theological and intellectual tradition that continued in the Prophets, whose inheritors 
Justin considered the Christians like himself.
120
 Moses, the “first of the Prophets,”121 
recorded the true oracles of God, and his influence according to Justin extended far 
beyond just his Hebrew successors. Merely on account of his antiquity, Justin argued, it 
was clear that wherever the teaching of the Greeks seemed to resemble that of Moses it 
was the former who had borrowed from the latter: 
“For Moses is more ancient than all the Greek writers. And whatever both 
philosophers and poets have said concerning the immortality of the soul, or 
punishments after death, or contemplation of things heavenly, or doctrines of the 
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like kind, they have received such suggestions from the Prophets as have enabled 
them to understand and interpret these things. And hence there seem to be seeds 
of truth among all men.”122 
Plato, too, was said to have reaped his cosmogony and even an obliquely Trinitarian 
theology from Moses.
123
 Justin’s reconstruction of how precisely it came to be that the 
ancients were able to borrow from Moses remains unclear. His statement that Moses had 
been translated into Greek and was kept in Egypt
124
 suggests that he accepted an old
125
 
and what by Justin’s time and later126 must have been the quite developed belief that the 
Greeks had taken much of their knowledge from Egypt, where Moses had lived, though 
Justin was loath to suggest that the Greeks of his time actually were aware of the origins 
of what he thought was right in their philosophy. Through this process, Justin understood 
that from Mosaic theology and law there had been introduced into Greek thought strands 
of truth that were certain and trustworthy on account of their having their ultimate source 
in God. These seeds of true knowledge that were gleaned from Moses gave form to the 
intrinsically rational faculty that was in humans, namely those seeds of Reason (Logos) 
that the Creator had endowed innately to all humans but in fallen human practice were 
not infallible. This possibility of a human intellect informed by divine truth enabled a few 
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excellent humans to see through the epistemic morass that was created by two factors that 
conspired against them: demonic misinformation and human misconception.
127
 
On the one hand, the demons, whose very nature had become to oppose God’s 
will, to twist true theology into the parody of it that one could find in the pagan myths 
and the heresies of latter times,
128
 and to cajole rational creatures, in their ignorance, into 
doing the same, did not allow these rare few to go unmolested. Through their influence 
over the human establishment and their seeing to the appointment of laws conformable to 
their ends in human society,
129
 the demons ensured that figures like Socrates, who 
exhorted the people “to reject the wicked demons” and the false teachings of the poets 
and to “consider and prove things by human reason,”130 “suffered persecution and were in 
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bonds,” while such charlatans and rogues as Sardanapalus and Epicurus “seemed to be 
blessed in abundance and glory.”131 On the other hand, despite their best efforts, the fact 
that these right thinkers had still only a partial view of the Logos, “which is Christ,” 
meant that, quite apart from the demons’ obstruction, they were unable still both to 
understand properly what they had borrowed from the Prophets and to reason through 
their own thoughts, and so inevitably they were led to contradict both the truth and each 
other on key matters of knowledge.
132
 Despite the efforts of some of its number, 
humanity at large was still in a state of darkness. 
In this light, the incarnation of the Son emerged in Justin’s mind as the key event 
that on account of its fullness and immediacy broke the cognitive cycle that had kept 
people enslaved, and checked the further possibility of human misconception and 
demonic connivance by acting as an epistemological foundation on which one could 
build with trust. In Christ, the truth had been laid bare for all to see, and the veracity of 
his teaching was confirmed not only in the miraculous particulars of his life but also by 
the fact that they attested to what Scripture had already foretold. Christ’s submission to 
the Will of the Father,
133
 his Incarnation, his rejection by his people,
134
 his humiliation, 
his death,
135
 his resurrection, and his ascension,
136
 had all been portended by the 
Prophets. Christ’s supernatural coming, therefore, validated the tradition that had 
predicted it, and thus it inspired confidence in those prophetic claims that still remained 
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unfulfilled, most notably the belief that all the nations will believe in Him.
137
 For Justin, 
the embracing of the Incarnate Son by the whole world would be the natural realization 
of the partial knowledge of which all nations are possessed.
138
 
Placing the idea of Christ as the perfect offspring of God’s will alongside the 
notion of the Son as the anchor of true knowledge, an understanding of the Son’s mission 
on earth and its repercussions for the believer begins to take shape: Christ overturned the 
ill-work of the Devil and caused his destruction by enlightening the world through 
educative means and bringing about the free realignment of the will of rational beings 
with the will of God: 
“And when Isaiah calls Him the Angel of mighty counsel [Is. 9:6], did he not 
foretell Him to be the Teacher of those truths which He did teach when He came 
[to earth]? For He alone taught openly those mighty counsels which the Father 
designed both for all those who have been and shall be well-pleasing to Him, and 
also for those who have rebelled against His will, whether men or angels, when 
He said: ‘They shall come from the east and from the west, and shall sit down 
with Abraham, and Isaac, and Jacob, in the kingdom of heaven: but the children 
of the kingdom shall be cast out into outer darkness.’”139 
If humans’ disobedience toward God was the product of ignorance then only once they 
were educated could they be in a position freely to choose the good. The Son bestowed 
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true knowledge on the world so that humans, thence enlightened, might then freely make 
the choice to obey God. 
We begin to see here that Justin’s implicit acceptance of Socrates’ axiomatic 
connection between ignorance and sin was meeting with an explicitly anti-Stoic 
championing of human free will. To deny human freedom would mean for Justin the 
acceptance of the Stoics’ proposition that Providence or Fate govern all human action. 
Theologically, such a belief would have to rest on one of two flawed premises: either that 
God was coterminous and identifiable with the endless, inexorable cycle that made up 
reality, in which case the world’s wickedness was a part of God or was caused by him; 
or, secondly, that there was no essential difference between good and evil, right and 
wrong, because they were morally neutral subsets of a greater whole (viz. reality).
140
 If 
there were no choice for humans, then one would be justified in laying the responsibility 
for one’s actions at God’s feet. Not so, said Justin, quoting Plato: “the blame is his who 
chooses; God is blameless.”141 Shirking human responsibility in this way would render 
incoherent all understanding of accountability, reward and praise.
142
 Thus we see too that 
hand in hand with Justin’s theodicean concerns were the inklings of an anthropology that 
was consonant with his basically humanist leanings, and emphasized the self-agency of 
rational creatures. “God,” he argued, “in the beginning made the race of angels and men 
with free-will…this is the nature of all that is made: to be capable of vice and virtue.”143 
And though “at our birth we were born without our own knowledge or choice, by our 
parents coming together, and were brought up in bad habits and wicked training;” the 
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goal of Christians who had accepted the baptismal washing that “is called illumination” 
was that by being born again they might 
“not remain the children of necessity and of ignorance, but may become the 
children of choice and knowledge, and may obtain in the water the remission of 
sins formerly committed.”144 
In Christ, therefore, who has “taught us these things for the conversion and restoration of 
the human race,”145 humans were afforded the opportunity to become children of “choice 
and knowledge.” In short, God’s will stood against the necessity of this world. It was 
made manifest in Christ, the incarnate will of God, and humans were rescued by aligning 
their own individual wills with it. To be sure, Justin’s soteriology had a strongly ethical 
dimension in which right intentionality and action were the result of right knowledge. 
Christ came to reveal to the world that knowledge. From Justin, the philosopher, we 
would expect no less. 
In light of his vision of Christ as revealer and fulfiller of God’s will, it seems clear 
that there was little sense in Justin of a volitional contingency in the Son around which 
one could build a theory of Christ’s meritorious obedience to God in behalf of humans. 
Of course, Justin preached that Christ was God who indeed took flesh for the healing of 
humanity,
146
 that his “blood did not spring from the seed of man, but from the will of 
God,”147 that human sin was forgiven in his blood,148 that he took upon himself the curse 
that was the due of humanity,
149
 that his flesh and blood served as nourishment for 
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believers,
150
 and that the particulars surrounding his suffering, death, and resurrection 
were all the fulfillment of prophecy,
151
 but the volitive movement throughout followed 
one and the same course: from God, through the Son, into creation. Creation was of 
course called to respond to this action of will through its own obedience, but never did it 
flow from the Son back to the Father, let alone as a contingent volitive action that could 
theoretically lapse. The Son remained the externalized volitional movement of the Father, 
and there simply was no possibility of conditionality of purpose in him that could serve 
as a basis for his exaltation as meritorious exemplar. 
In this vein, it is unsurprising that Justin also rejected Trypho’s suggestion that he 
adopt a theory of election and view Christ not as God born of a virgin—a tenet he 
considered “monstrous” and similar “to the fables of those who are called Greeks”—but 
as one who, “on account of having led a life conformed to the law and perfect,” earned 
the “honor of being elected to be Christ.” Justin stood his ground: 
“...he endured all these not as if he were justified by them, but completing the 
dispensation which his Father the maker of all things, and Lord and God, wished 
him [to complete].”152 
This understanding of Christ’s work as unidirectional volitive movement was reinforced 
by what appeared to be the absence in Justin of a developed appreciation of a human 
mind in Christ. I am not prepared to identify this as proto-Apollinarianism
153—there is 
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simply not enough information—but this deemphasis of the human will was most clearly 
illustrated was in his explanation of Christ’s seeming ignorance in Gethsemane and his 
words to the Father, “Not as I will, but as thou wilt” (Matt. 26:39): 
“Even as there was not ignorance on God’s part when he asked Adam where he 
was, or asked Cain where Abel was, but [it was done] to convince each what kind 
of man he was, and in order that through the record [of Scripture] we might have 
a knowledge of all: so likewise Christ declared that ignorance was not on his side, 
but on theirs, who thought that he was not the Christ, but fancied they would put 
him to death, and that he, like some common mortal, would remain in Hades.”154 
His seeming ignorance was not a sign of the psychological frailty that lies in the human 
mind, neither was this a scene of supreme paradigmatic obedience, but it was a rhetorical 
moment aimed at bringing his listeners to their senses. For at all times, Christ as the Son 
                                                                                                                                                 
Logos assumed in the Incarnation. Goodenough makes the point that, in his effort to maintain a consistent 
vision of the divine nature in Christ, Apollinaris denied the fullness of the human one. In Justin, however, 
Christ’s humanity, though without doubt real (Justin was no Docetist), was a new creation, fashioned not 
from the preexistenet human material in the Virgin’s womb, but completely anew as Adam’s had been. In 
defense of this peculiar understanding of Justin’s Christology, Goodenough invokes several passages (ibid. 
242): Dial. 76 (ANF 1:236 [PG 6:652C]): “For when Daniel speaks of ‘one like unto the Son of man’...he 
declares...[that] He appeared, and was man, but not of human seed (τὸ γὰρ <<ὡς υἱὸν ἀνθρώπου>> εἰπεῖν, 
φαινόμενον μὲν καὶ γενόμενον ἄνθρωπον μηνύει, οὐκ ἐξ ἀνθρωπίνου δὲ σπέρματος ὑπάρχοντα δηλοῖ)”; Dial. 54 
(ANF 1:222 [PG 6:593D-596A]): “For as God, and not man, has produced the blood of the vine, so also 
[the Scripture] has predicted that the blood of Christ would be not of the seed of man, but of the power of 
God” (Ὃν γὰρ τρόπον τὸ τῆς ἀμπέλου αἷμα οὐκ ἄνθρωπος ἐγέννησεν, ἀλλὰ Θεός, οὕτως καὶ τὸ τοῦ Χριστοῦ αἷμα 
οὐκ ἐξ ἀνθρωπείου γένους ἔσεσθαι, ἀλλ ἐκ Θεοῦ δυνάμεως, προεμήνυσεν); and Dial. 84 (ANF 1:241 [PG 
6:673BC]): “...and predicted it, as I have repeated to you, in various ways; in order that, when the event 
should take place, it might be known as the operation of the power and will of the Maker of all things; just 
as Eve was made from one of Adam’s ribs, and as all living beings were created in the beginning by the 
word of God” (...προεκήρυξεν, ἵνα ὅταν γένηται, δυνάμει καὶ βουλῇ τοῦ τῶν ὅλων Ποιητοῦ γενόμενον γνωσθῇ· ὡς 
καὶ ἀπὸ πλευρᾶς μιᾶς τοῦ Ἀδὰμ καὶ ἡ Εὔα γέγονε, καὶ ὥσπερ τἄλλα πάντα ζῶα λόγῷ Θεοῦ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐγεννήθη). 
In my view, Goodenough is making too much of what are no more than statements that preclude a sexual 
understanding of the Son’s incarnation. Justin’s leading example is Eve’s generation from Adam’s rib—
miraculous, non-sexual generation, but from pre-existent human material, which goes against 
Goodeneough’s claim that Christ’s blood “was not made from Mary’s blood, His flesh was not her flesh” 
and that Christ had “no relationships with the human race” (ibid. 242). There is no warrant for this 
understanding of Justin. 
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become human was omniscient and therefore impervious to the agony of deliberation, 
and there was no sense of conditionality to his virtue. If there was such an incidence of 
such that Justin called upon, it was the example of the Virgin Mary. The Son, Justin 
explained, became human by her so that “the disobedience which proceeded from the 
serpent might receive its destruction in the same manner in which it derived its origin.” 
He went on: 
For Eve, who was a virgin and undefiled, having conceived the word of the 
serpent, brought forth disobedience and death. But the Virgin Mary received faith 
and joy...and she replied, ‘Be it unto me according to thy word’ (Luke 1:38).”155 
It was not her obedience per se that destroyed the ancient disobedience, it was God, but it 
was an act of contingent volition that co-operated with the divine plan in an exemplary 
manner. 
 
TERTULLIAN 
We turn now to Tertullian. Of particular importance in our quest will be his 
Against Praxeas, a polemical tract written around 213 that constituted one of the earliest 
Christian expositions specifically on the doctrine of the Trinity. Tertullian directed this 
piece against certain factionists of his time who rejected the existence of three Persons in 
the Godhead because such a belief allegedly embodied the very polytheism from which 
Christianity was supposed to be leading people. For these malcontents, the Father, Son, 
and Holy Spirit were one and the same person. Responding to their erroneous views, 
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Tertullian personified his opponents under the name of one Praxeas, apparently an old 
adversary of Tertullian’s and originator of the heretical creed that he was now aiming to 
rebut.
156
 
Tertullian penned his Against Praxeas toward the end of his career, after he had 
joined Montanus’ prophetic movement in a move that for many a later observer has 
tarnished his otherwise brilliant memory. As a Montanist, his stake in responding to a 
theological system that eliminated the distinctions between the persons of the Trinity and 
conflated them into one divine person took on an especially private character. By 
denouncing Praxeas and defending the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity, Tertullian was by 
extension also shielding the distinct subsistence of the Holy Spirit, who was professed to 
be directly inspiring the work of the Montanist movement, of which he was now a part, 
and whose incarnation Montanus was even being claimed to be. Despite Tertullian’s 
understandable motivations in defending the interests of his ecclesial confreres—an 
agendum that was all but made explicit in his preamble—the primary focus in the Against 
Praxeas was not so much the Holy Spirit, as one might initially expect, but the person of 
the Son and his relation to the Father. To be sure, this greater attention to the Son than to 
the Spirit conveniences our own concerns, given that we are retracing a particular 
theological trajectory that culminated in the controversies over Arius’ teaching, but it 
should not be seen as being in tension with the essentially Spiritualist interests of his 
Montanist confederates. Tertullian was, as will become apparent, just arguing from 
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Scripture, and Scripture mentions the Son more than it does the Spirit. To the Montanist 
mind, which shared much with those advocates of economic historicism, the fewer 
references to the Spirit in Scripture would have been taken not as a diminution of the 
same, but as part of a deliberate scheme in which Writ gave only enough information to 
establish his existence and his distinct, concrete personhood. More intimate knowledge of 
the third person in the Trinity would be gained only in the life of the Church as that 
prophetic, Spirit-filled institution that Montanus’ devotees protested that it should be. So 
Tertullian defended the doctrine of the Son in order on the one hand to establish what he 
regarded as the catholic truth received by revelation and the apostles, but also to secure 
thereby the doctrine of the Spirit and the reality of his work in the unfolding of the divine 
economy as Tertullian had experienced it. 
To read the preface of the Against Praxeas, we are left to conclude that Praxeas’ 
unfortunate career began as a direct reaction to the good work of Montanus. For 
Tertullian, Praxeas represented the polar opposite of what he and his associates stood for. 
He related how in previous years, when Tertullian presumably had still not yet become a 
Montanist, Praxeas had first come to Rome from Phrygia in order to protest the apparent 
acknowledgement, by the Roman bishop of the time, of the activities and prophetic gifts 
of Montanus and his associates Priscilla and Maximilla in Asia Minor. By “urging false 
accusations against the prophets themselves and their churches,” Praxeas apparently had 
managed to have Rome rescind its previously amiable correspondence to Montanus and 
adopt a now more hostile stance toward him—a policy shift that in Tertullian’s newly 
Montanist reckoning of the past amounted to nothing less than the suppression of the gift 
of prophecy, the banishment of the Paraclete, and, presumably because of Praxeas’ 
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heretical advocacy of anti-Trinitarian unipersonalism in the Godhead, the crucifixion of 
the Father. Nevertheless, Tertullian claimed that back then he had been able to expose 
and refute Praxeas, who, thus defeated, had no choice but to renounce his erroneous 
beliefs before finally withdrawing into obscurity. Despite his departure from the scene, 
however, the “tares of Praxeas” still managed “everywhere to shake out their seed,” 
which, “having lain hid for some while” with “its vitality concealed under a mask,” had 
now once again “broken out with fresh life.” All this forced Tertullian into renewed 
action, finally committing his thoughts to paper against the wrong doctrines of his old 
rival and this newer generation of his disciples that had been spawned of his dishonorable 
teaching.
157
 
Tertullian’s protest against Praxeas’ unipersonalization of God was, at its center, 
exegetical, in that the instinctive touchstone by which he measured the validity of his 
opponent’s beliefs was the data provided by Scripture. For Tertullian, Praxeas’ central 
claim that “one cannot believe in One Only God in any other way than by saying that the 
Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost are the very selfsame Person”158 ran up against a 
mountain of Scriptural evidence to the contrary. Tertullian’s methodology against 
Praxeas was straightforward: he offered a close reading of those contentious passages in 
Scripture, which either talked directly of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, or in some 
more oblique way suggested at least a plurality of divine persons, and argued that it 
would strain the reader’s credulity to suggest that this plurality of persons in the texts 
really referred to one and the same person. On the contrary, Tertullian would contend, 
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there was no easy way of avoiding the fact that Scripture discerned three divine persons 
all of whom in various ways it called God. 
Besides arguing for the textual implausibility of Praxeas’ beliefs, Tertullian’s 
work also cast light on two other areas. The first was that it allows us to gain an insight 
into some of the theological concerns that both Tertullian and Praxeas seemed to share. 
Thus, for example, we see him acknowledging Praxeas’ concern for safeguarding 
monotheism and the divine monarchy (i.e. God’s sole sovereignty), and even admitting 
the appeal that Praxeas’ unipersonalist theology might have had for a considerable 
number of simple Christian believers. The Christian teaching on the Trinity was indeed a 
delicate one, he seemed to concede, and one that was easily mistakable for tri-theism. If 
the doctrine were misunderstood, or misrepresented, people understandably would begin 
to question whether the Church’s mission really was to withdraw people from the 
“world’s plurality of gods to the one only true God” as it surely is.159 
But these shared concerns did not serve so much as the possible ground for a 
meeting of minds as they did as fields for further battle, this time over what a modern 
critic might call interpretive premises. For, together with his rebuttal of Praxeas’ readings 
of Scripture, we will also see Tertullian assailing his opponent over the facileness and 
contradictoriness of his comprehension of such concepts as the divine monarchy, over 
which they both ostensibly shared a concern, and how this understanding was informing, 
or to Tertullian’s mind, misinforming Praxeas’ reading. Tertullian’s abiding goal in the 
Against Praxeas remained to argue for the real and distinct existence of three Persons in 
the Godhead as the proper reading of the Scriptural record, and to show how this, when 
properly understood, did not have to imply the capitulation of monotheism or the divine 
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monarchy, as Praxeas seemed to presuppose, or the fracturing of the divinity into the tri-
theism of which he accused Tertullian’s camp. 
The second, and, for the purposes of this study, more interesting dimension of 
Tertullian’s work followed from the first, in that in Tertullian’s attacks on Praxeas we can 
catch glimpses of the larger theological backdrop that was shaping his thought. To be 
sure, Tertullian was more of a polemicist than a systematic expositor, but we still can 
espy, and, with the help of other works of his, reasonably reconstruct, the broader 
theological framework that was holding together the various facets of his thought to 
which we are privy in the Against Praxeas. Clearly, parts of this framework had their 
apparent inspiration in Scripture. But other parts of it seemed to rest on Tertullian’s 
attachment to specific precepts that, despite his celebrated scorn for the philosophers,
160
 
can only be described as philosophical. It is this systematic aspect of Tertullian’s thought 
on which this study will place much of its focus. I will contend that a strong sense of the 
will suffused Tertullian’s method as he tried in the Against Praxeas to form the data from 
Scripture into a theological whole that, over and against Praxeas’ conflation of the Father, 
Son, and Holy Spirit into one person, upheld the reality and concreteness of the threefold 
distinction in the Godhead, as he believed had been received in the Christian tradition, 
while demonstrating that this in no wise denoted a lapse into tri-theism, viz. the 
acceptance of three independent divine entities. This preoccupation with the will in 
                                                 
160
 See, e.g., his often cited piece in the Praesc. 7 (ANF 3:246): “He [Paul] had been at Athens, and had in 
his interviews (with its philosophers) become acquainted with that human wisdom which pretends to know 
the truth, whilst it only corrupts it, and is itself divided into its own manifold heresies, by the variety of its 
mutually repugnant sects. What indeed has Athens to do with Jerusalem? What concord is there between 
the Academy and the Church? What between heretics and Christians? Our instruction comes from ‘the 
porch of Solomon,’ who had himself taught that ‘the Lord should be sought in simplicity of heart.’ Away 
with all attempts to produce a mottled Christianity of Stoic, Platonic, and dialectic composition! We want 
no curious disputation after possessing Christ Jesus, no inquisition after enjoying the Gospel! With our 
faith, we desire no further belief. For this is our palmary faith, that there is nothing which we ought to 
believe besides.” 
61 
Tertullian will manifest itself manifoldly. First, in the broadest sense, Tertullian will 
present everything about God’s nature—particularly God’s threeness—as a matter of 
God’s having both willed it to be so, and revealed it to be so, so that belief in the Holy 
Trinity will become not the product of human speculation but strict observation of God’s 
revelation. Secondly, against those who accused Christians of tri-theism Tertullian will 
lay down the principle of the divine monarchy as a oneness of dominion and will that was 
born of the identity of substance between Father and Son, and the perfect and absolute 
knowledge they shared. Again, this will be in line with Greek norms describing ignorance 
and sin. Thirdly, Tertullian will establish the Father’s begetting of the Son on the Father’s 
intention to move beyond himself. Thus, a specific act of will stirs divine Reason into 
becoming the distinct Word, which will be externalized as Son by a further act of will in 
the Father. In this sense, Tertullian like Justin will establish the sense of precedent will in 
the Father’s generation of the Son as a confirmation of God’s sovereignty. Fourthly, the 
Son, possessed of the Father’s substance—which Tertullian takes in materialist terms—
will be understood as being the executor of the Father’s power and will. Thus, through 
the Son all creation will be said to have been willed into existence. Fifthly, as the visible 
aspect of the otherwise invisible Godhead, the Son also will also be the revealer to 
humans of the will of the Father. All human interaction with God throughout Scriptural 
history will be presented as having been contact with the Son. Like Justin, Tertullian will 
also lay special emphasis on human free-will in salvation, and the human response and 
willing obedience to God will be understood as matters of revelation and overcoming sin 
through the education and elucidation—again in line with Greek conventions—that 
Christ brings to the world. 
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SCRIPTURE AGAINST PRAXEAS: GOD WILLED TO BE HOW HE IS 
One of the basic premises that one quickly detects was lurking behind Tertullian’s 
dispute with Praxeas is the centrality of Scripture to the theological enterprise. This idea 
that the word of Scripture must trump human calculation might not have been articulated 
explicitly but it is easily inferred from Tertullian’s methodology. For example, we know 
already that Tertullian rejected Praxeas’ principle that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit 
were one and the same person. Yet it was not the logical difficulties that came with this 
belief that compelled Tertullian to dismiss it. On the contrary, when Praxeas was led to 
issue his corollary argument that “He [i.e. the Father] Himself…made Himself a Son to 
Himself,”161 and invoke God’s omnipotence as the means through which it was made 
possible, Tertullian rather entertained this proposition as perhaps the only thing that 
might have lent Praxeas’ beliefs some plausibility. Saying that “with God nothing is 
impossible”162 was at least an argument that was both logical enough and supported by 
Scripture.
163
 But Tertullian’s fear with invoking the unlimitedness of God’s power was 
that “if we choose to apply this principle so extravagantly and harshly in our capricious 
imaginations,” we may then have God “do anything we please, on the ground that it was 
not impossible for Him to do it.” Therefore, rather than appeal to God’s omnipotence in 
order to support something that one speculated God may have done, one would be better 
served simply by inquiring whether or not God had really done it.
164
 For whether God 
truly did what one claimed was not a matter of ability—all agreed that God could do 
anything—but of whether he willed to do it. Thus, in his quest to defend the principle of 
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divine Monarchy, which he took as being synonymous with divine unipersonalism, 
Praxeas had to beware that he was not destroying that same principle by attempting to 
“overthrow the arrangement and dispensation of it, which has been constituted in just as 
many names as it has pleased God to employ.”165 It was entirely proper to uphold the 
notion of the divine Monarchy as Praxeas tried to do, but one could not do so in a way 
that violated its “arrangement and dispensation” as God had willed them to be. 
Already we can begin to see the strong sense of the divine will in Tertullian’s 
thought that displaced any attempt to impose human restriction on God. In this respect, 
Tertullian was the consummate theistic voluntarist
166—though, I must also add, a subtle-
minded one, who went in some unexpected directions—who confronted the too 
speculative endeavors of humans with the truth as God had revealed it directly. Even the 
doctrine of the Trinity was really a question of God’s will. God was three because God 
had decided it to be that way and because God had willed to reveal this fact to us 
accordingly, not because Christians had rationalized independently that it must be so, or 
projected onto God their own extraneous parameters that were unsupported by Scripture. 
Because God’s threeness had its origin in God’s will, and because God in turn had willed 
to reveal this threeness to humans, one had no other choice but to turn to the record of 
God’s self-revelation, namely Scripture, to see for oneself that it was from there that the 
belief in plurality in the Godhead—a belief “so handed down”167—was grounded and 
confirmed. Since God was true, as Christians believed him to be, Tertullian was 
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“sure that He declared nothing to exist in any other way than according to His 
own dispensation and arrangement, and that He had arranged nothing in any other 
way than according to His own declaration.”168 
Guided by what God had declared, therefore, we begin to see that Praxeas’ idea 
that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit were one and the same person, along with 
his scarcely imaginable theory of the Father begetting himself as his own son, had to be 
rejected because there was no mandate for them in Scripture. If Praxeas’ teaching were 
true, why did Scripture simply not say something in its support? All it would have to say 
is something like, “My heart hath emitted Myself as my own most excellent Word,”169 or, 
“The Lord said unto Himself, I am my own Son, today have I begotten myself,”170 or, 
“Before the morning did I beget myself,”171 or, “I the Lord possessed Myself the 
beginning of my ways for my own works; before all the hills, too, did I beget myself”?172 
But it did not. Rather, each and every one of these passages stated the opposite, namely 
that the Father had begotten the Son and not himself.
173
 
So a plain reading of Scripture was of no help to Praxeas. But neither was a more 
constructive one either. Saying that the Father had begotten himself, or made a son of 
                                                 
168
 Prax. 11 (ANF 3:605-606 [PL 2:190A]): “Et ideo veracem Deum credens, scio illum non aliter quam 
disposuit pronuntiasse nec aliter disposuisse quam pronuntiavit.” Hippolytus, who in Noetus was battling a 
foe who was theologically akin to Tertullian’s Praxeas, is even more strident (Noet. 8-9 [ANF 5:226-7]): 
“For there is one God in whom we must believe, but unoriginated, impassible, immortal, doing all things as 
He wills, in the way He wills, and when He wills…There is, brethren, one God, the knowledge of whom 
we gain from the Holy Scriptures, and from no other source…Whatever things, then, the Holy Scriptures 
declare, at these let us look; and whatsoever things they teach, these let us learn; and as the Father wills our 
belief to be, let us believe; and as He wills the Son to be glorified, let us glorify Him; and as He wills the 
Holy Spirit to be bestowed, let us receive Him. Not according to our own will, nor according to our own 
mind, nor yet as using violently those things which are given by God, but even as He has chosen to teach 
them by the Holy Scriptures, so let us discern them.” 
169
 Cf. Ps. 44:1 [LXX]: “My heart hath emitted my most excellent Word.” 
170
 Cf. Ps. 2:7 [LXX]: “Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten thee.” 
171
 Cf. Ps. 109 (110):3 [LXX]: “I have begotten thee from the womb before the morning.” 
172
 Cf. Prov. 8:22f.: “The Lord made me at the beginning of his work...” 
173
 Prax. 11 (ANF 3:605-606). 
65 
himself to himself, was inadequate because it failed to take seriously the significance of 
the names “Father” and “Son” that Scripture employed, and the kind of relation that they 
pointed to: “a Father makes a Son, and a Son makes a Father.” In other words, “father” 
and “son” were correlatives in that the existence of the one necessitated the existence of 
the other.
174
 Things that were related in such a manner, “out of each other to each other,” 
could not by themselves become so related to themselves “that the Father can make 
Himself a Son to Himself, and the Son render Himself a Father to Himself.” Rather, in a 
father-son relation, a father had to have a son in order to be a father, and a son needed to 
have a father in order to be a son. Clearly, since it was “one thing to have, and another 
thing to be,” one was quickly led to a logical paradox if one took the one who has and the 
one who is to be one and the same person.
175
 Correlatives such as father-son and 
husband-wife, in which the one was what it was by having the other, demanded logically 
that two subjects be understood in order to avoid an irrational morass: “if I am to be to 
myself any one of these relations, I no longer have what I am myself to be.” He 
concluded, “inasmuch as I ought to have one of these relations in order to be the other; 
so, if I am to be both together, I shall fail to be one while I possess not the other.”176 
So Praxeas’ contentions that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit were one and the 
same person, and that the Father had begotten himself, had trouble squaring with even the 
most basic reading of Scripture or simplest of logical syllogisms. Praxeas’ woes were 
compounded when Tertullian also pointed out that, besides the numerous evidences of 
the Father begetting the Son as another, Scripture also pushed home the concrete and 
distinct personhood of each by recording verbal exchanges between them as though 
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between distinct conversants. The pages of Scripture, he argued, were filled with 
instances of the Father addressing the Son,
177
 and the Son addressing the Father,
178
 so as 
to intimate the peculiarity and otherness of the first from the second. Almost all the 
Psalms, Tertullian argued, represented the Son speaking to the Father. In other instances, 
the Holy Spirit, too, was shown to be speaking to both Father and Son.
179
 Some texts 
referred to God as “us,” or applied the name God to more than one subject.180 Others 
even suggested distinct roles for these divine subjects, as in, for example, the creation 
account where the one agent, called God, issued commands and the other, also called 
God, executed them.
181
 These accorded with John’s account of the Word being with God, 
but also himself being God and the one “through whom all things were made, and 
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without whom nothing was made.”182 Unless one were to do the unthinkable and suggest 
that all these passages really were cases of divine dissimulation, in which God was 
pretending to talk to another though in reality talking to himself—an explanation that 
would make God “a liar, and an impostor, and a tamperer with His word”—then one had 
no choice but to acknowledge the reality of the distinction between the Persons in the 
Trinity. None of these passages appeared to have been written as a parable or an allegory, 
and so the allusions to more than one Person being called God had to be taken plainly and 
literally. And the fact that there were multiple persons being called God were a 
reassurance of Scripture’s consistency, for it also named as “gods” even those simple 
human believers in God who had become sons of God by faith.
183
 How much more 
proper was it that that same Scripture also conferred the titles of “God” and “Lord” on 
one who was not just a human believer but God’s “true and only Son”?184 
 
THEOLOGY: MONARCHY AS ONENESS OF DOMINION AND WILL ESTABLISHED IN THE 
ONENESS OF SUBSTANCE AND PERFECTION OF KNOWLEDGE 
Tertullian had managed thus far to establish the support of Scripture, but his 
problem remained of how to arrange these details into a system that assured the inquirer 
that Christians are not tri-theists as Praxeas accused. The belief that three persons who 
were all called God could be misconstrued for faith in three gods—a difficulty that 
Praxeas had been quick to exploit for his purposes—but history itself was proof that 
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Christians had never declared a belief in three gods, even when it may have been 
advantageous for them to do so. Scripture applied the divine title to the Father, the Son, 
and the Holy Spirit, yet Christians had always insisted that they believe in one God, and 
this even at the pain of death. If Christians were tri-theists as Praxeas charged, why did 
they not just state this supposed belief in multiple deities and thereby escape 
persecution?
185
 Clearly, there was more here than met the eye, yet the type of language 
that had been enlisted thus far was insufficient to grasp the intricacy of Christianity’s true 
beliefs. Even Christians themselves spoke about God in a peculiar way that required 
elucidation. If, for example, both the Father and the Son were being referred to, 
Christians follow the example of Paul and “call the Father ‘God,’ and invoke Jesus Christ 
as ‘Lord.’” On the other hand, when Christ alone was being mentioned, Christians 
referred to him as “God,” again following Paul, who said, “…of whom is Christ, who is 
over all, God blessed for ever.”186 Tertullian explained this Christian convention with the 
help of a naturalistic interpretive paradigm and a theological vocabulary that he had 
expanded in important ways: 
“For I should give the name of ‘sun’ even to a sunbeam, considered in 
itself; but if I were mentioning the sun from which the ray emanates, I 
certainly should at once withdraw the name of sun from the mere beam. 
For although I make not two suns, still I shall reckon both the sun and its 
ray to be as much two things and two forms of one undivided substance, 
as God and His Word, as the Father and the Son.”187 
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Tertullian’s solar analogy, together with his statement on “one substance,” signaled a 
move beyond the firmly biblical parameters of the conversation thus far into a more 
philosophical and systematic direction. This shift in Tertullian’s methodology, from 
arguing over the words of Scripture to testing the philosophical principles that informed 
how one read Scripture and understood theology, demanded a turn from his strictly 
biblical commentary to the rigorous examination of the more constructive elements in 
Tertullian’s thought as he tried at once to undermine Praxeas’ designs and organize the 
fragmented data of Scripture into a coherent theological system. 
Tertullian’s first target was Praxeas’ conception of the divine Monarchy. From a 
strictly logical point of view, the divine monarchy could not be taken to depend 
necessarily on a notion of God’s unipersonality because such a criterion did not even 
accord with the basic human concept of monarchy. For example, the unity of a king’s 
dominion was fractured neither by his appointment of administrators, nor by the 
existence of a prince; all things being equal, the king remained the monarch despite the 
existence of subordinates or offspring. From the viewpoint of human statecraft, therefore, 
Praxeas’ basic premise held no water. But even when considered from the vantage point 
of Praxeas’ own theology there was contradiction. For it was certain that he would never 
dare to question the authority of his strictly unipersonal God because of the existence of 
the myriads of angels that ministered unto and stood before him. If in these two cases 
there was no question of the undermining of the idea of monarchy, by what rationale did 
Praxeas claim the fear of such if alongside the Father Tertullian upheld the existence also 
of the Son and Holy Spirit, when it was clear that these two persons were, in their relation 
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to him, “so closely joined with the Father in His substance” that the kind of division and 
severance that one might have had with the existence of the multitude of angels was 
potentially more deleterious to God’s monarchy? Thus, if one could accept with Praxeas 
the maintenance of the monarchy in the case of human government or of angels, then one 
had, a fortiori, also to accept it in the case of the Son and Holy Spirit, who were related to 
the Father in a way that was indivisible, inseparable, and by way of what he would call 
“substance.” “For,” he concluded, “do you really suppose that those, who are naturally 
members of the Father’s own substance, pledges of His love, instruments of His might, 
nay, His power itself and the entire system of His monarchy, are the overthrow and 
destruction thereof?” What constituted an assault on the divine monarchy was not 
whether there was a plurality of persons in the Godhead, but rather that 
“another dominion, which has a framework and a state peculiar to itself (and is 
therefore a rival), is brought in over and above it: when, for example, some other 
god is introduced in opposition to the Creator, as in the opinions of Marcion; or 
when many gods are introduced, according to your Valentinuses and your 
Prodicuses.
188
 Then it amounts to an overthrow of the Monarchy, since it involves 
the destruction of the Creator.”189 
As we can see, Tertullian framed the contingency of the divine monarchy in terms 
of an opposition to God the Father by some rival agent that had its own “framework and 
state.” To be sure, such a challenge to God’s dominion inevitably had to be conceived in 
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 A reference to the dualistic systems of Marcion and other Gnostics. 
189
 Prax. 3 (ANF 3:599 [PL 2:181C-182A]): “Membra et pignora et instrumenta et ipsam vim ac totum 
censum monarchiae eversionem deputas eius? Non recte. Malo te ad sensum rei quam ad sonum vocabuli 
exerceas. Eversio enim monarchiae illa est tibi intellegenda cum alia dominatio suae condicionis et proprii 
status ac per hoc aemula superducitur, cum alius deus infertur adversus Creatorem cum Marcione, cum 
plures secundum Valentinos et Prodicos: tunc in monarchiae eversionem cum in Creatoris destructionem.” 
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terms of a conflict of wills between God and this contender. Tertullian seemed to be 
alluding that, whereas in human and angelic affairs concord with king or God was 
fundamentally a matter of coercion or subordination, with volitional disharmony being 
avoided only because the subordinate remained obedient to the potentate, there was on 
the other hand a sense that being joined “with the Father in His substance” greatly 
diminished or, rather, altogether eliminated the potential of volitional opposition. In order 
to appreciate this correlation, it remains for us first to explore what Tertullian meant by 
this new factor substance. And in order to be in a position to grasp his concept of 
substance more firmly, it would be more fruitful for us first to turn to what one might 
describe as the psychological paradigm that Tertullian puts forward to depict the relation 
between Father and Son. From there, we will be able to explore the significance of 
substance as we observe Tertullian complementing his psychological paradigm with a 
theory of the commonality of substance between the persons of the Trinity, which he in 
turn elucidated with naturalistic analogies drawn from the physical world. 
 
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PARADIGM OF THE BEGETTING AND THE IMPERATIVE OF PRECEDENT 
WILL 
Moved by his conviction that there was a kinship between the human soul and 
God,
190
 Tertullian propounded a psychological model of the Trinity that set up an analogy 
                                                 
190
 See Apol. 17 (ANF 3:32): “Would you have the proof from the works of His hands, so numerous and so 
great, which both contain you and sustain you, which minister at once to your enjoyment, and strike you 
with awe; or would you rather have it from the testimony of the soul itself? Though under the oppressive 
bondage of the body, though led astray by depraving customs, though enervated by lusts and passions, 
though in slavery to false gods; yet, whenever the soul comes to itself, as out of a surfeit, or a sleep, or a 
sickness, and attains something of its natural soundness, it speaks of God; using no other word, because this 
is the peculiar name of the true God. “God is great and good”—“Which may God give,” are the words on 
every lip. It bears witness, too, that God is judge, exclaiming, “God sees,” and, “I commend myself to 
God,” and, “God will repay me.” O noble testimony of the soul by nature Christian! Then, too, in using 
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between the human thought process and the relation of the Father to the Son. The first 
step in this model was to consider God the Father in himself. Tertullian observed that 
God the Father was generally taken to exist alone before the generation of the Son or 
anything else that was outside of his own person. In short, God the Father was at this 
point his own universe, his own space, and his own “all things.” Yet even here God was 
not completely alone because, being rational, he was possessed of his own Reason (ratio) 
that existed with him as a part of himself. However, moved by his intention to move 
beyond himself and create the universe, God agitated this Reason of which he is 
possessed so that it become Word (sermo). Word thus could be described provisionally as 
Reason that had been agitated by God’s Will. With this Word God then entered into a 
kind of premeditative conversation in a way that was, based on the fact that humans were 
created in God’s image and likeness, analogous to, though infinitely more perfect than, 
the human process of thinking a plan through in one’s own mind before acting.191 
                                                                                                                                                 
such words as these, it looks not to the Capitol, but to the heavens. It knows that there is the throne of the 
living God, as from Him and from thence itself came down.” 
191
 Prax. 5 (ANF 3:600-601). Worthy of note is Tertullian’s similarity on this point with Hippolytus (Noet. 
10-11 [ANF 5:227]): “God, subsisting alone, and having nothing contemporaneous with Himself, 
determined to create the world. And conceiving the world in mind, and willing and uttering the word, He 
made it; and straightway it appeared, formed as it had pleased Him. For us, then, it is sufficient simply to 
know that there was nothing contemporaneous with God. Beside Him there was nothing; but He, while 
existing alone, yet existed in plurality. For He was neither without reason, nor wisdom, nor power, nor 
counsel. And all things were in Him, and He was the All. When He willed, and as He willed, He manifested 
His word in the times determined by Him, and by Him He made all things. When He wills, He does; and 
when He thinks, He executes; and when He speaks, He manifests; when He fashions, He contrives in 
wisdom. For all things that are made He forms by reason and wisdom-creating them in reason, and 
arranging them in wisdom. He made them, then, as He pleased, for He was God. And as the Author, and 
fellow-Counsellor, and Framer of the things that are in formation, He begat the Word; and as He bears this 
Word in Himself, and that, too, as (yet) invisible to the world which is created, He makes Him visible; 
(and) uttering the voice first, and begetting Him as Light of Light, He set Him forth to the world as its 
Lord, (and) His own mind; and whereas He was visible formerly to Himself alone, and invisible to the 
world which is made, He makes Him visible in order that the world might see Him in His manifestation, 
and be capable of being saved. And thus there appeared another beside Himself. But when I say another, I 
do not mean that there are two Gods, but that it is only as light of light, or as water from a fountain, or as a 
ray from the sun. For there is but one power, which is from the All; and the Father is the All, from whom 
cometh this Power, the Word. And this is the mind which came forth into the world, and was manifested as 
the Son of God. All things, then, are by Him, and He alone is of the Father. Who then adduces a multitude 
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To be sure, to the human mind this movement from Reason to Word was difficult 
to trace exactly, but Tertullian checked the imprecision of those who would simply 
identify them by remarking that “it would be more suitable to regard Reason as the more 
ancient; because God had not Word from the beginning, but He had Reason even before 
the beginning.” Reason began as a discernible faculty of God the Father that he stirred by 
his intention and planning into becoming a distinct reality—the Word—that, now a 
differentiated though still internal entity, God engaged, as like a second, in the reflective 
dialectic that preceded his creative act. In other words, moved by his plan, viz. God’s 
prior will, an “aspect” of God became more fully a “something other” while ever 
remaining, Tertullian would argue, inseparable from God. So, he concluded, 
“even…before the creation of the universe, God was not alone, since He had within 
Himself both Reason, and, inherent in Reason, His Word, which He made second to 
Himself by agitating it within Himself.”192 
The Scriptures confirmed the intellectual character of this second divine 
hypostasis by also referring to him as Wisdom.
193
 They recorded Wisdom’s declarations 
                                                                                                                                                 
of gods brought in, time after time? For all are shut up, however unwillingly, to admit this fact, that the All 
runs up into one. If, then, all things run up into one, even according to Valentinus, and Marcion, and 
Cerinthus, and all their fooleries, they are also reduced, however unwillingly, to this position, that they 
must acknowledge that the One is the cause of all things. Thus, then, these too, though they wish it not, fall 
in with the truth, and admit that one God made all things according to His good pleasure. And He gave the 
law and the prophets; and in giving them, He made them speak by the Holy Ghost, in order that, being 
gifted with the inspiration of the Father's power, they might declare the Father's counsel and will.” 
192
 Prax. 5 (ANF 3:600-601 [PL 2:184A]): “et tunc Deum ante universitatis constitutionem solum non 
fuisse, habentem in semetipso proinde rationem, et in ratione sermonem, quem secundum a se faceret 
aitando se.” 
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 E.g.: Prov. 8:1, 22-25: “Doth not wisdom cry? and understanding put forth her voice?…‘The LORD 
possessed me in the beginning of his way, before his works of old. I was set up from everlasting, from the 
beginning, or ever the earth was. When there were no depths, I was brought forth; when there were no 
fountains abounding with water. Before the mountains were settled, before the hills was I brought forth’”; 
Prov. 8: 27-30: “‘When He prepared the heaven, I was present with Him; and when He made His strong 
places upon the winds, which are the clouds above; and when He secured the fountains, (and all things) 
which are beneath the sky, I was by, arranging all things with Him; I was by, in whom He delighted; and 
daily, too, did I rejoice in His presence.’” 
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of his being with God “in the beginning of his way,” and in these monologues they 
substantiated the reality of his personhood, but also his existence from before creation 
and his involvement in the preparation for the creative act itself.
194
 In the act of creation 
that took place “as soon as it pleased God”195 the Word assumed its own “form and 
glorious garb…sound and vocal utterance,” undergoing its own “perfect nativity” as it 
“proceeds forth from God” as his perfectly articulated command.196 Thus, those things, 
which God had first planned and ordered within himself in conjunction with his 
inseparable Word, were now made “openly known,” and “kept permanently in their 
proper forms and substances,” through the now begotten, externalized Word.197 In short, 
God internally generated the Word first “to devise and think out all things under the 
name of Wisdom—‘The Lord created or formed (condidit) me as the beginning of His 
ways;’”198 then afterward begat him “to carry all into effect—‘When He prepared the 
heaven, I was present with Him [Prov. 8:27].’”199 This internal preparatory phase 
resembled a period of gestation that culminated in God’s begetting of the Word when 
God willed to put his plan into effect. This fact of the begetting of what was thitherto the 
inherent Word as now the spoken or externalized Word was the reason why Scripture 
also named the second person Son: 
“Thus does…[God]…make Him equal to Him: for by proceeding from Himself 
He became His first-begotten Son, because begotten before all things;
200
 and His 
only-begotten also, because alone begotten of God, in a way peculiar to Himself, 
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 Prax. 6 (ANF 3:601). 
195
 Prax. 6 (ANF 3:601). 
196
 Prax. 7 (ANF 3:601-602). 
197
 Prax. 6 (ANF 3:601). 
198
 Prov. 8:22. 
199
 Prax. 7 (ANF 3:601). 
200
 Col. 1:15. 
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from the womb of His own heart-even as the Father Himself testifies: ‘My heart,’ 
says He,
201
 ‘hath emitted my most excellent Word.’”202 
We must underscore that in ultimate terms the Word to Tertullian’s mind was not 
strictly coeternal with the Father. God’s Reason existed coeternally with the Father, but 
Reason was not the same thing as the Word. By an act of will God stirred Reason into 
becoming the fully personalized Word, and by an act of the Father’s will again it was 
fully externalized as Son.
203
 This ordo of generation broadly correlated with Tertullian’s 
denunciation of dualism in the Adversus Hermogenem. Here he argued that if even God’s 
very own Wisdom was at some point generated, how much more would something that 
was extrinsic to God also be generated.
204
 On this basis, the non-coeternity of the Son, i.e. 
the spoken Word, became an even simpler proposition: there was a time when the Father 
was not Father, only because there was a time when the Son was not;
205
 he was begotten 
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 Ps. 44:1 [LXX]. 
202
 Prax. 7 (ANF 3:601-602 [PL 2:184D-185A]): “Exinde eum patrem sibi faciens de quo procedendo filius 
factus est primogenitus, ut ante omnia genitus, et unigenitus, ut solus ex Deo genitus, proprie de vulva 
cordis ipsius secundum quod et Pater ipse testatur: Eructavit cor meum sermonem optimum.” We note, too, 
that beyond the Son’s generation being just an image of ratiocination on the part of God, there is also a 
sense in Tertullian of their relation being a communion of love between persons: “The father took pleasure 
evermore in Him, who equally rejoiced with a reciprocal gladness in the Father's presence: ‘Thou art my 
Son, today have I begotten Thee;’ (Ps. 2:7 [LXX]) 202 even before the morning star did I beget Thee (Ps. 
109:3 [LXX]).” 
203
 Tertullian’s scheme of a Word that was first in the Father before springing forth from him fits into what 
H. A. Wolfson once identified as the “twofold stage theory of the Logos” that he shows is shared by a 
number of early Christian writers and which he believes has its ultimate source in Philo. See: H. A. 
Wolfson, The Philosophy of the Church Fathers (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 
1970), 192-256. 
204
 Herm. 18 (ANF 3:487-488): “Let Hermogenes then confess that the very Wisdom of God is declared to 
be born and created, for the especial reason that we should not suppose that there is any other being than 
God alone who is unbegotten and uncreated. For if that, which from its being inherent in the Lord was of 
Him and in Him, was yet not without a beginning—I mean His wisdom, which was then born and created, 
when in the thought of God It began to assume motion for the arrangement of His creative works—how 
much more impossible is it that anything should have been without a beginning which was extrinsic to the 
Lord!” 
205
 Herm. 3 (ANF 3:478-479): “I maintain that the substance existed always with its own name, which is 
God; the title Lord was afterwards added, as the indication indeed of something accruing. For from the 
moment when those things began to exist, over which the power of a Lord was to act, God, by the 
accession of that power, both became Lord and received the name thereof. Because God is in like manner a 
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as Son, we saw already, when God commanded the cosmos into being. What mediated 
between God’s prior sole existence and the generation of the Word was God’s specific 
act of will. 
 
SUBSTANCE 
Tertullian began to unpack his idea of substance in earnest when he stated that 
this begotten or spoken Word was not of a fleeting and vacuous nature like those words 
that are uttered by humans, but was a being that had both its source in the “great and 
mighty substance,” that is the Father, and was itself that through which all the mighty 
substances of creation had been brought into being. Though a thing made may have 
differed considerably from its maker, the fact remained that a void and empty thing could 
not make something that had existence. “How could He who is empty,” he asked, “have 
made things which are solid, and He who is void have made things which are full, and He 
who is incorporeal have made things which have body?”206 The implication here that 
incorporeity was synonymous with existential void and emptiness reflected in Tertullian 
a materialist worldview influenced by Stoicism.
207
 That the Son was begotten of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Father, and He is also a Judge; but He has not always been Father and Judge, merely on the ground of His 
having always been God. For He could not have been the Father previous to the Son, nor a Judge previous 
to sin. There was, however, a time when neither sin existed with Him, nor the Son; the former of which was 
to constitute the Lord a Judge, and the latter a Father. In this way He was not Lord previous to those things 
of which He was to be the Lord. But He was only to become Lord at some future time: just as He became 
the Father by the Son, and a Judge by sin, so also did He become Lord by means of those things which He 
had made, in order that they might serve Him.” 
206
 Prax. 7 (ANF 3:602). Elsewhere (Carn. Chr. 11 [ANF 3:531]) he is even more explicit: “Everything 
which exists is a bodily existence sui generis. Nothing lacks bodily existence but that which is non-
existent.” 
207
 Sextus Empiricus: Against the Professors 8:263: “According to them [the Stoics] the incorporeal is not 
of a nature either to act or be acted upon” (Τὸ γὰρ ἀσώματον κατ’ αὐτοὺς οὔτε ποιεῖν τι πέφυκεν οὔτε πάσχειν). 
Cicero, Academica 1.39: “Zeno differed from the same philosophers [Platonists and Peripatetics] in 
thinking that it was totally impossible that something incorporeal (to which genus Xenocrates and his 
predecessors too had said the mind belonged) should be the agent of anything, and that only a body was 
capable of acting or of being acted upon” (...nec vero aut quod efficeret aliquid aut quod efficeretur posse 
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Father, and in turn had created the entire cosmos, from the vast to the solid to the full, 
meant not only that he was a super-existent but that he must also have been of some 
unfathomable super-material. Otherwise, one would have had to draw what for Tertullian 
was the irrational conclusion that an incorporeal being was behind such mighty actions. 
All existents, especially ones that act, had to have corporeity. The angelic beings that 
stood before God, though invisible, had form and body. God, too, had the same, but of a 
sort that was entirely unfathomable. If his gainsayers were to point to the declaration in 
Scripture that “God is Spirit,” they would only be parading their failure to recognize that 
“Spirit”—and here Tertullian used Spirit to mean the divine substance or nature—was a 
type of material that “has a bodily substance of its own kind, in its own form,”208 and that 
this Spirit really was “the body of the Word.”209 
Though a deeply problematic precept from the point of view of later theology—
especially in the upheaval over the precise meaning of the homoousion—Tertullian’s 
materialization of the divine being allowed him to make more palpable what would be 
one of his principal claims, viz. that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, though 
distinct, were of one and the same substance.
210
 Based on his materialistic conception of 
the divine substance, he easily drew analogies between the divine generation and 
processes that were observable in the physical world: “God sent forth the Word…just as 
                                                                                                                                                 
esse non corpus). For these Hellenistic sources, see A. A. Long and D. N. Sedley (The Hellenistic 
Philosophers [Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1987, repr. 1995], vol. 1, 272 (vol. 2, 269 for 
the Gk. and Lat.). 
208
 Prax. 7 (ANF 3:601-602). This reflects the Stoic idea that spirit and soul are material. Cf. Nemesius 
78,7-79,2: “(1) He [Cleanthes] also says: no incorporeal interacts with a body, and no body with an 
incorporeal, but one body interacts with another body. (2) Now the soul interacts with the body when it is 
sick and being cut, and the body with the soul; thus when the soul feels shame and fear the body turns red 
and pale respectively. (3) Therefore the soul is a body.” 
209
 Prax. 8 (ANF 3:602-603). 
210
 Tertullian’s vision of one and the same substance, of course, is a nascent antecedent of what in the 
fourth century will be formalized as the homoousion, one of the primary arguments against which will be 
precisely its materialistic connotations. 
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the root puts forth the tree, and the fountain the river, and the sun the ray.”211 In other 
words, though the Son was not the same thing as the Father, he was not a thing that was 
alien or extraneous to him either, but was of one and the same stuff as his source—the 
Father—in the same way that a tree is of the same substance as the root from which it 
springs without being one and the same thing as it. “Nothing,” Tertullian averred, “is 
alien from that original source whence it derives its own properties.”212 The Son derived 
his divine properties from the fact that he had his source in the Father. Whatever the 
divine properties were of the Father—be they immortality, omniscience, omnipotence, 
omnipresence etc.—these same were those of the Son as well. But the Son qua Son was 
not exactly the same thing as the Father qua Father. One was the source, or parent, the 
other was the offspring: “every original source is a parent, and everything which issues 
from the origin is an offspring.”213 They were connected correlatively but they could not 
be conflated. The same logic applied to a river and the fountain from which it issued, and 
a ray and the sun from which it radiated: “The root and the tree are distinctly two things, 
but correlatively joined; the fountain and the river are also two forms, but indivisible; so 
likewise the sun and the ray are two forms, but coherent ones.”214 
As per these analogies, therefore, the Son was envisaged as an extension from the 
Father of that very matter of which the Father consisted, to the point of its distinct 
personalization in the Son,
215
 without this connoting a separation between Father and 
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 Prax. 8 (ANF 3:602-603). 
212
 Prax. 8 (ANF 3:602-603). 
213
 Prax. 8 (ANF 3:602-603 [PL 2:187A]): “quia omnis origo patens est; et omne quod ex origine profertur, 
progenies est.” 
214
 Prax. 8 (ANF 3:603 [PL 2:187A]): “Nam et radix et frutex duae res sunt sed coniunctae, et fons et 
flumen duae species sunt sed indivisae, et sol et radius duce formae sunt sed cohaerentes.” 
215
 This broadly agrees with the view expressed by Christopher Stead (Divine Substance [Oxford, UK: 
Oxford University Press, 1977], 178-80). In this same context, he asks whether the homoousion found 
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Son: “the tree is not severed from the root, nor the river from the fountain, nor the ray 
from the sun; nor, indeed, is the Word separated from God.” He continued: 
“Everything which proceeds from something else must needs be second to that 
from which it proceeds, without being on that account separated. Where, 
however, there is a second, there must be two; and where there is a third, there 
must be three.”216 
By mentioning “a third” besides the Father and the Son, Tertullian was clear that all he 
had said till now on the substance and divinity of the Son also applied to Holy Spirit, and 
he expanded his materialist analogies accordingly: “Now the Spirit indeed is third from 
God and the Son; just as the fruit of the tree is third from the root, or as the stream out of 
                                                                                                                                                 
greater acceptance in the West because of the more materialist understanding of the Godhead that had been 
cultivated by such authors as Tertullian. 
216
 Prax. 8 (ANF 3:603 [PL 2:187AB]): “Nec frutex tamen a radice nec fluvius a fonte nec radius a sole 
discernitur, sicut nec a Deo Sermo...omne quod prodit ex aliquo secundum sit eius necesse est de quo 
prodit, nec ideo tamen est separatum. Secundus autem ubi est, duo sunt, et tertius ubi est, tres sunt.” Cf. 
Apol. 21 (ANF 3:34-35): “But the Son of God has no mother in any sense which involves impurity; she, 
whom men suppose to be His mother in the ordinary way, had never entered into the marriage bond. But, 
first, I shall discuss His essential nature, and so the nature of His birth will be understood. We have already 
asserted that God made the world, and all which it contains, by His Word, and Reason, and Power. It is 
abundantly plain that your philosophers, too, regard the Logos—that is, the Word and Reason—as the 
Creator of the universe. For Zeno lays it down that he is the creator, having made all things according to a 
determinate plan; that his name is Fate, and God, and the soul of Jupiter, and the necessity of all things. 
Cleanthes ascribes all this to spirit, which he maintains pervades the universe. And we, in like manner, hold 
that the Word, and Reason, and Power, by which we have said God made all, have spirit as their proper and 
essential substratum, in which the Word has in being to give forth utterances, and reason abides to dispose 
and arrange, and power is over all to execute. We have been taught that He proceeds forth from God, and in 
that procession He is generated; so that He is the Son of God, and is called God from unity of substance 
with God. For God, too, is a Spirit. Even when the ray is shot from the sun, it is still part of the parent mass; 
the sun will still be in the ray, because it is a ray of the sun—there is no division of substance, but merely 
an extension. Thus Christ is Spirit of Spirit, and God of God, as light of light is kindled. The material 
matrix remains entire and unimpaired, though you derive from it any number of shoots possessed of its 
qualities; so, too, that which has come forth out of God is at once God and the Son of God, and the two are 
one. In this way also, as He is Spirit of Spirit and God of God, He is made a second in manner of 
existence—in position, not in nature; and He did not withdraw from the original source, but went forth. 
This ray of God, then, as it was always foretold in ancient times, descending into a certain virgin, and made 
flesh in her womb, is in His birth God and man united. The flesh formed by the Spirit is nourished, grows 
up to manhood, speaks, teaches, works, and is the Christ.” 
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the river is third from the fountain, or as the apex of the ray is third from the sun.”217 
Though Tertullian would not dwell on the particulars of the Spirit’s generation to the 
same extent that he did on those of the Son, he extended his previous claims on the 
preservation of the divine monarchy and economy to argue that the existence of the third 
person in the Godhead remained true to God’s self-revelation without embarrassing 
God’s monarchy: “the Trinity, flowing down from the Father through intertwined and 
connected steps, does not at all disturb the Monarchy, whilst it at the same time guards 
the state of the Economy.”218 
 
A CHRISTIAN PROBOLE BASED ON THE ONENESS OF KNOWLEDGE, WILL AND SUBSTANCE 
Tertullian was aware that his conception of a Godhead that flowed down from the 
Father “through intertwined and connected steps,” might be taken as support for the 
doctrine of emanations, prolations or probolai that one could find in non-Christian 
theology.
219
 He urged his readers not to fear the term probole, because he too was 
teaching something of the sort though in a way that was fundamentally different from 
how groups like the Gnostic Valentinians used it.
220
 The problem with the Valentinian 
                                                 
217
 Prax. 8 (ANF 3:603 [PL 2:187B]): “Tertius enim est Spiritus a Deo et Filio, sicut tertius a radice fructus 
ex frutice et tertius a fonte rivus ex flamine et tertius a sole apex ex radio.” 
218
 Prax. 8 (ANF 3:603 [PL 2:187B]): “Ita Trinitas per consertos et connexos gradus a Patre decurrens et 
monarchiae nihil obstrepit et oeconomiae statum protegit.” 
219
 Although he mentions only Gnostics, his teaching is also reminiscent of the Neo-Platonic theory of a 
cascading stream of divinity stemming from the One and overflowing to the Nous and the Soul (cf. 
Plotinus’ Enn. 5.2). 
220
 We note, however, Tertullian’s remark in his treatise against the Valentinians (Val. 4 [ANF 3:505]) that, 
although they have their ultimate origins in Valentinus—who he confesses was an able man both in genius 
and eloquence, but also a restless one, who left the Church allegedly out of bitterness at his not attaining a 
bishopric—they have departed from his original teachings. According to Tertullian, Valentinus had 
included the Eons “in the very essence of the Deity, as senses and affections of motion.” Rather, it was one 
Ptolemaeus, who came after, that established the later Valentinian tenet of “distinguishing the names and 
the numbers of the Eons into personal substances, which, however, he kept apart from God,” thus creating 
what Tertullian dismisses as the spectacle of “so many marriages, so many offsprings, so many exits, so 
many issues, felicities and infelicities of a dispersed and mutilated Deity” (Val. 3 [ANF 3:504-505]). 
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understanding of the probole between the Eons was not so much its materialistic 
implications—we have seen already that Tertullian was not far removed from them on 
this point—but the fact that, if it were used in a Christian context, a Valentinian 
conception of probole would put the Son at a distance from the Father, to such a degree 
that the Son, being almost swallowed up by the rest of matter, would no longer know the 
Father, but be left able only to yearn for him as the Valentinians understood has happened 
to the Eons.
221
 
In Tertullian’s eyes, such an eventuality, in which the Son was ignorant of the 
Father, was first and foremost counter-Scriptural, because Scripture declared that “the 
Son alone knows the Father, and has Himself unfolded ‘the Father’s bosom.’”222 
Moreover, Scripture also asserted that no man “knoweth the things which be in God, but 
the Spirit which is in Him.”223 The Word, we saw already, “was formed by the Spirit, 
and…the Spirit is the body of the Word.” If, then, the Son was of this same divine (and 
material) substance (that Tertullian called Spirit) as the Father, and that this substance 
knew the things that be in God, then it stood to reason that the Son was not only not 
ignorant of the Father, but rather had the most profound imaginable knowledge of him. 
For Tertullian, therefore, “the Son alone knows the Father, and has Himself unfolded ‘the 
Father’s bosom.’ He has also heard and seen all things with the Father; and what He has 
been commanded by the Father, that also does He speak.” If this were so, then “it is not 
His own will, but the Father’s, which He has accomplished, which He had known most 
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 Prax. 8 (ANF 3:602-603). We will see this in greater depth in the next chapter. 
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 1 Cor. 2:11. 
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intimately, even from the beginning.”224 The Son was not at a remove from the Father as 
a peculiarly Valentinian view of the begetting would have it, but was united with him in 
such a way that he executed whatever the Father commanded and whatever the Father 
willed without a distinction of purpose or volition ever arising between them. The Son’s 
complete consonance with God’s will was not the result of choice but of inherent nature; 
the Son effected the will of the Father because he was of the same substance as he.
225
 
We observe that we have here two divergent perceptions of the significance of 
probole and its repercussions on the knowledge that an emanated entity had of its source. 
For the Valentinians, the Eons’ ignorance of and yearning for their source was archetypal 
of the even deeper ignorance and further distance (given humans’ lower ontological 
position to that of Eons) from God that afflicted humans. They desired knowledge of 
God’s nature and will in order to be reunited with him, their original source. Contained in 
the story of the eons’ primordial generation and fall from God was the understanding of 
how people might overturn their own removal from God and initiate their return to him. 
Conversely, in Tertullian’s understanding, the Son was generated by a specific act of the 
Father’s will and, on account of his commonality of substance with the Father, had 
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 Prax. 8 (ANF 3:603 [PL 2:186BC]): “...solus Filius Patrem novit, et sinum Patris ipse exposuit...nec 
suam sed Patris perfecit voluntatem, quam de proximo immo de initio noverat.” 
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 In Prax. 22 (ANF 3:617-618), Tertullian pointed out that the “Ego et Pater unum sumus” (John 10:30) 
employed the neuter unum not the masculine unus (Tertullian, expert in the language, must have known 
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of person, and the plural verb sumus, which could apply only to more than one subject. The “unum…does 
not imply singularity of number, but unity, likeness, conjunction, affection on the Father’s part, who loves 
the Son, and submission on the Son’s, who obeys the Father’s will” (PL 2:207BC: “Unum dicit, neutrali 
verbo, quod non pertinet ad sigularitatem, sed ad unitatem, ad similitudinem, ad conjunctionem, ad 
dilectionem Patris, qui Filium diligit; et ad obsequium Filii qui voluntati Patris obsequitur”). There is 
nothing to suggest that the language of submission (obsequium) here can ever imply potential dissonance 
between Father and Son. Tertullian’s scheme points rather to the suggestion that the Son’s unity with the 
Father can only ever mean that at all times he effects the will of the Father. Hippolytus (Noet. 7, [ANF 
5:226]) also focuses on this passage but, placing it next to John 17:21-22 (“that they may be one, even as 
we are one”), concludes that it implies a oneness “in the power and disposition of unity of mind” between 
the Father and the Son. 
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perfect knowledge of and identification with that will, so that the Son was not the 
paradigm of the ignorance that was born of one’s falling away from God as a Valentinian 
view of the Son would reckon, but was, oppositely, the very means through which God’s 
will was effected in the universe and made known to humans. A hypothetically 
Valentinian Son would have been the paradigm of humans’ ignorance of God, whereas 
for Tertullian, the Son was the very extension of the Father and the conduit of knowledge 
of him. 
 
THE SON AS REVEALER OF GOD’S WILL 
Tertullian offered his most rigorous examination of this status of the Son’s as the 
revealer of God the Father in his fascinating attempt at resolving the apparent 
contradiction in Scripture over whether God was visible or invisible. Some passages in 
Scripture seemed to say that God was unseeable and incomprehensible, even stating that 
if one were to see God he would not live.
226
 In other passages, however, the patriarchs 
and prophets were said to have seen God, but without dying as those previous passages 
suggest that they should have. In fact, Moses and Jacob were said even to have beheld 
God face-to-face and yet they still lived.
227
 The episode with Moses was particularly 
puzzling. In Ex. 33:11 he was said to have conversed with God “face-to-face, as one 
would speak to his friend.” Then, only a few narrative lines later, and in seeming 
unawareness of these face-to-face conversations’ ever having taken place, Moses asked 
God to show himself to him. And God, almost as though to crown the reader’s confusion, 
responded, “Thou canst not see my face; for no man shall see my face and live” (Ex. 
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 For example, in response to Moses’ request of God to be given to see him, God in Ex. 33:20 replies: 
“Thou canst not see my face; for there shall no man see me, and live.” 
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 Ex. 33:11, Gen. 32:30. 
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33:20). One might have been left with the impression from all this that “Scripture 
misleads us, when it makes God invisible, and when it produces Him to our sight.”228 
Of course, Tertullian’s exasperation was rhetorical. In reality, these apparent 
contradictions were for him programmatic. In line with his broader agendum of proving 
the plurality in the Godhead, he saw Writ’s conflicting statements on God as yet further 
evidence that there was more than one person in Scripture who was called God. Thus, he 
took these instances of God at one moment being described as visible and at another as 
invisible as reflecting the two divine persons, Father and Son, respectively. But this 
provisional explanation, left as it is, was not without its problems—the chief of which 
was how it could be reconciled with the idea of the identity of substance of the two 
persons that Tertullian had spent so long establishing. In other words, how could the 
Father and the Son have the identical substance and the first be invisible and the second 
visible? 
Tertullian worked through his thoughts by using two of his various gainsayers as 
rhetorical foils. The first group—perhaps Praxeas—mounted the argument that the Son 
must also be invisible given the sameness of nature between the Father and the Son. The 
second—without doubt Praxeas—took this idea a further step and said that this 
community of nature between the Father and the Son really equated to an identity of 
Person. Thus, when manifesting himself as Father, this unitary Person was invisible, and 
when as Son, visible. Tertullian seemed to acknowledge the first group’s point and 
agreed that, because “He is God, and the Word and Spirit of God,” the Son, when 
considered in himself, had indeed to be invisible, too. With Praxeas, on the other hand, 
                                                 
228
 Prax. 14 (ANF 3:609 [PL 2:194BC]): “...aut scriptura mentitur [cum invisum aut] cum visum Deum 
profert.” 
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Tertullian shared the general idea that visibility correlated with the Son and invisibility 
with the Father, except, of course, that he rejected Praxeas’ idea that Father and Son were 
not two distinct Persons but mere manifestations of one underlying Person who chose 
when to be invisible and when visible. More subtly, however, by having already agreed 
with the first group, as we saw, and argued that the Son, too, was in himself invisible, 
Tertullian detracted from Praxeas’ strategy of strictly confining divine invisibility to the 
Father-manifestation only. As divine, the Son, too, when seen from the point of view of 
his divine nature, was in his essence invisible.
229
 
So the question arose of how the Son could be visible even though he was of the 
same substance as the Father who was by nature invisible. The answer lay in Tertullian’s 
materialist understanding of the Trinity and the hierarchy in the Godhead. We have 
already seen how Tertullian understood the generation of the Son by the Father as the 
material extension of the Father’s substance. Thus, though distinct, the Son was of the 
same substance as the Father. But in Tertullian’s eyes, though they were of the same 
substance, the Father maintained a primacy that was not only causal, with the Father 
being perceived as the cause or source of the Son, but also materialistically quantitative 
and qualitative, wherein the Father was taken to be the substantive whole, and the Son a 
part: “the Father is the entire substance, but the Son is a derivation and portion of the 
whole, as He Himself acknowledges: ‘My Father is greater than I.’”230 From the point of 
view of his perceivability to humans, therefore, the Father’s sheer magnitude 
overwhelmed human cognizance, whereas the Son’s partialness and derivedness, that is, 
his being a fraction of the unimaginable colossus of the divine mass, allowed humans an 
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230
 Prax. 9 (ANF 3:603-604 [PL 2:187C]): “Pater enim tota substantia est, Filius vero, derivatio totius et 
portio, sicut ipse profitetur: Quia Pater maior me est.” 
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albeit imperfect view of the divinity without their being completely overpowered. 
Tertullian explained: 
“It will therefore follow, that by Him who is invisible we must understand 
the Father in the fullness of His majesty, while we recognize the Son as 
visible by reason of the dispensation of His derived existence; even as it is 
not permitted us to contemplate the sun, in the full amount of his 
substance which is in the heavens, but we can only endure with our eyes a 
ray, by reason of the tempered condition of this portion which is projected 
from him to the earth.”231 
Tertullian’s solar paradigm was useful not only in explaining the consubstantiality of the 
Father and the Son, as we have seen already, but now also the seeming disparity between 
a Father, who to humans was invisible, and his Son who was at least partially visible. In 
short, the divine substance, which was of the Father and subsisted in him wholly and 
without fracture, was in itself invisible, and made him invisible too. But, because it 
subsisted in the Son proportionally and by derivation, the latter was rendered less 
invisible.
232
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 Prax. 14 (ANF 3:609 [PL 2:194C]): “Et consequens erit ut invisibilem Patrem intellegamus pro 
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 In explaining Tertullian’s rationale on the Son’s visibility as a function of material rarefaction, I could 
be accused of being more extrapolative than strictly descriptive, although I would argue that my position 
finds a place for the evident materialism that pervades Tertullian’s thought. I cannot dwell on the question 
at length, but will note only that the question of the Son as the visible aspect of the otherwise invisible 
Godhead in the thought of some of the early fathers, including Tertullian, has been the subject of recent 
academic inquiry. See e.g. Robin Jensen’s “Theophany and the Invisible God” (Vigiliae Christianae, 
Supplements, 94: God in Early Christian Thought: Essays in Memory of Lloyd G. Patterson [Boston, MA: 
Brill Academic Publishers, 2009], 271-296). On Tertullian, specifically, she writes: “...this ability of the 
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or to subordinate the latter to the former. He insisted that the two divine Persons are co-eternal, the same in 
substance, and united in intention and in deed. The difference is merely one of dispensation—one does 
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Armed with this interpretive paradigm, Tertullian now was in a position to unlock 
the difficulties he saw in Scripture on the matter of divine unknowability. Contextually, it 
was clear that the confusing Moses narrative above could not be taken literally. The 
“face-to-face” meetings that Moses had with God could not have been literally such, 
otherwise the text would not then have ignored them but a few lines later. Tertullian 
asked: 
“If the Lord so spake to Moses, that Moses actually discerned His face, eye to 
eye, how comes it to pass that immediately afterwards, on the same occasion, he 
desires to see His face, which he ought not to have desired, because he had 
already seen it?”233 
The explanation is that in these face-to-face meetings Moses was given to see God not as 
he really is—such a possibility is contextually unsustainable—but “as in a glass…and by 
enigma.”234 That there existed such enigmatic perceptions of God was confirmed by two 
passages in Scripture: Num. 12:6-8 and 1 Cor. 13:12.
235
 We will mention the second one 
first because of its lesser significance in Tertullian’s exposition. Its sole importance here 
was that it afforded passing confirmation of the fact that all divine apparitions, at least 
                                                                                                                                                 
appear to humans and the other does not. The Word is visible in virtue of its being a derived being and not 
an un-derived one.”  
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 Prax. 14 (ANF 3:609-610 [PL 2:195C]): “si sic Moysi locutus est dominus ut et Moyses faciem eius 
cominus sciret, quomodo statim atque ibidem desiderat faciem eius videre, quam quia viderat non 
desideraret?” 
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 Prax. 14 (ANF 3:610 [PL 2:195CD]). The whole passage reads: “Well, then, was the Son visible? 
Certainly not, although He was the face of God, except only in vision and dream, and in a glass and 
enigma, because the Word and Spirit (of God) cannot be seen except in an imaginary form” (“aut numquid 
Filius quidem videbatur—etsi facie, sed ipsum hoc in visione et somnio et speculo et aeni mate, quia Sermo 
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 Num 12: 6-8: “And he said to them, ‘Hear my words: If there should be of you a prophet to the Lord, I 
will be made known to him in a vision, and in sleep will I speak to him. My servant Moses is not so; he is 
faithful in all my house. I will speak to him mouth to mouth, apparently, and not in dark speeches.’” 
Though not cited by Tertullian, the passage continues: “‘And he has seen the glory of the Lord; and why 
are you not afraid to speak against my servant Moses?’” 1 Cor. 13:12: “For now we see through a glass, 
darkly; but then face-to-face: now I know in part; but then shall I know even as also I am known.” 
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here on earth, were “enigmatic,” and secondly, it provided a name for these visions of 
which Tertullian clearly availed himself. 
The first passage (Num. 12), however, was the more crucial for Tertullian. 
Besides talking about enigmatic visions of God, it allowed him to connect the question of 
divine visibility to an overarching understanding of the Son as the means of God’s self-
revelation to the world, whose manifestations in the Old Testament were rehearsals for 
what would be the great culmination of his appearances in the Incarnation. In this 
pericope, which was set long after Moses’ visitations with God on Mount Sinai, God 
informed the Israelites that there would be further prophets who would rise up among 
them. To these God “will speak” only in visions and in sleep, but to Moses, they were 
told, God “will speak” mouth-to-mouth, apparently, and not in dark speeches.236 The crux 
of Tertullian’s interpretation of this prophecy hinged on its use of the future tense “will 
speak.” It insinuated that Moses had not yet seen God “mouth to mouth, apparently, and 
not in dark speeches,” but that this would happen at some future time. Thus, Tertullian 
understood that this prophecy was fulfilled neither at Sinai, nor at any other moment 
during Moses’ earthly life, but at Mount Tabor, where Moses was given to speak directly 
to Christ. As the New Testament reported abundantly, Christ was both God and, as 
incarnate, clearly had been seen face-to-face.
237
 So it made perfect sense for Tertullian 
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 We should mention here that Tertullian did not cite the passage in its entirety. The uncut passage also 
mentioned that Moses had seen the glory of the Lord. Nevertheless, this omission presents no difficulty to 
our understanding of Tertullian, because, in accordance with what he had already said, we would have to 
take Moses’ seeing “the glory of the Lord” as nothing other than those enigmatic apparitions that were 
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 John 1:1-2: “In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. The 
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that the prophecy in the Book of Numbers regarding Moses be understood to have found 
its fulfillment in the Transfiguration scene. If faces and mouths were visible, bodily 
things, then in Christ, an actual, no longer enigmatic, but face-to-face interaction with 
God had become a reality.
238
 
Nevertheless, difficulties remained, primarily because these same New Testament 
witnesses, who had confirmed Christ’s divinity and physical tangibility, also went to 
great lengths to reiterate the old point about God’s invisibility.239 Even here, it seems, 
despite the new level of revelation gained in the New Testament, one was still returned to 
Tertullian’s original question of how God, now incarnate and said to be seen, was so 
resolutely still said also to be invisible. How could it be so? Tertullian showed his hand: 
God unseen was the Father, and had always been the Father; God seen was the Son, and 
had always been the Son. The appearances of God to humans from the beginning of 
history were always in fact appearances of the Son, in which appearances the way was 
gradually prepared for the fullest possible interaction between God and humans in the 
Incarnation. He explained: 
“This being the case, it is evident that He was always seen from the 
beginning, who became visible in the end; and that He, (on the contrary,) 
was not seen in the end who had never been visible from the beginning; 
and that accordingly there are two—the Visible and the Invisible. It was 
                                                                                                                                                 
witness, and shew unto you that eternal life, which was with the Father, and was manifested unto us).” John 
1: 14: “And the Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us, (and we beheld his glory, the glory as of the 
only begotten of the Father,) full of grace and truth.” 1 Cor. 9:1: “Am I am not an apostle? Am I not free? 
Have I not seen Jesus Christ our Lord? Are not ye my work in the Lord?”  
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 1 John 4:12: “No man hath seen God at any time. If we love one another, God dwelleth in us, and his 
love is perfected in us.” John 1:18: “No man hath seen God at any time, the only begotten Son, which is in 
the bosom of the Father, he hath declared him.” 1 Tim. 6: 16: “Who only hath immortality, dwelling in the 
light which no man can approach unto; whom no man hath seen, nor can see: to whom be honor and power 
everlasting. Amen.” 
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the Son, therefore, who was always seen, and the Son who always 
conversed with men, and the Son who has always worked by the authority 
and will of the Father; because ‘the Son can do nothing of Himself, but 
what He seeth the Father do’ [Mt. 17:6; Mk. 9:6.]—‘do’ that is, in His 
mind and thought. For the Father acts by mind and thought; whilst the 
Son, who is in the Father's mind and thought, gives effect and form to 
what He sees. Thus all things were made by the Son, and without Him was 
not anything made [Jn. 1:3].”240 
The distinction between God invisible and God visible, apart from bolstering Tertullian’s 
abiding belief in the existence of distinct Persons in the Godhead, fitted into a larger 
scheme wherein “the entire order of the divine administration has from the very first had 
its course through the agency of the Son.”241 Tertullian had given us to see aspects of this 
agency already. As we had seen previously, the Word was generated when, by an act of 
will, the Father stirred his own Reason in an internal, premeditative process that preceded 
creation. Though it would be inaccurate simply to call the Son the product of the Father’s 
will, it was the Father’s will to move beyond himself that initiated this stirring that 
generated the Son from within the Father’s own nature. Next, in issuing his creative 
command, the Father externalized and begat the Word as Son, who in turn then created 
and maintained the world in line with the will of the Father. Now we see that, as God 
who was derived, partial, and more cognizable than the imponderable magnitude that was 
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 Prax. 15 (ANF 3:611 [PL 2:197C-198A]): “Si haec ita sunt, constat eum semper visum ab initio qui 
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 Prax. 16 (ANF 3:612 [PL 2:199C]): “...a primordio omnem ordinem divinae dispositionis per Filium 
decucurrisse.” 
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the Father, the Son was also he who had appeared to humans throughout salvation 
history, guiding them, and making known to them the will of the Father. 
To be sure, we note that the Son’s appearances to humans could never have been 
more than enigmatic, because the divine nature, of which the Son too was possessed, was 
in itself ontologically incomprehensible. For this reason, the fullest possible view of the 
Son could only be in the flesh of his Incarnation, not in his divine nature. Thus, we see 
that in salvation history his appearances followed a discernible upward trajectory from 
the Old Testament to the New as humans were gradually prepared for closer contact with 
God: 
“For He it was who at all times came down to hold converse with men, 
from Adam on to the patriarchs and the prophets, in vision, in dream, in 
mirror, in dark saying; ever from the beginning laying the foundation of 
the course of His dispensations, which He meant to follow out to the very 
last. Thus was He ever learning even as God to converse with men upon 
earth, being no other than the Word which was to be made flesh. But He 
was thus learning (or rehearsing), in order to level for us the way of faith, 
that we might the more readily believe that the Son of God had come 
down into the world, if we knew that in times past also something similar 
had been done.”242 
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 Prax. 16 (ANF 3:611-612 [PL 2:198BC]): “ipse enim et ad humana semper colloquia descendit, ab 
Adam usque ad patriarchas et prophetas, in visione in somnio in speculo in aenigmate ordinem suum 
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cognosceremus.” 
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All divine manifestations, from his seeking after the disobedient Adam in Eden, to the 
judgment of those haughty malefactors at Babel, to the judgment of the wickedness of 
Sodom and Gomorrah, were appearances of the Son, acting by the “authority and will of 
the Father.” And the anthropomorphisms that were ascribed to God in many of these 
accounts, e.g., his seeming ignorance of Adam’s whereabouts, his tempting of Abraham, 
his taking offense at persons etc., were clues to humans not that the Son was imperfect or 
ignorant—on the contrary, he knew all things—but rather that he was rehearsing his 
eventual taking on of the human nature, where he would “experience even human 
sufferings—hunger and thirst, and tears, and actual birth and real death, and in respect of 
such a dispensation ‘made by the Father a little less than the angels [Ps. 8:6].’”243 The 
Father had committed to the Son the sovereignty over the universe, so that he might lead 
it back to the Father, and everything be restored and subject to him, in accordance with 
the will of the Father, whose monarchy was never compromised.
244
 
 
THE CENTRALITY OF WILL IN HUMAN FALLENNESS AND THE RESPONSE TO GOD 
The centrality of Will in Tertullian’s theology has so far been established in five 
ways. First, in the broadest, most overarching sense, we have seen that everything about 
God’s nature—particularly God’s threeness—was the way that it was because God had 
willed it to be so and, in the Economy, had revealed it to be so. Thus, belief in the Holy 
Trinity was not the product of human speculation but of attention to God’s revelation. 
Secondly, against those who accused Christians of tri-theism Tertullian laid down the 
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 Prax. 4 (ANF 3:599-600); cf. 1 Cor. 15:27-28. 
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principle of the divine monarchy as an oneness of dominion and will that was born of the 
identity of essence between Father and Son, and the perfect and absolute knowledge they 
shared. This was in line with Greek norms describing ignorance and sin. Thirdly, 
Tertullian established the Father’s begetting of the Son on the Father’s intention to move 
beyond himself. A specific act of will stirred divine Reason into becoming the distinct 
Word, and an act of will again externalized this Word as Son. Fourthly, the Son, as 
possessed of the Father’s substance, was ever the executor of the Father’s power and will. 
Through the Son all creation was willed into existence. Fifthly, as the visible aspect of 
the otherwise invisible Godhead, the Son also was the revealer to humans of the will of 
the Father. All human contact with God throughout salvation history was contact with the 
Son. 
These five elements come together to form a view of the Economy as a grand 
exitus of the divine will from the Godhead into creation, that culminated in a 
corresponding reditus, in which the Son led creation back to the Father and subjected it to 
him. The Son effected this return through his role as the revealer of God’s truth and will, 
a role that in the incarnation reached its consummation, and which showed the Son as the 
perfect and exemplary executor of the divine will.
245
 However, there was no trace in 
Tertullian of an understanding of Christ as the soteriological hero who overcame the 
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well to ourselves, in so far that there is nothing of evil in the will of God; even if, proportionally to each 
one’s deserts, somewhat other is imposed on us. So by this expression we premonish our own selves unto 
patience. The Lord also, when He had wished to demonstrate to us, even in His own flesh, the flesh’s 
infirmity, by the reality of suffering, said, ‘Father, remove this Thy cup;’ and remembering Himself, added, 
‘save that not my will, but Thine be done.’ Himself was the Will and the Power of the Father: and yet, for 
the demonstration of the patience which was due, He gave Himself up to the Father ’s Will.” 
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contingency of his own will, remained obedient to God, and earned thereby salvation on 
behalf of humans. Rather, because the Son was of one and the same substance with the 
Father, and his will could not differ from the Father’s, his saving work could only be seen 
as an act of grace, not merit. His coming in the flesh was the consummation of a long 
process of divine revelation whose goal had been to achieve humans’ free realignment 
with the divine will by presenting them incrementally with truth. 
The concept of repentance as an act of free will informed by truth formed the 
kernel of Tertullian’s soteriology. Though he was a proponent of divine sovereignty and 
initiative, and was scornful of human attempts at postulating truth independently of 
Scripture, Tertullian came out as a strong supporter of human free will, making his 
strongest case for it against Marcion’s opinions on the evil of the Old Testament God and 
his creation. In a classically theodicean manner, Tertullian defended God’s goodness by 
citing human choice and disobedience to God as the true sources of human woe. God was 
not merely good, but was the only being that was good by its very nature. By contrast, 
humans were contingently good. Created with a predisposition toward the good, they had 
to appropriate this goodness and perform it spontaneously through the exercise of their 
free will. Otherwise, by acting out of compulsion, their virtuous deeds would be the 
unmeritorious work of automata: “the reward neither of good nor of evil could be paid to 
the man who should be found to have been either good or evil through necessity and not 
choice.”246 
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 Marc. 2.6 (ANF 3:302 [PL 2:318C]): “Caeterum, nec boni nec mali merces jure pensaretur ei qui aut 
bonus aut malus necessitate fuisset inventus, non voluntate.” We note that Tertullian’s advocacy of free 
will also extended to the matter of religious freedom—a question obviously of paramount importance for 
persecuted Christianity: “Let one man worship God, another Jupiter; let one lift suppliant hands to the 
heavens, another to the altar of Fides; let one—if you choose to take this view of it—count in prayer the 
clouds, and another the ceiling panels; let one consecrate his own life to his God, and another that of a goat. 
For see that you do not give a further ground for the charge of irreligion, by taking away religious liberty, 
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Yet, Tertullian’s advocacy of human free will was more than just theodicy 
formulated in the heat of debate. It had more metaphysical roots, being founded on the 
basic affinity that, as we saw with his psychological understanding of the Godhead, 
Tertullian believed existed between the human soul and God. The source of human free 
will lay in the fact that God endowed humans with breath (afflatus) that granted them 
certain “lineaments of divinity”—e.g. immortality, freedom and self-mastery, 
foreknowledge, reasonableness, and a capacity for knowing and understanding.
247
 
Although this breath had its source in Spirit, namely the divine substance, it was not 
exactly the same thing as Spirit, but a rarified derivative thereof, as a breeze was to the 
wind. It was an image of the divine substance, from which it had its origin, but the 
properties that it afforded did not amount to the actual power of deity.
248
 Despite this 
breath’s divine provenance, it was on account of its “slenderness of nature” subject to the 
                                                                                                                                                 
and forbidding free choice of deity, so that I may no longer worship according to my inclination, but am 
compelled to worship against it. Not even a human being would care to have unwilling homage rendered 
him…” (Apol. 24 [ANF 3:38-39]). 
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 As Tertullian says in An. 16 (ANF 3:194-195), the soul has two parts: the rational and irrational. The 
rational part is the afflatus, and has its origin in God, the irrational part has “accrued later, as having 
proceeded from the instigation of the serpent,” and come to seem like a natural development in humans. 
Thus virtue is synonymous with reason, and evil with irrationality. 
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 We cannot but diverge at this point in order to observe the similarity between the afflatus and the person 
of the Son. Both are derived from the divine substance, and we have seen that, given Tertullian’s 
materialistic understanding of divine substance, their derivation in each case entails a relative rarefaction of 
the divine substance from its level of “density” in the Father, its source. In the case of the Son, the fact the 
he is but a part of what the Father is the whole means that, although the Father remains transcendent and 
invisible, the Son by contrast is less invisible, i.e., visible, but still only enigmatically so. But the contrast 
with the Father ends there, for there is never the sense in Tertullian that the Son could ever differ from the 
Father on matters pertaining to will. The Son’s will remains completely identical with that of the Father, 
because, despite its relative de-concentration, the Son’s own substance is still that of the Father. The Son is 
still God because he has no other substance than the divine, even if to an attenuated degree compared to 
that of God the Father. Substance for Tertullian is that thing that affords its possessor his properties, so its 
relative “thinning” in his generation gives the Son properties that are generally the same (e.g., will) as those 
of the Father, though slightly scaled down in some respects (e.g., he is less invisible). The afflatus, on the 
other hand, is a sliver of the divine substance that grants humans free will and the other higher traits. But 
here two additional factors come into play. The first is that humans are possessed of a created, human 
substance, in whose makeup also dwells the afflatus as a fraction of that divine substance that has been 
bestowed on it as God’s gift. The divine substance is not the entire substance of the human, but is rather 
hosted by the created substance of humans, and is subject to their decisions. The second is that the 
rarefaction of the divine substance in the afflatus has been to such a degree that makes its subordination to 
the human even possible. Thus the afflatus’ human possessors can abuse the powers that it confers to them. 
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possibility of disobeying God, though, Tertullian clarified, the rebellion that eventuated in 
Eden did not properly originate from within breath itself, but from humans’ reckless 
deployment of the free will it engendered. Thus, the fault for the ancestral fall rested not 
with God but with humans.
249
 Having been made in God’s image, they had self-mastery 
and knowledge, and were superior even to the angel that beguiled them.
250
 The choice to 
disobey was theirs and theirs only: “God designed for man a condition of life, so man 
brought on himself a state of death.”251 
God’s work through the entire span of salvation history since the fall therefore 
became to elicit the penitent response of humans and their free obedience to God by 
reacquainting them with the truth that had since become a stranger in this world.
252
 
Repentance for Tertullian was an emotion of the mind that arises from disgust “at some 
previously cherished worse sentiment.”253 Because “there is no sinning save by will,”254 
and the “principle of voluntary obedience consists in similarity of minds,”255 there could 
be no repentance and turning to God unless there be a meeting of minds with him first. 
For Tertullian, this meeting of minds took the narrowly heteronomous form of revelation 
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 Marc. 2.9 (ANF 3:304-305). 
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 We note that, too, that Tertullian places the culpability for the origin of evil in Satan in his free choice. 
From being the most intelligent and exalted of creatures, by choice he began “lusting after the wickedness 
which was spontaneously conceived within him” (Marc. 2.10 [ANF 3:305-306]). However, Tertullian does 
not offer an explanation of the origins free will in angels as he does for humans. 
251
 Marc. 2.8 (ANF 3:303 [PL 2:320B]): “Deus homini vitae statum induxit, ita homo sibi mortis statum 
adtraxit.” 
252
 Cf. Apol. 1 (ANF 3:17): “She [i.e. Truth] knows that she is but a sojourner on the earth, and that among 
strangers she naturally finds foes; and more than this, that her origin, her dwelling-place, her hope, her 
recompense, her honors, are above.” 
253
 Paen. 1 (ANF 3:657). 
254
 Paen. 3 (ANF 3: 659 [PL 1:1342B]): “quibus exceptis iam non nisi voluntate delinquitur.” We note that 
for Tertullian (Praescr. 6 [ANF 3:245-6]) heresy, too, was a matter of the will. The term heresy derived 
from the Gk. for choice, and thus a heretic was said to be “self-condemned” (Titus 3:10-11) precisely 
because he had of himself chosen that for which he was being condemned. “We, however, are not 
permitted, to cherish any object after our own will,” he concluded of the right-believers, “nor yet make 
choice of that which another has introduced of his private fancy.” 
255
 Paen. 4 (ANF 3:660 [PL 1:1344A]): “obsequii enim ratio in similitudine animorum constituta est.”  
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and acceptance. God came in revelation directly and told humankind what is good and 
evil. For Tertullian, God was the sole criterion of truth whose will determined what is 
virtue and sin: what he commanded was virtue, what he forbad was sin.
256
 Otherwise, one 
went the way of the unbelievers who, not knowing God but relying on their own decrepit 
postulations of truth, most often ended up repenting of deeds that were not sins and 
overlooking ones that were.
257
 There was no room objectively to confirm the virtue of 
God’s laws by external rational criteria, because the goodness of his laws and the 
imperative of obeying them rested on the authority of him who issued them, and not on 
some limited human conception of virtue that might have sought audaciously to confirm 
them. In short, “it is not the fact that it is good which binds us to obey” a divine precept, 
“but the fact that God has enjoined it.”258 
This strict theocentricity in Tertullian’s understanding of virtue was in keeping 
with the strong sense of theistic initiative that we have seen in him from the beginning of 
this study. However, what tempered this view of the relationship between God and 
humans, preventing it from becoming one of blind obedience to an arbitrary or fickle 
deity, was Tertullian’s belief in the kinship between God and the soul. In this light, 
humans were not being called simply to bow down before something capricious or alien 
to themselves, because, in being given direct knowledge of God in revelation, they were 
in actuality being given direct knowledge of their true self. It was in this sense that 
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 Paen. 3 (ANF 3:658): “For when the Lord is known, our spirit, having been ‘looked back upon’ [Luke 
22:61] by its own Author, emerges unbidden into the knowledge of the truth; and being admitted to (an 
acquaintance with) the divine precepts, is by them forthwith instructed that ‘that from which God bids us 
abstain is to be accounted sin:’ inasmuch as, since it is generally agreed that God is some great essence of 
good, of course nothing but evil would be displeasing to good; in that, between things mutually contrary, 
friendship there is none.” 
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 Paen. 1 (ANF 3:657). 
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 Paen. 4 (ANF 3:660 [PL 1:1344A]): “neque enim quia bonum est, idcirco auscultare debemus, sed quia 
Deus praecepit.” 
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Tertullian could also say that all sin was irrational. It had its origin in the devil, and was 
an alien principle to God.
259
 There was here a prior correspondence between God and 
humans, of which the latter were unaware before they were brought to knowledge. This 
affinity explains why Tertullian went to considerable lengths to demonstrate God’s 
willingness himself to execute first the virtues that he enjoined of humans. If Christians 
were called to patience
260
 or obedience,
261
 they had to know that God was the first to 
exercise these. Similarly, when called to repentance, humans had also to know that, after 
having elicited from Adam and Eve an admission of their transgression by presenting 
them with the devastating truth of its consequences,
262
 God inaugurated “repentance in 
His own self, by rescinding the sentence of His first wrath, engaging to grant pardon to 
His own work and image.”263 Though still subject to death, by their earnest confession, 
Adam and Eve overturned the term of their punishment and won for the human race 
forgiveness in the form of candidacy for salvation and relief that was to come in the 
“future taking of the man into the divine nature.”264 Thus was put into motion the plan 
that, by gradual re-familiarization with truth, would undo the consequences of their fall 
and punishment, and offer them redemption and salvation that would be predicated on 
their informed repentance.
265
 Because God knew a priori that humans “delight in the law 
of the Lord,” the election of the Israelites and the promulgation of the Law became an 
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 An. 16 (ANF 3:194-5). 
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 Pat. 2-4 (ANF 3:707-708). 
261
 Or. 4 (ANF 3:682-683). 
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 Marc. 2.25 (ANF 3:316-317). For Tertullian, the “O Adam, where art thou?” that God uttered was not a 
question into his whereabouts, but a presentation of truth, as though it were saying: “Look where you have 
placed yourself.” Noteworthy, too, is the fact that when Cain was given similar opportunity to confess his 
crime, he chose instead to deny it, and thus earned God’s curse. 
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 Paen. 2 (ANF 3:657 [PL 1:1339A]): “iam inde in semetipso paenitentiam dedicavit, rescissa sententia 
irarum pristinarum ignoscere pactus operi et imagini suae.” 
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 Marc. 2.25 (ANF 3:316-317). Peculiarly, Tertullian takes the passage “Behold, Adam is become as one 
of us” (Gen. 3:22) as portending the future union of divinity and humanity in the incarnation. 
265
 Paen. 2 (ANF 3:657-658). 
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effort in re-acquainting humans with obedience, subduing “the nation’s hardness of heart, 
and, by laborious services, hewing out a fealty which was (as yet) untried in 
obedience,”266 with the prophets enjoining repentance whenever they fell short of the 
mark.
267
 In the incarnation, this re-exposure to truth reached its apogee. In Christ humans 
were given to see God himself, to learn his truth, to see the perfect execution of God’s 
commands, to become partakers in divinity through the re-awakening of that divine 
bestowal in themselves, to turn back to God through an act of free will, and to enjoy to 
forgiveness and salvation. Christ’s work opened the path for God to pour out his 
forgiving grace freely “as a flood of light on the universal world through His Spirit” on 
those who through repentance prepared the home of the heart, making it clean for the 
Holy Spirit, which was coming finally to save those who were fallen.
268
 Christ’s work 
was not only didactic but also sanctifying because “in Christ that same flesh is 
maintained without sin, which in man was not maintained without sin…in putting on our 
flesh, he made it his own; in making it his own, he made it sinless.”269 He was the new 
Adam who inaugurated a human race that henceforth would live without sin, coming “as 
the good brother, who should blot out the memory of the evil brother [i.e. the old 
Adam].”270 
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 Marc. 2.19 (ANF 3:312 [PL 2:333BC]): “Quam legem non duritia promulgavit auctoris, sed ratio 
summae benignitatis, populi potius duritiam edomantis, et rudem obsequio fidem operosis officiis 
dedolantis.” 
267
 Paen. 2 (ANF 3:657-658). 
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 Paen. 2 (ANF 3:657-658 [PL 2:1339A]) “per Spiritum suum universo orbi inluminaturus esset.” 
269
 Carn. Chr. 16 (ANF 3:535-536 [PL 2:826AB]): “in Christo sine peccato habetur quae in homine sine 
peccato non habebatur...nostram enim induens suam fecit, suam faciens non peccatricem eam fecit.” 
270
 Carn. Chr. 17 (ANF 3:536 [PL 2:828A]): “in vulvam ergo Deus Verbum suum detulit bonum Fratrem, 
ut memoriam mali fratris eraderet.” 
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Yet, in all this we must note that in this notion of flesh that the Son assumed in 
himself there was no specific mention of a human mind in Christ. R. E. Roberts
271
 was 
not incorrect to draw attention to the Carn. Chr. to show that Tertullian talked of both a 
soul and body in Christ. Indeed, in order to counter his various opponents, who either 
attempted to present the flesh that Christ assumed as a type of soul, or, oppositely, his 
soul as a type of flesh, Tertullian affirmed the distinctness of soul and flesh in Christ.
272
 
Nevertheless, the provenance and function of this soul were not clear. On the one hand, 
Tertullian averred that “the Son of God did descend and take on him a soul, not that the 
soul might discover itself in Christ, but Christ in itself.”273 Yet, on the other, the only 
thing that Tertullian registered an objection to in his opponents’ claim that “the soul 
became flesh”274 was the implication that the soul had changed its nature and was 
transformed into flesh and not clothed in flesh,
275
 but evidently not the suggestion that 
the soul somehow pre-existed its incarnation. This hint of the soul’s possible pre-
existence gained additional texture in Prax. 27, where Tertullian presented the flesh in the 
incarnation as antipodal, not to the soul as he had done in the Carn. Chr., but to the 
Spirit, namely the Son’s divine nature.276 This opened the field to a possibly proto-
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 R. E. Roberts, The Theology of Tertullian (London: Epworth Press, 1924), p. 174-5. 
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 Carn. Chr. 11-13 (ANF 3:531-33). 
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 Carn. Chr. 12 (ANF 3:532 [PL 2:821B]): “Propterea Filius Dei descendit et animam subiit, non ut ipsa 
se anima cognosceret in Christo sed Christum in semetipsa.” 
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 Carn. Chr. 13 (ANF 3:533 [PL 2:821B]): “Caro facta est anima...” 
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 Carn. Chr. 11 (ANF 3:532 [PL 2:820A]): “Restore, therefore, to Christ, His faith; believe that He who 
willed to walk the earth as a man exhibited even a soul of a thoroughly human condition, not making it of 
flesh, but clothing it with flesh [Redde igitur Christo fidem suam, ut qui homo voluit incedere animam 
quoque humanae condicionis ostenderit, non faciens eam carneam sed induens eam carne].” 
276
 Prax. 27 (ANF 3:624 [PL 2:215BC]): “We see plainly the twofold state, which is not confounded, but 
conjoined in One Person—Jesus, God and Man. Concerning Christ, indeed, I defer what I have to say. (I 
remark here), that the property of each nature is so wholly preserved, that the Spirit on the one hand did all 
things in Jesus suitable to Itself, such as miracles, and mighty deeds, and wonders; and the Flesh, on the 
other hand, exhibited the affections which belong to it. It was hungry under the devil’s temptation, thirsty 
with the Samaritan woman, wept over Lazarus, was troubled even unto death, and at last actually died 
[videmus duplicem statum, non confusum sed coniunctum, in una persona deum et hominem Iesum. de 
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Apollinarian view of Tertullian’s Christology in which the pre-incarnate Son himself 
made up at least a part of the human soul. In light of the kinds of actions that we saw 
Tertullian apportion to the two respective natures in the incarnation, my own temptation 
has been to suggest that he may have envisaged the Son as taking the place of the afflatus 
in the human soul, though there is neither solid evidence in Tertullian for such an 
interpretation, nor even the concurrence of more recent scholars.
277
Whatever the 
underlying reasons, the fact remains that Tertillian maintained a relative silence on the 
question of Christ’s human mind, and consequently on the matter of a human will in 
Christ that might be understood as operating, in terms of human volition, contingently 
relative to the Father. This was no small thing, and helps to reinforce why nowhere in 
Tertullian was there a hint that the efficacy of the Son’s work of rebirthing the human 
race was dependent on a sense of the contingency of his will. Because in the incarnation 
the only volitive agent could have been the Son in his divine nature, a tenet of contingent 
will would have run contrary to the consubstantiality between Father and Son that 
Tertullian had spent so long establishing. Rather, the role of successful contingent was, as 
in Justin, ascribed to the Virgin Mary, who in the same De Carne Christi was likened to 
Eve: “As Eve had believed the serpent, so Mary believed the angel. The delinquency 
which the one occasioned by believing, the other by believing effaced.”278 The work of 
                                                                                                                                                 
Christo autem differo. et adeo salva est utriusque proprietas substantiae, ut et spiritus res suas egerit in illo, 
id est virtutes et opera et signa, et caro passiones suas functa sit, esuriens sub diabolo, sitiens sub 
Samaritide, flens Lazarum, anxia usque ad mortem, denique et mortua est].”  
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 Ernest Evans (Tertullian’s Treatise on the Incarnation : the Text Edited with an Introduction, 
Translation, and Commentary [UK: SPCK, 1956]) leaves the question of the precise function and origin of 
the human soul in Christ unexplored. Eric Osbron (Tertullian, the First Theologian of the West 
[Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997], 139-143), too, leaves the question of the origin of 
Christ’s human soul untouched, preferring to focus on the question of how Christ’s two natures, which to 
his materialist understanding must both be material, can occupy the same space. 
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 Carn. Chr. 17 (ANF 3:536 [PL 2:828A): “Crediderat Eva serpenti, credidit Maria Gabrieli: quod illa 
credendo deliquit haec credendo delevit.” 
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Christ remained therefore revelatory and sanctifying. His work was also exemplary and 
vicariously meritorious, but not on the basis of a supposed contingency of will that he 
shared with creatures. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
THE GNOSTICS, PLOTINUS, AND IRENAEUS 
 
In Justin and Tertullian we saw the establishment of a theology of volitional 
movement, from the Father in the Son, outward from the Godhead and into the world as 
an act of self-revelation and enlightenment, to which creation was called freely to align 
its own will and be led back to be together with the divine source. The Son, as perfect 
externalization of the Father’s wisdom and will, was the channel of this divine 
expression. Divine sovereignty against necessity was affirmed with a psychological 
depiction of the generation of the Son as Logos which, in line with how a word is 
generated in the human mind, posited a precedent act of the Father’s will, but also 
stressed the closeness of the Son to the Father, his commonality of substance and 
cognitive parity with him, and thus, in line with Greek norms, the impossibility of a 
volitional rift between the two that would embarrass what Tertullian described as the 
monarchy of the Trinity. 
We also saw Tertullian contrasting his own understanding of probole 
(“projection”) with that of the Valentinian Gnostics, who, he argued, in their account of 
theological origins placed the generate hypostases in the Pleroma at a distance from their 
source. The result was disarray in the heavenly realm. In this chapter, we will first 
examine Valentinian theology in more depth, and demonstrate that it was a system that 
had at its center a complex effusion of hypostases derived from the primal deity, Bythos, 
that will be racked by conflict precisely because of the stratification in their respective 
104 
cognitive powers. The result will be a sublimated version of the pagan theologies of old 
that too had been characterized by discord in the divine estate. Of more interest, however, 
will be our examination of two responses to the threat posed by Gnosticism. The first will 
be that of Plotinus in whom we will espy an evolution of thought that precipitates from 
his engagement with Gnosticism. Thus he will shift away from his early speculation on 
tolma, that is daring or arrogance, as the motor of pluralization in the divine sphere to a 
theory that sheds all hint of caprice to the divine plan and lays emphasis rather on the 
rational necessity of the divine movement. In this context we will see a recognition of 
choice and will as a pole of irrationality and ignorance. 
The second response that we will examine will be that of Irenaeus of Lyon, the 
great defender of the faith against the encroachments of the Gnostics, from whose 
polemic efforts as bishop in southern Gaul we also have the fullest record of their belief. 
Of note will be the fact that his purposes stand on the opposite end of the theological 
spectrum from those of Tertullian. If Tertullian’s effort had been to defend plurality in 
the Godhead from the likes of modalists such as Praxeas, Irenaeus’ labors will be directed 
at restoring those who had “fallen away from unity, and taken up the doctrine of manifold 
deities.”279 Tertullian sought to demonstrate how the Church’s teaching on the begetting, 
including his own psychological model which included the notion of willing in the 
Godhead, did not compromise the divine monarchy. Irenaeus, on the other hand, having 
the Gnostics as his primary point of focus, will follow a similar route to that of Plotinus, 
and will put forward a theology that leaves little place for the will in the internals of the 
Godhead. His theology will be one that emphasizes a transcendent simultaneity of the 
divine persons and will instead prefer, in its effort to avoid imagery that suggest notional 
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 Haer. 4.33.3 (ANF 1:507). 
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seriation in the Godhead, the corporeal and holistic image of Son and Holy Spirit as the 
“hands” of God. In this respect, we might see a vague analogy between the trio of the 
Gnostics, Tertullian, and Irenaeus, and the disputants in the fourth century,  namely Arius 
and the two theological streams that reacted to him: the one group that would continue to 
talk of the will in its account of the Godhead, and the other which rejected such talk. 
We turn now to our representative group of Gnosticism, namely the Valentinians. 
 
VALENTINIANISM 
The loosely neo-Platonist synthesis, described succinctly as transcendental 
monotheism,
280
 which emerged as the dominant philosophical and theological system in 
late antiquity, presupposed a stratified view of reality that allowed one to connect, 
through a layered series of intermediaries, the absolute oneness, infinitude, and 
transcendence of some ultimate source of existence with the multifariousness and 
limitation of creation. Within this basic framework, the Gnostic Valentinus (ca. 100—ca. 
160) and his followers made their own unique explanation of the origins of the universe 
and the human predicament, in which the faculty of will featured so prominently as to 
provoke a consciously anti-volitionist reaction from competing schools of thought. This 
chapter, therefore, will examine the Valentinians, but also the rival schemes of Plotinus 
(ca. 204—270) and Irenaeus (d. ca. 202), an orthodox neo-Platonist and orthodox 
Christian respectively, with respect to our abiding concern over will in these emerging 
attempts at articulating cogent systems of pluralistic monotheism. 
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In Gnosticism scholarship has long identified religious and philosophical 
elements drawn from Irano-Zoroastrian, Babylonian, Judaic, Hellenistic, and Christian 
sources.
281
 Yet the precise origins of the movement are difficult to pinpoint. It remains a 
mystery whether one of the abovementioned elements constituted the nucleus around 
which the others were arranged, or the basic core was something wholly other next to 
which all the above influences were juxtaposed. Yet its enigmatic, mixed lineage allowed 
Gnosticism to be all things to all people. Its free use of terminology that was congruent 
with that also used by both the neo-Platonists and the Christians, or their liberally citing 
the authorities and Scriptures of each in support of their own doctrines, had both Plotinus 
and Irenaeus often treating the Valentinians more as wayward kin than adherents of 
wholly other schools or religions.
282
 
It was probably the Iranian strain in the Gnostic pedigree that produced the deep 
sense of alienation from the material world and led the Valentinians to believe in the 
severely antithetical, though ultimately derived, dualism they preached. In their eyes this 
world was profoundly corrupted and had been, till latter times—or, as Irenaeus reports, 
till Christ’s time—under the governance of a being ignorant of the true origins of the 
physical universe and the existence of a higher and true sphere. As a result, and to the 
dismay of the churchmen, the Gnostics radically reinterpreted the Old Testament as the 
record of the rule of this inferior governing principle over the world. For them, both the 
visible world and its creator and ruler were byproducts of a malfunction in the higher 
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 Plotinus takes particular offence (Enn. 2.9.4) at their disrespect toward Soul, the governing principle of 
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sphere, and saw themselves as spiritual entities that, from the fallout of this unrest, had 
become trapped in material form. In the ornate, convoluted myths they shared with their 
followers and believed disclosed to them the true knowledge they needed for their 
salvation and return to their original beauty, the Valentinians traced a path from original 
perfection, transcendence, stillness, and purity in a divine and supernal sphere they called 
the Pleroma (Plenitude), to a fateful moment of disturbance which had cosmic 
consequences that were still playing out in the human sphere, before culminating in the 
coming recapitulation of all things in their cosmic source in the Pleroma. Gnosticism 
shared with Judaism and Christianity the belief that this disturbance had its root in some 
ancestral misdeed. With the Eden account both Jews and Christians placed this fault 
firmly within the human sphere, although the furtive role of the serpent, who came to be 
identified with an angelic being that fell away from God before creation, perhaps also 
hinted at anterior causes rooted in some heavenly rebellion. However, Valentinianism 
saw this defect as having its origin unambiguously in the Pleroma. Thus, although 
strident dualists, they were derived dualists: there was, in the end, a singular principle 
from which, through rebellion, was formed a second.
283
 
 
THE PLEROMA AND THE EMERGENCE OF A THEOLOGY OF WILL 
Like any sophisticated cosmogony, the Valentinians’ mythical account of the 
history of the Pleroma and the subsequent creation of the world sought to explain the 
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 John Dillon (“Monotheism in the Gnostic Tradition,” in Pagan Monotheism in Late Antiquity [ed. 
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origins and nature of the universe, but also the source of the strife and wayward desires 
that bedeviled human endeavor, clouded people’s judgment, and led them down the 
wrong path.
284
 On one level, one might accuse Valentinus of theological crudity because 
the drama that unfolded among the host of hypostases or eons he described in the 
Pleroma seemed like a sublimated rendition of the tumultuous and quarrelsome stories 
from the court of the gods of old.
285
 The eons were indeed more anthropomorphic in their 
behavior than what one found in other similar systems, and what made them so was their 
waywardness and contingent intentionality. Yet Valentinianism clearly felt that a serious 
consideration of the waywardness of will was the only way of accounting for the 
emergence of division from the primordial state of oneness. What powered this theory 
was the intensely psychological and typically Socratic belief
286
 that faulty knowledge 
begat faulty intention. The causal hierarchy in the Pleroma produced a corresponding 
stratification of knowledge. The Gnostics styled themselves the possessors of true, saving 
knowledge, and so it was only natural that the motor driving the disturbance in the 
Pleroma was access to knowledge and, more specifically, the kind of will it begat. The 
misalignment of wills in the Pleroma was in essence the result of the tension between 
knowledge and varying degrees of ignorance. Theirs was a theology that accepted 
plurality in the divine, yet, at the same time, foresaw an underlying unity among these 
divine persons that distinguished Gnosticism from the classic polytheism that had 
autonomous gods who often worked even at cross-purposes. As we will see below, the 
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locus of this underlying unity among the eons was a sense of the will, as informed by 
knowledge, as a unifying force between agents. 
 
COSMIC BEGINNINGS 
The Valentinian account began with Bythos (Profundity), the pre-existent eon, in 
whom, directly or indirectly, all the hypostases in the Pleroma—thirty in all, including 
Bythos—had their origin. Bythos, also known as Proarche (Pre-beginning) and Propator 
(Pre-father, Forefather), dwelt in the invisible and ineffable heights above. He was 
perfect, pre-existent, invisible, incomprehensible, eternal, and unbegotten, and “he 
remained throughout innumerable cycles of ages in profound serenity and quiescence.”287 
Alongside Bythos there also existed his companion Ennoea (Idea), also known as Sige 
(Silence) or Charis (Grace).
288
 At some point, Bythos “determined to send forth from 
himself the beginning of all things, and deposited this production (which he had resolved 
to bring forth) in his contemporary Sige, even as seed deposited in the womb.”289 From 
her union with Bythos, Sige became pregnant and bore Nous (Mind), also known as 
Monogenes, Father, and Beginning of all things. Nous was both “similar and equal” to 
Bythos, who had produced him, and was alone capable of “comprehending his father’s 
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greatness.”290 Along with Nous, his companion Aletheia (Truth) was also brought into 
being. The details of her generation were not given, so we can only assume that she too 
was the product of this same generative process. These four primal hypostases—Bythos, 
Sige, Nous, and Aletheia—made up the first and first-begotten Pythagorean Tetrad, 
which the Valentinians viewed as the beginning of all things. Irenaeus was silent on what 
it was that led Bythos to commence this “sending forth from himself.”291 Bythos’ 
calculations and motives were shrouded in the mystery of his transcendence. The most 
exalted of all conceivable principles, Bythos was impenetrable in all respects, unknown 
and unknowable except by his own voluntary self-disclosure and action. His prior 
“determination” “at some point” (ἐννοηθῆναί ποτε) was all one could identify as having 
mediated between the initial state of divine perfection and stillness, which had lasted for 
“innumerable cycles of ages,” and this new sending forth from himself that introduced 
other hypostases into the Pleroma. Further explanation was futile, except from assuming 
that, as highest principle, Bythos was the theoretical standard against which every knower 
of truth was measured, even if the precise content of that absolute truth remained 
inscrutable.
292
 As a result, the will of Bythos simply was, and when he intervened, as he 
was to do later, to steady the misguided intentions of his subordinates, it was decisive and 
irrefutable, its perfection being simply the product of his absolute knowledge. 
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 This doctrine of the complete unknowability of the true God, namely that behind each conception of a 
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In his turn, Nous, “perceiving the purpose for which he had been produced,” i.e. 
to be the “father of all those who were to come after him, and the beginning and 
fashioning of the entire Pleroma,”293 came together with Aletheia to put forth two new 
hypostases: the couple Logos (Word) and Zoë (Life). In like wise, Logos and Zoë 
produced Anthropos (Man) and Ecclesia (Church), and thus was completed the first-
begotten Ogdoad, which comprised the four masculo-feminine principles mentioned thus 
far. Finally, the eons Logos and Zoë, and Anthropos and Ecclesia, having been produced 
for the glory of the Father, and “wishing, by their own efforts, to effect this object,” 
emanated new hypostases by means of their procreative conjunction.
294
 In this way, 
through their own initiative, and to the glory of Nous the Father, the Pleroma was 
populated with eons born of the union of each of these two divine couples: Logos-Zoë 
generated another five pairs of eons,
295
 and Anthropos-Ecclesia another six,
296
 bringing 
the total, along with the original four, to fifteen couples, or thirty individual eons. These 
thirty eons were enveloped in silence, known to no one, and grouped hierarchically into 
an Ogdoad, a Decad, and a Duodecad.
297
 To the frustration of Irenaeus, the Valentinians 
found support for this partition of the Pleroma in the highly allegorical hermeneutic they 
employed to interpret Scripture. 
Along with this causal hierarchy in the Pleroma there also came, as one moved 
down through the ranks of the eons, a corresponding stratification of their cognitive 
powers. Bythos, located at the highest stratum, was all-knowing in himself, but to others 
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he remained entirely invisible and incomprehensible. Only Nous, the lone eon produced 
directly of Bythos (and Sige), was capable of contemplating and comprehending his 
father’s “immeasurable greatness.”298 The other eons, generated as they were by Nous or 
other lower entities, were not so privileged, and to these Bythos ever remained 
inscrutable. It was for this reason that Nous, already privy to the pleasure of beholding 
Bythos’ infinitude and having communion with him, also meditated on how he might 
share this blessed vision of his greatness with the other eons. The fact that he deliberated 
over how he might divulge this knowledge to the lower eons is reflective of even Nous’ 
limited cognition. He longed to convey to them a sense of Bythos’ vastness, his might, 
beginninglessness, and invisibility, and inspire in them too a desire to investigate his 
nature. Thus, thanks to Nous’ misguided intentions, was there kindled in the eons, though 
in a “kind of quiet way,” a yearning to see Bythos, the first cause without beginning.299 
We observe that the generation of Nous marked the entry of the first agent whose 
knowledge, though more exalted than that of any of the eons that were to follow, was, in 
comparison to that of Bythos, relative, and whose will, consequently, was characterized 
by uncertainty, deliberation, and a lack of resolution. Thus in Nous a downward 
trajectory of uncertain and ultimately misguided will was set into motion that, as we will 
see further, culminated in the eventual failure in the Pleroma and led to creation of the 
fallen world. Nous’ relative knowledge and will manifested itself in two ways. First, 
Nous was said to begin generating other eons on perceiving the purpose for which he had 
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been produced. We note that Irenaeus’ word choice here (αἰσθόμενον—having perceived) 
suggests more a growth in knowledge than a solid possession of it from the beginning, 
although the term βουληθέντας, which he used to describe the desire of the secondary eons 
to reproduce the other hypostases to the glory of Father, was admittedly far less 
suggestive. In any case, this deficit in true understanding among the lower eons was 
manifested unambiguously in the second stage of the story, once all the eons had been 
generated. Here, as we saw, Nous became engrossed over how to share with the other 
eons the view and understanding of Bythos to which only he, as his direct descendant, 
had been privy. Clearly, Nous did not realize that this was contrary to Bythos’ will and 
his plans met with opposition from above. As if to foresee the danger this ignorant desire 
posed to the harmony of the Pleroma, Bythos intervened: he imposed his own will on 
Nous and restrained him from acting on his perilous desire. This, “in accordance with the 
will of the Father,” Ennoea-Sige was sent to restrain Nous from bringing his wishes to 
fruition and sharing his knowledge with the other eons.
300
 However, though almost 
completely choked at birth, this incipient passion nevertheless survived, and was passed 
down by contagion from those eons close to Nous to all the eons in the Pleroma. Among 
these was Sophia, one of the latest eons and the youngest of the Duodecad born of 
Anthropos and Ecclesia. At some point, the story went, this passion to know Bythos 
welled up inside and overcame her because she missed the embrace of her consort 
Theletos. In the other eons, this desire had always remained subdued, existing, as 
Irenaeus already reported, in a “kind of quiet way” (ἡσυχῇ πως). In Sophia, on the other 
hand, it boiled over and became uncontrolled, and this because her motivations, though 
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superficially inspired by a deep love for Bythos, were more precisely rooted in her great 
temerity (τόλμης), “because she had not, like Nous, enjoyed communion with the perfect 
Father.”301 
Although she was completely overwhelmed by this passion, her attempt at 
comprehending his greatness proved futile all the same. She had, after all, “aimed at an 
impossibility.”302 Rather, her endeavor provoked in her an extreme agony of mind. Given 
the vast profundity and unsearchable nature of Bythos, and her great love for him causing 
her ever to stretch herself forward toward him, there was a danger of her being 
completely absorbed by his sweetness and resolved into his absolute essence. The only 
thing that saved her was a certain power within the Pleroma called Horos, which 
supported all things and “preserved them outside of the unspeakable greatness.”303 Horos 
both restrained and supported her, and, once she had been brought back to her senses, she 
came to see for herself that Bythos was incomprehensible. Thus she gave up both her 
reckless plan and the passion that had born it.
304
 
Another account said that, in the heat of her futile attempt, Sophia brought forth a 
formless substance “such as her female nature enabled her to produce.”305 When she 
looked upon this thing she had produced, she was horrified both by its imperfection and 
ugliness, and the fear that her very existence was in danger. She, along with Nous and the 
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other Aeons, besought Bythos to come to her aid. This version of the story teaches that, 
in response to their supplications, Bythos, without union or collaboration with a feminine 
principle,
306
 produced, in his own image and by means of Nous-Monogenes, the 
aforementioned Horos.
307
 It was this Horos who then intervened, purified Sophia of her 
passion, established her, and restored her to Theletos.
308
 Moreover, Horos removed from 
her this substance, which the Gnostics called Sophia’s enthymesis (inborn idea), and 
placed it outside of the Pleroma.
309
 This enthymesis was a spiritual substance, which had 
some of the properties of an eon, but was shapeless and without form because it had 
“received nothing” from a male principle in an act of union, because, as we saw above, 
Theletos, Sophia’s mate, was not with her.310 It was to become the substance from which 
was to be derived all material existence, which the Gnostics were to disparage as having 
had its beginning in Sophia’s “ignorance, grief, fear and bewilderment.”311 
In the wake of this crisis, Nous-Monogenes, acting in accordance with the 
forethought of Bythos, generated another connubial couple: Christ and the Holy Spirit. 
Their role was to safeguard the Pleroma against the re-emergence of the kind of discord 
unleashed by Sophia’s reckless actions. In order to bring peace to the Pleroma, Christ 
began by instructing the eons that Bythos was simply incomprehensible to all of them, 
except, insofar as he was known by Nous only.
312
 The Holy Spirit then taught the eons to 
be grateful because they all had been made equal in form and sentiment; the younger 
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eons were no lesser than those of the older generations. Thus perfect peace was restored 
to the Pleroma, and the eons came together with great joy to glorify and sing praises to 
Bythos. In a final crescendo, all the eons of the Pleroma gathered, and, with the approval 
of Christ, the Holy Spirit, and Bythos, they skillfully put together whatever most precious 
each of them had to offer in order to form a being of most perfect beauty. This being they 
named Jesus, and they fashioned him to the honor and glory of Bythos. He was the 
perfect fruit, the star of the Pleroma, and had been formed from the contributions of all 
the eons. Along with him they also produced angels of the same nature as he, and these 
were to act as his bodyguard.
313
 This Jesus and his angelic cohort were to play a central 
role in the redemption of the fallen, created world that was created out of Sophia’s 
enthymesis that had been sealed off from the heavenly realm. The created world was as a 
reflection of the Pleroma.
314
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  The story of the Pleroma is of course the precursor to the account of the generation of this world, 
of which, for the sake of brevity, we can treat only as a footnote. The formless enthymesis, also named 
Achamoth (Cf. Khokmah [Hb. המכח]: Wisdom), which had been ejected from the Pleroma, continued to 
dwell, alone, formless, and racked by fear, in the places of darkness and vacuity outside the Pleroma. Out 
of pity, Christ and the Holy Spirit proceeded from within the Pleroma, penetrated through Stauros its 
boundary, and came to her in order to bestow on her form, intelligence (but not the level of intelligence 
enjoyed by the Aeons), and an “odor” of immortality, before withdrawing again. Achamoth began to long 
for that withdrawn source which had given her life, but was prevented from reentering the Pleroma because 
of her involvement with passion. She was overcome by grief at being barred from reaching the source, fear, 
lest her life withdraw too, and a general perplexity. All these passions were born of her ignorance. Sophia’s 
ignorance and passion had been the result of her degeneracy, whereas Achamoth’s were ontological—she 
had never possessed knowledge (Haer. 1.4.1 [ANF 1:321]). The passions that afflicted Achamoth went on 
to become the matter from which this world was formed. Every soul, including the Demiurge, was made 
from her desire for her source of life. From her tears, all things that were liquid were formed; from her 
smile, all things that were lucent; and from her perplexity came the corporeal elements in the world (Haer. 
1.4.2 [ANF 1:321]). 
Still, in her anguish, Achamoth was able to stave off her passions, undergo a kind of conversion, 
and supplicate the Pleroma for help. This time, Jesus came to give her form and intelligence. He also 
separated her passions from her—though not completely, because they were so entrenched—and 
compacted them into two groups: the first being an evil substance derived from her passions, and the 
second one that was subject to suffering and derived from her conversion. Freed from her passion, she was 
able to behold the angels that were with Jesus, and, in her ecstasy, conceived by them to bring forth new 
beings that were partly in her image, partly in that of the angels (Haer. 1.4.5 [ANF 1:321-2]). These beings 
were of three sorts: the first, from the passion, was matter; the second, from the conversion, were the 
animal beings; the third, which she brought forth herself, were the spiritual ones. She then also gave form 
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to these (She could only give form to those substances lower than herself: the animal and material. She did 
not form the spiritual substance of which she too consisted), according to the instruction she had received 
from Jesus, and thus were an image of how things were in the Pleroma. Thus, when from the animal 
substance she brought forth the Demiurge, the Creator of the world, her relationship reflected that between 
Bythos and Nous, except that she remained hidden from him. The angels, too, that the Demiurge brought 
forth were reflections of the eons in the Pleroma (Haer. 1.5.1 [ANF 1:322]). Thus the Demiurge became the 
Father and God of everything outside of the Pleroma, being the creator of all animal and material 
substances. He discerned between the animal and material substances, from which he made corporeal and 
incorporeal substances and fashioned the things on earth and in the heavens. This made him the framer both 
of things material and animal. He made the seven heavens beneath him, which were intelligent and said to 
be angels. Above the third heaven was Paradise, with which Adam had held converse and derived certain 
qualities from (Haer. 1.5.2 [ANF 1:322]). Unbeknown to the Demiurge, the things he created were done in 
conjunction with the creative power of Achamoth, which is why the Demiurge did not really know the 
things he was creating (Haer. 1.5.3 [ANF 1:322-3]). He thought he alone was God (e.g. Is. 45:5-6). For the 
Valentinians the Demiurge was not evil, just ignorant; it was Marcion of Pontus and his followers, not 
Valentinus, who taught that the Creator God revealed in the Law and Prophets was evil (Haer. 1.27.2). 
Achamoth continued to reside one level above the Demiurge, but outside of the Pleroma. The Demiurge, as 
a product of Achamoth’s conversion, was animal. However, creatures Demiurge produced from the matter 
(i.e. from Achamoth’s passions, in this case, specifically, her grief) the spirits of wickedness, at whose head 
was the Cosmocrator, i.e. the devil who dwells in this world (the Demiurge dwells above it). The elements 
of the world, too—earth, water, air, fire—where all born of these passions, which were the product of 
ignorance (Haer. 1.5.4 [ANF 1:323]). The Demiurge also created the bodily part of man, as well as 
breathed into him the animal element of his nature, which was in the image of the Demiurge (Haer. 1.5.5 
[ANF 1:323]). Meanwhile, the Demiurge remained oblivious of both Achamoth and the spiritual substance 
she had brought forth, which, unbeknown to him, she deposited in him, and he in turn deposited in the 
humans he created. When this increased it would make humans receptive of perfect rationality. Thus, the 
man (also known as Ecclesia as a reflection of the Aeon above) consisted of his animal soul from the 
Demiurge, his body from the passions, and his spiritual aspect from Achamoth (Haer. 1.5.6 [ANF 1:323]). 
Regarding these three substances, the material perishes and is incapable of receiving incorruption; 
the animal, as intermediate, passes to the side to which it is inclined; and the spiritual substance comes to 
unite itself to the animal and draw it upward. For the animal substance, endowed with free will, had to be 
trained by means of its outward senses. This why the world was even created: to train animal substance by 
means of outward senses. Savior came to save animal nature. He received the first fruits of Achamoth, 
namely the spiritual substance she produced. From the Demiurge he received the animal Christ who had an 
animal body that looked material—i.e. was visible, tangible and passible—but was not material. For them, 
the consummation of all things will take place when all that is spiritual has been formed and perfected by 
Gnosis, and attained and a perfect knowledge of God after being initiated into it by Achamoth (Haer. 1.6.1 
[ANF 1:323-4]). 
Animal people have mere faith, not knowledge, and need to perform works to be saved. They 
considered the members of the Church to be such ones. The Gnostics, however, as spiritual beings, shall be 
saved, not because of their conduct, but because they are spiritual by nature. In the way that it was 
impossible for material nature to be saved, so, conversely, was it impossible for spiritual nature ever to 
come under the power of corruption, irrespective of what deeds they had done: gold, even if it were dipped 
in filth, was still gold (Haer. 1.6.2 [ANF 1:324]). They made a distinction between those in the world (i.e. 
the spiritual) and those of the world (i.e. the animal). The latter had to exercise abstinence and good works 
so that they may gain the “intermediate habitation.” The former, however, were not subject to this rule. 
Their entry into the Pleroma was not a question of conduct and behavior, but a matter of a “seed sent forth 
thence in a feeble, immature state, and here brought to perfection” (Haer. 1.6.4 (ANF 1:324-5]). Indeed, 
when the seed was to have come to perfection, Achamoth would pass from the intermediate place where 
she resided, to the Pleroma, and be joined to Jesus-Savior. The spiritual ones would shed their animal souls, 
become intelligent spirits, and enter into the Pleroma as brides for the host of angels who wait upon Jesus-
Savior. The Demiurge would ascend to Achamoth’s former position in the intermediate habitation just 
outside the Pleroma. The souls of the righteous would repose here too with him, but the animal nature 
would not enter into the Pleroma. Then fire would arise that would obliterate all matter (Haer. 1.7.1 [ANF 
1:325]). 
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Thus, final and lasting peace in the Pleroma was achieved through a twofold 
strategy: first, by the direct imposition by Bythos of his will over against that of his 
subordinates, although we note too that they had requested his help beforehand. This he 
did by specially generating Horos, who imposed proper order on the eons. Secondly, he 
brought peace by appointing a pair of, again, purposely-generated eons to educate the 
other eons on the limitation of their knowledge, the futility of their trying to exceed this 
limitation, and the necessity of their being satisfied with their station and level of 
understanding.
315
 The final, triumphant celebration and the generation of Jesus that 
followed marked the close of this first chapter of the Gnostic story of the world, which 
we saw dealt with the origins of the eons in the Pleroma, the arising of the strife, and the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Regarding the abovementioned animal Christ, who was produced by the Demiurge, he passed 
through Mary as water through a tube and, at his baptism, Jesus-Savior descended upon him from within 
the Pleroma. He was composed of four substances: that which is spiritual, from Achamoth; that which is 
animal, from the Demiurge; the quasi-material (a substance that appeared material but was not), also from 
Demiurge; and Savior who descended on him. But only the quasi-material part underwent suffering on the 
Cross (Stauros), and in this way was a type of the Christ who extended himself through the Stauros (i.e. the 
boundary of Pleroma) (Haer. 1.7.2 [ANF 1:325]). 
The souls that possessed the seed of Achamoth were dearly loved by the Demiurge, though he did 
not know why, and he distributed them among the prophets, priests and kings. These souls uttered things 
from Achamoth and from the Demiurge. There were three types of prophecy: those from Achamoth, those 
from the spiritual seed, and those from the Demiurge. Similarly, the animal Jesus uttered three types of 
prophecy: that from Savior, that from Achamoth and that from the Demiurge (Haer. 1.7.3 [ANF 1:325-6]). 
The Demiurge was skeptical of these prophecies, but when Savior came, Demiurge learned from him the 
truth and joined himself to him. In the meantime, he has been given care of the world and the Church, in 
the knowledge that he will be rewarded with Achamtoth’s habitation (Haer. 1.7.4 [ANF 1:326]). There are 
three kinds of people: spiritual, material and animal, who are represented by Cain, Abel, and Seth. These 
three natures are no longer found in one person, as was the case of Adam, but now characterize whole kinds 
of people. The material group goes to corruption. The animal, if it chooses the good, goes to the 
intermediate place just outside the Pleroma; if not, it too goes to corruption. The spiritual elements were 
weak when first sown by Achamoth. But after discipline and nourishment in righteous souls and attaining 
to perfection they shall be given over as brides to the angels of the Savior, while their animal souls, which 
they had to have out of necessity, will go with the Demiurge to the intermediate place. Of the animal souls, 
some are by nature good, others evil. The good ones can receive spiritual seed, the bad cannot (Haer. 1.7.5 
[ANF 1:326]). 
The reason why Savior came to endure suffering was to indicate the passion that the last of the 
eons had endured, and by his own end to announce that the disturbance that had arisen among the eons had 
ceased (Haer. 1.8.2 [ANF 1:326-7]). 
315
 In Haer. 2.17.10-11, Irenaeus asks why Bythos did not simply educate the other eons about his 
inscrutable nature from the beginning, but allowed his transcendence to become the cause of sin. 
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final resolution and return to peace therein. It represented an enormously important 
dimension of the kind of theological thinking that surrounded early Christianity. 
What is of key significance for our purposes is the centrality of the role of the 
interplay between informed and uninformed will in this Gnostic attempt at formulating a 
theology of what one might call pluralistic monotheism. The causal hierarchy in the 
Pleroma produced an analogous stratification in knowledge as one moved away from the 
primordial perfection of Bythos. This in turn correlated with a gradient in intention 
among the hypostases that ranged from the all-informed will of Bythos, which acted with 
absolute rectitude and decisiveness, to the careful indecision and learned intention born 
of a kind of growing into one’s calling in the intermediate eons, to the impulsive and 
hubristic desire of the lowest eon Sophia that led to the disturbance in the Pleroma. In 
short, the entire drama in the Pleroma was a dialectic of wills, respectively informed and 
uninformed by knowledge as the case may be.
316
 And what won the day in the 
Valentinian system was a combination of coercion and enlightenment that guaranteed 
what can only be described as a symphonic union of agents with a high degree of 
independence in the divine sphere. In this light, the Gnostic teaching on the heavenly 
realm or Pleroma as the abode of a causal hierarchy of divine entities whose generation, 
origins, and continued unity among themselves were based on a strong sense of the will 
as a theological factor is of special interest to us. Gnostic theology’s vague congruence—
only insofar as it identified plurality and otherness in the Godhead—with the Christian 
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 In a passage (Haer. 1.21.4 [ANF 1:346]) dealing with the followers of Marcus, another Gnostic, but 
which would be equally applicable to the Valentinians, Irenaeus expands on how they viewed the 
connection between knowledge, ignorance, and passion: “These hold that the knowledge of the 
unspeakable Greatness is itself perfect redemption. For since both defect and passion flowed from 
ignorance, the whole substance of what was thus formed is destroyed by knowledge; and therefore 
knowledge is the redemption of the inner man.” 
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doctrine of the Trinity, and the sweeping implications that it potentially could have had 
thereon if its theological methods were accepted uncritically, hold special significance for 
a study such as this which examines the evolution of the question of will in the 
understanding of the tri-hypostatic God. The reaction of Irenaeus to the postulations of 
the Gnostics on this matter, and his careful articulation of the orthodox position in answer 
to them, serve to make his interaction with them on the question of will something of a 
dress rehearsal for the disputes provoked by Arius. 
 
PLOTINUS 
The Gnostics’ view of the heavenly realm had a hierarchy of divine hypostases, 
each one of which was causally dependant on its superior, and all subordinate volitionally 
to the will of the Chief hypostasis, Bythos. The neo-Platonists had been the first to 
present such a stratified view of reality as a means of connecting, through a layered series 
of intermediaries, the absolute oneness and infinitude of the ultimate source of existence 
with the multifariousness and individual limitation of creation. However, the Gnostics 
had taken this neo-Platonist scheme and modified it in key ways, to the great ire of the 
latter. Neo-Platonists like Plotinus (ca. 204—270) saw the production of a chain of 
hypostases from a single, original source, the Hen (One), as the result of a natural 
overflowing of its perfection. The Hen was absolute and lacked nothing. It did not 
actively will any proliferation of hypostases from itself, as will would imply movement, 
and movement would violate the Hen’s absolute simplicity.317 It was the Hen’s own 
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 Plotinus, Enn. V.1.6: “Given this immobility in the Supreme, it can neither have yielded assent nor 
uttered decree nor stirred in any way towards the existence of a secondary.” Any movement would have to 
be counted as a second principle, and the thing generated by this movement would then be the third (Enn. 
V.1.6.26-28). Thus, such movement could not have existed. 
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natural “exuberance” (τὸ ὑπερπλῆρες)318 that led to the production of the second 
hypostasis, Nous or Mind, in the same way that the unchanging sun produces the light 
that emits from it.
319
 This begetting was not a matter of will but of necessity. For all 
existents, on account of their inherent power (παρούσης δυνάμεως) and essence (οὐσίας), 
produce about themselves “some necessary, outward facing hypostasis [that is] 
continually attached to them and representing, in image, the engendering archetypes.”320 
Thus fire produces heat, snow keeps cold, and aromatic substances give off fragrance. 
Nous was the offspring of the very Hen itself and a direct image thereof, and was the 
most perfect that a begotten principle can be. The source and its product were intimately 
bound, “attached by a bond of necessity,” and “separated only in being distinct.”321 And 
this distinction is what allowed Nous to turn toward the Hen, its begetter, to become the 
most complete and unmediated contemplative expression of its infinitude and perfection, 
and, thus, the supreme intellectual principle that its name, Nous, connoted.
322
 Nous was 
the vision of the Hen, but it could never be the ultimate source because, unlike the Hen, it 
was not a simplex, self-sufficient entity, but, as intellective principle, was determined by 
the object of its intellection. It was not a simplex but manifold.
323
 
The Soul or Psyche was the third hypostasis in this cascade of being. Flowing 
forth from Nous, it too was an image of its source. More specifically, it was the 
verbalized expression of Nous. If Nous was logos endiathetos, then Soul was logos 
prophorikos, “an utterance of Nous.”324 As verbalized, it was necessarily time-bound325 
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and stood in relation to Nous in the way that discursive, sequential thought contrasted 
with holistic, simultaneously present cognition.
326
 Its discursive nature, and its outward 
and downward pitch gave it various aspects as it stretched across the many layers of 
reality, joining Nous with the variegation of the cosmos. In its upper reaches, close to its 
source, Soul differed but little from Nous. The closeness of their relationship was such 
that it resembled that of Nous to Hen: “nothing separates them but the fact that they are 
not one and the same.”327 Still, each of them operated between a highest and lowest level 
of being, and “descent to its own downward ultimate” before turning back were their 
natural movements. Thus, Nous’ “downward ultimate” was Soul, “to which it entrust[ed] 
all the latter stages of being while itself turn[ed] back on its course.”328 In like wise, Soul 
had its own band of operation, stretching from its highest aspect which “cleave[ed] 
continually to the beings above itself”329 (i.e. Nous), to its lowest, the “body side,”330 
which interacted with, animated, and beautified the universe. Inspired by Plato’s 
Timaeus, Plotinus came to see the Soul’s animation with the material world as a matter of 
benign necessity. Soul was given to the sensory world by the goodness of the Creator so 
that all things might be possessed of intellect and thus be complete. God
331
 sent Soul 
down in order to bring order to the lower spheres,
332
 and for this reason Plato called the 
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 Here we must assume that God refers to the entirety of Soul. Cf. Enn. V.1.2.35-38: “Through soul the 
universe is a God: and the sun is a God because it is ensouled; so too the stars: and whatsoever we 
ourselves may be, it is all in virtue of soul...This, by which gods are divine, must be the oldest God of them 
all.” 
332
 Enn. IV.8.5.13-15, 23-32. 
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cosmos a blessed God.
333
 We note, too, that this animation took place in a special way, 
not through an act of “will, based on calculation as we do—but proceed[ed] by purely 
intellectual act as in the execution of an artistic conception—its ministrance [wa]s that of 
a laborless overpoising, only its lowest phase being active upon the universe it 
embellishe[d].”334 In a later tract against the Gnostics, Plotinus likened this unwilled, 
laborless act of animation to a kind of illumination by which the Soul left its image on the 
material world without directly contacting it or descending to it.
335
 The direct object of 
Soul’s laborless and “kingly presidence” was the unchanging, “complete, competent, and 
self-sufficing”336 cosmos itself, considered in its organic entirety.337 
 
THE SOULS 
Yet the Soul’s discursive, timebound nature also meant that around it, like 
fragments of itself, there existed lesser souls, “members of the Soul’s circuit.”338 These 
individualized aspects of Soul, namely the souls, also brought life to the material world, 
though in a very different way from how Soul itself did. Unlike with Soul, the products of 
their action were those more ephemeral entities—things like individual bodies that were 
always in a state of dissolution, headed to a natural terminus, and vulnerable both to 
assault and need.
339340
 And unlike Soul’s laborless illumination, the souls represented a 
second, more direct, mode of governance of the cosmos, the proverbial “hand to the 
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task,”341 and they effected this role through direct action, immediate contact, and 
enmatterment. 
This more direct mode of control, wherein a soul became enmattered, also meant 
that souls were more likely to be influenced by the nature of their material object and to 
go astray.
342
 Plato had held that the commerce between soul and matter
343
 was an evil that 
led to the soul’s enchainment and entombment by the body.344 He saw it as having 
coming about through a kind of failure in the soul. In the Phaedrus he described this 
failure as a malfunction, a shedding of the soul’s “wings,” which prohibited it from 
remaining focused on the upper spheres and forced it to land onto something material.
345
 
Elsewhere, he presented the soul’s failure and enmeshment in the material world as the 
result of some prior judgment against it.
346
 “In all these explanations,” Plotinus observed, 
Plato found “guilt in the arrival of the soul at body.”347 Plotinus, however, did not 
consider the soul’s descent into the material world as necessarily evil per se. On the 
contrary, he reasoned that if the soul turned back quickly, all was well; simply “acquiring 
the knowledge of evil and coming to understand what sin is” would not do it harm.348 If a 
soul did not penetrate deeply into the body and was not enslaved by it, but exercised 
sovereignty over it and always remained mindful of its own divine origin, then it would 
not succumb to the misfortunes that awaited the souls that had too close a liaison with 
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their material host.
349
 These woes included hindrance of their intellective powers, 
subordination to pleasure, desire, and pain,
350
 and the blissful vision of Nous that souls 
originally enjoyed giving way to but a memory of him
351—“Memory...commences after 
the soul has left the highest spheres.”352 The resultant relative ignorance would only 
reinforce the sense of the Soul’s fragmentation into individual souls.353 
Thus, for Plotinus the soul’s fall was not its spatial descent from the heavenly 
sphere to matter, but its inclination, once it had become enmattered, away from its source 
and toward materiality. Plotinus named this faulty inclination tolma, which meant self-
will or audacity, and was tantamount to a desire for self-ownership (τὸ βουληθῆναι δὲ 
ἑαυτῶν εἶναι). It drove souls to forget their origins and cleave to the matter they had come 
to animate. Enamored of their freedom, some souls indulged their own fancy and 
“hurried down the wrong path.”354 Their shameless tolma was the underlying cause 
behind their fall,
355
 and only such an irrational act of will or defiance against the 
established rational order of things could explain the misfortune that befell soul and 
ushered in misery to human life. The punishment for this brazenness, to which Plato had 
alluded, was the Soul’s subjection to the aforementioned pain and suffering, and loss of 
its higher knowledge. Any additional offences committed by the soul after its 
embodiment were punished, if they were not grievous, by further transmigration to 
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another body, whereas graver sins incurred harsher penalties that were administered by 
demons.
356
 
 
THE QUESTION OF TOLMA 
Plotinus, especially after his dispute with the Gnostics, did not want to 
overemphasize the role of tolma, especially if it meant losing sight of the fact that all that 
happened in the cosmos was a matter of divine necessity, not of contingency and 
capricious errant-will. Tolma was ultimately an irrational, or at least uninformed and 
ignorant, impulse in what was for Plotinus a rational cosmic system. One could argue that 
it played a role similar to that of the random swerve that Epicurus invoked to counter 
determinism. And the truth is that, in his earlier writings, Plotinus made more regular 
appeal to tolma to explain otherwise inexplicable movement away from the eternal stasis, 
sometimes in ways that seemed to undermine even some of the pillars of his mature 
system.
357
 It could be argued that what forced him to narrow the role of tolma in his own 
theology and cosmogony was his confrontation with Gnosticism. Their ruthless rejection 
both of the material world and its creator as absolutely fallen and corrupt proved too 
much for Plotinus, who instead saw the sensory world as the very best possible reflection 
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of the intelligible one.
358
 Tellingly, they taught that this irredeemable strife in the cosmos 
had its origin in errant will, which they too called τόλμη,359 running unchecked in the 
heavenly realm. Thus, Plotinus lamented, they taught “a medley of generation and 
destruction...they cavil[ed] at the Universe...they ma[d]e the Soul blameable for the 
association with body...they revile[d] the Administrator of this All...they ascribe[d] to the 
Creator, identified with the Soul, the character and experiences appropriate to partial 
beings.”360 He acknowledged that it was from Plato361 and others362 that the Gnostics 
acquired the idea that the body was a “grave hindrance to the Soul.” But they simply 
pushed it too far, turning it into a blind hatred for the entire material world. They failed to 
understand that “as long as we have bodies we must inhabit the dwellings prepared for us 
by our good sister Soul in her vast power of laborless creation.”363 Only thus would they 
be able to see the beauty contained in those vast elements of the universe not given over 
to corruption,
364
 and use them as rational beacons back to the heavenly realm. 
The Gnostics rejected any such naturalistic guideposts back to the heavenly 
sphere. For their salvation they relied instead on revealed and secret accounts of their 
divine origins that they shared among themselves. For Plotinus, these stories departed 
radically from the received philosophical tradition. Although the Gnostics took a part of 
their doctrine from Plato, “all the novelties through which they seek to establish a 
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philosophy of their own” had been “picked up outside the truth.”365 And this showed 
most clearly when they applied their belief system to their daily lives. For example, they 
taught they could exercise influence over the spiritual powers if they uttered “spells, 
appeasements, and evocations” in the right way, i.e. with “certain melodies, certain 
sounds, specially directed breathings, sibilant cries, and all else to which [was] ascribed 
magic potency upon the Supreme.”366 They also claimed to be able to drive off illnesses, 
which they thought to be spiritual beings and not the result of what levelheaded people 
could easily recognize as physical causes.
367
 The result was an irrational philosophy 
verging on magic and superstition. 
The preeminence of the role of errant-will and desire inside the Pleroma in the 
Gnostics’ cosmic myths pointed to the idea of tolma in Plotinus’ own thought. So his 
project against the Gnostics was carefully to circumscribe the effects of tolma in his 
cosmogony in order to counter their tactic of giving it the kind of universal reach that 
justified their throwing out the whole created world. First, he countered the Gnostic belief 
that the deity itself had succumbed to desire and that creation had been the work of Soul 
after the failing of its wings. He rejected this claim and asserted instead that “no such 
disgrace could overtake the Soul of the All.”368 If such a thing had ever happened, he 
called on the Gnostics to demonstrate when and why it did: “if from eternity, then the 
Soul must be essentially a fallen thing; if at some one moment, why not before that?”369 
If Soul was in ignorance as a result of its fall, then how could it create? Why, moreover, 
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would it create: to seek glory, the way that human sculptors do?
370
 How could the 
Gnostics say that their own souls were divine, yet declare that the Soul animating the 
stars in the heavens was inferior?
371
 All these questions pointed to the new clarity that 
was forming in Plotinus’ mind: Soul animated matter not because, in some moment of 
haughtiness, it chose to do so, but because that was what it was meant to do. The creative 
act presupposed no contingency—neither a fall, nor some intention to gain glory—only 
the necessity of Soul’s natural movement, the “sheer need of its nature,”372 of which the 
created world was also a manifestation: “To ask why the Soul has created the Cosmos, is 
to ask why there is a Soul and why a Creator creates.”373 The world was not the 
byproduct of “arrogance (ἀλαζονείαν) and tolma,”374 but necessity. 
Secondly, Plotinus also wanted to make clear that this necessity extended to the 
descent of the individual souls as well. In coupling with matter, the souls were not 
impelled by self-centered volition, but by an inner, necessary principle. We quote him at 
length: 
“The souls go forth neither under compulsion nor of freewill; or, at least, freedom, 
here, is not to be regarded as action upon preference; it is more like such a leap of the 
nature as moves men to the instinctive desire of sexual union, or, in the case of some, to 
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fine conduct; the motive lies elsewhere than in the reason: like is destined unfailingly to 
like, and each moves hither or thither at its fixed moment.”375 
An inner law resided innately in the souls and led them to be enmattered. He described it 
as an eternal law of nature, according to which there was a movement of being that 
abandoned its superior and ran out to serve the needs of another.
376
 It was necessary and 
purely instinctual; this is what souls were meant to do: to animate matter, to beautify the 
universe, and then to return to their heavenly source once their work was done. This was 
neither a question of free will nor of rationalizing through to a correct course of action, 
because for Plotinus the exercise of free will was at bottom a measure of ignorance.
377
 If, 
as the ancients held,
378
 no one could knowingly sin, then, for someone fully cognizant of 
truth, free will became a moot point; knowing agents made correct rational choices 
without having rationally to deliberate and choose. That some souls turned from their 
rational source and, in their material existences, became self-absorbed and lapsed into 
intellectual dysfunction presented the usual paradoxes that bedevil lapsarian myths—how 
could souls succumb to tolma if they enjoyed the divine vision?—but their lapse in no 
wise justified the Gnostics’ sweeping rejection of the entire rational architecture of 
universe. For the universe was basically good, the product of rational action from the 
divine, and the discord therein was limited only to the dissensions of one quarter. Even 
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so, the innate law would weigh heavily even on these dissenting souls and create in them 
a painful longing so that eventually they would break the cycle of punitive transmigration 
and, through their uncovering in themselves the truth, turn back heavenward.
379
 Again, 
this was not so much a question of an exaggerated remedial will that aimed at undoing 
the effects of some ancestral errant-will, but an opening of oneself to a philosophy that 
“inculcates simplicity of character and honest thinking in addition to all other good 
qualities...it cultivates reverence and not arrogant self-assertion...its boldness is balanced 
by reason, by careful proof, by cautious progression, by the utmost circumspection.”380 
This dispassionate method of working through the human situation meshed perfectly with 
Plotinus’ vision of a universe operating along the ordered lines of necessity. As E. R. 
Dodds put it, “Whatever his earlier doubts, Plotinus emerges in the end as an upholder of 
Hellenic rationalism.”381 
 
PLOTINUS’ CONTRACTION OF WILL 
In the face of Gnostic hyperbole, we see Plotinus curtail the extent to which will 
could be invoked as a factor in both theological and cosmological questions. Clearly, he 
found little satisfaction in the Gnostics’ portrayal of the supra-rational will of God 
overpowering an irrational, or at least ignorant, desire that arose among his subordinates, 
and he took steps to delimit its role in his system. Such commitment to volition as a 
theological factor led only to irrational superstition, for will was an index of irrationality. 
He made clear that will had no role whatever in the generation of the divine hypostases, 
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and left no trace of it in the descent of individual souls, which included humans’ souls, to 
matter. Only in the course of certain souls’ enmatterment did the question of will arise, as 
tolma, a narcissistic self-pride and absorption that drew souls away from their proper 
purpose. But even this was not so much a question of capricious choice as allowing 
oneself to turn from truths already known. These truths led one to a panorama of a 
universe built on the necessity of how things simply are. This does not mean that there 
was only compulsion and no freedom. Though this study has consciously tried to limit 
the conversation on will to its function in models of divine plurality, I cannot avoid 
closing this section with a long quote from J. M. Rist, which shows how in Plotinus even 
will, and the free exercise thereof in the human sphere, was but a question of knowledge 
and rationality: 
“Freedom then for Plotinus is not simply equivalent to the power of choice. 
Rather it is a freedom from that necessity of choice which the passions impose. 
The soul that hesitates between good and evil is not free, nor is such a choice 
godlike. What is godlike is the desire for the truth and achievement of it, and this 
is a power available to a purified soul. It is an optimistic philosophy, but in 
Plotinus’ world, where salvation by any miraculous act of God is excluded, it is 
the only alternative to despair. Were man to be unable to choose the right without 
additional help from God, then he would not choose the right at all.”382 
Indeed, the notion of God as imagined by the Gnostics, as a being moved by inscrutable 
motives, had no place in Plotinus’ thought. 
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IRENAEUS 
In this period of theological ferment came Irenaeus’ (d. ca. 202) contribution to 
the conversation. A Greek, resident in Gaul and prelate of the Church in Lugdunum, 
Irenaeus had intricate knowledge—he is one of our most complete and systematic 
sources—of the various Gnostic factions, including the Valentinians on whom we have 
focused, but also of the various philosophical streams surrounding him. His contribution 
to the question of will in the understanding of the Trinity has enormous implications for 
our question of will for in it one saw for the first time in Christian theology the complete 
elimination of God’s willful agency from the internal life of the Trinity and its limitation 
exclusively to his interactions with creation. Irenaeus expressed no specific objection 
against the Valentinian application of will, but the fact that it was concomitant with their 
fissional view of the divinity directly implicated it in his accusation that they had 
abandoned the very principles of monotheism. For Plotinus, who wrote later than 
Irenaeus, will was a corollary of ignorance, and its prominence in theology had to be 
stemmed in order to preserve the sense of the universe’s underlying rationality. In 
Irenaeus, will was eliminated from the internals of the divine life as part of his quest of 
restoring the sense of unity in the Trinity. Thus, although he was aware of, and in fact 
influenced by, Justin, Irenaeus was evidently uninterested in following him and 
examining the triune God after the cosmological method first established by Philo, 
wherein was traced the movement from the Father’s primordial solitude to the generation 
of the Son/Logos as the intermediary step to the creation of the world. In such a theology 
there was a level of distinction between Father and Son that was mediated by an act of 
will. Irenaeus, however, rejected all suggestions of sequence when it came to the Trinity, 
134 
preferring what one might call an unfathomable simultaneity, wherein he affirmed the 
Son’s inexplicable ever-presence with the Father. Of its nature, such a relation surpassed 
all human understanding. Thus, in what was a favorite image of his,
383
 Irenaeus presented 
the Son and the Spirit as God’s hands, by which he created the world. The implication 
was that, in the same way that a human is never without hands, the Father was never 
without the Son and Spirit.
384
 They were the outer face of the Father’s contact with the 
world, ever-present extensions of the Father, through which he created the world. On the 
other hand, a negative inference the critical observer could have drawn from the hand 
imagery was that in this scheme the Son and Spirit were not really personal, or at least 
they defied conventional human parameters of personhood: to be autonomous, willing 
beings that chose to love and be unified with the same. 
Irenaeus’ voluminous work, Against Heresies, written in his native Greek but 
surviving mostly in Latin,
385
 was directed against all the Gnostic groups known to him. 
Most prominent among these were the disciples of Valentinus, whom he attacked first 
and most extensively. Their errors were legion, but their gravest was that they had “fallen 
away from unity, and taken up the doctrine of manifold deities.”386 Using both Scripture 
and the philosophical, generally neo-Platonist, principles within his reach, Irenaeus set 
about restoring the Valentinians to this unity. Their central claim that the creator of the 
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universe was not the true God but a lesser deity that was the product of disturbance in the 
divine realm which consisted of a host of hypostases, or eons, became the chief target of 
his attacks.
387
  
 
“ANOTHER GOD BEYOND GOD” 
High in Irenaeus’ sights was the Valentinian claim that the creator of the world 
was not God. It flew in the face of the testimony of the prophets, Christ, the apostles, and 
their lineal successors in the Church, who all affirmed the opposite position that, namely, 
the heavenly Father, the highest deity, and the Creator of the world were one and the 
same being.
388
 There was no reason to prefer the Valentinians over such, far weightier 
testimony.
389
 However, this was not really a dispute over biblical interpretation but about 
how to reconcile the fact of an imperfect world with a supposedly perfect creator and/or 
first principle. Both sides agreed there was a creator, but for the Valentinians the world’s 
imperfection showed that this creator was not the ultimate, but at best some intermediary, 
principle in the universe.
390
 A perfect God would not create such an imperfect world or 
even deign directly to exercise providence over it.
391
 Thus, they posited “another god 
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beyond God,”392 Bythos, whom they depicted as uninvolved in the creation of the world 
in order “to guard against attributing want of power to him.”393 The want of power lay 
with the Demiurge, that lesser being that was generated of the animal effluent of 
Achamoth and was ignorant of both Achamoth and the Pleroma from which she had been 
ejected. His relationship to Achamoth was seen as a reflection of the relationship between 
Bythos and Nous—except that the Demiurge had no awareness of Achamoth—and his 
creations were taken as reflections of the eons in the Pleroma.
394
 All this created a 
sufficient remove between the cause of this world and the supreme Bythos, who, 
dwelling in the invisible and ineffable heights, remained perfect, pre-existent, eternal, 
unbegotten, invisible, and incomprehensible.
395
 This remove from the world was not just 
causal, but also epistemological. Being wholly untied to the making and maintenance of 
the world, he was also unknowable because he lay outside the cognitive categories of this 
world. For the Valentinians, a deity that had “come within reach of human knowledge” 
earned only their disdain.
396
 To be sure, Irenaeus dismissed their Bythos as a mere revival 
of “the god of Epicurus, who does nothing either for himself or others [and]...exercises no 
                                                                                                                                                 
specific offender here) held that a providential God was beneath what a real God should be. They 
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providence at all,”397 but he was now presented with two new problems that required 
answers if he was to maintain that God the Father was the Creator. 
The first, the classic problem of how to explain the imperfection in a world 
created by a good and perfect God, was dealt with through the standard biblical means of 
recalling Eden and the role of the devil in leading the ancestors to disobedience and 
death.
398
 This explanation, of course, took the cause of imperfection away the divine 
sphere, where the Gnostics had placed it, and planted it firmly within the realm of the free 
will of creatures.
399
 God allowed this adversity to ensue only because he foresaw that, in 
his plan, greater good would eventually come of it.
400
 
The second issue focused on the Valentinians’ insistence on the unknowability 
and remoteness of God and how this challenged Irenaeus’ belief in a God who was 
known through his activity, both natural and supernatural, in the world. We recall that 
God’s unfathomability was a key element in Valentinian theology. Apart from isolating 
Bythos from the imperfect world, it also served as one of the causes, if only passively, of 
the disturbance in the Pleroma by becoming the thing yearned for by the lower 
hypostases. The notion of a singular, transcendent supreme principle was nothing new in 
this period, and on this point Irenaeus stayed true to the prevailing mind. His work, too, 
was permeated throughout with unequivocal statements of God’s unknowability and 
complete otherness from the world, and these would prove most useful to his theology. 
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Against an ever-shifting creation that was “compound, mutable and transient,”401 
Irenaeus placed an increate, simplex and immutable God,
402
 who alone was “without 
beginning and without end, being truly and forever the same, and always remaining that 
same unchangeable being.” Conversely, the things he created received their “beginning 
of generation, and on this account [were] inferior to Him who formed them, inasmuch as 
they [were] not unbegotten.”403 God fashioned the world in exact accordance with the 
“conception of His mind,”404 and was its “creator, and maker, and sustainer, and Lord.”405 
He was in no way obligated to or reliant on it;
406
 on the contrary, created things endured 
only as long as God willed “that they should have an existence and continuance.”407 The 
obvious difficulty that all this presented to Irenaeus was how to demonstrate that the 
singular God he advocated for could be both known on account of his work in the world, 
and unknown on account of his sheer supremacy. We shall see how this was resolved in 
his treatment of the second overarching question, namely the generation of the eons. 
 
THE EONS 
To be sure, Irenaeus’ transcendence theology was not an inconsequential 
appendage to his thought, but rather an integral part of it that gained some of its fullest 
expression in his attack on the Valentinians, especially with regards to their teaching on 
the eons. His lighter observations on the beliefs of his opponents had to do with the 
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arbitrary and nonsensical way they ordered their eons. First, they counted Bythos among 
the Triacontad of eons despite the fact that he was clearly of a different type from the rest 
of them. They were derived, he was not; he was incomprehensible to them all, they were 
all comprehensible to him; he was without form, they had definite shape; and, most 
serious of all, he was being enumerated with a being, Sophia, who was subject to passion 
and error.
408
 The same applied to Sige/Ennoea. If she was not generated, but was always 
with Bythos, on what basis did they include her with the other eons? And if she had 
always been united with Bythos in, one would presume, an inseparable conjunction, then 
it necessarily followed that their offspring, too, was generated from eternity, and so on, to 
include all the eons.
409
 This chain of reasoning also rendered impossible their belief that 
the last eon, Sophia, was at some moment apart from the embrace of her partner.
410
 Also, 
why were not Horos, Christ, the Holy Spirit, and Savior, who were produced after the 
disturbance, not numbered among the Triacontad?
411
 
On the other hand, the way they named these eons also made little sense. For 
example, how could Sige (silence) coexist eternally with Logos (speech) in the 
primordial Ogdoad?
412
 Or how could Bythos and Ennoea have produced Nous when the 
reverse would have been the more logical, viz. that Nous (mind) produced Ennoea 
(idea).
413
 Ennoea, Enthymesis, and Logos, as mental expressions, all should have been 
subordinate to Nous.
414
 They also erred when they suggested that Logos and Zoë (life) 
were sent forth by Nous in the fifth and sixth place when in reality neither of these could 
                                                 
408
 Haer. 2.12.1 (ANF 1:371). Irenaeus explains that the Valentinians included Bythos with the other 
hypostases because they wanted them to total thirty, Jesus’ age at baptism. 
409
 Haer. 2.12.2. 
410
 Haer. 2.12.3-4. 
411
 Haer. 2.12.7. 
412
 Haer. 2.12.5-6. 
413
 Haer. 2.13.1. 
414
 Haer. 2.13.1-2. 
140 
be considered posterior to Nous.
415
 No one could “maintain that intelligence is more 
ancient than life, for intelligence itself is life; nor that life is later than intelligence, so that 
he who is the intellect of all, that is God, should at one time have been destitute of 
life.”416 
The truth was that the Valentinians’ unfortunate muddling of the hypostases was a 
symptom of the graver theological malady that underlay their speculations. All quibbles 
over precise ordering and naming aside, the mere fact that the Valentinians chose to 
present a seriate hierarchy of hypostases in the godhead was the clearest evidence that 
they were applying to God what were really the “affections, and passions, and mental 
tendencies of men.”417 Humans were “compound by nature,” consisting of a body and a 
soul,
418
 and thus were characterized by division, discursiveness, and sequence in their 
thinking and acting. This is why one could say of the human mind that “thought [sprang] 
from mind, intention again from thought, and word (logos) from intention.”419 Humans 
also lacked constancy. Sometimes they were “at rest and silent,” at other times “speaking 
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and active,”420 and even in speaking the tongue could barely keep up with the mind 
because of the haphazard interaction of soul with body.
421
 
But it was wrong to say these things of God. Isaiah
422
 had declared that God’s 
ways, counsels, and thoughts were unlike those of humans,
423
 and Irenaeus took it to 
mean that the fragmented, sequential ways of human life and thought simply had no place 
in a proper understanding of God. Where the Valentinians imposed sequence and 
fragmentation, Irenaeus saw there could only be oneness and simultaneity: 
“He is a simple, uncompounded Being, without diverse members, and altogether 
like, and equal to himself, since He is wholly understanding, and wholly spirit, 
and wholly thought, and wholly intelligence, and wholly reason, and wholly 
hearing, and wholly seeing, and wholly light, and the whole source of all that is 
good—even as the religious and pious are wont to speak concerning God.”424 
Irenaeus was moving well beyond Scripture here and disclosing a set of theological 
premises in keeping with the broader theological milieu.
425
 Against the Valentinians’ 
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 Haer. 2.28.4 (ANF 1:400 [PG 7:808A]): “...et aliquando quidem quiescere, et tacere hominem, 
aliquando autem loqui, et operari.” 
421
 Haer. 2.28.4 (ANF 1:400 [PG 7:808A]): “Our tongue, as being carnal, is not sufficient to minister to the 
rapidity of the human mind, inasmuch as that is of a spiritual nature, for which reason our word is 
restrained within us and is not at once expressed as it has been conceived by the mind, but is uttered by 
successive efforts, just as the tongue is able to serve it” (“Velocitati enim sensus hominum propter spiritale 
ejus non sufficit lingua deservire, quippe carnalis exsistens: unde et intus suffocatur verbum nostrum, et 
profertur non de semel, sicut conceptum est a sensu; sed per partes, secundum quod lingua subministrare 
praevalet”). 
422
 Is. 55:8-9. 
423
 Haer. 2.13.3. 
424
 Haer. 2.13.3 (ANF 1:374 [PG 7:744A]): “et simplex, et non compositus, et similimembrius, et totus ipse 
sibimetipsi similis, et aequalis est, totus cum sit sensus et totus spiritus, et totus sensuabilitas, et totus 
ennoia, et totus ratio, et totus auditus, et totus oculus, et totus lumen, et totus fons omnium bonorum; 
quemadmodum adest religiosis ac piis dicere de Deo.”  
425
 Irenaeus’ near contemporary, Plotinus (Enn. V.1.4), would employ very similar language when 
contrasting the wholeness and simultaneity of Nous compared to the discursiveness and sequentiality of 
Soul: “Soul deals with thing after thing—now Socrates; now a horse: always some one entity from among 
beings—but the Nous is all and therefore its entire content is simultaneously present in that identity: this is 
pure being in eternal actuality; nowhere is there any future, for every then is a now; nor is there any past, 
for nothing there has ever ceased to be; everything has taken its stand for ever, an identity well pleased, we 
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depiction of a serialized extension of the godhead through the generation of the 
autonomous eons, which, as we saw, ultimately led to conflict and division in the divine 
sphere, Irenaeus took the step of identifying these eons with the attributes of God, which, 
he argued, had to inhere in him simultaneously and from all time: 
“These and such like attributes have not been produced according to a gradual 
scale of descent, but they are names of those perfections which always exist in 
God, so far as it is possible and proper for men to hear and to speak of God. For 
the name of God the following words will harmonize: intelligence, word, life, 
incorruption, truth, wisdom, goodness and such like.”426 
Although Irenaeus did not go to the trouble of explaining how each and every one of the 
thirty eons as the Valentinians conceived them might be reconceptualized as a divine 
perfection, his strategy was unmistakable: to pit one type of monotheist model popular in 
late antiquity—namely, the sort he loosely subscribed to, which argued that the apparent 
divisions in the godhead were superficialities underlain by divine unity
427—against 
another, that is the idea that the order in the divine sphere resembled that which one 
                                                                                                                                                 
might say, to be as it is; and everything, in that entire content, is Nous and Authentic Existence; and the 
total of all is Nous entire and Being entire.” 
426
 Haer. 2.13.9 (ANF 1:375 [PG 7:748A]): “Et non secundum descensionem, et quae sunt talia acceperunt 
emissiones; sed earum virtutum quae semper sunt cum Deo, appelationes sunt, quemadmodum possibile est 
et dignum homonibus audire et dicere de Deo. Appellationi enim Dei coobaudiuntur sensus, et verbum, et 
vita, et incorruptela, et veritas, et sapientia, et bonitas et omnia talia.”  
427
 See, e.g., Ps. Aristotle [Mund.] 401
a
12-26: “God being one yet has many names, being called after all 
the various conditions which he himself inaugurates. We call him Zen and Zeus, using the two names in the 
same sense, as though we should say him through whom we live [i.e. Ζῆνα from ζῆν; Δία from δι’ ὅν]. He is 
called son of Kronos and of Time, for he endures from the eternal age to age. He is God of lightning and 
thunder, God of the clear sky and of ether, God of the thunderbolt and of rain, so called after the rain and 
the thunderbolts and other physical phenomena...deriving his names from all natural phenomena and 
conditions, inasmuch as he is himself the cause of all things” (trans. E. S. Forster in The Complete Works of 
Aristotle: the Revised Oxford Translation, ed. Jonathan Barnes [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1991]). In Apuleius’ Hymn of Isis (Metam. 11.5) we read: “Behold, Lucius, moved by your prayers I have 
come, I the mother of the universe, mistress of all the elements, and first offspring of the ages; mightiest of 
deities, queen of the dead, and foremost of heavenly beings; my one person manifests the aspect of all gods 
and goddesses...My divinity is one, worshipped by all the world under different forms, with various rites, 
and by manifold names” (trans. J. Arthur Hanson in Apuleius’ Metamorphoses: Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1999). 
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found in human, typically administrative, affairs,
428
 and in which category one could also 
group the Valentinian system on account of the top-down volitional symphony that held 
it together. It is no surprise that this second general system was one that more than one 
Christian apologist identified with his pagan counterparts, which Irenaeus was also quick 
to do of the Valentinians.
429
 
With the sense of oneness against the Valentinians’ dangerous “doctrine of 
manifold deities”430 secure, Irenaeus’ next move went in an entirely different direction. 
Here he began to argue that, although it was good and proper to predicate the 
abovementioned perfections of God which came together in the divine simplicity, one 
                                                 
428
 See e.g. what Origen says of Celsus (Cels. 8.35 [ANF 4:652]): “Now let us consider another saying of 
Celsus, which is as follows: ‘The satrap of a Persian or Roman monarch, or ruler or general or governor, 
yea, even those who fill lower offices of trust or service in the state, would be able to do great injury to 
those who despised them; and will the satraps and ministers of earth and air be insulted with impunity?’ 
Observe now how he introduces servants of the Most High—rulers, generals, governors, and those filling 
lower offices of trust and service—as, after the manner of men, inflicting injury upon those who insult 
them”; or Aelius Aristides (Or. 43): Zeus, the supreme deity, was “the beginning of all things and all things 
come from Zeus...”(9); he gave “to the gods to dwell in heaven, as it were the acropolis of the universe” 
(14); “each one of all the tribes of the gods has an effluent from the power of Zeus, the father of all things, 
and indeed like Homer’s chord, all are attached to him” (15); “first of all he begot Love and Necessity, 
these two powers which are most unifying and strong, so that they might hold the universe together for 
him” (16); “thus he gave preeminence, rule, and leadership to the gods” (17); “and he gave the four regions 
to the gods, so that nothing anywhere might be without gods” (18); “and the benefits of the gods are the 
work of Zeus, and all the gods care for mankind keeping to the position assigned by him, as it were, in an 
army by the general of all” (26) (From P. Aelius Aristides’ Orations [from The Complete Works, trans. 
Charles A. Behr [Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1981]). Julian the Apostate (preserved in Cyril of Alexandria’s Contr. 
Jul. IV [PG 76:677B]) held that: “Our writers say that the creator is the common father and king of all, but 
that the remaining [needs] of the nations have been assigned by him to national gods and guardian deities 
of cities, every one of whom administers his own province in his own characteristic way. For since, in the 
father, all things are complete and all things are one, it follows that in the individual deities one power or 
another predominates. Therefore Ares administers the warlike nations, Athena those wise and warlike, and 
Hermes those more wise than daring, so that the nations administered by both [παρὰ σφῶν—i.e. the father 
and their individual god] follow the respective essential character of their proper god.” 
429
 Haer. 2.14.1 (ANF 1:376). Irenaeus claimed a close resemblance between the Valentinians’ theology 
and the account of one Antiphanes, “one of the ancient comic poets,” who in his Theogony spoke of “Chaos 
as being produced from Night and Silence...that then Love sprang from Chaos and Night; from this again, 
Light; and that from this, in his opinion, were derived all the rest of the first generation of the gods.” The 
Valentinians had merely changed the names of these deities: “In place of Night and Silence they substitute 
Bythos and Sige; instead of Chaos, they put Nous; and for Love (by whom, says the comic poet, all other 
things were set in order) they have brought forward the Word; while for the primary and greatest gods they 
have formed the Æons; and in place of the secondary gods, they tell us of that creation by their mother 
which is outside of the Pleroma, calling it the second Ogdoad.” Thus, Irenaeus lamented, the Valentinians 
had incorporated into their theology the very things that were being performed in the theaters. 
430
 Haer. 4.33.3 (ANF 1:507 [PG 7:1074A]): “incidere in multiforme dei judicium.” 
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had also to recognize that God himself remained “above these properties, and therefore 
indescribable.”431 While it was correct to call God an Understanding that comprehends all 
things, he was not like the understanding of humans. He could be called Light, but he was 
wholly unlike the light with which people were familiar. By extension, therefore, God 
was above the human understanding of all the attributes that were ascribed to him. Of 
course, this was an enlargement of Isaiah’s principle that God’s ways differed from 
humans’ ways: the “Father of all is in no degree similar to human weakness.”432 This 
amounted to a strident declaration of the divine unknown, and the most glaring problem 
was whether these attributions that were applied to God were functionally meaningless if 
they were always meant in a way that surpassed human understanding? No. Irenaeus 
clarified: “He is spoken of in these terms according to love; but in point of greatness, our 
thoughts regarding him transcend these expressions.”433 
 
TWO ASPECTS OF GOD: GREATNESS AND LOVE 
These were the beginnings of a distinction between God’s greatness and his love 
that Irenaeus would invoke over and again, that helped him to steer the conversation into 
a more specifically Christian and Trinitarian direction and put into words a theory of the 
triune deity that both reinforced divine unity against the Valentinians and eased the 
tension over the God who was both known and unknown. Irenaeus had first mentioned 
the idea of greatness in connection with Bythos. We recall that Nous alone was capable 
                                                 
431
 Haer. 2.13.4 (ANF 1:374 [PG 7:744B]): “Est autem et super haec, et propter haec inenarrabilis.” 
432
 Haer. 2.13.4 (ANF 1:374 [PG 7:744B]): “nulli similis erit omnium Pater hominum pusillitati.”  
433
 Haer. 2.13.4 (ANF 1:374 [PG 7:744B]): “...Et dicitur quidem secundum haec propter delectionem, 
sentitur autem super haec secundum magnitudinem.” 
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of comprehending Bythos’ greatness (μέγεθος),434 and that he not only exulted in 
beholding this greatness (μέγεθος) but also meditated how he might communicate it to the 
other eons.
435
 Sophia’s desire too had been to comprehend his greatness (μέγεθος),436 and 
the fact that none could contemplate his greatness (magnitudinem) led to passion in the 
Pleroma.
437
 Irenaeus was happy to take this term greatness, which he also correlated with 
God’s substantia,438 and apply it to that aspect of God that was beyond the reach of 
human cognition. Yet, a focus solely on God’s greatness gave only half of the story. 
Unlike the “Epicurean”439 Bythos of the Valentinians, which had no rapport with creation 
whatsoever, the God that Irenaeus preached was a God that had revealed himself and was 
known. Irenaeus called this outward moving aspect of God that underlay his activity in 
the world God’s “love” (dilectionem): the Creator, 
“who has granted this world to the human race, and who, as regards his greatness, 
is indeed unknown to all who have been made by him (for no man has searched 
out his height, either among the ancients who have gone to their rest, or any of 
those who are now alive); but as regards his love, he is always known through 
him by whose means he ordained all things.”440 
                                                 
434
 Haer. 1.1.1 (PG 7:445B). 
435
 Haer. 1.2.1 (PG 7:452B). 
436
 Haer. 1.2.2 (PG 7:453B). 
437
 Haer. 2.7.10 (PG 7:453B). 
438
 Haer. 3.24.2 (PG 7:967B): “...in agnitionem autem non secundum magnitudinem, nec secundum 
substantiam.” 
439
 Haer. 3.24.2. 
440
 Haer. 4.20.4 (ANF 1:488 [PG 7:1034AB]): “qui et mundum hunc attribuit humano generi, qui secundum 
magnitudinem quidem ignotus est omnibus his, qui ab eo facti sunt (nemo enim investigavit altitudinem 
ejus, nec veterum, qui quieverunt, nec eorum qui nunc sunt); secundum autem dilectionem cognoscitur 
semper per eum, per quem constituit omnia.”  
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To be sure, the fact that God’s nature was above speculation meant that the initiative in 
his unveiling rested entirely with the Father—“God cannot be known without God,”441 as 
Irenaeus put it so well.
442
 Of course, the Father’s “express will” was that he should be 
known,
443
 and the channel through which he was made manifest—this abovementioned 
principle “by whose means he ordained all things”—was the Son, as Scripture 
declared:
444
 “No man knoweth the Son, but the Father; neither knoweth any man the 
Father, save the Son, and he to whom the Son has willed to reveal [Him].”445 The Father 
revealed “the Son, that through His instrumentality He [the Father] might be manifested 
to all.”446 The agency of the Son in revealing the Father found exquisite expression in 
Irenaeus’ epigrammatic “the Father is the invisible of the Son, the Son is the visible of 
the Father.”447 The Son revealed “the knowledge of the Father through His own 
manifestation. For the manifestation of the Son is the knowledge of the Father; for all 
things are manifested through the Word.”448 Thus the Son/Word became the principle by 
which the Father acted and revealed Himself ad extra, in this divine outward movement 
that Irenaeus called God’s “love.” This work began with creation, with the Father 
                                                 
441
 Haer. 4.6.4 (ANF 1:468 [PG 7:989A]): “ἄνευ Θεοῦ μὴ γινώσκεσθαι τὸν Θεόν.” 
442
 Cf. Haer. 4.6.4 (ANF 1:468 [PG 7:988C]): “No man is capable of knowing God, unless he be taught of 
God” (“Θεὸν εἰδέναι οὐδεὶς δύναται, μὴ οὐχὶ Θεοῦ δοξάζοντος”); Haer. 4.20.5 (ANF 1:489 [PG 7:1035A]): “Man 
does not see God by his own powers; but when He pleases He is seen by men, by whom He wills, and 
when He wills, and as He wills” (“Homo etenim a se non videt Deum. Ille autem volens videtur hominibus, 
quibus vult, et quando vult, et quemadmodum vult”). 
443
 Haer. 4.6.4 (ANF 1:468 [PG 7:989A]): “αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ γινώσκεσθαι τὸν Θεόν, θέλημα εἶναι τοῦ Πατρός.” 
444
 Mt. 11:27; Lk. 10:22; cf. Jn. 1:18 (cited in Haer. 4.20.6). 
445
 Haer. 4.6.1 (ANF 1:467 [PG 7:986C]): “Verbum ejus, per quem cognoscitur Deus, dicebat: ‘Nemo 
cognoscit Filium nisi Pater, neque Patrem quis cognoscit nisi Filius, et cui voluerit Filius revelare.’” 
446
 Haer. 4.6.5 (ANF 1:468 [PG 7:989A]): “Et ad hoc Filium revelavit Pater, ut per eum omnibus 
manifestetur.” 
447
 Haer. 4.6.6 (ANF 1:469 [PG 7:989C]): “invisibile etenim Filii Pater, visibile autem Patris Filius.” 
448
 Haer. 4.6.3 (ANF 1:468 [PG 7:988A]): “Et propter hoc Filius revelat agnitionem Patris per suam 
manifestationem. Agnitio enim Patris, est Filii manifestatio: omnia enim per Verbum manifestantur.” Cf. 
Haer. 4.6.7 (ANF 1:469 [PG 7:990B]): “The Son is the knowledge of the Father, but the knowledge of the 
Son is in the Father, and has been revealed through the Son” (“Agnitio enim Patris, Filius; agnitio autem 
Filii in Patre, et per Filium revelata”). 
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creating the world through the Son.
449
 The more intrusive the Word’s intervention was in 
the world, the more profound was his disclosure of the Father—but also of the Son 
himself
450—to the world. The most penetrating work of the Son was, of course, his 
incarnation, through which, as new Adam, he inaugurated a renewed, recapitulated 
human history, freed from the enslavement of sin.
451
 Thus the Son was presented as the 
“dispenser of paternal grace,” and his work balanced between, first, preserving the 
Father’s invisibility, “lest man at any time become a despiser of God” and thus not 
“possess something towards which he might advance,” and, second, revealing enough of 
God to humans, lest they, “falling away from God altogether, should cease to exist.”452 
Communication between God and humans was central to Irenaeus’ theology: “the glory 
of God,” he declared, “is a living man; and the life of a man consists in beholding 
God.”453 And so the whole of history since the fall consisted of God’s not allowing the 
serpent to be triumphant,
454
 but to enact an unfolding plan of re-acquainting humanity 
                                                 
449
 And, as we shall see, the Spirit. 
450
 Haer. 4.6.5 (ANF 1:468-9 [PG 7:989AB]): “The Father therefore has revealed Himself to all, by making 
His Word visible to all; and, conversely, the Word has declared to all the Father and the Son, since He has 
become visible to all” (“Omnibus igitur revelavit se Pater, omnibus Verbum suum visibile faciens: et rursus 
Verbum omnibus ostendebat Patrem et Filium cum ab omnibus videretur”).  
451
 Haer. 3.18.7 (ANF 1:448 [PG 7:938BC]): “Thus, then, was the Word of God made man, as also Moses 
says: ‘God, true are His works’ (Deut. 32:4). But if, not having been made flesh, He did appear as if flesh, 
His work was not a true one. But what He did appear, that He also was: God recapitulated in Himself the 
ancient formation of man, that He might kill sin, deprive death of its power, and vivify man; and therefore 
His works are true” (“Sic igitur Verbum Dei homo factus est, quemadmodum et Moyses ait: ‘Deus, vera 
opera ejus.’ Si autem non factus caro, parebat quasi caro, non erat verum opus ejus. Quod autem parebat, 
hoc et erat; Deus hominis antiquam plasmationem in se recapitulans, ut occideret quidem peccatum, 
evacuaret autem mortem, et vivificaret hominem et propter hoc vera opera ejus”). 
452
 Haer. 4.20.7 (ANF 1:489-490 [PG 7:1037B]): “Et propterea Verbum dispensator paternae gratiae factus 
est ad utilitatem hominum, propter quos fecit tantas dispositiones, hominibus quidem ostendens Deum, Deo 
autem exhibens hominem: et invisibilitatem quidem Patris custodiens, ne quando homo fieret contemptor 
Dei, et ut semper haberet ad quod proficeret; visibilem autem rursus hominibus per multas dispositiones 
ostendens Deum, ne in totum deficiens a Deo homo, cessaret esse.” 
453
 Haer. 4.20.7 (ANF 1:490 [PG 7:1037B]): “Gloria enim Dei vivens homo, vita autem hominis visio Dei.”  
454
 Haer. 3.23.1 (ANF 1:455 [PG 7:960B]): “For if man, who had been created by God that he might live, 
after losing life, through being injured by the serpent that had corrupted him, should not any more return to 
life, but should be utterly [and for ever] abandoned to death, God would [in that case] have been conquered, 
and the wickedness of the serpent would have prevailed over the will of God” (“Si enim qui factus fuerat a 
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with himself, “in regular order and connection, at the fitting time for the benefit [of 
humankind].”455 The end point of this revelatory process would come at the eschaton, at 
which time, even though under normal circumstances it was an impossibility to see God, 
God supernaturally would make the impossible possible and allow the faithful the view 
of his fullness.
456
 
 
THE BLANKET OF MYSTERY SHROUDS THE WILL 
The understanding of the Son as the perceivable aspect of the otherwise 
unknowable Father required explication. The natural questions that arose had to do with 
the origin of the Son, and the nature of his relationship with the Father. These Irenaeus 
subordinated to the notion of God’s unity: “God being all Mind, and all Logos, both 
speaks exactly what he thinks, and thinks exactly what he speaks.”457 In other words, God 
could not be said to be one thing and his mind another as if there were separation 
between them. God was not separated from his Logos. Scripture talked of the Son as 
being the only-begotten of the Father, but his sonship implied division from the Father 
only if one looked at it in terms of human generation, which was characterized by fission, 
                                                                                                                                                 
Deo homo, ut viveret, hic amittens vitam laesus serpente qui depravaverat eum, jam non reverteretur ad 
vitam, sed in totum projectus esset morti; victus esset Deus, et superasset serpentis nequitia voluntatem 
Dei”). 
455
 Haer. 4.20.7 (ANF 1:489 [PG 7:1037A]): “The Son of the Father declares [Him] from the beginning, 
inasmuch as He was with the Father from the beginning…in regular order and connection, at the fitting 
time for the benefit [of humankind]. For where there is a regular succession, there is also fixedness; and 
where fixedness, there suitability to the period; and where suitability, there also utility” (“Enarrat ergo ab 
initio Filius Patris, quippe qui ab initio est cum Patre, qui et visiones propheticas, et divisiones 
charismatum, et ministeria sua, et Patris glorificationem consequenter et composite ostenderit humano 
generi, apto tempore ad utilitatem”). 
456
 Haer. 4.20.5 (ANF 1:489). 
457
 Haer. 2.28.5 (ANF 1:400 [PG 7:808AB]): “Deus autem totus exsistens mens, et totus exsistens Logos, 
quod cogitat, hoc et loquitur; et quod loquitur, hoc et cogitat.” 
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and ignored Irenaeus’ warning that human norms were inapplicable to the godhead.458 
The nature of the Son’s begetting was simply beyond human speculation. Scripture itself 
had made this clear when it declared that none “shall describe his generation” (Is. 
53:8).
459
 On this we must quote Irenaeus at length: 
“If any one, therefore, says to us, ‘How then was the Son produced by the 
Father?’ we reply to him, that no man understands that production, or generation, 
or calling, or revelation, or by whatever name one may describe His generation, 
which is in fact altogether indescribable. Neither Valentinus, nor Marcion, nor 
Saturninus, nor Basilides, nor angels, nor archangels, nor principalities, nor 
powers [possess this knowledge], but the Father only who begat, and the Son who 
was begotten. Since therefore His generation is unspeakable, those who strive to 
set forth generations and productions cannot be in their right mind, inasmuch as 
they undertake to describe things which are indescribable. For that a word is 
uttered at the bidding of thought and mind, all men indeed well understand. 
Those, therefore, who have excogitated [the theory of] emissions have not 
discovered anything great, or revealed any abstruse mystery, when they have 
simply transferred what all understand to the only-begotten Word of God; and 
while they style Him unspeakable and unnameable, they nevertheless set forth the 
production and formation of His first generation, as if they themselves had 
                                                 
458
 Haer. 2.28.5 (ANF 1:400-401 [PG 7:808BC]): “...ye pretend to set forth His generation from the Father, 
and ye transfer the production of the word of men which takes place by means of a tongue to the Word of 
God, and thus are righteously exposed by your own selves as knowing neither things human nor divine” 
(“Vos autem generationem ejus ex Patre divinantes, et verbi hominum per linguam factam prolationem 
transferentes in Verbum Dei, juste detegimini a vobis ipsis, quod neque humana, nec divina noveritis”). 
459
 Haer. 2.28.5 (ANF 1:400). 
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assisted at His birth, thus assimilating Him to the word of mankind formed by 
emissions.”460 
In short, the nature of the Father’s begetting of the Son was unknown and impossible ever 
to know, and one could not explain it using human parameters. One of the key collateral 
implications of the inscrutable nature of the Son’s generation was the similarly 
impenetrable question of the role of will in the begetting or even in the continued relation 
between the Father and the Son. It was thenceforth a matter that was impossible to 
speculate on because Irenaeus had, at a stroke, left no place for it in the inner life of God. 
In a similar way to how God’s attributes were said to come together in the divine 
simplicity in a mode that defied human understanding, so too was the begetting of the 
Son now put forth as leaving the divine oneness inviolate in a way that was also 
unfathomable. All one could know was that the Son was the visible aspect of the invisible 
Father, the “knowledge of the Father,”461 and what process instituted this theological 
datum lay beyond the limits of human knowledge. To be sure, there remained the strong 
sense of the Son and the Holy Spirit acting in strict accordance with the will of the 
Father, but never was their work ever implied to be contingent. Rather, as extensions or 
aspects of the Father, their action was always one that could not have any other motor but 
                                                 
460
 Haer. 2.28.6 (ANF 1:401 [PG 7:809AB]): “Si quis itaque nobis dixerit: Quomodo ergo Filius prolatus a 
Patre est? dicimus ei, quia prolationem istam, sive generationem, sive nuncupationem, sive adapertionem 
aut quolibet quis nomine vocaverit generationem ejus inenarrabilem exsistentem, nemo novit; non 
Valentinus, non Marcion, neque Saturninus, neque Basilides, neque Angeli, neque Archangeli, neque 
Principes, neque Potestates, nisi solus qui generavit Pater, et qui natus est Filius. Inenarrabilis itaque 
generatio ejus cum sit, quicunque nituntur generationes et prolationes enarrare, non sunt compotes sui, ea 
quae inenarrabilia sunt enarrare promittentes. Quoniam enim ex cogitatione et sensu verbum emittitur, hoc 
utique omnes sciunt homines. Non ergo magnum quid invenerunt, qui emissiones excogitaverunt, neque 
absconditum mysterium, si id quod ab omnibus intelligitur, transtulerunt in unigenitum Dei Verbum: et 
quem inenarrabilem et innominabilem vocant, hunc, quasi ipsi obstetricaverint, primae generationis ejus 
prolationem et generationem enuntiant, assimilantes eum hominum verbo emissionis.” 
461
 Haer. 4.6.7 (ANF 1:469 [PG 7:990B]): “Agnitio enim Patris, Filius; agnitio autem Filii in Patre, et per 
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Filius, et quibuscunque Filius revelaverit.’” 
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the will of the Father.
462
 The sphere of contingent will remained only the domain that lay 
wholly outside the divine interior, in creation, where the struggle between disobedience 
and obedience to the divine will was played out. Satan apostatized from God of his own 
free will, and instead of blaming his own “voluntary disposition,” he chose to blame God 
for his fall.
463
 By falsehoods, he then provoked the disobedience of Adam and Eve.
464
 
Not to permit Adam and Eve to be “abandoned unto death” and thus allow the serpent’s 
wickedness to prevail “over the will of God,”465 the divine plan rectified the ancestral 
disobedience through the obedience, even unto death, of the new Adam, Christ.
466
 In the 
new Adam there was no sense of contingency in his obedience, for he was of the Father. 
His was an obedience and passion that brought knowledge of the Father—unlike the 
passion of the Valentinians’ Sophia, which was born of ignorance of the Father, and 
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464
 Haer. 5.23.1 (ANF 1:551). 
465
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established ignorance and error in the world.
467
 Thus was fulfilled the incarnate Son’s 
mission: “by his passion [he] destroyed death, and dispersed error, and put an end to 
corruption, and destroyed ignorance, while he manifested life and revealed truth, and 
bestowed the gift of incorruption.”468 In keeping with the Irenaeus’ idea of a perfect 
inversion and recapitulation of human history in the incarnation, he also saw the new Eve 
in the Virgin Mary.
469
 Unlike the old Eve, the Virgin Mary was obedient to God, 
although, Irenaeus noted, she “was persuaded to be obedient to God.”470 Unlike that of 
her Son, who was the incarnate Word of God, her obedience was contingent, and “what 
the virgin Eve had bound fast through unbelief, this did the virgin Mary set free through 
faith.”471 For to “believe in God is to do his will.”472 And now that the Son had come to 
reveal the father, there was no excuse for those who, though they have seen, choose to 
turn away.
473
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Thus, the elimination of the will from the divine sphere, which had been the 
motor of division from original simplicity in both the Valentinian and early Plotinian 
systems, through the invocation of divine transcendence became the means of reinforcing 
the divine unity that Irenaeus so sought. This marked the earliest appearance of a 
strategy, that would enjoy some longevity, of eliminating will as a theological factor in 
order to ensure the divine unity in the face of such theologies where will was the cause of 
unseemly fracture in the divine sphere. It is nigh impossible to prove that will was the 
deliberate and not collateral target of Irenaeus’ strategy, for he made no specific reference 
to it with respect to the internal relations in the godhead. Nevertheless, it was a strategy 
that was to be employed again by those theologies, which later would make their 
denunciations of will in the divine sphere explicit, and must be listed with them.  
 
THE HOLY SPIRIT: THE PREPARER 
Before proceeding further, we should at this point also mention the place of the 
Holy Spirit in Irenaeus’ system. The Holy Spirit, which Irenaeus identified with God’s 
Wisdom,
474
 was said always to have been with the Father, and was mentioned 
prominently as having had a role with the Son in the creation of the world. With the 
Father, Irenaeus taught, “were always present the Word and Wisdom, the Son and the 
Spirit, by whom and in whom, freely and spontaneously, He made all things.”475 When 
the Father said, “Let us make man after our image and likeness” (Gen. 1:26), he was 
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speaking to the Son and Holy Spirit.
476
 The Son and the Spirit were the Father’s 
“hands”477 by which he created the world, to the praise of the Psalmist.478 The manual 
imagery connoted ontological parity between the Son and the Spirit, for each one was a 
hand. It also suggested a caret-shaped symmetry in their relation to the Father, as though 
they were distinct aspects of him as his “his offspring and his similitude,”479 a perception 
reinforced by his description of the Son and Spirit as Word and Wisdom of the Father 
respectively. Finally, given that one is normally never without one’s hands, it also 
reinforced the sense of coeternity of the Son and the Spirit with the Father.  
In the self-revelatory work of God, which as we saw, was so important in 
Irenaeus’ theology, the Spirit too had its own specific role. The Son we said was the outer 
face of the Father; the work of the Spirit was to prepare and sensitize humans spiritually 
for the coming of the Son. Here, the persons of the Trinity assumed a telescoped linearity. 
The Son sent forth the Spirit from the Father
480
 and in those of the Mosaic dispensation 
established a “receptacle of the prophetic Spirit.”481 Thus in the Spirit the prophets were 
given to announce the coming of the Son not only in their prophecies, but in their visions, 
in their mode of life, and in the actions they performed “according to the suggestions of 
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 Haer. 4.36.2 (ANF 1:515 [PG 7:1091A]): “receptaculum prophetici Spiritus.” 
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the Spirit.”482 Thus, Irenaeus could say that God was seen in the Spirit “prophetically.” In 
this same passage, of course, which tended toward a dispensationalist Trinitarianism, he 
also said that, in the Son, God was seen “adoptively,” and, at the eschaton, God himself 
would be seen “paternally.”483 The adoption signified the joining of humanity to God in 
the Incarnation, in which human history was restarted in the new Adam. We note that this 
reconstituted Adam was fashioned anew by God’s hands, just as the old one had:484 by 
the Son, who took on its flesh; and by the Spirit, who rested on him. In recapitulated 
humankind, the Son united “man to the Spirit, and causing the Spirit to dwell in man, He 
is Himself made the head of the Spirit, and gives the Spirit to be the head of man: for 
through Him (the Spirit) we see, and hear, and speak.”485 Thus, in the time since Christ’s 
coming, the work of the Spirit expanded from announcing the coming of the Son, leading 
the faithful to him, now that he had come. The work of the Spirit had believers 
incrementally “tending toward perfection, and preparing us for incorruption, being little 
by little accustomed to receive and bear God.”486 This was what it meant to be spiritual: 
not, as the Valentinians taught, to shed one’s physical body, but to possess the Spirit.487 
The Spirit perfects and completes the human, and so a human that is in the perfect order 
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in which the hands of God created him had also to possess Spirit.
488
 For the Spirit 
prepared humans in the Son of God, and the Son of God led them to the Father.
489
 And so 
at the end of time, all will return to the Father, with the telescoped linearity of the divine 
movement leading all back to his bosom: “The presbyters, the disciples of the apostles, 
affirm that this is the gradation and arrangement of those who are saved, and that they 
advance through steps of this nature; also that they ascend through the Spirit to the Son, 
and through the Son to the Father, and that in due time the Son will yield up His work to 
the Father.”490 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
ORIGEN: THE THEOLOGIAN OF WILL 
 
The great teacher of the Alexandrian school, a “man of spotless character” and 
“one of the most original thinkers the world has ever seen,”491 Origen (185-253) was one 
of the most influential writers in the early Christian period. Roughly contemporaneous 
with Tertullian, the Gnostics, and Plotinus, the monumental undertaking of the deeply 
pious and ascetic Origen—himself the son of a martyr, Leonidas, pupil of the great 
Ammonius Saccas,
492
 and confessor of the faith before the persecutors—had been to 
organize the doctrines of Christianity into a systematized whole at a level of academic 
rigor unheard of till that time, and thus to provide Christians with the intellectual 
sustenance that they otherwise might have sought elsewhere. The vastness of his learning, 
and the depth and originality of his speculations were the inspiration of many theologians 
in his day. Local churches vied for his services, and, after leaving behind his native 
Alexandria, he ended his days in Palestinian Caesarea, the see which the famous 
Eusebius, an indefatigable devotee of Origen’s, would come to man some sixty years 
after the death of the master. 
However, despite these abundant accolades, it was also true that long after 
Origen’s death his name would become embroiled in controversy. A seminal thinker 
famed for blazing new ground, some of Origen’s undoubtedly well-intentioned but more 
exploratory points of theological conjecture had the misfortune of inspiring certain later 
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thinkers, who became embroiled in the great theological disputes that were to rack the 
life of the Church in the centuries after its de-proscription by Constantine at Milan some 
seventeen-hundred years ago. The fierce loyalty he inspired in his admirers and the 
continual association of his legacy with controversy eventually made Origen a source of 
dread among those authorities who had grown weary of conflict in the bosom of the 
Church. Simply put, although his works had served to inspire so many, they came to be 
considered more trouble than they were worth. As a result, Origen was condemned by the 
Fifth Ecumenical Council (553), some three centuries after his death, and his works 
systematically were committed to the flames, with few of them surviving entirely in their 
original Greek.
493
 
One such volume was his dogmatic work, the Peri Archon, which has survived in 
the Latin translation of his fourth century admirer, Rufinus of Aquileia, as the De 
Principiis.
494
 The degree of doctrinal interpretation and sanitization to which Rufinus 
subjected the work in order to protect the good name of his master has remained a matter 
of guesswork. Nevertheless, certain themes in this treatise were so strong that they were 
impossible to suppress. One such theme was its conscientious, full-blooded promotion of 
will as a central factor in theology. In Origen’s case, the embrace of will was part of his 
effort to push far from the Church’s teaching the materialist view of God, the soul, and 
the cosmos, which as we saw even in writers like Tertullian had ensconced itself in 
certain quarters of Christian thought, and thus to save it from what he feared would 
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degenerate into a theology of “force and necessity”495 that presumably496 rested on the 
determined mechanical interactions of purely material entities.
497
 Against this system of a 
world subject to God by compulsion, Origen put forward a vision of God as wielding 
dominion over the universe “through wisdom, that is, by word and reason.” All agreed 
that God was omnipotent because he held authority over all things. But for Origen the 
“purest and brightest glory” of this omnipotence was the fact that he held the universe in 
subjection “by reason and wisdom, and not by force and necessity.”498 In this quest, 
Origen framed will as his bulwark against materiality and necessity in theology. In it he 
saw the very clearest index of the freedom from the determinism that he associated with 
materiality, and not few would be his analogies between the operation of will and the 
dynamic inside the incorporeal triune Godhead. Second, as a movement of mind, will, at 
its best, could also be seen, in line with Greek thought, as the natural expression of 
knowledge. This was certainly the case in Origen’s postulations on the divine sphere, 
where there was the perfect meeting of absolute will and supreme omniscience. 
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Till now, we have made it our stated purpose to lay the primary focus of our 
examinations on the place of will in the divine sphere and in the theology of the Trinity 
as it developed in the early centuries of Christianity. But certain peculiarities in Origen’s 
thought, particularly in his Christology—in itself an harbinger, I will argue, of future 
controversy—will make a full treatment of will in the Trinity impossible without also a 
very close examination of his views on the theological role of will in creation. He was, I 
will propose, the theologian of will. For in his understanding of the created and mutable 
world, Origen ascribed such primacy to the freedom of will that even the prevailing 
Greek principle of will as the natural outflow of knowledge suddenly seemed inadequate. 
It was as if Origen was responding to the opinions of his fellow pupil at the knee of 
Ammonius Saccas, namely Plotinus, for whom the questions of free will and choice were 
relevant only where there was a deficit of knowledge, and took them as representing a 
rationalistic form of repression of freedom, which ultimately left no room for the 
Christian call to faith and obedience to God’s self-revelation. Thus, it would become 
apparent that Origen invested the operation of will with characteristics that, although not 
necessarily opposed to the dictates of reason, they were not entirely circumscribed by 
them either, so that assent became its own criterion nurtured by, but also functioning 
alongside, understanding.
499
 
In this context, the free operation of will became the mechanism that drove a 
cosmic system resting on free choice and its consequences. Origen’s purposes were to 
restore to the cosmos, and specifically to the created volitive agents therein, that sense of 
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fairness and accountability in their relation to God that appeared to be absent in the 
predetermined and arbitrary mechanisms of the materialists, but also to ensure that, in the 
etiologies surrounding the misery of the human condition, God remained forever 
unimpeachable. This stood to reason. The rise of Christianity and its belief in a judgment 
at the end of time, which assumed that the earthly deeds by which humans would be 
judged lay within their power, made the analysis of intentionality and the pursuit of a 
sense of ultimate justice all the more imperative.
500
 That Origen was not alone among 
Christians in this quest, but was expressing beliefs that were widely held in the Church at 
large, was attested to by the fact that the entire first chapter of the third book of his 
treatise, which argued for free will and tackled the biblical texts that seemed to challenge 
it, was preserved in its original Greek as the twenty-first chapter of the Philocalia 
compiled by Gregory Theologian and Basil, who clearly considered it salutary reading.
501
 
For the God of Christianity was good, and the cosmos was in a fallen state and at a 
distance from him only because, for Origen, rational creatures had in previous 
incarnations succumbed and voluntarily turned away from him. Human circumstances 
were the direct consequence of their own actions. In the wake of Christ’s example and 
teaching, therefore, the purpose of the God-seeker became to acquire godly wisdom and 
exercise obedience to the divine will so that he would be brought close to God once 
again.
502
 Origen understood that this educative, karmic process might take time, even 
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several incarnations, so that one might overcome the compounded consequences of 
primordial disobedience. 
Origen’s explanation of the current state of the world as being the result of a 
turning away from God at a time prior to the present incarnation made his system on 
some levels similar to that of the Valentinians. As we saw, for them the world was the 
complex result of a disturbance in the Pleroma that was produced when the generate 
divine hypostases, moved by their naiveté, sought to be like the primal deity. Origen 
would differ from the Valentinians on key points. First, he would place this arena of 
choice-making exclusively within the created order, and not primordially in the divine 
sphere and flowing over into creation as the Valentinians had taught. Moreover, 
Valentinianism’s teaching on the disturbance in the Pleroma was meant to explain what it 
taught was the stratified, and largely, though not completely, determinate state of affairs 
that prevailed in the dualistic cosmos. For the Valentinian, free choice was severely 
curtailed in the present life because of the predetermined, mutually-opposed, and 
immiscible spiritual domains established in this world following the unrest in the 
heavenly realm. Origen, conversely, would view every creature’s lot in this world as the 
result of its own choices in its previous existence, and its future as lying entirely within 
its own control and choice. 
However, we must also emphasize that, although Origen did not share the 
Valentinians’ belief in a collision of purposes in the divine sphere, he did not eliminate 
all sense of will from the Godhead itself. On the contrary, will would be absolutely key to 
his understanding of God. On the one hand, as many others had done, Origen, too, 
viewed the divine will as a purposeful movement outward from the Godhead, a governing 
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force precedent to creation, and the perfect expression of God’s absolute omniscience. In 
this context, deliberative choice, as a phenomenon founded on relative ignorance, had no 
place in his understanding of God. At the same time, on a very different level, and in a 
way peculiar to Origen, his reflections on willing, as a purely psychic and non-materialist 
action emanating from within mind, would afford him a means of visualizing the Father’s 
begetting of the Son that would depart from the conceptions of materialist fission that 
others had relied on to describe it. In this scheme, the Father would be mind, and the Son 
will itself, emerging from within mind without fissure. Thus, his likening the begetting of 
the Son to an act of volition was to anchor the entire architecture of Origen’s theology to 
will, from its conceptual starting point inside the Trinity downward, into creation. For the 
notion that in the divine sphere will was an action of non-material mind would stand as 
archetype behind human free will in its role as rampart against materialist determinism in 
the created order. 
The most contentious aspect of Origen’s thought, especially in terms of the 
theological trajectories it inspired in the Trinitarian and Christological disputes that were 
to beset the Church from the fourth century onward, would center on how he juxtaposed 
these two theaters of volitional activity, namely the divine and the created, in the 
mediating principle between the two, namely the Christ. In the person of Christ—and 
here I use person in a decidedly non-technical sense, given what would be Origen’s 
proto-Nestorian understanding of the Incarnation—was played out the perfect example of 
obedience of his human soul to the divine will, both prior to his incarnation, during which 
phase his soul’s willing subordination to God earned him the divine favor and his special 
union with the divine Logos, and in his incarnation, where he served as perfect exemplar 
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to incarnate being, showing obedience to God, even unto death. The paradigm of Christ 
as contingent moral exemplar would prove to be theologically very attractive, and in 
Arius we would see what may well have been an indexterous attempt, in the heat of the 
dispute, at steering clear of the dual agency in Christ that Origen had put forth and 
placing the Son as the sole volitive agent in Christ. The unfortunate result in Arius’ case 
was that he would reintroduce potential discord into the Godhead, with all the cognitive 
inequities among the divine persons that this entailed, thus setting off a monumental 
dispute in the life of the Church. These things shall be examined in their turn. For now, 
we turn to the seminal work of Origen. 
 
GOD AS MIND 
The materialism that for Origen underlay this coercive theology of determinism 
and necessity was all-encompassing, and Origen made it one of his first duties to 
challenge the central claim of those materialist Christians that even God himself 
consisted, in his being, of a material body. Clearly inspired by the Stoic
503
 identification 
of God with the elemental building blocks of the universe, these faithful had found 
support for their belief in God’s corporeality504 in such passages as “God is a consuming 
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fire”505 and “God is spirit.”506 In response, Origen’s strategy became to draw special 
attention to those passages in Scripture that he argued declared God’s non-materiality, 
and thus to challenge their claim of Writ’s univocally materialist witness on God’s 
nature. For example, those Scriptural descriptions of God as light
507
 by which humans 
themselves saw light
508
 were for Origen references not to a material light, like that of the 
sun, but to an intellectual light, a spiritual power, which, “when it lightens a man, it 
causes him either to see clearly the truth of all things or to know God himself who is 
called the truth.”509 God the fire consumed not material things such as “wood or hay or 
stubble,”510 but “evil thoughts of the mind, shameful deeds and longings after sin, when 
these implant themselves in the minds of believers.”511 
In similar wise, when God was called spirit it did not mean that he consisted of 
rarefied matter like wind, as some took spirit to be, but of something intellectual and 
entirely non-material in character. Illustrative of this was the person of the Holy Spirit 
himself. He was spirit in very name, and yet human experience showed him to be very 
different from material entities. For example, the saints’ liberating and knowledge-
bearing
512
 participation in the Spirit did not entail his material division into shares that 
were then apportioned to those who partook of him. Rather, participation in the Spirit 
more closely resembled a group of people sharing in a common object of intellection, 
such as medicine, without physically partitioning and distributing it among themselves. 
Of course, the Holy Spirit was “far different” from the “system or science of medicine”: 
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he was an “intellectual existence, with a subsistence and being of its own, whereas 
medicine is nothing of the sort.”513 Nevertheless, Origen’s underlying point remained. By 
describing God as spirit, Scripture was urging one to understand him in non-material and 
non-spatial terms. Christ had made this clear to the Samaritan woman
514
 when he 
revealed to her that the proper way of worshiping God, “in spirit and in truth,” would 
require one to “abandon all idea of material places” in one’s conceptions of God. The 
localized and materialist worship symbolized by both Jerusalem and Gerizim, long the 
objects of Jewish and Samaritan bickering, was a preoccupation with the mere “shadows 
and images”515 of the heavenly realities that Christ had come to make known.516 
This call to look beyond the shadows and images of the material world to the 
higher realities in God would form one of the cornerstones of Origen’s theology. To be 
sure, as the only being which alone had the “privilege of existing apart from all material 
intermixture,”517 God was “incomprehensible and immeasurable,”518 and the human 
mind, enfeebled as it was by its association with the human body,
519
 and used only to 
perceiving material things, strained even to catch a glimpse of the incorporeal divine 
nature: 
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“Whatever may be the knowledge which we have been able to obtain about God, 
whether by perception or by reflection, we must of necessity believe that he is far 
and away better than our thoughts about him.”520 
However, he also included a crucial addendum. Despite the transcendence of the 
Godhead, Origen was convinced that it was possible to infer certain things about God 
based on “the beauty of his works and the comeliness of his creatures.”521 Among those 
created things that told of God was, first and foremost, the human mind itself, which too 
owed its existence to God, “the mind and fount from which originates all intellectual 
existence or mind.”522 The clearest proof of this affinity between the human mind and 
God was the behavior of the mind itself. By late antiquity, the largely Platonist 
perception, namely that the ultimate ontological principle was both unknowable and 
nameable only on the basis of what it was not, had become widespread. It was on these 
grounds that Origen observed a high degree of correlation between the way mind did its 
work and the characteristics that philosophical thought had resolved must apply to the 
ultimate principle. He noted how mind required no physical space to move and operate, 
and experienced no delay in its movements. Its operation was largely unaffected by its 
physical location,
523
 and it was able to grow and broaden its knowledge and abilities 
without requiring any physical addition to itself.
524
 The mind’s correlation with what was 
postulated of the divine nature was to such a degree that Origen concluded that, unlike 
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the organs of sensory perception, such as the eyes, the ears, etc., which were material in 
their make-up and whose activities were directed at material objects, the mind had as its 
truest object of contemplation things, such as God himself, that were intellectual in nature 
and physically invisible.
525
 All this led to what would be one of Origen’s central 
premises, namely that it was the processes of mind and intellection, which all humans 
could observe through simple introspection, and not the metaphysical systems of the 
Stoic and other materialists, that provided the most appropriate and accurate paradigm for 
approaching the nature of God. 
 
THE SON AS WILL 
Origen then turned his attention to the person of the Son, and to exploring his 
relationship with the Father in terms of the non-materialist and psychological framework 
he had just established to conceptualize the divine nature. His strategy was to gather the 
scriptural data relating to the person of the Son, and to argue that there was no warrant to 
understand any of it in a materialist manner. In fact, the only way to harmonize the 
various titles that Scripture had bestowed on the Son was to interpret them in a way that 
purposely looked beyond the norms of the material world. When considering the Son as 
Wisdom, Origen could not ignore the fact that he was also Son, and thus concluded that 
this Wisdom, unlike the wisdom of humans, was not an entity “without hypostatic 
existence.” Wisdom was not an inanimate thing that merely imparted influence and 
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intelligence to the minds of people and made them wise.
526
 He was a concrete, personal 
existence, a “wise living being,” as one would expect of an entity who was also a son. He 
was “God’s wisdom, hypostatically existing.”527 
However, this same entity was also called the Firstborn Son of the Father, born in 
truth of him and drawing his being from him.
528
 He was Son by very nature, and not 
through some “external way” such as adoption in the Spirit.529 Paul had called the Son the 
“image of the invisible God,”530 and one knew from the example of Adam, who had 
begotten Seth “after his own image and after his own kind,”531 that image could denote 
only the “unity of nature (naturae) and substance (substantiae) common to a father and a 
son.”532 The Son, therefore, was connected to the Father by nature. Solomon had said the 
same thing of Wisdom, talking of it as a “a breath of the power of God,” “a pure 
emanation
533
 of the glory of the Almighty,” “the brightness of the eternal light,” “an 
unspotted mirror of the working of God,” and, we note, “an image of his goodness.”534 
This was further proof that the Son and Wisdom were one and the same, and it influenced 
how one perceived his generation from the Father. For if one took his generation as 
implying a beginning in the existence of the Son, or that he was begotten in time, this 
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amounted to an act of impiety against the unbegotten Father himself, because it denied 
that he had been possessed of his Wisdom from all ages.
535
 To reach the true 
understanding of the Son’s relation to the Father, therefore, one had to extrapolate 
beyond the bounds of human comprehension and say that the generation of the Son was 
indeed a begetting, but one that did not imply a beginning. It was an “eternal and 
everlasting begetting, as brightness is begotten from light,”536 and it lay “beyond the 
limits of any beginning that we can speak of or understand.”537 
There was, of course, the issue of Scripture calling Wisdom the “beginning 
[ἀρχὴν] of his [i.e. God’s] ways for his works,”538 but this was not to be taken in the 
temporal sense but only as a statement that in Wisdom were contained “both the 
beginnings and causes and species of the whole creation.” In Wisdom was “implicit every 
capacity and form of the creation that was to be, both of those things that exist in a 
primary sense, and of those which happen in consequence of them.”539 Thus understood, 
Wisdom as the beginning of God’s ways was nothing other than the Logos, which was 
another title that Scripture had bestowed on the Son, and which represented that cosmic 
principle broadly recognized
540
 as the summation of all laws and principles (logoi) 
governing the creation and workings of the universe.
541
 The Logos revealed to created 
beings “the meaning of the mysteries and secrets which are contained within the wisdom 
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of God” because he was the “interpreter of the mind’s secrets.”542 That the Logos too was 
one and the same as Wisdom, and by extension the Firstborn Son, was made clear by 
Scripture itself. The (apocryphal) Acts of Paul, for example, called the Logos a “living 
being,” and John had declared that he was “in the beginning with God”543—two 
observations that, as we saw above, Origen had also made regarding Wisdom. Indeed, all 
the titles that Scripture had given the second person of the Trinity were in agreement with 
what had been said of Wisdom, and in no instance was there justification for a 
materialistic understanding of his being.
544
 
Another proof that the Son possessed the image of the Father was for Origen the 
scriptural declaration that “all things that the Father doeth, these the Son doeth 
likewise.”545 He reasoned that based on the fact that the “Son does all things just as the 
Father does,” one could say that “the Father’s image is reproduced in the Son, whose 
birth from the Father is, as it were, an act of his will proceeding from the mind.”546 Given 
his correlation of image with nature, Origen here was effectively presenting activity as 
an index of nature. Because the Son’s activity was the same as that of the Father, he 
necessarily was possessed of the same nature as the Father. This alignment of activity 
with nature was in itself poignant enough, and it was a correlation, albeit indirectly 
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presented here by Origen, that subsequent generations would nevertheless uphold and 
cultivate.
547
 
His next point, however, on the Son’s birth from the Father and its resemblance to 
an act of the Father’s will, was a part of so obliquely articulated and compressed a 
passage of reasoning that we must pause here and trace carefully how Origen was 
advancing his argument. It is fair to assume that he was positioning will as precedent to 
any action. Because the activity of the Father and the Son was the same, it followed, 
perforce, that their antecedent volitional activity was identical too. It was in this context 
of identity of will that Origen found opportunity to frame the Son’s incorporeal 
generation from the Father as comparable to an act of will “proceeding from the mind.” 
We already know that Origen likened the Father to mind, and so the invocation of mind 
here was both a synonym for the Father, but also a cue to appreciate the illustration of a 
volitive procession by reflecting on the incorporeal processes of the human mind. Origen 
was not in this particular passage making the Son a product of the Father’s will, but 
saying only that his generation was analogous to how the mind/Father generates an act of 
will. Origen continued: 
“...an act of the Father’s will ought to be sufficient to ensure the existence of what 
he wills; for in willing he uses no other means than that which is produced by the 
deliberations of his will.”548 
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Here was the mystery. An act of will clearly always does the same thing as its origin, the 
willer. In like manner, because, as per Scripture, the Son, too, always did the things that 
the Father did, it was entirely reasonable to assume that the generation of the Son might 
have resembled the way the divine will proceeded from the Father, whom Origen had 
already likened to mind. That the divine will was an unmediated action flowing forth 
from the Father suggested that the generation of the Son was similarly unmediated a 
process. Thus, Origen concluded, “it was in this way”—namely as an act of willing 
proceeding from mind—“that the existence of the Son also is begotten of him.”549 The 
Son was begotten in a way comparable to how the divine will proceeds from the Father, 
and the implication was that humans could perceive this through reflection on the 
procession of their own will from their mind. 
Although this notion of the connection between the Son’s generation and the 
procession of will from mind would prove a mainstay of Origen’s theology throughout 
the Peri Archon, we must also draw attention to what was his slight vacillation on this 
point. Till now, he had likened the generation of the Son to the movement of the divine 
will. There had been, however, no explicit statement that the Son’s begetting was an act 
of divine will, but reference only to a resemblance in the mutually incorporeal manner of 
their operation. Yet there were also moments in his treatise where increasingly he began 
to see the Son both as the special product of the Father’s will and as the externalized and 
hypostatized will of the Father. Inspired, for example, by the scriptural description of 
Wisdom as “the breath of the power of God,”550 he argued that power here referred to 
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“that by which he is strong,” by which also he established, preserved, and controlled all 
things visible and invisible, and by which he exercised his providence without any lack. 
The breath of this power, i.e. Wisdom, “so great and so immense” as it was, came to have 
a “subsistence of its own.” Of course, this breath proceeded from God’s power itself “as 
will proceeding from mind.” However, it was also a fact that “the will of God comes 
itself to be a power of God.” God’s Will was one of God’s powers and so Wisdom was 
also a breath of God’s will. And, in being begotten 
“There comes into existence, therefore, another power, subsisting in its own 
proper nature, a kind of breath, as the passage of Scripture calls it, of the first and 
unbegotten power of God, drawing from its source whatever existence it has; and 
there is no time when it did not exist.”551 
Because this “breath” of God’s was the product of God’s power, it was also the product 
of his will. And as “another power, subsisting in its own proper nature,”552 it was also the 
externalized and hypostatized will of the Father, taking on executive power
553
 in God’s 
outward movement. Later in his treatise, in the parts of it that have been preserved in the 
original Greek, Origen would go as far as to say that the Son was “begotten of the 
Father’s will,” and even to call him the “Son of his will,” because he was begotten of the 
“invisible and incorporeal God apart from any bodily feeling, like an act of will 
proceeding from mind.”554 
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Clearly, Origen was wed to his paradigm of comparing the generation of the Son 
to the procession of will from within the mind. However, one would have expected that 
his complete theory to be that God/mind generated the Son/will, and that the Son was to 
the Father as will was to mind. Origen had committed much time to paralleling the nature 
of the Father to that of mind, and the natural corollary would have been to take the Son to 
be God’s own will. Yet, he appears never unambiguously to have made such a statement. 
Even in the instance where he presented the Son as the externalized will of the Father, i.e. 
“another power, subsisting in its own proper nature,”555 he still presupposed that God was 
possessed of his own proper power and will, which in the Son were externalized as 
“another power.” We know from other examples that, to Origen’s mind, the Son, as 
image of the faculties of the Father, was not these same faculties in their fullness. Thus, 
although, for example, the Son was the image of the Father’s goodness, it was clear to 
Origen that he was “not goodness itself”; the Son, “while being good, is yet not good 
purely and simply.” Original goodness resided in the Father, but the Son and the Holy 
Spirit drew into themselves the nature of that goodness that existed “in the fount,” that is, 
in the Father.
556
 In like manner, the clear implication was that the Son was not the will of 
the Father per se, but its externalized and hypostatized image.
557
 This quality of 
secondariness, which Origen ascribed to the Son as God’s image, was central to his 
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hierarchical vision of the Trinity. The Son and the Holy Spirit of the Father, “from whom 
the one is born and the other proceeds,”558 he likened to the two six-winged seraphim that 
in the Book of Isaiah (6:2) were said to be close to the throne of God.
559
 The most vivid 
proof of this hierarchy, of course, was Origen’s famous theory of the diminishing 
purview of the divine persons as one considered them in their turn.
560
 
For those churchmen of the fourth century, desperately searching for precedents 
in support of their positions in the height of theological controversy, these points of 
irresolution had serious ramifications. Whether one considered the Son as having been 
generated in a way analogous to the procession of will from mind, or identified him with 
an image of the divine will, or the divine will itself, or described him as a product of the 
divine will, all would become markers of the ontological standing in which one held the 
Son in the theological speculations surrounding the Council of Nicaea. All sides would 
look back to Origen for their inspiration, but Origen himself clearly could have had no 
inkling of the theological problems that the coming centuries would bring and the 
authority his writings would assume during them. He was a seminal thinker, and one of 
the early pioneers who tried to put into writing a systematic account of Christian 
theology. His specific purpose here had been simply to put forward a convincing 
alternative to the materializing paradigms that had encroached into the theology of his 
day. He intended this theory to preclude notions of corporealist emanation, fracture, and 
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 Princ. 1.2.13 (PG 11:144C): “quae est in eo fonte de quo vel natus est Filius, vel procedit Spiritus 
sanctus.” 
559
 Princ. 1.3.4; 4.3.14. 
560
 See, for example, the Greek fragment at Princ. 1.3.5: “The God and Father, who holds the universe 
together, is superior to every being that exists, for he imparts to each one from his own existence that which 
each one is; the Son, being less than the Father, is superior to rational creatures alone (for he is second to 
the Father); the Holy Spirit is still less, and dwells within the saints alone. So that in this way the power of 
the Father is greater than that of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, and that of the Son is more than that of the 
Holy Spirit, and it turn the power of the Holy Spirit exceeds that of every other holy being.” 
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division in the divine nature, while maintaining proper theological order and the notion 
that none was unbegotten except the Father.
561
 And although his final product was 
characterized
562
 by a strong sense of hierarchy inside the Trinity that would enthuse many 
an anti-Nicene, from the perspective of our particular focus what I find more engaging is 
the way that Origen subordinated the all-important question of will to a different sense of 
hierarchy, not that hierarchy that applied to the internals of the Trinity, but a cosmic one 
that was stratified according to the degree of materiality of the various beings in the 
universe. As purely incorporeal and non-material, God was at the peak of this pyramid. 
All other beings, even the ostensibly invisible powers, were material, even if that 
materiality consisted of the most rarefied matter. As we shall see, Origen viewed matter 
as inherently labile, and therefore as the agent of waywardness in material beings.
563
 The 
only thing that would keep them in obedience to the divine will was their own concerted 
volitional effort,
564
 which in turn was a function, although not exclusively so, of their 
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 Princ. 1.2.6. 
562
 This system of hierarchy had as its pillars the unbegottenness of the Father, and the Son’s status as 
image of the Father. The secondariness in rank of the image was typified by such illustrations as that the 
Son was the image of God’s goodness but “not goodness itself.” The Son, “while being good is yet not 
good purely and simply” (Princ. 1.2.13). The clearest example of this hierarchy is in Origen’s famous 
theory of the diminishing purview of each of the divine hypostases when they were considered in turn: the 
Father, as source of all existence, had jurisdiction over all creation; the Son, as the origin of reason, had 
jurisdiction over the rational beings; and the Spirit, as source of holiness, had jurisdiction over the saints. 
563
 Princ. 2.2.2 (PG 11:187B): “...material substance possesses such a nature that it can undergo every kind 
of transformation” (“materialis ista substantia hujus mundi habens naturam quae ex omnibus ad omnia 
transformatur”).  
564
 Princ. 1.3.8 (PG 11:155BC): “But if at any time satiety should possess the heart of one of those who 
have come to occupy the perfect and highest stage, I do not think that such a one will be removed and fall 
from his place all of a sudden. Rather must he decline by slow degrees, so that it may sometimes happen, 
when a slight fall has occurred, that the man quickly recovers and returns to himself. A fall does not 
therefore involve utter ruin, but a man may retrace his steps and return to his former state and once more set 
his mind on that which through negligence has slipped from his grasp” (“Si autem aliquando satietas capit 
aliquem ex his qui in summo perfectoque constiterint gradu, non arbitror quod ad subitum quis evacuetur, 
ac decidat; sed paulatim et per parles defluere eum necesse est: ita ut fieri possit interdum, ut si brevis 
aliquis lapsus acciderit, et cito resipiscat, atque in se revertatur, non penitus ruere, sed revocare pedem, et 
redire ad statum suum, et rursum statuere possit id quod per negligentiam fuerat lapsum”).  
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own level of cognizance or wisdom.
565
 Needless to say, in this scheme, the will of God, 
as an expression of his omniscience, was absolute, and, coupled with the fact of his 
similarly absolute non-materiality, unwavering. 
As we progress, we shall chance to look into this entire scheme further. For now, 
what we must note is that, irrespective of whether he was the divine will, an analog, or 
even a product thereof, the Son did, as Scripture witnessed, the same things as did the 
Father, and thus willed the same things as the Father. He was, as the book of Wisdom 
(7:25) stated, the “unspotted mirror of the energy or working of God.”566 Like the Father, 
he was absolutely incorporeal, and as such was not subject to change. Notwithstanding 
the internal hierarchy in the Trinity, the “omnipotence of the Father and the Son” was 
“one and the same,”567 and so, with respect to the broader chain of being we have 
described, the Son was on the same ontological level as the Father. Although the Son was 
presented as the externalized will of the Father, the relationship between Father and Son 
nevertheless was characterized by absolute identity of volitive action. There simply was 
no room for a concept even of potential disharmony of purposes inside the Trinity. The 
Son was both Wisdom and the image of the will of God, and, as one that like the Father 
was incorporeal in the absolute, he was omniscient and eternally steadfast in his purpose, 
and not subject to deliberative choice born of ignorance or a wavering generated by the 
inherent instability of material nature.
568
 In this respect, if one considered that there was a 
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 Princ. 1.2.10 (PG 11:141AB): “...it is through wisdom, which is Christ, that God holds power over all 
things, not only by his own authority as Master, but also by the voluntary service of his subjects” (“...per 
sapientiam enim, quae est Christus, tenet Deus omnium potentatum, non solum dominantis auctoritate, 
verum etiam subiectorum spontaneo famulatu”).  
566
 Princ. 1.2.12. From Wis. 7:26: “ἔσοπτρον ἀκηλίδωτον τῆς τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐνεργείας.” 
567
 Princ. 1.2.10 (PG 11:141B): “...unam et eamdem omnipotentiam Patris et Filii esse.” 
568
 Ignorance, materiality, and instability can all be interrelated if one understands materiality as a 
hindrance to true knowledge, which in turn creates ignorance, and leads to deliberation, wrong choice, and 
change. Part of the human journey to perfection was to obtain Wisdom: “...such as have been deemed 
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distinction between God and creation, then the Son in Origen’s contemplations would 
without doubt have had to be placed on the divine side of that distinction. 
 
CREATION: THE SPHERE OF CHANGE 
In contrast to the divine realm, in which the persons of the Trinity were 
characterized by perfect non-materiality, infinite knowledge, and absolute oneness and 
steadfastness of purpose, the created world represented the domain of instability, change, 
and conflict. This proneness to instability had it origin in a combination of three factors: 
the created nature of souls, and the influence on them of the material nature of the 
universe. We note that there was not in Origen a concrete sense of a beginning to the 
universe.
569
 Rather, it was presented as existing from everlasting and flowing through an 
interminable, karmic succession of lapses and restorations. The lapses had been 
precipitated by the faltering of the created rational elements in the world, namely the 
souls, from their state of primordial submission and oneness with God, and the 
restorations were the result of their subsequent repentance and self-correction. This cycle 
of descents and ascents was not the unfolding of an inexorable cosmic fatalism, but rather 
                                                                                                                                                 
worthy of advancing to this degree through the sanctification of the Holy Spirit obtaining in addition the 
gift of wisdom by the power of the working of God’s Spirit” (Princ. 1.3.8). 
569
 I must make clear here that although in passages such as Princ. 3.5.1 Origen talks of a “definite time” of 
the beginning of existence for this age, which encapsulates the current fall and restoration that the souls are 
passing through, there is, elsewhere, also a sense that there may be other ages that possibly preceded and 
will follow this one (see e.g. Princ. 2.3.5). In Princ. 3.5.3, Origen raised the point that, because God’s 
omnipotent nature could never have been dormant and without movement, there was never “a time when 
goodness did not do good and omnipotence did not exercise its power.” From this reasonable premise, 
however, some argued that there must always have existed an object of his virtue and omnipotence, namely 
the world, which, they then mistakenly concluded, was without beginning. Origen asserted that this world 
did indeed have a beginning, and added the “logical answer” that preserved “the rule of piety,” namely that 
“God did not begin to work for the first time when he made this visible world, but that just as after the 
dissolution of this world there will be another one, so also we believe that there were others before this one 
existed.” 
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the fruit of the souls’ free will,570 which Origen held as absolutely sacrosanct for his 
entire theological system was committed to upholding free will and rejecting all notion of 
deterministic oppression in the universe. To appreciate the cosmic proportions of the 
repercussions of the souls’ fall, one must understand that Origen did not view them as the 
animating principles in the human make-up only, but as preexisting powers that in their 
fall had come to animate and govern all the material entities in creation, from the beasts 
to the heavenly bodies, according to rational dictate. Thus, in this karmic system the 
deeds of a soul in a given incarnation would determine its destination in the next, with the 
entire succession of incarnations being subordinate to a grand, and possibly unending 
(admittedly, Origen is unclear on this), cycle of movements away from and then back to 
God. 
 
THE INTELLIGENT BEINGS 
The intelligent beings or minds were those intellectual entities that, “by an act of 
his will,” God created in the heavenly sphere in primordial time.571 As minds, they were 
images of God, for God himself was the “mind and fount from which originated all 
intellectual existence or mind”572 for no other reason than “himself, that is, his 
goodness.”573 As intelligent beings, the primary attribute of the minds was intellection, 
and the original object of their contemplation was God himself.
574
 These were the first of 
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 Princ. 2.3.4: “For souls are not driven on some revolving course which brings them into the same cycle 
again after many ages, with the result that they do or desire this or that, but they direct the course of their 
deeds towards whatever end the freedom of their individual minds may aim at.” 
571
 Princ. 2.9.1 (PG 11:225C): “τῷ βουλήματι αὐτοῦ.” 
572
 Princ. 1.1.6 (PG 11:125A): “mens ac fons ex quo initium totius intellectualis naturae vel mentis est.” 
573
 Princ. 2.9.6 (PG 11:230B): “nullam habuit aliam creandi causam nisi propter seipsum, id est bonitatem 
suam.” 
574
 Cf. Princ. 3.6.3. For the sake of precision, this passage had to do with the End of the world and the 
consummation of the plight of mind/soul. Origen saw the End as the reestablishment of what had applied at 
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all the creatures that God made, and their coming into existence corresponded to the 
fashioning of what in the opening passage of the creation story were called the “heaven 
and the earth”—a reference not to firmament and dry land but to those ideal entities after 
which their earthly namesakes were named.
575
 The Platonism was evident in this 
explanation, but Origen would differ from Plato in that there would be no separation of 
the ideal from the material cosmos. As we shall see, the minds that God created in the 
beginning, and which represented the original world, were themselves to become the 
visible world of material creation as a result of their fall.
576
 
As creatures, the nature of the minds was “neither their own nor eternal” but was 
“given by God.” Any good that existed in them was not there “by nature, but as a result 
of their Creator’s beneficence.” Most importantly, their being creatures also meant that 
the minds “were made when before they did not exist,” and this imparted to them an 
inherent instability; the shift from prior inexistence to existence made them “of necessity 
subject to change and alteration.”577 As was the case with their divine archetype—namely 
God, the supreme mind—the created minds also exercised, besides their powers of 
intellection, the faculty of will, which was of absolutely central importance to Origen’s 
system. It was part of God’s specific endowment to the minds that they have the power of 
free and voluntary movement. Only through these the good that was in the minds “might 
                                                                                                                                                 
the beginning (cf. Princ. 1.6.2: “The end is always like the beginning”), one of the key characteristics of 
which was God’s restoration as sole object of intellection in the minds. 
575
 Princ. 2.9.1. 
576
 Princ. 2.3.6. Origen found support for this theory from the creation story itself, which talked of the 
heaven and the earth being formed on the first day, and firmament and dry land being formed on the second 
(Gen. 1:1-8). Thus, he combined the biblical account with a Platonist metaphysics in his cosmogony. 
577
 Princ. 2.9.2 (PG 11:226C): “factae sunt cum ante non essent, hoc ipso quia non erant, et esse coeperunt, 
necessario convertibiles et mutabiles substiterunt.” 
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become their own, since it was preserved by their own free will.”578 That the minds had 
to exercise will in order to appropriate virtue spoke to their fragmented nature. In the 
divine mind, knowledge, virtue, and will were all simultaneous. For Greek thought, such 
simultaneity was the mark of the philosophical life, in which true knowledge bore virtue, 
and will was a concern only where there was ignorance. However, Origen understood the 
created minds as in a state of potential mutability and fragmented operation. They were 
endowed with virtue and, being in the presence of God, were given full knowledge, yet 
volition was required as a distinct act in order for them to appropriate that virtue and 
knowledge and make it their own. To be sure, the fact that, as we shall see in the next 
section, the minds also had a peculiar association with unstable matter which made their 
exertion of volitional effort to remain close to God all the more imperative. Nevertheless, 
Origen viewed these requisite exertions not as a disadvantage, but as a positive thing, for 
it provided the minds with the opportunity to exercise freedom. Willing was an action by 
which the minds, images as they were of the supremely incorporeal divine mind, both 
imitated their divine archetype and at the same time stood against the inherent 
determinism of the material world. Any deprivation of the minds’ ability freely to choose 
virtue by themselves Origen saw as a grave incursion of compulsion into the life of God’s 
creation and, ultimately, as an indictment against his absolute justice. 
From this state of primordial closeness to God, Origen described how over time 
the minds began to wane in their volitional and intellective energies. Instead of vigilance 
and the pursuit of virtue, the effort required to preserve the good began to take its toll. 
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 Princ. 2.9.2. Cf. Princ. 3.1.20, where, taking his inspiration from Phil. 2:13 (“To will and to work are of 
God”), he argued: “...What we received from God was the power of movement in general and it is we who 
use this power for the worse or for the better, so we have received the power of working, by virtue of our 
being living creatures, and from the Creator the power of willing, but it is we who use the power of willing 
either for the noblest purposes or for the opposite ones, and likewise the power of working.” 
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This set off in the minds a process of withdrawal from the good and their gradual 
immersion into evil, which was nothing other than the lack of good.
579
 Here Origen was 
proposing something quite different from what both the Gnostics and the neo-Platonists 
had argued for as the cause behind the disruption to primordial harmony. The fall of the 
minds was caused neither by ignorance nor a misguided curiosity. There was not even a 
mention of a lack of knowledge among the minds or of a naive quest on their part to 
fathom secrets that they lacked the ability to comprehend, as the Gnostics had described. 
Neither was there something comparable to the daring and tolma that (the early) Plotinus 
had talked of. Rather, the minds fell away out of a faltering of will born of sheer “sloth 
and weariness of taking trouble to preserve the good, coupled with disregard and neglect 
of better things.”580 There is no reason to suspect that Origen was engaging in allegory 
here, or that he was anything but sincere in accepting this as cosmic history. Yet the myth 
of the minds’ fall seemed also to be a statement on spiritual life as it had been lived in the 
past, apart from Christ, and its inability to produce anything other than listless ennui 
unless one looked beyond merely theoretical rationalism to a life inspired by faith in 
God’s revelation. By promoting the will as the ultimate arbiter, Origen was moving 
beyond the classical Greek model
581
 of the self-sufficiency of knowledge to produce 
virtue and advocating a response of faith and love to the supra-rational revelation made 
by God to humans. Of course, the minds in the cosmogonic myth had no real inkling of a 
specific revelation that they were called to respond to, but as Origen’s account unfolded, 
one would be revealed in the work of the Christ. Only the action of free will could 
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 Princ. 2.9.2. 
580
 Princ. 2.9.2 (PG 11:226D): “desidia et laboris taedium in servando bono, et aversio ac negligentia 
meliorum.” 
581
 See, e.g., Plato’s Meno (77b-78b). Cf. Diogenes Laertius (Lives 2.31) on Socrates: “There is only one 
good, knowledge, and one evil, ignorance.” 
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overcome the systems of oppression that Origen had vowed to combat. These, one feels, 
must in Origen’s mind have included the view that the will must be subordinate to 
rationalist necessity and other predictable systems of rules that could only produce 
boredom, weariness, and apathy. To be sure, Origen was not rejecting outright the 
correlation between knowledge and right choice—on the contrary, the erudite Origen 
would be the defender par excellence of knowledge and learning—but only affirming the 
importance, for creatures, of the will, enacted as free assent to faith, as the ultimate factor 
in whether the minds appropriated and made their own the virtue and knowledge that had 
been instilled in them from without. It was by their voluntary submission to the Word of 
God that the souls showed themselves to be “receptive of his wisdom.”582 For it was 
“through Wisdom, which is Christ, that God holds power over all things, not only by his 
own authority as Master, but also by the voluntary service of his subjects.”583 
From their initial closeness to God, therefore, there began in the minds a process 
of descent that Origen envisaged as a cooling. Scripture had always associated the divine 
with fire, and fervency with zeal for God,
584
 but here the minds were turning cold toward 
him. It was on this basis that Origen began to refer to fallen minds as souls,
585
 because, he 
argued, the term psyche was derived from ψύχεσθαι (to be made cold).586 Scripture, he 
averred, was replete with references to the lower nature of soul.
587
 Without doubt, there 
were echoes here of the neo-Platonist conception of the primeval dissent, separation, and 
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 Princ. 2.3.7. 
583
 Princ. 1.2.10 (PG 11:141AB): “Per sapientiam enim, quae est Christus, tenet Deus omnium potentatum, 
non solum dominantis auctoritate, verum etiam subjectorum spontaneo famulatu.” 
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 E.g., Heb. 12:29: “Our God is a consuming fire”; Heb 1:7: “Who maketh his angels spirits and his 
ministers a burning fire”; Ex. 3:2: “The angel of the Lord appeared in a flame of fire in a bush”; Rom. 
12:11: “fervent in spirit”; inter alia. 
585
 Princ. 2.8.3: “Mind when it fell was made soul, and soul in its turn when furnished with virtues will 
become mind.” 
586
 Princ. 2.8.3. 
587
 Princ. 2.8.2. 
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subsequent downward spiral of the souls, which were a lower manifestation of Soul, 
which in turn had come forth from Nous (mind), the higher hypostasis. But there were 
also crucial differences. The souls in Origen were not new hypostases that were born of 
and then separated from mind, but were at all times one and the same entity as the minds, 
just a degenerate transformation thereof. Because of their laxity and poor choice, the 
minds/souls were plunged into a process that clouded, and in the worst cases 
extinguished,
588
 their original intellective faculties. According to Rufinus, Origen defined 
soul as “an existence possessing imagination and desire [substantia φανταστικὴ et 
ὁρμητική], which qualities can be expressed in Latin...as capable of feeling and 
movement [potest sensibilis et mobilis].”589 This was in keeping with philosophical 
precedent,
590
 but it also presented, again in broad agreement with neo-Platonist 
postulation, the traits of soul as a crucial step down from those purely rational activities 
of mind. This was reinforced by his comparison of the responses of irrational and rational 
beings to stimuli. An irrational soul reacted impulsively to images it received from the 
imagination. Oppositely, the rational soul had “something besides its imaginative nature, 
namely reason, which judges the images.”591 This distinction spoke to the basic problem 
of the fallen souls: the loss of their original rationality and their consequent lapse into 
varying degrees of ignorance, which left them at the mercy of their impulses and unable 
effectively to discern between good and evil. The degree of fall among the different souls 
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 Princ. 2.10.3. Here, Origen interpreted the “outer darkness” (Matt. 8:12) not as a place but as a 
“description of those who through their immersion in the darkness of deep ignorance have become 
separated from every gleam of reason and intelligence.” 
589
 Princ. 2.8.1. 
590
 Cf. Aristotle (De an. 3.9 [432
a
15-17]): “The soul of animals is characterized by two faculties, the faculty 
of discrimination, which is the work of thought and sense, and the faculty of originating local movement;” 
Philo (Leg. 2.7 [23]): “The soul is a nature which has taken to itself imagination and desire” (“ψυχὴ δέ ἐστι 
φύσις προσειληφυῖα φαντασίαν καὶ ὁρμήν”). 
591
 Princ. 3.1.3 (PG:11:252A): “Τὸ μέντοι λογικὸν ζῶον καὶ λόγον ἔχει πρὸς τῇ φανταστικῇ φύσει, τὸν κρίνοντα 
τὰς φαντασίας.” 
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varied, so that some retained a residual intellective faculty that Origen called spirit,
592
 
and which gave them a relative advantage in acting in virtue. 
The great diversity in the levels of disobedience and apostasy that took hold 
among the plethora of souls is what gave rise to the spectacular variety that one could 
witness in the created world.
593
 In all this, however, God remained unimpeachable. It was 
neither he, nor fate, nor chance, but the souls themselves, with their freely made choices, 
who brought about their own apostasy and catastrophe,
594
 and the magnitude of the 
resultant lapse down the ontological chain that an individual soul experienced 
corresponded, in a natural, just, and exact manner, to the magnitude of its own voluntary 
turn away from God: 
“This...was the cause of diversity among rational creatures, a cause that takes its 
origin not from the will or judgment of the Creator, but from the decision of the 
creature’s own freedom. God, however, who then felt it just to arrange his 
creation according to merit, gathered the diversities of minds into the harmony of 
a single world, so as to furnish, as it were, out of these diverse vessels or souls or 
minds, one house, in which there must be ‘not only vessels of gold and silver, but 
also of wood and of earth, and some unto honor and some unto dishonor’ [2 Tim 
2:20].”595 
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 Princ. 2.10.7. 
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 Princ. 2.1.1: “Now since the world is so very varied and comprises so great a diversity of rational 
beings, what else can we assign as the cause of its existence except the diversity in the fall of those who 
decline from unity in dissimilar ways.” 
594
 Princ. 3.5.5: “This arrangement, I say, some men have not understood; and because they have not 
perceived that this variety of arrangement has been instituted by God as a result of previous causes arising 
from free will, they have supposed that everything in this world is governed either by chance movements or 
by fateful necessity and that nothing is within the power of our will. As a result they have been unable to 
free God’s providence from the imputation of blame.” 
595
 Princ. 2.9.6 (PG 11:230C): “Et haec existit causa...diversitatis inter rationabiles creaturas, non ex 
conditoris voluntate vel judicio originem trahens, sed propriae libertatis arbitrio. Deus vero cui jam 
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In his just and righteous providence, God’s work remained to ensure that these 
multifarious, disparate, and volitively autonomous parts could come together in a system, 
the world, without breaching the free will of the constituent beings therein but 
maintaining a strict and just meritocracy. Only God could superintend a system of such 
complexity,
596
 and in this respect, one could view the world not as a chaotic 
agglomeration of discordant parts but as a body composed of “many members”597 that 
was held together by the “power and reason of God as by one soul.”598 
 
BODY 
One of the most salient characteristics of the world that resulted from the fall of 
the souls was its materiality. Yet Origen’s precise account of the origin of matter, its 
appearance in his theology which till now had been dominated by the plight of the souls, 
and the nature of its relationship with the souls all require some analysis and 
systemization. Hyle or matter was that theoretical substrate which underlay all bodies. 
The great variety of bodies that made up the world was produced by the mingling of 
matter with the four qualities—heat, cold, dryness, and wetness. Matter was theoretically 
distinct from the qualities but it was never “found actually existing apart from them.”599 
Thus, matter always existed as a constituent of bodies, which themselves represented the 
                                                                                                                                                 
creaturam suam pro merito dispensare justum videbatur, diversitates mentium in unius mundi consonantiam 
traxit, quo velut unam domum, in qua inesse deberent non solum vasa aurea et argentea, sed et lignea et 
fictilia, et alia quidem ad honorem, alia autem ad contumeliam, ex istis diversis vasis, vel animis, vel 
mentibus ornaret.” 
596
 Princ. 3.1.14: “For souls are, so to speak, innumerable, and their habits are innumerable, and equally so 
are their movements, their purposes, their inclinations and their impulses, of which there is only one perfect 
superintendent, who has full knowledge both of the times and the appropriate aids and the paths and the 
ways, namely, the God and Father of the universe.” 
597
 1 Cor. 12:12. 
598
 Princ. 2.1.3. Origen’s invocation of world soul, so beloved of the Stoics, might be taken here as a 
statement on how far he would allow their determinism.  
599
 Princ. 2.1.4. Cf. Timaeus 51-A. 
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combination of matter with qualities. However, his thought on the relation of bodies with 
the souls was not as straightforward. In some passages, he seemed to indicate that souls 
came into contact with bodies only because of their laxity and subsequent turn to evil. As 
long as a soul continued to abide in the good it would have had “no experience of union 
with a body.”600 Souls in and of themselves were bodiless, this line of thinking 
proclaimed, and in this respect the implication was that they differed from God, who also 
was bodiless, only in the fact that souls, unlike God, were creatures.
601
 
Taken in isolation, one might take these comments as proof of an incipient 
dualism in Origen. The souls’ coalescence with bodies on account of their disobedience 
and moral apostasy made matter seem concomitant with sin and thus as lying outside of 
God’s creative sphere. After all, God was the source only of good things, and not few 
were those thinkers of Origen’s time who separated matter from the things created by 
God and invested it with an ontological status that was antipodal to that of God 
himself.
602
 However, a more complete reading of the master shows he was no dualist. 
Scripture had declared that God created all things by “number and measure,”603 and 
Origen took this as evidence that God had created both the souls and matter: number 
pointed to the precise number of minds that God in his providence had created and was 
able to oversee and provide for, while measure was a reference to the analogous quantity 
of matter he had fashioned ahead of time for the production of the physical world.
604
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 Princ. 1.8.4. 
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 Princ. 1.7.1: “All souls and all rational natures, whether holy or wicked, were made or created. All these 
are incorporeal in respect of their proper nature, but though incorporeal they are nevertheless made.” 
602
 See, for example, Hellenistic perceptions of Plato’s teaching such as Diog. Laert. 3.69: “He set forth two 
universal principles, God and matter, and he calls God mind and cause; he held that matter is devoid of 
form and unlimited, and that composite things arise out of it.” 
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 Wis. 11:20. 
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 Princ. 2.9.1. In the Greek fragment of this passage on the creation of the intelligent beings is the 
controversial detail that Origen put a ceiling on their number to as many as God “could grasp and keep in 
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Moreover, at various points he began to talk of the original incorporeality of souls as 
more of a speculative abstraction than a concrete reality. In this more subtle view, he held 
that souls, while theoretically distinct, could never realistically be considered separate 
from matter. He explained: 
“While the original creation was of rational beings, it is only in idea and thought 
that a material substance is separable from them, and that though this substance 
seems to have been produced for them or after them, yet never have they lived or 
do they live without it; for we shall be right in believing that life without a body is 
found in the Trinity alone.”605 
A soul was bodiless only “in idea and thought,” for pure bodilessness was a quality that 
belonged to God alone. Remarkably, Origen would take this claim much further, 
implying that to consider the soul as separate from matter, because of that certain logical 
priority it held over it, was as misguided as considering the Father as separate from the 
Son and Holy Spirit on account of his being their origin and source.
606
 In addition, if one 
accepted that they were separate, and that the soul existed prior to matter, then it followed 
that matter was created from nothingness and that it would naturally “cease to exist when 
the need it had served had passed away.”607 Given that all things in this universe worked 
toward one and the same end, it followed that if one type of being could be shown to 
exist without body, then it would be possible for all things to do so.
608
 Such a conclusion 
                                                                                                                                                 
hand and subject to his providence.” Origen considered that God’s power had to be finite “for if the divine 
power were infinite, of necessity it could not even understand itself, since the infinite is by its nature 
incomprehensible.” For a thing to be comprehensible, it had to have a beginning and an end (Princ. 3.5.2). 
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 Princ. 2.2.2 (PG 11:187B): “materialem vero substantiam opinione quidem et intellectu solo separari ab 
eis, et pro ipsis vel post ipsas effectam videri, sed nunquam sine ipsa eas vel vixisse vel vivere, solius 
namque Trinitatis incorporea vita existere recte putabitur.”  
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 Princ. 2.2.1. 
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 Princ. 2.2.1 (PG 11:187A): “ita et esse desineret, cum ususejus ministerii praeterisset.” 
608
 Princ. 2.3.2. 
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would have pointed to the end of matter in the restored state of the souls. But this went 
against the witness of Scripture, which proclaimed that matter would persevere in the 
hereafter. According to Paul, what in this world was corruptible and mortal, namely the 
body, would in its redeemed state not cease to exist but put on incorruption and 
immortality.
609
 
We have to be clear here. The body which Origen associated with the soul was 
not limited to the flesh that humans possessed in their earthly life, but was the material 
substrate, ever varying in its qualities, that was always coupled with the soul irrespective 
of its ontological status, and always reflecting, either through its own rarefaction or 
densification, the spiritual state of the soul with which it was associated. He explained: 
“Material substance possesses such a nature that it can undergo every kind of 
transformation. When therefore it is drawn down to lower beings it is formed into 
the grosser and more solid condition of body and serves to distinguish the visible 
species of this world in all their variety. But when it ministers to more perfect and 
blessed beings, it shines in the splendor of celestial bodies, and adorns either the 
angels of God or the sons of the resurrection with the garments of a spiritual 
body.”610 
A soul was always coupled with matter, which, depending on the soul’s state of virtue, 
would vary between heavy and rarefied. On the question of how many incarnations a soul 
would undergo before its final restoration, the Peri Archon gave a somewhat garbled 
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 Princ. 2.3.2. The reference was to 1 Cor. 15:53-56. 
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 Princ. 2.2.2 (PG 11:187BC): “materialis ista substantia hujus mundi habens naturam quae ex omnibus 
ad omnia transformatur, cum ad inferiores quosque trahitur, in crassiorem corporis statum solidioremque 
formatur, ita ut visibiles istas mundi species variasque distinguat; cum vero perfectioribus ministrat et 
beatioribus, in fulgore coelestium corporum micat, et spiritualis corporis indumentis vel angelos Dei, vel 
filios resurrectio nis exornat.” 
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account. In one passage, which has been preserved in the Greek, it suggested several 
transmigrations of the soul, through a variety of positions on the ontological scale, before 
its final restoration.
611
 How Origen imagined the seamless migration of the soul from 
body to body, so that it never was left bodiless, was not explained. Elsewhere, however, 
he suggested that at death, the body would be “corrupted and scattered,” and, like a seed, 
be raised up at the resurrection and given exalted form in accordance with the virtue of its 
soul, or be subjected to punishments, which Origen described variously.
612
 We cannot 
here dwell on these vexing incongruities, but simply note that at the time of restoration 
matter would abandon the “grosser” state it had assumed through its association with 
souls which, through laxity and disobedience toward God, had passed to a lower level of 
being, and it would, through association with souls resplendent with virtue, once again 
return to its original condition which was “so pure and refined that we must think of it as 
being like the ether, as it were of a heavenly purity and clearness.”613 
Thus did Origen deal with incipient dualism. He posited that God created both the 
souls and the bodies, the association between which existed ab principio. In this light, 
while matter was not in itself the cause behind the lapse of souls from their original 
closeness to God, its being patient of “every kind of transformation” pointed to its 
inherent instability, and its crude densification with the downward spiral of the errant 
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 Princ. 1.8.4 (Gk.) describes the trajectory of soul most vividly: “By some inclination toward evil these 
souls lose their wings and come into bodies, first of men; then through their association with the irrational 
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 Princ. 2.10.3-8. 
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 Princ. 1.6.4 (PG 11:170C): “ita pura erit atque purgata, ut aetheris in modum et coelestis cujusdam 
puritatis atque possit intelligi.” Cf. Princ. 3.6.4.  
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soul made it synonymous with mortality itself. In this context, Origen pointed to another 
aspect of the symbiosis between soul and body. Over and against those anti-materialists 
of his time, who argued that the soul’s proper mode of life was to live free of body 
because the latter was the medium through which “death can have its effect,”614 Origen 
took the opposite position that the role of the soul was not to separate itself from body but 
to act as “clothing of the body” and “an ornament” which covered and concealed its 
mortal nature.
615
 Thus, although non-material only in theory, we still can begin to see the 
mind/soul as the locus of the freedom that characterized God, its divine archetype, 
operating in the world and directed against what would otherwise have been the 
inexorable determinism of pure materiality. Soul sanctified matter by leading it and 
forcing it to act against its own character, but instead to follow the soul and act freely and 
non-deterministically. Considered this way, the wearying exertions required of 
minds/souls in primordial time and their ultimate fall become more understandable. 
At the same time, if one believed that when souls had been fully restored bodies 
would be put away and matter be destroyed, then it followed that, if by their God-given 
power of free will souls were again to fall away from God, matter would have to be 
created a second time because the variety that makes up a world could in no way be 
produced without matter.
616
 Thus, apart from the aforementioned evidence of Scripture 
which upheld that matter would endure, the theory of a final destruction of matter seemed 
implausible in Origen’s eyes also because, without a continued association with matter, 
the rational souls would seem to hold their final exalted position “forever irremovably,” 
and “forget that they had been placed in their final state of blessedness by the grace of 
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God and not by their own goodness.”617 The rational souls sanctified and exalted matter, 
leading it to act against its own deterministic manner, while matter, paradoxically, acted 
as a kind of guarantor of the continued free will of the souls. By continuing to be 
associated with souls, matter provided them with an abiding theoretical avenue of change 
and volitive exertion away, thus affording their free will real and actuable potency. From 
here we see how souls stood in contrast to God. As we saw above, souls once did not 
exist “and then began to exist,” and therefore were “of necessity subject to change and 
alteration.”618 Their associated materiality was the avenue, though not the cause, of 
expressing this change and alteration. The association corroborated by Origen’s 
insistence that God was non-material, which in turn reinforced his immutability. 
 
THE CHRIST 
In this context of cosmic fallenness and restoration, Origen saw the work and 
purpose of Christ as the pivotal event which changed the course of the universe. Yet, 
preceding the physical Incarnation and earthly mission of Christ was an entire prehistory 
which Origen described as having taken place in the world of the minds and prepared the 
way for the coming of the Son of God in the flesh. It was there that Origen laid down the 
foundations of a Christology and theory of redemption that brought together various 
trajectories in his thought into a unique, though ultimately highly problematic, synthesis. 
The Incarnation was at its core the natural product of the love that God had for his 
creatures. In contrast to what the Gnostics may have claimed about the creator being an 
evil deity who was unconnected to the God revealed in Christ, Origen affirmed the view 
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 Princ. 2.3.3 (PG 11:192A): “ignorent se Dei gratia et non sua virtute in illo fine beatitudinis constitisse.”  
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 Princ. 2.9.2. 
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that all things had been made through the Son of God (Col. 1:16) and that his creatures 
were the objects of his love (Wis. 11:24). Out of this love, God granted to all the rational 
beings that he had created a “participation in himself...proportionate to the loving 
affection with which it had clung to him.”619 As we saw, however, the “loving affection” 
that the souls exhibited back toward their creator varied, from warmer to feebler, and this 
solely “by reason of the faculty of free will.”620 And so they fell, to varying degrees, 
according to their scale of apathy toward God. 
However, out of all of the souls that had been created, one of the souls—the very 
one talked of in Christ’s words, “No man taketh away my soul”621—did not fall away. 
Rather, it clung to God with determination, from the very beginning of creation and ever 
after, in a union “that was inseparable and indissoluble.”622 It was not uncommon in the 
thought of late antiquity for love to be seen as a species of volition
623
 and, in this respect, 
Origen was no exception; the love that the extraordinary soul displayed toward God was 
a matter of its will. But the reason why this and no other soul displayed such love 
remained unexplained by Origen. This soul had neither an ontological advantage over the 
others—it was a soul like they were—nor any guiding knowledge or insight that was 
superior to that possessed by the other souls. In fact, Origen’s clear purpose had been to 
establish the meritocratic nature of that soul’s pending participation in the divine. Any 
advantage that this particular soul held over the others would have called into question 
the deservedness of the favor that the soul was, as we shall see, about to be shown. Once 
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again, Origen simply was pointing to the primacy of will as ultimate determinant in his 
understanding of the relations of creatures with God. In a system of revealed religion, it 
could not be any other way. The only bridge between human cognitive ability and the 
absolute knowledge of the divine was an act of will, love, and faith. There was neither a 
tempter, nor a notion of inherent evil that might have explained the counter-rational turn 
of the souls, so why only one from among the plethora of equally endowed and equally 
informed souls exercised such faith and stayed true to God could only remain a mystery. 
Neither was the degree and distribution of the lapse of the souls statistically determined. 
To be sure, Origen’s depiction of the variety in the world as the result of the varied falls 
of the souls certainly seemed patient of a statistical interpretation, but without doubt he 
would have viewed statistical necessity as just another form of the compulsion that he 
found so repugnant. In the end, as incomprehensible as it might appear, we can only 
envisage the volitive behavior of the virtuous soul as being part of a system of truly 
unforced, possibly random, choices within a general context of divine providence that 
was both perfectly respectful of the free will of individual agents therein and strictly 
merit-based.
624
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 Michael Frede (Will, 2011) identified three conceptions of willing in ancient thought. The first, which he 
attributed to Aristotle, understood will as the expression of the rational faculty of the soul, which contrasted 
with desire, the expression of the irrational part of the soul. This was not necessarily free will, but rather 
rationality in necessary action. Second was the Stoic view that, rejecting Aristotle’s partitioning of the soul, 
amounted to what for Frede was the was the first unambiguous articulation of a theory of free will. Here, 
the unitary mind assented or not to suggestions that rose up from within it. The type of suggestions that 
arose were a reflection of the state of mind, which in turn was the end result of a chain of causality, in line 
with the generally deterministic Stoic worldview. The third was the neo-Peripatetic view, represented by 
such thinkers as Alexander of Aphrodisias, which, dissatisfied with what it saw as the residual determinism 
in the Stoic position, argued that will was free only if, when one chose to perform a given deed, it could 
just as well have chosen a different one. This was the “principle of alternate possibilities.” Without entering 
into too much analysis here, it seems to me that, by Frede’s measure, Origen generally was an adherent of a 
Stoic view. We saw how it fell to mind to respond to various external stimuli (Princ. 3.1.3). Yet, in his 
description of the action of Christ’s soul, which had no determined advantage over the other souls which all 
lapsed, Origen seemed to be inclining toward a view close to that of Frede’s Alexander. It almost 
resembled the view that Frede found particularly objectionable (p. 151), namely that “we are able to make 
196 
In line, therefore, with God’s intention to grant a participation in himself 
proportionately to a soul’s response to God, this lone soul would become, as a reward for 
its virtue, “the soul of the Wisdom and Word of God and of the truth and the true 
light.”625 Other souls, which had exhibited at least some warmth toward God and thus 
mitigated their degree of lapse, would have kept some of their virtuous traits as well, but 
this soul received the Son wholly and completely, and entered into his light and splendor. 
To a pre-eminent degree it was made “one spirit” with him according to Paul’s626 
promise.
627
 In the Incarnation, whereby the Son of God took on a human body, this soul 
became the mediating principle between God and the flesh, for it was not possible for the 
divine nature to mingle directly with a body without there being a medium.
628
 The soul, 
being a rational existence, was able both to enter the word, wisdom, and truth that were 
found in the divine, but also in turn to receive the Son of God wholly in itself. So 
complete was this mutual embrace between the Son of God and the soul of Jesus that 
Origen articulated what was a nascent doctrine of communicatio idiomatum: the soul, and 
the body coupled with it, could legitimately be called the Son of God and power of God, 
Christ and the wisdom of God; and the Son of God, on the other hand, could be called 
Jesus and the Son of man. In like manner, the Son of God was said to have died, whereas 
he who was said to come in the glory of God the Father was also called the Son of man. 
In short, “throughout the whole of Scripture, while the divine nature was spoken of in 
human terms the human nature is in turn adorned with marks that belong to the divine 
                                                                                                                                                 
absolute and unconditioned choices which have no further explanation.” The soul of Christ seemed to be 
exercising an absolute volition of mysterious origin. 
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 Princ. 2.6.3 (PG 11:211C): “utpote sapientiae et verbo Dei et veritati ac luci verae.” 
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 Princ. 2.6.3. 
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 Princ. 2.6.3. We are reminded of Origen’s view in Princ. 2.3.2 that “as...Christ is the clothing of the 
soul, so by an intelligible kind of reasoning the soul is said to be the clothing of the body; for it is an 
ornament of the body, covering and concealing its mortal nature.”  
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prerogative.”629 Thus, Origen argued, the passage, “They shall both be in one flesh,”630 
applied more properly to the Word of God and his soul than it did to a man and his wife. 
After this union of the Son with his soul, there was no longer potential for discord, and it 
was impossible for the soul of Christ to sin. By “firmness of purpose, immensity of 
affection, and an inextinguishable warmth of love,” he explained, “all susceptibility to 
change or alteration was destroyed.” This was because “what formerly depended upon 
the will was by the influence of long custom changed into nature.”631 The force of habit 
had transformed the concerted action of will into an extension of nature. This was a kind 
of union with the divine that other created souls simply were not privy to,
632
 although in 
theory they could have been. In the same vein, Origen even added the striking claim that 
“as the Son and the Father are one, so also the soul which the Son assumed and the Son 
himself are one.”633 
Here, we must make a digression and note that, to any historian of Christian 
doctrine, Origen’s thoughts thus far on Christ and the Incarnation must give pause, 
particularly because in them one can espy theological trajectories that both spoke to 
contentious questions of his day, but which also can be viewed as precedent to what were 
to become matters of enormous disagreement in the centuries that followed. The most 
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obvious of these was centered on his description of the mode of union of the Son of God 
with the soul of Jesus. On one level, Origen clearly was ascribing to Christ a divine 
dimension, and thus offering a rebuttal to the psilanthropism of such sects as the 
Ebionites, who propounded a low Christology and a view of Jesus as merely a human. On 
the other hand, his understanding of the unification into one entity of what were two clear 
agents, the Son of God and the pre-existing soul of Jesus, on what was fundamentally a 
moral and volitional basis, seemed to pioneer a Christological view that others such as 
Nestorius would later be accused of championing. Ironically, whereas Nestorius’ 
explanation of why that particular human, viz. Jesus, was selected for the extraordinary 
favors of the Son of God would be tainted by a sense of divine caprice, Origen’s view, 
for all its karmic spectacularism in the eyes of later generations, would at least preserve a 
sense of meritocracy and justice by arguing that the causes of the favor shown to Jesus’ 
soul lay in its commendable behavior in primordial time.
634
 
Nevertheless, perhaps the most notorious theological tendency that Origen gave 
voice to would remain that which was contained in his comment that the oneness of the 
soul of Jesus with the Son of God resembled that of the Father and the Son. This appears 
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 On the other hand, we must also note that Origen stands outside the dichotomy that Joseph Lienhard 
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to have been an isolated statement
635—perhaps it was no more than a rhetorical 
flourish—but, taken in abstraction from whatever else Origen had already said on the 
subject of the Son’s relation to the Father, it opened the way for the intimation that his 
oneness with the Father was a matter of will, a volitive union. For some, there would be 
kerygmatic allure in presenting the Son as the moral exemplar who earned his sonship 
through virtue, and pioneered the way for other creatures. The fact remained, however, 
that if oneness of nature between the soul of Jesus and the Son of God had been a matter 
of volitional habit, then this had obvious ramifications for the true deity of the Son if this 
same paradigm were projected onto the intra-Trinitarian discussion. It was precisely this 
type of analogy, which in time came to be expanded into a comparison between the unity 
in the Trinity to the concord between volitive agents in creation at large, that would 
become, as we shall see in the next chapter, a great specter that struck horror in those 
defenders of the Council of Nicea who saw in their opponents’ every mention of 
volitional harmony in the Trinity an attempt to question the Son’s true divinity. These 
would become some of the unsavory fruits of Origen’s hearty embrace of will as the great 
guarantor of fairness and justice in his theology. 
The souls’ fall away from God and God’s plan that they be returned back to their 
original state of closeness to God, without of course violating their free will, imparted to 
the world an inherently cyclic life as it flowed from primordial lapse back to 
eschatological restoration. The fall and separation from God provoked in the souls a 
sense of pain because of their “unstable and disordered condition”—it was as if they were 
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limbs torn away from their body
636—and when the cosmic cycle had reached its lowest 
ebb, then the Son of God, united with the soul of Jesus and its body, came into the world 
to save it. For Origen the most salient proof of this disorder in the world was the sense of 
discord that had come to characterize the relations between the rulers among the human 
race and their subjects. Both social strata had been overcome by weakness, their capacity 
respectively to rule and to obey had been “corrupted and profaned,”637 and as a result the 
world had been pushed to the very edge of destruction. 
In this context, Origen tellingly viewed the work of Christ in terms that had at 
their center the potentially opposed notions of the primacy of will and the cultivation of 
obedience. In coming, Christ’s purpose was to restore to the rulers the ability to rule, and 
to their subjects the capacity to obey. In both instances, he did this through his own 
example. By coming into the world, Christ, in accordance with Scripture, established his 
own rule and would continue to reign until he had put his enemies under his feet(1 Cor. 
15:27). Thus he restored the corrupted laws of government, and by the example of his 
own rule he taught the rulers “the arts of control.”638 On the other hand, he also taught 
humans the virtue of obedience. By emptying himself, taking the form of a servant, and 
being obedient even unto death, he taught submission and obedience to those who “could 
in no other way obtain salvation except through obedience.”639 In being obedient, he first 
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fulfilled in himself “what he wished to be fulfilled by others.”640 And once all things had 
been subjected to him, he would, in accordance with Paul’s words,641 subject himself, and 
all those who were included in him, back to the Father, and thus complete the 
consummation and restoration of the cosmos.
642
 This subjection was to reveal “the 
blessedness of our perfection,” and it would represent the “crowning glory” of his work 
because he offered to the Father “not only the sum total of all ruling and reigning,” which 
he had amended throughout the universe, “but also the laws, corrected and renewed, of 
the obedience and subjection due from the human race.”643 
Origen was emphatic that, at least in its purest and most ideal application, this 
glorious subjection and renewed system of governance among humans was not to be 
imposed in a manner that perhaps might have characterized the previous, “unamended” 
system of dominion. On the contrary, this submission would be characterized by reason, 
enlightenment and free assent, and achieved “through certain means and courses of 
discipline and periods of time.” The world would not be subject to God “by the pressure 
of some necessity that compels it...nor by the use of force,” but “by word, by reason, by 
teaching, by the exhortation to better things, by the best methods of education.”644 To be 
sure, this was Origen’s rejection of force and necessity at its finest, seeming even to be 
falling in line with classical Greek thinking by presenting the will to do the good as a 
function of knowledge and understanding. After all, the cessation of evil-doing was “the 
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beginning of an impulse towards virtue,”645 and passion in the human soul was a 
“likening to the irrational.”646 A rational being, moreover, that failed to adhere to the 
“ends and ordinances laid down by reason” was said to be sinning because it was 
departing from what was “just and right.”647 Thus it followed quite logically that only 
through reason could one be led to virtue. The role of Christ, therefore, was to teach 
obedience precisely through inaugurating a life that was based on true knowledge, and 
pointing out a “course of healing and improvement.”648 
Yet here there was also tension. On the one hand, this “process of instruction and 
rational training” allowed those, who with purer mind had devoted themselves in this 
present life to the higher pursuits, to attain to a “capacity for divine wisdom” and to 
advance to a “richer understanding of truth.” But this same process also proved “very 
severe...and full of pain” to those souls that refused to obey the Word of God.649 The 
reference to such pain and suffering may have been a reference to those souls’ continued 
estrangement from God, as those limbs torn from their body. By choosing to disobey, 
they would be subject to their continued downward spiral, a prospect Origen had already 
painted in the direst and most painful terms. However, this bleak prospect could also have 
been a part of what Origen conceded was the other, less savory, aspect of the pedagogical 
process that Christ had introduced, namely the parallel need for “such merited and 
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appropriate threatenings”650 toward those souls which contemptuously neglected their 
own salvation. Origen may have believed that free will was the final arbiter in divine-
human relations, but at this point he had come to the impasse: what was to happen if 
certain souls kept refusing to be obedient. These souls Origen had no choice but to 
commit to the inscrutable mystery of God’s ways, although he remained adamant that, 
throughout all, free will would always be preserved. We quote the master at length: 
“But how, consistently with the preservation of free will in all rational creatures, 
each person ought to be dealt with, that is, who they are whom the Word of God 
discovers to be prepared and capable and so instructs; who they are whom he puts 
off for a time; who they are from whom the word is utterly hidden and who are 
destined to be far away from the hearing of it; who again they are that despise the 
word when it is declared and preached to them and consequently are visited with 
God’s corrections and chastisements and pressed into salvation and whose 
conversion is as it were compelled and extorted; who they are for whom God even 
provides special occasions for salvation, so that sometimes a man has obtained an 
assured salvation when his faith was revealed by a mere answer; from what 
causes or on what occasions these things happen, or what the divine wisdom sees 
as it looks into these men or what movements of theirs will lead God to arrange 
all these things thus, is known to God alone and to his only begotten Son, through 
whom all things are created and restored, and to the Holy Spirit, through whom all 
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things are sanctified, who proceedeth from the Father himself, to whom is the 
glory forever and ever, Amen.”651 
In the end, there was no clear answer. Origen could only commit to God’s judgment the 
mystery of how recalcitrant disobedience among the creatures would be reconciled with 
the cosmos’ path back to God.652 
 
CONCLUSION 
In a context during which the place of will in theology was very much a live 
subject among the Gnostics and neo-Platonists, but largely ignored by Christian thinkers 
such as Irenaeus, Origen embraced the importance of will, and especially the notion of 
free will in rational creatures, seeing in it a bulwark by which he would do battle against 
the oppression of the Stoicizing determinism he associated with the materialist worldview 
which had been embraced in certain quarters of Christian thought. This valorization of 
free will allowed him to establish a cosmic meritocracy and to present the fallen nature of 
the world as the logical and just consequence of misdeeds freely committed by rational 
agents in previous incarnations. Unlike the Gnostics, who put the location of the 
disruption to the cosmic order in the divine sphere, Origen placed it firmly in the purview 
of the created beings. By pointing to the poor choices of the created rational agents as the 
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cause behind the fallen nature of the world, Origen was thus able to affirm the goodness 
of the Creator and his creation and reject Gnostic talk of an evil Demiurge. Though 
created and ontologically inferior, the minds, even in their fallen state, weakly reflected 
God, the supreme mind who had created them—so much so that Origen invoked the 
example of will proceeding from mind as an image of the divine begetting of the Son 
from the Father without fission or fracture. God’s pure incorporeality placed him wholly 
outside the determinism and compulsion of the material world. And the implication was 
that, when the created mind/soul, as a reflection of the divine mind, employed its own 
faculties of intellection and especially volition, it too acted as a locus of relative freedom 
from the materialist determinism that surrounded it. Thus envisaged, human free-will was 
metaphysically grounded in the similarity the human mind had to its archetype in God, 
the supreme mind. 
Building on this volitionistic framework that he had established, Origen in the 
course of his exposition introduced certain principles and premises that would prove 
enormously significant to later theology. The first of these was the notion that 
commonality of action and willing denoted commonality of nature. We saw this 
intimated in Origen’s presentation of the Son as either the will of the Father, or a 
reflection, or even a production thereof. Focusing on the principle of will as index of 
nature checked the suggestions of the Son’s (and Spirit’s) inferiority with respect to the 
Father that focusing solely on Origen’s sense of hierarchy might otherwise have 
inculcated. In the divide between Creator and created, the Son and Spirit were on the side 
of the Creator; the oneness of purpose that Origen ascribed to the divine Persons in his 
theology sufficiently established their co-divinity with the Father. This will prove 
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significant for the fourth century, where we will see attempts to shun the highly 
contentious and, for many, materializing ousia language and promote instead the 
language of the commonality of will as an index of oneness. I will argue that this was not 
an attempt to argue for the potentiality of volitive conflict in the Trinity, as for example 
the Gnostics might have imagined, but an effort at extrapolating back from the absolute 
oneness of purpose in the Trinity, which was observable both in Scripture and spiritual 
experience, to a type of oneness that otherwise remained indefinable and transcendent. 
Alongside this principle was that complex of ideas that grew out of Origen’s 
problematic Christology. First, there was the presentation of two clear agents in Christ, 
held together in a moral union, and more specifically the Nicomachean system wherein 
the volitional effort on the part of the soul of Christ to do the good led to the eventual 
appropriation of the good into its very nature through the power of habit. When this met 
with what can only be understood, from our safely distant vantage point, as Origen’s 
rhetorical flourish on the resultant oneness of the Word and the human soul in Christ 
being comparable to the oneness of the Persons of the Trinity, the mix for later 
generations became explosive. In the heat of the disputes in the fourth century, it is not 
hard to see how any mention of volition in the Trinity was quickly interpreted as code for 
a theory of the Son’s having grown, through obedience and habituation, from a lesser 
status into his divine rank. We shall see how these play out in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
THE DISPUTE OVER ARIUS 
 
In this final chapter, we will focus on the theologically fecund fourth century, 
which confessedly has functioned as something of a final cause for this study, drawing it 
along to its crescendo in the conflict provoked by the teaching of Arius. Although, as we 
have already seen, the will was a key element in several of the Trinitarian theologies that 
we have examined thus far, it was in the course of this tumultuous debate that it was 
identified explicitly as a problem. When the Council of Sardica, which was called in 343 
to respond to the perceived challenge that the Council of Antioch (341) posed to Nicaea, 
issued statements excoriating the “blasphemous and perverse” opinion that the passage 
from the gospel of John (10:30), “I and My Father are one,” signified the “concord and 
harmony” between the Father and the Son, it was articulating its conviction that, drawing 
from human experience, the will was too erratic a basis on which to formulate a vision of 
the oneness between the Father and the Son. As we shall see, Sardica was responding to 
the formula, oneness according to symphonia, which had been put forward by the 
Council of Antioch. But it was interpreting Antioch’s words—in my view, most 
unfairly—in the light of what we will see had been the early Arius’ radical teaching on 
the will as it pertained to the Holy Trinity. I have viewed the will as a purposive 
movement of mind, and suggested that in Greek thought conflicts between willing agents 
were manifestations of cognitive disparity. A lack of knowledge on the part of at least 
one of the agents was what lay behind volitional disharmony. In this respect, I will argue 
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that Arius, and especially the earliest Arius, was a specific case in point. In him, for the 
first time, we will see the incursion into the precincts of Trinitarian theology itself of a 
strongly volitionist theory that viewed the will as a mutable and contingent category and, 
for a number of reasons, even included a reflexive vector into what in the Christian 
thinkers we have seen thus far had been a strictly unidirectional movement of the will in 
the Godhead. As already intimated by Sardica, we will also see the committed attempts of 
his most stringent Nicene opponents to repel Arius precisely because—and here was the 
irony—they had accepted his premise of the fundamentally contingent nature of will. 
Thus, like him, they held that the inclusion of will would lead to a Son not only 
ontologically inferior to the Father but subject potentially to ignorance, error, and sin, 
which is why they, unlike him, rejected it altogether. 
Thus far, my examination of the will in Trinitarian discourse has been threefold. 
First, I have considered the role of will in the Father’s begetting of the Son. In Justin, 
Tertullian, and Origen, the Father’s precedent will was an affirmation of divine 
sovereignty, but more importantly it also formed an integral part of a psychological 
understanding of the begetting of the Son, in which the generation was likened to how the 
human mind moves by will to put forward an idea from within itself. This paradigm was 
intended to demonstrate the Son’s likeness and closeness to the Father, of whose will and 
wisdom he was the perfect, externalized expression. In non-Christian theologies, like that 
of the Valentinian Gnostics, we saw a divergent impulse that emphasized the precedent 
will of the primal deity but was part of a scheme that placed, as even Tertullian had 
observed, generator and generate at a distance from one another. This “distancing” would 
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become the ultimate cause of the strife that racked the divine sphere which in the Gnostic 
view then led to the generation of the material world. 
In this chapter, we will see how, early in the debate, Arius framed the precedent 
will of the Father as contingent, a matter of choice, thus making the Son’s existence 
similarly contingent and therefore of a lower ontological kind than that of the 
unconditionally existent Father. Thus, the Father’s precedent will became synonymous 
with his lordship over the Son, as over all creation, and the subsequent conditionality of 
the Son’s being put him ultimately at the same level with the common creatures. In this 
respect, there will be a certain correlation between Arius and the thinking of the 
Valentinians. Notably, the most strident supporters of the Council of Nicaea, who were 
also the most vociferous opponents of anything resembling a concession to Arianism, 
will seem, we note, to accept Arius’ correlation of will, contingency, and lordship, which 
is why they sought to expunge any mention of the will from the divine begetting. 
However, from within the moderate Nicene camp, a number of whom had originally been 
from groups that for a time had displayed caution toward Nicaea, emerged the view, 
which was to win the day, that a sense of the divine will in the begetting was imperative 
because it yielded the most satisfying account of revelation, preserved a proper sense of 
theological order, and served as both an affirmation of divine sovereignty and a safeguard 
against neo-Platonist emanationism. Faced with the problem of how to free the notion of 
precedent will of the connotations of ontological superiority with which Arius had 
charged it, and which both sides seemed to accept, the only recourse was to appeal to the 
transcendence and fundamental inexplicability of the divine nature.  
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Secondly, we have examined questions of volitional directionality in the divine 
sphere. In such thinkers as Justin, Tertullian, and Origen, the Son as Logos was 
understood to be the hypostatized expression of the Father’s wisdom and will, and as 
such he moved outward in a volitionally unidirectional movement that revealed to the 
world the will of God and the saving knowledge that might elicit from rational creation 
its free obedience and volitional alignment. Yet, we also saw theological systems that, 
instead of envisioning unidirectional volitional movement outward from the primal deity, 
put forward ideations of reflexive movement in the divine realm in which the will also 
worked back toward the divine source as the responsive will of its subordinates and 
inferiors. The motor of this interplay was the cognitive disparity between volitive agents 
that was ultimately born of their ontological alterity. In Valentinianism, plurality, 
division, and even disturbance in the divine sphere were the direct result of the 
“distancing” of generator from generate that Tertullian espied in the Valentinian account 
of generation (probole) and the inevitable volitional disharmony between the two that 
was resolved only by the revelation of deeper understanding and the subsequent 
restoration of concord. The fruit, of course, of the turmoil that passed was the created 
world, of which Gnosticism in general had a dim view. In the early Plotinus, however, 
this sense of misdirected reflexive will, tolma, became the apparatus through which 
primordial oneness devolved into plurality in the divine realm. Although Christian 
authors differed from Plotinus and did not view the begetting of the Son as any kind of 
lapse, this reflexive volitive action he preached could be seen as taking the place of the 
precedent will that Christianity talked of, only that all initiative to movement was in 
Plotinus ascribed to the subordinate sphere. 
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To be sure, we have also argued that the later Plotinus, probably influenced by his 
own struggles against the world-rejecting disposition of the Valentinians, talked less of 
tolma in his later formulations and more of a rational necessity, in which volitional action 
was seen as a manifestation of ignorance. In this devaluation of the will he resembled that 
other great warrior against Gnosticism, Irenaeus, in whom there was little mention of the 
will at all in his Trinitarian theology. There the emphasis was presenting the Son and 
Spirit as extensions of the Father—most graphically, as his “hands”—and by means of 
this corporeal image avoiding the sense of generative ordering in the Trinity. In Origen, 
who also struggled against Gnosticism, there was the converse strategy of embracing the 
will wholeheartedly, but taking the primordial conflict that was born of ignorance and 
contingent will out of the divine sphere and placing it directly inside the created realm, 
namely in sphere of the souls, where a karmic system of free-will and deserved 
consequence powered the movement of both the cosmic cycle and the scheme of 
salvation and redemption. It is in this account of the realm of the souls that we see in 
Origen one of the fullest attempts to address the question of the human soul and will in 
Christ. 
In this chapter, we will see in the early theology of Arius the apogee, if only a 
brief one, of this sense of reflexive will in Christian theology, with him viewing—at least 
in his earliest and most extreme period—the Son’s unity with the Father exclusively as a 
moral union, a oneness of will in a relation of obedience. This was the direct result of the 
Son’s ontological inferiority to the Father, as Arius had preached it. We must note, too, 
that in the limited body of his writings that has reached us there is no mention of a human 
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mind in Christ, and I will assume that there was a kernel of truth to the accusations
653
 
leveled against him and that the earliest Arius reinforced his vision of ontological 
stratification in the Godhead by viewing all the signs in Scripture of human weakness and 
finitude as evidence of the Son’s ontological inferiority.654 Thus, as the product of the 
Father’s contingent precedent will, the Son was lesser than the Father, and therefore 
shared obedience with the other rational creatures as the sole mode of being one with the 
Father. Rational creatures lacked the Father’s cognitive perfection, and so through willing 
acts of obedience, as faith-motivated rational extrapolations, they made up for what they 
lacked in knowledge. The Son’s perfect obedience to the Father was in turn exemplary 
for the obedience of all rational creatures. Yet, the early Arius disclosed, for the Son’s 
obedience to have any paradigmatic power, and resting as it did on contingent will, it had 
to be subject to at least the theoretical possibility of failure—a conclusion that was to be 
widely received with shock, even, it seems, among Arius’ supporters. As it would turn 
out, the theoretical possibility of the Son’s falling away from the Father was to prove 
secondary to Arius’ primary concern for cosmological order, and, very early in the 
debates, he would drop the notion altogether. Nevertheless, the memory of what he had 
preached on the matter would linger on, affecting attitudes to any mention of will, as we 
saw in the Council of Sardica. 
Thirdly and finally, we have also looked at will as volitive movement outward 
from the Godhead, by which God works in the world. Although the proposition of a 
force, not strictly subject to reason and potentially arbitrary, actively determining the 
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course of the universe may have proved problematic for some schools of thought of the 
time, this was the aspect of will least subject to controversy among Christians because 
they accepted the biblical view of God as working in the world. However, one of the key 
issues during the debates would remain how to understand this singular volitive action in 
the world in the light of the doctrine of the Trinity. In brief, the view that came to 
predominate was that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit had one singular outward will, 
which was indicative of the identity of their essence (ousia). My contention will be that 
the formula promulgated by Antioch, oneness according to concord (symphonia), was an 
early formulation in this direction, and certainly not a reissue of the early Arian position 
of contingent will as sole mode of oneness between Father and Son, which even he had 
abandoned, and which had been condemned by Sardica. 
After a drawn out period of sorting wheat from chaff, the excess provoked by 
Arius on both sides of the debate was duly jettisoned, and, I will argue, the acceptable 
limits of will as a factor in Trinitarian theology were delineated. For the question of will 
was one of the difficulties, such as personhood, the nature of divinity, and the act of 
begetting itself, that surrounded the more general problem of plurality in the Godhead 
that Christianity professed, especially a plurality expressed in terms of a begetting of one 
divine person by another, and complicated further by the belief that this begotten person 
had assumed human nature. It is impossible to make a pronouncement on the official 
fourth century Christian resolution to the question of will, because neither of the Councils 
that all came to recognize as binding, namely Nicaea (325) and Constantinople (381), 
made specific mention of it in its formal doctrinal statements. My analyses of necessity 
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can only be extrapolations from the writings of those authors who enjoyed the broadest 
approval of the time, and were connected with the proceedings at the Councils. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS 
The precise order of events marking the beginning of the conflict over the Holy 
Trinity, which was to preoccupy most of the fourth century, is not clear. From the 
chronicles of Socrates Scholasticus we learn that the dispute began at a gathering of the 
clergy in Alexandria, at which Alexander, the bishop of the city, was to deliver a lecture 
on the mystery of the unity of the Holy Trinity. Most scholars agree this must have been 
around 318.
655
 At some point during the speech, the presbyter Arius raised his voice in 
protest, charging that the prelate was “teaching the same view as Sabellius the Libyan.” 
“If the Father begat the Son,” Arius continued, “he that was begotten had a beginning of 
existence: and from this it is evident that there was a time when the Son was not. It 
therefore necessarily follows, that he had his substance from nothing.”656 Sozomen gives 
a slightly different version of events. According to him, it was Arius who, unprovoked, 
had first begun to preach in the churches these things that “no one before him had ever 
suggested,”657 and as a result caused much commotion. 
At the heart of this nascent conflict, of course, was the doctrine of the Trinity, 
specifically how to reconcile the plurality of divine persons in the Godhead, as revelation 
had made them known, with the philosophical need to preserve monotheism. From this 
basic datum each side was to draw its diverging theological and soteriological 
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conclusions. Arius was to understand monotheism as being synonymous with personal 
monotheism; for him the Father would be the monos theos. Emphasizing the Father’s 
ontological primacy, he would conclude unavoidably that the Son was inferior to, and in 
a sense a creature of, the Father. Insisting thus on the distinct existences of Father and 
Son, the problem for Arius would become how to envision the relationship between 
them, which the Son’s title as Son of God made clear had to be close. In his earliest 
attempt at a solution, Arius would propose volition as the medium of relation between 
Father and Son, and his argument would run something like this: possessed of free will as 
creatures are, and in volitional relation with the Father in the only way that creatures 
could be, the Son was perfectly obedient in all things to the will of the Father, yet was 
theoretically capable even of virtue and vice. Arius’ opponents would reject his 
implication of the Son’s createdness and especially the notion of his moral contingency 
as blasphemous and unbefitting of what they considered to be the Son’s indisputable 
divinity. So the question in its most basic rendition was about what constituted divinity, 
and, if the Son were possessed of it, whether he was divine in the same way that the 
Father was. To our enduring difficulty, as ones trying to retrace these events, this central 
theological question quickly became mired in a confusion of related, though probably 
unforeseen, issues to which the various disputants, it seems, responded sometimes too 
hastily, to judge from their subsequent readjustments and retreats from only previously 
held positions. 
As this initial war of words between Arius and his adversaries intensified, we 
learn from Sozomen that the litigants pleaded their respective cases to Alexander, the 
bishop of Alexandria. Alexandria at this time was still being racked by an earlier rift 
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provoked by the followers of Melitius,
658
 so the bishop deemed it more prudent in this 
instance to allow the parties to debate their cases openly, in an ecclesiastical setting, so 
that “persuasion rather than…force” might win the day.659 He convened a special hearing, 
over which he himself would preside, that formally would give ear to each side and settle 
the issue by arbitration. After the second session, the bishop finally ruled against Arius, 
whom he then instructed to renounce his position and receive the verdict of the council. 
Wedded to his convictions, and probably buoyed by the knowledge that there were many 
who shared them, Arius not only refused,
660
 but also denounced his bishop and accused 
him of Sabellianism.
661
 
Pandemonium ensued. The previous battle lines hardened while sentiment over 
Arius’ theology and perceived maltreatment soared, quickly spreading “throughout all 
Egypt, Libya, and the upper Thebes.”662 Openly coming to his support, Arius’ advocates 
expressed their discontent by worshiping separately from those congregations affiliated 
with Alexander, whose authority and theology they had begun to revile.
663
 Confronted by 
full-scale rebellion, the bishop had little choice but to call a regional council of some one 
hundred bishops from Egypt and Libya and anathematize both Arius “for his shameless 
avowal of these heresies,” and “all such as have countenanced them.”664 
With all his avenues closing in Alexandria, Arius and his cohort sent legations to 
the bishops of other provinces, requesting their opinions on the beliefs for which Arius 
                                                 
658
 Melitius and his supporters just years previously had formed their own breakaway Church in Egypt 
because, they charged, Alexander’s predecessor Peter had capitulated during Diocletian’s persecution, and, 
as a result, he, his successors, and those that had communion with them could only be regarded as having 
also fallen away from the true Church. 
659
 Sozomen, Hist. eccl. 1.15 (NPNF
2
 2:251). 
660
 Sozomen, Hist. eccl. 1.15 (NPNF
2
 2:251). 
661
 Socrates, Hist. eccl. 1.5. 
662
 Socrates, Hist. eccl. 1.6. 
663
 See Alexander’s Epistle to Alexander (apud Theodoret, Hist. eccl. 1.3 [NPNF2 3:35]). 
664
 Alexander, Epistle to Bishops Everywhere (apud Socrates Hist. eccl. 1.6 [NPNF
2
 2:4]). 
217 
was being punished. If they found Arius’ positions agreeable, they were asked to appeal 
his case to Alexander; if they did not, they were asked to explain why. Thus, Sozomen 
noted, the tenets of Arius and his confreres were “universally disseminated, and the 
questions they had started became matters of debate among all the bishops.”665 As it 
spread beyond Egypt, knowledge of the dispute in Alexandria “excited many to a 
consideration of the question; and thus from a little spark a large fire was kindled”666 that 
was to rage in the life of the Church for close to a century. 
 
THE THALIA 
It was in these circumstances that certain circles close to Eusebius, the bishop of 
Nicomedia, learned of the dispute in Egypt. Ostensibly motivated by sentiments of 
theological solidarity with Arius,
667
 although there is evidence that these were strongly 
mingled with grievances against Alexander of a decidedly political nature,
668
 they urged 
Arius to commit his thoughts to paper systematically. Arius complied and composed the 
Thalia (“Banquet”), a long, and—to judge from Athanasius’ denunciation, decades later, 
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 Sozomen, Hist. eccl. 1.15. 
666
 Socrates Hist eccl. 1.6. 
667
 Telling is the fact that, in his letter to Eusebius of Nicomedia (apud Theodoret, Hist. eccl. 1.4), Arius 
addressed him as “my fellow-Lucianist,” suggesting their common discipleship under Lucian of Antioch. 
Philostorgius (Hist. eccl. 2.14) enumerated Eusebius of Nicomedia, Maris of Chalcedon, Theognis of 
Nicaea, Leontius, later bishop of Antioch, among others—all supporters of Arius—among the disciples of 
Lucian. What Lucian’s views had been remains unclear. Epiphanius’ (Pan. 23/43) account of him being a 
disciple of Marcion and accepting a strongly Gnostic system of three metaphysical principles—God, the 
Demiurge, and the Evil One—seems completely unreliable. Alexander, however, reported (Theodoret, Hist. 
eccl. 1:3 [NPNF
2
 3:38]) that Lucian had separated himself, “during a period of many years,” from the 
bishops who ejected Paul of Samosata. His martyrdom in 312 earned him the respect both of his disciples 
and their opponents. Sozomen (Hist. eccl. 3.5) reports that the fourth Creed issued at the Council of 
Antioch in 342 (see Athanasius’ Syn. 25) was simply the publication of a Creed written by the late Lucian. 
668
 Judging from the pointedness of Alexander’s views (see: Socrates, Hist. eccl. 1.6 [NPNF2 2:3]) on 
Eusebius’ having left his first see of Berytus (Beirut) for the politically more influential one of Nicomedia 
(which, in the formation of the Tetrarchy in 293, Diocletian had made the capital of the East and seat of the 
senior Augustus), it is possible that, even before the issue with Arius had arisen, there had already been 
tension between the two prelates over the propriety of this transfer. Tellingly, the question of episcopal 
transferences was an issue that Nicaea eventually was forced to address. 
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of the dissolute poetic style of one Sotades the Egyptian that it allegedly mimicked—at 
least partly metric piece
669
 that articulated Arius’ theological and metaphysical views. 
The precise timing of its composition has been the point of considerable speculation, with 
the crucial focus being on whether Arius was among his sympathizers who lived outside 
of Alexandria when he wrote it. I am inclined to accept the view that Arius wrote the 
Thalia in Alexandria before he was able to meet with his allies abroad, namely, in the 
interim between his initial condemnation by the local synod and his final expulsion from 
the city. This position explains best the early divergences between some of Arius’ views 
and those of his allies, which, it seems, were harmonized only after they had met in 
person.
670
 The work has survived in fragments,
671
 with the two largest citations coming 
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 R. Williams (Arius, 98-99) observes how the fragment Athanasius presents in Syn. 15 is entirely 
metrical whereas that in C. Ar. 1:5-6 is not, except for the opening quotation that is of the same meter as 
that in Syn. 15. From this, Williams fairly construes that the Thalia was either partially metered, or that in 
the C. Ar. Athanasius is paraphrasing what may well have been an entirely metered piece. 
670
 On the dating of the Thalia, I lean toward Charles Kannengiesser’s (Charles Kannengiesser, “Où et 
quand Arius composa-t-il la Thalie?” in Kyriakon [ed. Patrick Granfield and Josef A. Jungmann: Münster 
Westfalen: Verlag Aschendorff, 1970], I: 346-351) suggestion that Athanasius’ Syn. 15 (Ἀλλ’ ἐκβληθεὶς καὶ 
ἐπιτριβεὶς Ἄρειος παρὰ τῶν περὶ Εὐσέβιον συνέθηκεν ἑαυτοῦ τὴν αἵρεσιν ἐν χάρτῃ...) should be understood as 
“Mais, jété dehors et poussé par les Eusébiens, Arius consigna sa proper hérésie par écrit…” This leads to 
his subsequent argument, which I also accept, that the time of the production of the Thalia should be put in 
the interval between his initial ecclesiastical censure by Alexander and his final abandonment of 
Alexandria. Kannengiesser’s view is accepted by Rudolf Lorenz (Rudolf Lorenz, Arius Judaizans? 
[Göttingen: Vanderhoeck & Ruprecht, 1979] 49-52), and it opposes the proposition that Arius penned the 
Thalia sometime after he had arrived in Eusebius’ Nicomedia. The opposing idea, namely that Arius wrote 
in Nicomedia, is reflected in the translation in NPNF
2
 4:457 (“However, after his expulsion, when he was 
with Eusebius and his fellows, he drew up his heresy upon paper…”), and shared by e.g. J. Quasten 
(Johannes Quasten, Patrology Vol. III [Utrecht/Antwerp: Spectrum Publishers, 1960], 11) and T. Kopecek 
(Thomas Kopecek, A History of Neo-Arianism [Cambridge, Mass.: Philadelphia Patristic Foundation, 
1979], 18-19). Rowan Williams (Rowan Williams, Arius: Heresy and Tradition [Grand Rapids, Michigan: 
Eerdman’s, 2001], 66) holds that the work was probably composed in Palestine, because Alexander 
suggests in his letter to Alexander of Thessalonica (Theodoret, Hist. Eccl. 1.3) that Arius had left the city 
already. It could well be true that Arius had already left Alexandria by the time of Alexander’s writing to 
his namesake, for it is clear that Alexander is unaware of Arius’ whereabouts, but there is no evidence to 
suggest that the Thalia had not already been written before Arius left Egypt. Alexander makes no specific 
mention of the Thalia, but, as we shall see, the theological views he ascribes to Arius are very close to what 
he expresses there. I am adamant on this point because it seems to me highly unlikely that the Thalia could 
have been produced under the patronage or direct influence of Arius’ allies outside of Egypt because they 
did not seem ever to have espoused some of its most characteristic theological positions. 
671
 The bulk of the fragments of the Thalia come from Athanasius: Syn. 15, C. Ar. 1:2-10, Decr. 16, Dion. 
6, inter alia. 
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from Athanasius’ Syn. 15 and his C. Ar. 1.5-6. The first fragment is an unmingled block 
of text, which I will quote in its entirety below as unquestionably representing Arius’ 
formal views. The second, however, is interwoven with Athanasius’ own commentary. It 
is impractical to cite extensively, but also burdened by a number of complications: it is 
difficult to distinguish what are direct quotations of Arius from what might be 
Athanasius’ extrapolations of an “Arian” position; its theological content differs from 
that of Syn. 15 fragment, which suggests either that it represents other parts of the Thalia, 
or that it might embody informal positions of Arius, or his followers, that were expressed, 
I suspect in haste, in the heat of the verbal disputes that must have marked the early days 
of the controversy. With all these factors in mind, we will begin by citing the Syn. 15 
fragment in full, complementing it with information from C. Ar. 1.5-6 and elsewhere, in 
an attempt to piece together a coherent picture of Arius’ theological concerns in the 
Thalia. We begin: 
God Himself then, in His own nature, is ineffable by all men. Equal or like 
Himself He alone has none, or one in glory. And Ingenerate we call Him, because 
of him who is generate by nature. We praise him as without beginning because of 
him who has a beginning. And adore him as everlasting, because of Him who in 
time has come to be. The Unbegun made the Son a beginning of things originated; 
and advanced him as a Son to himself by adoption. He has nothing proper to God 
in proper subsistence. For he is not equal, no, nor one in essence with him.
672
 
Wise is God, for he is the teacher of Wisdom. There is full proof that God is 
invisible to all beings; both to things which are through the Son, and to the Son he 
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 PG 26:705D-708A: “Ἴδιον οὐδὲν ἔχει τοῦ Θεοῦ καθ’ ὑπόστασιν ἰδιότητος· οὐδὲ γάρ ἐστιν ἴσος, ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ 
ὁμοούσιος αὐτῷ.” 
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is invisible. I will say it expressly, how by the Son is seen the Invisible; by that 
power by which God sees, and in his own measure, the Son endures to see the 
Father, as is lawful. Thus there is a Triad, not in equal glories. Not intermingling 
with each other are their subsistences. One more glorious than the other in their 
glories unto immensity. Foreign from the Son in essence is the Father, for he is 
without beginning. Understand that the Monad was; but the Dyad was not, before 
it was in existence. It follows at once that, though the Son was not, the Father was 
God. Hence the Son, not being (for he existed at the will of the Father), is God 
Only-begotten, and he is alien from either. Wisdom existed as Wisdom by the will 
of the Wise God. Hence He is conceived in numberless conceptions: Spirit, 
Power, Wisdom, God’s glory, Truth, Image, and Word. Understand that He is 
conceived to be Radiance and Light. One equal to the Son, the Superior is able to 
beget; but one more excellent, or superior, or greater, he is not able. At God’s will 
the Son is what and whatsoever he is. And when and since he was, from that time 
He has subsisted from God. He, being a strong God, praises in his degree the 
Superior. To speak in brief, God is ineffable to his Son. For he is to himself what 
he is, that is, unspeakable, so that nothing which is called comprehensible does 
the Son know to speak about;
673
 for it is impossible for him to investigate the 
Father, who is by himself. For the Son does not know his own essence, for, being 
Son, he really existed at the will of the Father. What argument then allows, that he 
who is from the Father should know his own parent by comprehension? For it is 
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 Though the Greek reads, “ὥστε οὐδὲν τῶν λεγομένων κατά τε κατάληψιν συνίει ἐξειπεῖν ὁ Υἱός,” the 
implication is that there is nothing in the Father that is comprehensible so that the Son may be able to 
speak of it. 
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plain that for that which hath a beginning to conceive how the Unbegun is, or to 
grasp the idea, is not possible.
674
 
 
THE UNKNOWN GOD AND THE CENTRALITY OF WILL 
Prominent in the lengthy passage above was the effusion of pronouncements on 
God the Father’s unknowability and invocations of his will as lying behind all action in 
the divine sphere. These were not desultory and unsystematic, but part of a layered and 
sophisticated plan that, resting on discernible theological precedent, laid out a coherent, 
albeit ultimately unorthodox, understanding of the Trinity, in which the centrality of will 
as a theological factor was attendant to Arius’ far-reaching theory on the knowledge of 
God and divine predication. As we shall see, a key element in this theory of will was the 
sense of cognitive asymmetry between the agents in the system—a system wherein a 
directive act of absolute volition, which had its center in, and was the expression of, the 
supreme and inscrutable knowledge and foresight of the Father, interplayed with the 
responses of subordinate agents whose understanding and cognitive powers were but 
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 Athanasius, Syn. 15 (NPNF
2
 4:457-8 [PG 26:765D-768C]): “Αὐτὸς γοῦν ὁ Θεὸς καθό ἐστιν ἄρρητος ἅπασιν 
ὑπάρχει. ἴσον οὐδὲ ὅμοιον, οὐχ ὁμόδοξον ἔχει μόνος οὗτος. Ἀγέννητον δὲ αὐτόν φαμεν διὰ τὸν τὴν φύσιν γεννητόν· 
τοῦτον ἄναρχον ἀνυμνοῦμεν διὰ τὸν ἀρχὴν ἔχοντα, ἀΐδιον δὲ αὐτὸν σέβομεν διὰ τὸν ἐν χρόνοις γεγονότα. Ἀρχὴν τὸν 
Υἱὸν ἔθηκε τῶν γενητῶν ὁ ἄναρχος καὶ ἤνεγκεν εἰς Υἱὸν ἑαυτῷ τόνδε τεκνοποιήσας, ἴδιον οὐδὲν ἔχει τοῦ Θεοῦ καθ' 
ὑπόστασιν ἰδιότητος, οὐδὲ γάρ ἐστιν ἴσος, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ὁμοούσιος αὐτῷ. Σοφὸς δέ ἐστιν ὁ Θεός, ὅτι τῆς σοφίας 
διδάσκαλος αὐτός. Ἱκανὴ δὲ ἀπόδειξις ὅτι ὁ Θεὸς ἀόρατος ἅπασι, τοῖς τε διὰ Υἱοῦ καὶ αὐτῷ τῷ Υἱῷ ἀόρατος ὁ 
αὐτός. ῥητῶς δὲ λέξω, πῶς τῷ υἱῷ ὁρᾶται ὁ ἀόρατος· τῇ δυνάμει ᾗ δύναται ὁ θεὸς ἰδεῖν· ἰδίοις τε μέτροις ὑπομένει ὁ 
Υἱὸς ἰδεῖν τὸν Πατέρα, ὡς θέμις ἐστίν. Ἤγουν Τριάς ἐστι δόξαις οὐχ ὁμοίαις, ἀνεπίμικτοι ἑαυταῖς εἰσιν αἱ 
ὑποστάσεις αὐτῶν, μία τῆς μιᾶς ἐνδοξοτέρα δόξαις ἐπ' ἄπειρον. Ξένος τοῦ Υἱοῦ κατ' οὐσίαν ὁ Πατήρ, ὅτι ἄναρχος 
ὑπάρχει. Σύνες ὅτι ἡ μονὰς ἦν, ἡ δυὰς δὲ οὐκ ἦν, πρὶν ὑπάρξῃ. Αὐτίκα γοῦν Υἱοῦ μὴ ὄντος ὁ Πατὴρ Θεός ἐστι. 
Λοιπὸν ὁ Υἱὸς οὐκ ὢν (ὑπῆρξε δὲ θελήσει πατρῴᾳ) μονογενὴς Θεός ἐστι καὶ ἑκατέρων ἀλλότριος οὗτος. Ἡ Σοφία 
σοφία ὑπῆρξε σοφοῦ Θεοῦ θελήσει. Ἐπινοεῖται γοῦν μυρίαις ὅσαις ἐπινοίαις Πνεῦμα, δύναμις, σοφία, δόξα Θεοῦ, 
ἀλήθειά τε καὶ εἰκὼν καὶ λόγος οὗτος. Σύνες ὅτι καὶ ἀπαύγασμα καὶ φῶς ἐπινοεῖται. ἴσον μὲν τοῦ Υἱοῦ γεννᾶν 
δυνατός ἐστιν ὁ κρείττων, διαφορώτερον δὲ ἢ κρείττονα ἢ μείζονα οὐχί. Θεοῦ θελήσει ὁ Υἱὸς ἡλίκος καὶ ὅσος ἐστίν, 
ἐξ ὅτε καὶ ἀφ' οὗ καὶ ἀπὸ τότε ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ ὑπέστη, ἰσχυρὸς Θεὸς ὢν τὸν κρείττονα ἐκ μέρους ὑμνεῖ. Συνελόντι 
εἰπεῖν τῷ Υἱῷ ὁ Θεὸς ἄρρητος ὑπάρχει· ἔστι γὰρ ἑαυτῷ ὅ ἐστι τοῦτ' ἔστιν ἄλεκτος, ὥστε οὐδὲν τῶν λεγομένων 
κατά τε κατάληψιν συνίει ἐξειπεῖν ὁ Υἱός. Ἀδύνατα γὰρ αὐτῷ τὸν Πατέρα τε ἐξιχνιάσει, ὅς ἐστιν ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ. Αὐτὸς 
γὰρ ὁ Υἱὸς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ οὐσίαν οὐκ οἶδεν, Υἱὸς γὰρ ὢν θελήσει Πατρὸς ὑπῆρξεν ἀληθῶς. Τίς γοῦν λόγος συγχωρεῖ 
τὸν ἐκ πατρὸς ὄντα αὐτὸν τὸν γεννήσαντα γνῶναι ἐν καταλήψει; Δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι τὸ ἀρχὴν ἔχον, τὸν ἄναρχον, ὡς 
ἔστιν, ἐμπερινοῆσαι ἢ ἐμπεριδράξασθαι οὐχ οἷόν τέ ἐστιν.” 
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relative. These responses were volitive actions that complemented the subordinate 
agents’ deficit of knowledge, acts of faith that the supreme will expressed by the Father 
was the truth, with which they then aligned their own wills. 
Arius’ Trinity was a hierarchy—“a Triad, not in equal glories”—at whose peak 
reigned God the Father.
675
 The importance of this sense of hierarchy to Arius’ thought 
cannot be overemphasized. He considered the language of begetter and begotten in 
Christian theology tailor-made for the kind of stratified ontology he preached and which 
already enjoyed considerable appeal in the broader intellectual setting, and he was 
bewildered by his bishop Alexander’s insistence on the ontological parity and ever-
coexistence of Father and Son.
676
 This scale of unequal glories correlated in Arius’ mind 
with an analogous ontological and epistemological gradation among the divine 
hypostases. The higher one went up the order of the hierarchy, from the Holy Spirit 
through the Son to the Father, the closer one approached the peak of all existence—the 
Father—and the deeper one entered a realm that transcended all categories of cognition. 
This framework, which organized itself around an epistemology of the divine, reflected a 
theological trend enshrined by neo-Platonists like Plotinus with their image of an ascent 
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 Arius talked of a Triad, but his focus was specifically on the relation between the Father and the Son. 
The position of the Spirit in this Triad was left unexplored, at least in the fragments of the Thalia that have 
reached us, and we can only assume, on the basis of the “not equal in glories,” that Arius viewed its status 
as similar to or lower than that of the Son. 
676
 Characteristic was Arius’ complaint—which Opitz dates to 318, i.e. very early in the controversy—to 
Eusebius of Nicomedia against Alexander’s epigrammatic “God always, the Son always” (ἀεὶ Θεὸς ἀεὶ 
Υἱός), which Arius found so disagreeable (Theodoret, Hist. Eccl. 1.4). His correspondent (Athanasius, Syn. 
17) affirmed Arius, and elaborated that it was clear to all that things which were produced were inexistent 
prior to their coming into being, and that generate things of necessity had a beginning to their being. 
Eusebius of Caesarea (Opitz, III, Urk. 3), too, found the doctrine of the eternal coexistence of Father and 
Son contrary to established principle: the Father must needs have preexisted the Son for one was 
ingenerate, the other not. That which is first and higher in the order surpasses the second in both glory and 
honor because he is the cause of the both the being and the way-of-being of the second. Of course, such a 
principle had already been laid down in the deep past, e.g. Plato’s Phaedr. (245d) (Alexander Nehamas and 
Paul Woodruff): “That is because anything that has a beginning comes from some source; but there is no 
source for this, since a source that got its start from something else would not longer be the source.” 
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into the clouds of intellectual transcendence as one engaged, in their order, the three 
metaphysical hypostases that underlay reality. The Father, as the highest hypostasis in the 
Trinity and pinnacle of all being, was infinitely transcendent. Arius on this point was 
clear. God the Father was “ineffable,” “unspeakable,” “invisible,” and characterized by 
an otherness that even the Son lacked the wherewithal to penetrate.
677
 Unknowability was 
God the Father’s most salient trait. It was axiomatic, a belief long held in the broader 
culture in its ruminations on the divine,
678
 and thus one not requiring any special 
explanation by Arius or proof besides simple assertion, even from the opening line of our 
passage: “God himself then, in his nature, is ineffable by all men.” 
At the same time, the Father’s unknowability confirmed his uncausedness. As 
Justin had once remarked: “To the Father of all, who is unbegotten, there is no name 
given. For by whatever name He be called, He has as His elder the person who gives Him 
the name.”679 It was widely held that the mensurability of a thing implied the anterior 
existence of a measurer, its nameability the prior subsistence of a namer.
680
 The Father 
                                                 
677
 The Arian historian Philostorgius (Hist. eccl. 2.3 [PG 65:468A]) reviled Arius for holding the position 
that the Son did not know the Father. He added that Secundus, Theognis, and the disciples of Lucian of 
Antioch, namely Leontius, Antonius, and, notably, Eusebius of Nicomedia, did not accept Arius’ view on 
this either. 
678
 See e.g. Plato’s Crat. 400d (C.D.C. Reeve): “The first and finest line of investigation, which as 
intelligent people we must acknowledge is this, that we admit that we know nothing about the gods 
themselves or about the names they call themselves—although it is clear they call themselves by true ones. 
The second best line on the correctness of names is to say, as is customary in our prayers, that we hope the 
gods are pleased by the names we give them, since we know no others.” 
679
 Justin, 2 Apol. 6. 
680
 See, e.g., the Gnostic Apocryphon of John 4:5-19 (Berlin Codex): “It is not appropriate to think about It 
as God or that It is something similar. For It surpasses divinity. It is a dominion having nothing to rule over 
It. For there is nothing existing before It nor does It have need of them. It does not need life. For It is 
eternal. It does not need anything. For It cannot be made perfect as though It were deficient and only 
required perfecting. Rather It is always totally perfect. It is light. It cannot be limited because there is 
nothing before It to limit It. It is inscrutable for there is no one before It to scrutinize It. It is immeasurable 
because there is no other to measure It as though (anything) exists before It. It is invisible because there is 
no one to see It. (It is) an eternity existing forever. (It is) ineffable because no one has comprehended It in 
order to speak about It. (It is) the one whose name cannot be spoken because no one exists before It to 
name It.” From Karen L. King’s Secret Revelation of John (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 
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was unknown and unnamable because there was simply no one ontologically prior to him 
who could name him.
681
 
Of course, the Son, as his title suggested, was close to the Father. Nevertheless, 
ontologically speaking, as “beginning of things originated” he was on the side of 
generated things, which all had their origin in inexistence. Before God became Father, he 
simply was, alone, monos.
682
 Phonic similarity allowed Arius to identify the monos God 
with the monad, or the primal, absolute one of philosophical thought, which lay at the 
base of reality and existence. This “Monad was,” he explained, “but the Dyad was not, 
before it was in existence.”683 If the Father was the Monad, then the Son was the Dyad—
that other metaphysical principle that by Arius’ time had come to be understood as 
having coming after and subordinate to the Monad.
684
 Likening the Son to the Dyad was 
useful in that it afforded the Son the ontological status that was his due without 
compromising the principles of the Father’s ontological superiority that Arius had laid 
out. For the Son was the highest of things generated by God, a superior to whom it was 
                                                                                                                                                 
2006) pp.28, 30. Cf. Aristides, Apol. (Syr.) 1 (ANF 9:264): “Everything which has a name is kindred to 
things created.” 
681
 We note Arius’ assertion (Syn. 15 [NPNF2 4:458] and C. Ar. 1.5 [NPNF2 4:309]) that the Son did not 
even know his own essence. This is consistent with the principle because the Son did not generate himself. 
682
 This line of argumentation comes from the Thalia fragment in C. Ar. 1.5, which reads: Οὐκ ἀεὶ ὁ Θεὸς 
Πατὴρ ἦν· ἀλλ’ ἦν ὅτε ὁ Θεὸς μόνος ἦν, καὶ οὔπω Πατὴρ ἦν ὕστερον δὲ ἐπιγέγονε Πατήρ. (“God was not always 
a Father; but, once, God was alone, and not yet a Father, but afterwards He became a Father.”) 
683
 Syn. 15. 
684
 The Monad and Dyad were designations for what the older thinkers held to be the two basic 
metaphysical elements whose complex interplays and combinations stood behind the whole of existence. 
Their reality was discernible in the multifarious polar opposites that permeated the entire spectrum of the 
phenomena: hot and cold, light and dark, male and female and, especially for the more abstracted types of 
Greek thought, form and matter, inter alia. So, in one respect, by subjugating the Monad to the Dyad, Arius 
was simply availing himself of a philosophically monistic line of thinking first revived in neo-Pythagorean 
circles around 1
st
 c. B.C. and eventually appropriated by neo-Platonists such as Plotinus (e.g. Enn. 5.1.5), 
which held that the Monad caused the Dyad. This opposed the older dualistic view, suggested by Plato and 
the Pythagoreans of his time, that the Monad and the Dyad were parallel, independent entities. This idea of 
God the Father as the Monad was fundamental to Arius’ thought and reappeared in his Epistle to Alexander 
(Syn. 16): “ἀλλ’ ὡς μονὰς καὶ ἀρχὴ πάντων, οὕτως ὁ Θεὸς πρὸ πάντων ἐστί. Διὸ καὶ πρὸ τοῦ Υἱοῦ ἐστιν...” For 
an enlightening study on the understanding of the relationship between the Monad and the Dyad through 
Plotinus, see: John Rist, “Monism: Plotinus and Some Predecessors,” HSCP 69 (1965): 329-344. 
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impossible for the Father to produce, but there was a time, before his origination, when 
he did not exist,
685
 and this created an ontological opposition between him and the Father, 
making him, in his mode of existence, the very anti-paradigm of the Father. Thus, on 
account of the Son, who was generate, possessed of a beginning, and come to be in time, 
the Father had to be understood to be ingenerate, unbegun, and timeless.
686
 To be sure, 
this was not a logical must; there was no rational principle that a generator had of 
necessity the opposite traits from the thing it generated. But Arius here was again simply 
falling in line with the long accepted practice of applying such processes of negation 
from created things when postulating on the nature of the ultimate principle of the 
cosmos.
687
 That Arius put forth the Son as that point of contrast reiterated one of the 
Thalia’s central points, namely, that the Son was ontologically inferior to the Father, and 
was more properly to be considered on a par with creation at large, with which he shared 
a common alienness to God’s nature.688 Arius’ opponents complained from the first that 
he was drawing from Scripture the wrong conclusions about the nature of the Son 
because he was focusing on what the Son endured according to the human nature he 
assumed and ignoring those statements in Writ that put him ontologically on a par with 
the Father.
689
 Whether indeed Arius did as Alexander claimed and ascribed the apparent 
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 C. Ar. 1.5 (NPNF
2
 4:308-9): “‘God was not always a Father;’ but ‘once God was alone, and not yet a 
Father, but afterwards He became a Father.’ ‘The Son was not always;’ for, whereas all things were made 
out of nothing, and all existing creatures and works were made, so the Word of God Himself was ‘made out 
of nothing,’ and ‘once He was not,’ and ‘He was not before His origination,’ but He as others ‘had an 
origin of creation.’ ‘For God,’ he says, ‘was alone, and the Word as yet was not, nor the Wisdom.’” 
686
 Syn. 15: “Ἀγέννητον δὲ αὐτόν φαμεν διὰ τὸν τὴν φύσιν γεννητόν· τοῦτον ἄναρχον ἀνυμνοῦμεν διὰ τὸν ἀρχὴν 
ἔχοντα, ἀΐδιον δὲ αὐτὸν σέβομεν διὰ τὸν ἐν χρόνοις γεγονότα. Ἀρχὴν τὸν υἱὸν ἔθηκε τῶν γενητῶν ὁ ἄναρχος.” 
687
 The classic example of this theological method, wherein one strips away all created concepts from one’s 
understanding of God, can be found in the discussion of the One in Plato’s Parmenides (137c-142a). 
688
 Syn. 15. 
689
 See, e.g., Alexander of Alexandria’s Letter to Alexander (Theodoret, Hist. eccl. 1.3 [NPNF2 3:35]): 
“They pick out every passage which refers to the dispensation of salvation, and to his humiliation for our 
sake; they endeavor to collect from them their own impious assertion, while they evade all those which 
declare his eternal divinity, and the unceasing glory which he possesses with the Father.” 
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weakness or frailty that Scripture attributed to Christ back to the pre-incarnate nature of 
the divine Son has remained a point of great speculation among scholars, particularly 
because we have no direct evidence from the pen of Arius himself that supports the 
accusation. To be sure, besides Alexander’s witness, all we have is Arius’ silence on the 
question of a human soul in Christ and the strongly stratified understanding of the Trinity 
that he puts forward, which seems to support the idea of Christ’s sufferings as the 
evidence of the Son’s volitive contingency.690 Nevertheless, whether or not Arius 
acknowledged a human soul in Christ, and whether this influenced his views on the Son’s 
volitional contingency is not ultimately a key concern—first, because we know from 
elsewhere that the Scriptural witness of Christ’s suffering and temptations would have 
been but auxiliary evidence for a thesis of contingency that was already in place; and, 
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 The other piece of evidence that has interested scholars is a passage from a statement of faith of the anti-
Nicene Eudoxius, which is contained August Hahn’s Bibliothek der Symbole und Glaubensregeln der Alten 
Kirche (Breslau: Verlag von E. Morgenstern, 1897), pp. 261-3: “σαρκωθέντα, οὐκ ἐνανθρωπήσαντα· οὔτε γὰρ 
ψυχὴν ἀνθρωπίνην ἀνείληφεν, ἀλλὰ σὰρξ γέγονεν, ἵνα διὰ σαρκὸς τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ὡς διὰ παραπετάσματος θεὸς ἡμῖν 
χρηματίσῃ· οὐ δύο φύσεις, ἐπεὶ μὴ τέλειος ἦν ἄνθρωπος, ἀλλ’ ἀντὶ ψυχῆς θεὸς ἐν σαρκί· μία τὸ ὅλον κατὰ σύνθεσιν 
φύσις· παθητὸς δι’ οἰκονομίαν· οὔτε γὰρ ψυχῆς ἢ σώματος παθόντος τὸν κόσμον σώζειν ἐδύνατο” (“...who became 
flesh but not a human. For neither did he take a human soul, but became flesh so that God be revealed to 
humans in the flesh as through a curtain; not two natures, because he was not a complete human, but 
instead of a soul [it was] God in the flesh. The whole was one by composition. For neither could the world 
be saved by the suffering of a soul or body”). Aloys Grillmeyer, S.J. (Christ in Christian Tradition, Vol. 1 
[Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1975], p. 244) called this statement both “the clearest Arian formula of the 
incarnation” and a “central Arian formula,” which was “already strongly reminiscent of Apollinarius of 
Laodicea.” R.P.C. Hanson (The Search for the Christian Doctrine of God: The Arian Controversy, 318-381 
[Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2005], p. 112), too, saw this passage as a glance “into the heart of 
Arianism, and added that “The Arians want to have a God who can suffer, but they cannot attribute 
suffering to the High God, and this is what (with some reason) they believed the Homoousian doctrine 
would entail.” David M. Gwynn (The Eusebians: The Polemic of Athanasius of Alexandria and the 
Construction of the ‘Arian Controversy.’ [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007], p. 201), on the other 
hand, looks on academic claims of a collective Arian position more as falling in line with a rhetorical 
construct put forward by Athanasius than a reflection of reality. Moreover, he also argues (ibid. p. 201, n. 
87) that the question of a human soul in Christ “was simply not a central point at issue for either Arius or 
Athanasius.” To complicate the question further, we must also note that, in his efforts to establish the 
reality of the Son against the Sabellianizing Marcellus, Eusebius of Caesarea (Eccl. Theol. 1.20.41-3 [PG 
24:877AB]) denied a human soul in Christ. His thinking was that, by having the Son take the place of the 
human soul, he could ascribe to the Son actions that could not have been the Father’s, and thus to establish 
their distinctness. Clearly, Eusebius’ thinking was clumsy and, in light of the long Christological inquiries 
of the centuries that were to follow, inadequate. Nevertheless, despite his advocacy of no human soul in 
Christ, Eusebius made every effort never to ascribe the human weakness exhibited by Christ back to him in 
his divinity (see e.g. Dem. ev. 4.13 [PG 22:284D-288D]). 
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secondly, because this study will take the position that this entire line of thinking on the 
Son’s potentially being disobedient to the Father that has been attributed to Arius was 
soon to be abandoned by him anyway. What is important to note is that Arius brought to 
Scripture his own hermeneutic presuppositions which determined that the Son’s 
begottenness meant that he both had a beginning and was born in time. These to Arius’ 
mind correlated with the conditionality of creatures, but contrasted with the 
incontingency of the Father, who, unlike the Son and creation in general, was unbegotten, 
without beginning, and outside of time (or, more literally, timeless). In short, Arius 
concluded that the Father’s being without beginning meant he was “foreign to the Son in 
essence (κατ’ οὐσίαν).”691 
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 Syn. 15. Arius’ invocation of the term ousia here seemed quite sudden, and it may have been because it 
already had come up in the discussions prior to his writing the Thalia. Of course, the meaning of this 
contentious term here was not clear, especially since, as Christopher Stead (Divine Substance, [Oxford, 
UK: Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1977] 224.) points out so correctly regarding the early debates over 
Arius, “...Ousia was used in a wide variety of senses, which the users themselves largely failed to 
recognize, by all parties to the dispute.” The fact that Arius also introduced it here in an adverbial 
prepositional phrase, without an article, does little to help us to pinpoint its precise meaning. I will consider 
four options, not to posit which one I think Arius intended exactly, but to cast our nets sufficiently widely 
so as to form a general picture of what Arius might have meant: (1) Firstly, we might take ousia as 
denoting a subsistent, being, or distinct entity, in the sense of πρώτη οὐσία. Thus the Father and the Son 
could not have been one and the same being because the one was without beginning, while the other had a 
beginning. The same being could not have been both originate and unoriginate. The fact that in the very 
next line Arius mentioned the Monad as existing before the Dyad (a passage to which we shall return) 
seemed to confirm that the sequentiality, as Arius saw it, of their existence proved that Father and Son were 
distinct subsistences. (2) Secondly, if we take ousia as corresponding to type of being, or genus, then the 
point similarly became that the Father and Son must have been of different ousiae for the same reason: an 
unoriginate being could not have been of the same type of being as an originate one. (3) Thirdly, if we 
perceive ousia to be the whatness of a thing, then again too, the Father, defined, among other ways, as the 
unoriginate being, could not have the same ousia as the Son, among whose definitions would have been 
included the fact of his origination. Thus, if the Father and Son were not only different types of being but 
also possessed of different whatnesses, then this only legitimated Arius’ tactic of using the Son as the anti-
paradigm of the Father. (4) Lastly, if we push the term in a more materialistic direction and take ousia to 
mean the stuff of which a thing is composed, then sameness in ousia again could not work to Arius’ mind 
because the stuff making up the Father was without origin, while that of which the Son was constituted was 
originate. I add preemptively that the fact that, as we shall see, Arius laid so much emphasis on the 
volitional nature of the casual relationship between Father and Son seemed to be an effort at precluding any 
sense of change or diminution of the Father that the fissuring of the divine stuff would have suggested 
(Stead [ibid.], too, raises this last point). 
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Arius’ stratified theological framework shared much with that of neo-Platonists 
like Plotinus, especially in its charting of the ascent into ontological and cognitive 
transcendence as one considered, in an upward movement, the persons of the Trinity. 
Yet, another mechanism, which we have not yet explored, played an equally decisive role 
in the grand scheme of his theology. It was one that can only have taken its inspiration 
from the biblical image of a deity active in the affairs of the world. Thus Arius’ thought 
departed radically from the philosophical vision of a remote, impersonal divinity and a 
serene, rigidly rational architecture of existence, and opened a prominent place for what 
was, alongside divine unknowability, a second pillar in the theology of the Thalia: the 
divine will. In Arius’ mind, this ascent into transcendence and unknowability “unto 
immensity,” as one considered the Persons in turn, corresponded to a chain of active 
causality, the motor of which was not, as in the Plotinian scheme, a natural overflowing 
of divine being,
692
 but a specific movement of the divine Will that had its seat in the 
Father. Apart from its biblical inspiration, this turn to will was also a natural extension of 
the principles of divine transcendence that Arius had put in place. A God so completely 
ineffable and indescribable, who was unfettered by any external restriction or convention, 
could not be discovered through human speculation but only through God’s own self-
revelation. Moreover, what motivated the primordial divine movement from monos Theos 
to plurality in the divine sphere, from the Monad to the Dyad, from the state of pre-
Fatherhood to actual Fatherhood,
693
 could not but remain shrouded in mystery. God was 
sovereign, and was free of any compulsion in his movement, and his underlying 
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 E.g. Enn. V.2.1. 
693
 See the Thalia fragment in C. Ar. 1.5, which reads: Οὐκ ἀεὶ ὁ Θεὸς Πατὴρ ἦν· ἀλλ’ ἦν ὅτε ὁ Θεὸς μόνος ἦν, 
καὶ οὔπω Πατὴρ ἦν ὕστερον δὲ ἐπιγέγονε Πατήρ. (“God was not always a Father; but, once, God was alone, 
and not yet a Father, but afterwards He became a Father.”) 
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motivations were beyond speculation. All divine knowledge presupposed God’s 
initiative, and God’s good pleasure lay behind the subsistence of all things, even the Son 
and the Spirit. Thus Arius pushed home, with no less than four explicit statements in the 
fragment above, that the Son, the first of all generate beings, “existed at the will of the 
Father,”694 whom the Son did not know.695 This precedent and initiating will of the all-
transcendent Father was the metaphysical lynchpin of Arius’ theology. It set in motion 
and sustained the cosmos, and all, even the Son, were subordinate to it. What was 
unknowable, inscrutable, and transcendent became known to its inferiors because it 
willed it, and did so through what was necessarily a set of subordinate relations. Thus 
Arius’ theology must take its place among those theistic voluntarist theologies in history 
that, in emphasizing the anonymity and intellectual transcendence of God, put forward 
the divine will as the final arbiter in theological reflection. And the problem he 
encountered was the objection of much of the Church to his making the Son the first of 
many external objects of this divine volitional process. 
 
THE RESPONSIVE WILL OF THE SON 
The Father determined not only whether the Son would exist, but also how he 
existed. It was at God’s will that “the Son is what and whatsoever he is.”696 He ordained 
which of his own attributes he would manifest in the Son in a divine act that was both 
generative of the Son and but also revelatory of the Father: 
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 The other three were: “Wisdom existed as Wisdom by the will of the wise God”; “At God’s will the Son 
is what and whatsoever He is”; “For, being Son, He really existed, at the will of the Father.” 
695
 Syn. 15 (NPNF
2
 4:458): “To speak in brief, God is ineffable to His Son.” 
696
 Syn. 15 (NPNF
2
 4:458). 
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“For God...was alone, and the Word as yet was not, nor the Wisdom. Then, 
wishing to form us, thereupon He made a certain one, and named Him Word and 
Wisdom and Son, that He might form us by means of Him.”697 
Again, one could see the ontological significance of the naming act. Arius’ specific 
designation of the Father as the Son’s namer was yet another expression of his belief in 
the Father’s ontological priority over the Son. Moreover, the purposefulness of the 
generative act—“that he might form us by means of him”—focused attention on what we 
have already called the Father’s instigating or initiating will, which was absolute, and 
whose motivations surpassed human speculation. The Father’s rank as ontologically 
supreme and absolute unknowable went hand in hand with his status as willing cause of 
all other being. The Father himself was without cause, his inscrutability was absolute—
no one could name him—, and his movement outward from himself, i.e. his self-
revelation and relations with other beings, took place on the basis of his inscrutable will. 
Moreover, the Father’s will became a marker of his activity outside of himself, dealing 
with things that were contingent and not distinguished by the necessity that characterized 
his own being.
698
 Will, as a movement of the mind, in this case the divine mind, was 
perceived as an outward action that allowed the Father to maintain his uniqueness and 
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 C. Ar. 1.5 (NPNF
2
 4:309 [PG 26:21AB]): Ἦν γὰρ...μόνος ὁ Θεός, καὶ οὔπω ἦν ὁ Λόγος καὶ ἡ Σοφία. Εἶτα 
θελήσας ἡμᾶς δημιοργῆσαι, τότε δὴ πεποίηκεν ἕνα τινά, καὶ ὠνόμασεν αὐτὸν Λόγον, καὶ Σοφίαν καὶ Υἱόν, ἵνα 
ἡμᾶς δι’ αὐτοῦ δημιουργήσῃ.” 
698
 Here we must draw attention to a comment by Arius’ supporter, Eusebius of Nicomedia, in his Epistle to 
Paulinus, Bishop of Tyre. (Theodoret, Hist. eccl. 1.5 [NPNF
2
 3:42]), where he argued that the term 
“begotten” was not exclusive to the Son, but that Scripture applied it to other beings as well (Is. 1:2; Deut. 
32:28; Job 38:28). The expression begotten, Eusebius concluded, implied “simply that all things were 
formed according to his will.” Athanasius (C. Ar. 3.59 [NPNF2 4:426]), in the opposite camp, observed a 
similar link when he declared, “For he who says, ‘The Son came to be at the Divine will,’ has the same 
meaning as another who says, ‘Once He was not,’ and ‘The Son came to be out of nothing,’ and ‘He is a 
creature.’”  
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ontological isolation from other beings,
699
 keeping the willing agent at a remove from its 
object, and not allowing for one to extrapolate conclusions about the Father’s nature 
based purely on the things he willed into being. As a movement of mind toward an end, 
will was also an expression of knowledge. This was a perfectly Greek correlation that had 
long maintained currency.
700
 Faulty knowledge begot errant will; perfect knowledge, will 
toward perfect ends. Because the omniscient Father was possessed of absolute, perfect, 
and transcendent knowledge, his will also was perfect, complete, inerrant, absolute, and 
transcendent. 
Yet in this cloud of transcendence there was also something new: a series of 
positive statements on the attributes of the otherwise unknowable and invisible God. 
“Wisdom existed as Wisdom by the will of the Wise God,” Arius declared, explaining 
that one knew that “God is wise because he is the teacher of Wisdom.”701 In other words, 
Arius was able to name the otherwise un-nameable God wise because, in generating the 
Son, he also allowed him to participate in certain of the Father’s own attributes, which he 
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 Syn. 15 (NPNF
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 4:458): “For he is to himself what he is, that is, unspeakable. So that nothing which is 
called comprehensible does the Son know to speak about; for it is impossible for Him to investigate the 
Father, who is by himself.” 
700
 In the thought of the Greeks, will and knowledge or reason were closely intertwined. Plato’s Meno made 
one of the earliest such correlations when it said: “It is clear then that those who do not know things to be 
bad do not desire what is bad, but they desire those things that they believe to be good but that are in fact 
bad. It follows that those who have no knowledge of these things and believe them to be good clearly desire 
good things” (77e). Aristotle (Eth. nic. 2.6 [1106b36-1107a2]) declared that “Excellence is a state concerned 
with choice, lying in a mean relative to us, this being determined by reason and in the way in which the 
man of practical wisdom would determine it.” The Stoics warmly embraced this association, arguing that 
impressions activated impulses (Stobaeus, 2.86.17), while wrong action, for the Stoic Chrysippus, was the 
result of faulty judgment (Galen, On Hippocrates’ and Plato’s Doctrines 4.6.2). The determining power of 
reason and knowledge over volition led some Stoics to declare passion “no different from reason” 
(Plutarch, On Moral Virtue 446F) (For these Hellenistic sources, see A.A. Long and D. N. Sedley, The 
Hellenistic Philosophers (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1987, repr. 1995). For the Stoic 
Zeno, will (βούλησις) was nothing other than a “rational appetite” (εὔλογον ὄρεξιν) (Diogenes Laertius 7. 
106). Athanasius, too, took a similar position when he remarked: “I consider understanding and will to be 
the same” (C. Ar. 3.65 [NPNF2 4:429]).  
701
 Syn. 15 (NPNF
2 
4:457). 
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identified verbally. Moreover, according to Athanasius,
702
 the reality for Arius was that 
there were two wisdoms: the first being the archetypal “attribute co-existent with God,” 
and the second, of course, being the Son himself, who was named Wisdom only on 
account of his participation in that particular quality of the Father. For the same reason, 
there were also two Words: first, the attribute proper to the Father; and second, the Son 
himself, who was Word by participation in that attribute. In this way, the Son was 
conceived in a host of conceptions—Spirit, Power, Wisdom, God’s glory, Truth, Image, 
Word, Radiance, Light
703—for the Father not only generated the Son and conferred on 
him the participation in these attributes, it was he also who named him and identified 
these attributes for us. In this same vein, the Father also bestowed on the Son “that power 
by which God sees” so that, “in his own measure” and “as is lawful,”704 the Son was able 
to see the Father, who by nature was invisible both to the Son and all generate being.
705
 
The Son, therefore, was a weak image of the Father, and to him also was given a 
weak vision of the same. Given, too, that the Son did not properly know even his own 
essence,
706
 his knowledge, bestowed on him by the Father, was but a faint reflection of 
the Father’s omniscience. The Son’s status as reflection of the Father warranted his being 
called God, but only under the understanding that “the Word is not the very God.” 
“Though he is called God, yet he is not very God,” but, “by participation of grace, he, as 
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 C. Ar. 1:5 (NPNF
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4:309). 
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 Syn. 15 (NPNF
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4:458). 
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 Syn. 15 (NPNF
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4:457). 
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 Curiously, Origen (Princ. 2.4.3) too, at least in how Rufinus rendered him, had insisted on the 
invisibility of God the Father to the Son. This, however, was not because of the Son’s inferiority, but 
because visibility was a trait of material bodies. As both Father and Son were non-material, visibility was 
inapplicable to them, and passages that talked of seeing the Father really only meant understanding the 
Father. 
706
 C. Ar. 1:6 (NPNF
2 
4:309). 
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others, is God only in name.”707 In like wise, he was not the “true power of God,” but one 
of those powers and hosts, like the locust and the caterpillar,
708
 of which God the Father 
was said by Scripture to be Lord.
709
 
On another level, Arius also considered the Son’s primordial origin in things 
inexistent, and his subsequent passage into existence by the direct action and will of the 
Father, a most radical kind of ontological transformation, which rendered the Son’s 
nature, and the nature of all generate being in general, fundamentally mutable and 
contingent.
710
 Unlike the unchanging Father, who stood above the cycles and vicissitudes 
of cosmic life, the Son was subject to change and adaptation. According to Athanasius, 
Arius had maintained that 
“By nature, as all others, so the Word himself is alterable, and remains good by 
his own free will, while he chooseth. When, however, he wills, he can alter as we 
can, as being of an alterable nature.”711 
                                                 
707
 C. Ar. 1:6 (NPNF
2 
4:309 [PG 26:21D-24A]): “...οὐδὲ Θεὸς ἀληθινός ἐστιν ὁ Λόγος. Εἰ δὲ καὶ λέγεται Θεός, 
ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἀληθινός ἐστιν· ἀλλὰ μετοχῇ χάριτος, ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες, οὕτω καὶ αὐτὸς λέγεται ὀνόματι μόνον 
Θεός.” 
708
 Joel 2:25. 
709
 C. Ar. 1:5 (NPNF
2 
4:309). As noted above, the portions of the Thalia contained in Athanasius’ C. Ar. 1:5 
are not unalloyed text, but excerpts interspersed with paraphrases, explications, and extrapolations. One 
cannot know whether Arius in the Thalia indeed likened the Son to the locust and caterpillar of Joel, or 
whether this was not just an image brought forth in the heat of the debates. In any case, we cannot but note 
this statement’s considerable shock value. 
710
 In his Epistle to Alexander, which Opitz dated at 324, Alexander of Alexandria (Theodoret, Hist. eccl. 
1.3 [NPNF
2
 3:35-36]) saw clearly this connection between Arius’ premise of the Son’s generation from 
things existent and the mutability of the same: “God, they say, created all things out of that which was non-
existent, and they include in the number of creatures, both rational and irrational, even the Son of God. 
Consistently with this doctrine they, as a necessary consequence, affirm that He is by nature liable to 
change, and capable both of virtue and of vice, and thus, by their hypothesis of his having been created out 
of that which was non-existent, they overthrow the testimony of the Divine Scriptures, which declare the 
immutability of the Word and the Divinity of the Wisdom of the Word, which Word and Wisdom is 
Christ.” The same principle can also be found in Origen (Princ. 2.9.2), who argued that the nature of the 
rational beings that God made was mutable because they were created: “...by this very fact that they did not 
exist and then began to exist they were of necessity subject to change and alteration” (trans. Butterworth). 
711
 C. Ar. 1:5 (NPNF
2 4:309). The Greek reads: “Καὶ τῇ μὲν φύσει, ὥσπερ πάντες, οὕτω καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ Λόγος ἐστὶ 
τρεπτός, τῷ δὲ αὐτεξουσίῳ, ἕως βούλεται, μένει καλός” (PG 26:21C). 
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The specific workings of how Arius imagined this process of volition are not easy to 
pinpoint. In light of the connection between knowledge and willing that seemed so to 
infuse Arius’ thought, it seems plausible to imagine Arius’ understanding of the Son’s 
will as a direct expression of the Son’s knowledge, which we said was a lesser image of 
the Father’s omniscience, and comprehend his volitive alignment with the Father to be 
his abiding focus on those divine attributes in which the Father had given him to 
participate. The task for an agent possessed of lesser knowledge than the Father, yet both 
generated by and participating in him, was: to discern, on the basis of its own relative but 
God-given knowledge, its own source, namely the Father, who was none other than the 
source of all truth and goodness; to remain always in absolute association with him; and 
never to allow one’s own partial ignorance to lead one astray. Such a leading astray 
would also be an act of will, namely a movement of mind toward an end, but an end 
based on ignorance rather than the true knowledge come from the Father. Will, therefore, 
as a movement of mind toward truth, became the means of relating the ontologically 
divergent strata in this essentially neo-Platonic worldview that Arius, and much of late 
antiquity, were invested in. This was the modus of oneness that Arius envisaged as 
bonding the Son to the Father. It was a symphony, a concord of wills of discrete agents, 
where the subordinate recognized in the superior its own source and remained fixed on 
it.
712
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 Such a reconstruction would agree with the view of obedience and apostasy held more generally. For 
example, Athanasius held that the soul was where intelligence resided, and that “by it alone can God be 
contemplated and perceived”; it was “unlike men possessed of an intellect to deny God, its maker and 
artificer” (C. Gent. 30.3-4). By this intellective power resident in the soul one exercised reflection and 
chose “by judgment the better of alternative reasonings.” For “the hand is able to take hold of a sword-
blade, and the mouth to taste poison, but neither knows that these are injurious, unless the intellect decide” 
(C. Gent. 31.2-3). Obedience to God was connected to knowledge. E. P. Meijering (Orthodoxy and 
Platonism in Athanasius: Synthesis or Antithesis? [Leiden, Netherlands: E.J. Brill, 1968] 23) holds that, in 
235 
In accordance with this line of thinking, the very basis of the Son’s glory and 
status was his compliance to the divine will. In fact, the Father had bestowed the title of 
Son on him ahead of time, at his generation, because he foresaw the obedience he would 
demonstrate throughout his heavenly existence and especially his ministry on earth. 
Therefore, “as foreknowing that he would be good, did God by anticipation bestow on 
him this glory, which afterwards, as man, he attained from virtue.”713 Alexander of 
Alexandria, too, attributed to Arius and his circle the belief that, “being begotten,” the 
Son was of a “nature mutable and susceptible of change, as all other rational creatures 
are.”714 But from this premise of the mutability that the Son shared with other generate 
beings, Alexander sought also to show how Arius’ teaching amounted to making the Son 
comparable in all respects to other generate beings. Thus Alexander, in the same epistle, 
also remarked: 
“Some one accordingly asked them [Arius and his cohort] whether the Word of 
God could be changed, as the devil had been? And they feared not to say, ‘Yes, he 
could; for being begotten, he is susceptible of change.’”715 
It is not clear whether this passage represented a bold and clear statement of belief on the 
part of the Arians, or an admission made perhaps in the heat of the moment during one of 
what must have been many impassioned confrontations early in the dispute. In another 
epistle, written some years later, Alexander of Alexandria upheld this same testimony, 
                                                                                                                                                 
this passage, Athanasius came very close to the Platonist position that people did not deliberately do evil 
but did so only out of ignorance. 
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even including the detail that, for the Arians, the Son was in nature no different from the 
other sons of God. He was chosen because, “though mutable by nature, his painstaking 
character suffered no deterioration.” If a Peter or Paul did the same thing, he added, their 
sonship would have been the same as the Son’s.716 
Clearly the tendency among Arius’ opponents was to draw attention to those 
implications of Arius’ teaching which put the Son on an equal footing in all respects with 
the rest of generate being. Besides suggesting that Arius was belittling the Son by 
likening him, in the most extreme case, to the insects, it also emphasized the theoretical 
potential, in Arius’ teaching, of him sinning—clearly a shocking proposition. R.C. Gregg 
and D. E. Groh
717
 proposed that Arius’ enemies took his teaching of a mutable Son in the 
directly opposite way from how he intended it. Arius laid emphasis on the Son’s 
mutability, they argued, not to stress the possibility of his falling away from God, but to 
present the volitive action of the Son as an endeavor in advancement that culminated in 
his adoption by the Father.
718
 Alexander of Alexandria noted
719
 how Arius and his 
confreres cited Ps. 44:7 (LXX)—“Thou hast loved righteousness and hated iniquity”—in 
support of the concept of the Son’s progress toward the Father. This was perfectly 
consonant with their volitionist theology if one considered the Son’s striving for the 
Father an act of love and bore in mind the Stoic conception of agapesis itself as nothing 
other than a species of will.
720
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Gregg and Groh went on to suggest that Arius’ focus on the Son’s obedience to 
the Father formed the cornerstone of a vast soteriological theology that characterized 
early Arianism, in which the submission to the Father of the Son—as the representative 
of creation, its moral exemplar, and pioneer of its salvation—became the mechanism 
through which all creatures were shown the path they too should follow to their own 
deliverance. However, Arius’ suggestion that the Son was mutable and, at least 
potentially, subject to sin was met with almost uniform outrage, and—and this we cannot 
emphasize enough—it led, as we shall see, to an almost immediate retreat by Arius on 
this point. As we shall see in the next section, in his later works Arius not only 
abandoned the idea of a morally contingent Son completely, but was to insist instead on 
his immutability, which suggested more a passing than an essential attachment to the 
soteriological theory advanced above. Arius’ primary interests were metaphysical and 
were centered on how to posit the exact meaning of divinity, to reconcile revelation with 
the stratified neo-Platonist ontology he took as a given, and to establish a mechanism for 
relating these ontological strata while keeping them discrete from one another.
721
 Despite 
this, the notion that the Son could sin, which in his most virulent opponents’ eyes seemed 
to grow directly out of Arius’ volitionist theology, had the effect of stigmatizing any 
mention of will in the internals of the Trinity, so that any expression of the notion of 
union based on, or—and here the distinction is critical—merely including, a symphony of 
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wills automatically became tantamount to preaching a morally contingent Christ and was 
dismissed as the continuation of Arianism by other means. 
 
ARIUS’ TURN 
One of the great points of perplexity in this dispute is the speed and degree to 
which Arius seemed so completely to distance himself from these most egregious and 
shocking teachings he was said to have been promulgating. In his letter to Eusebius of 
Nicomedia, dated by Opitz at 318,
722
 in which he complained to his friend over the 
injustice of his expulsion by Alexander and argued for the rectitude of his own position, 
he made no mention of the Son’s mutability, let alone the potential of his falling away 
from the Father, but focused solely on the necessary precedence of the Father, as 
unbegotten, over the begotten Son: 
“But we say and believe, and have taught, and do teach, that the Son is not 
unbegotten, nor in any way part of the unbegotten; and that He does not derive His 
subsistence from any matter; but that by will and counsel He has subsisted before time, 
and before ages, as perfect God, only begotten and unchangeable, and that before He was 
begotten, or created, or purposed, or established, He was not. For He was not unbegotten. 
We are persecuted, because we say that the Son has a beginning, but that God is without 
beginning. This is the cause of our persecution, and likewise, because we say that He is 
of the non-existent. And this we say, because He is neither part of God, nor of any 
essential being.”723 
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There was no talk here of the Son’s mutability or the possibility of him sinning. On the 
contrary, Arius now described him as ἀναλλοίωτος, unchangeable, i.e. unable to change. 
One could perhaps attempt to salvage a sense of mutability by arguing for a secondary 
meaning of the term, unchanging,
724
 and suggest that the Son chose or happened not to 
change, but the tenuousness of such an argument would only underline the degree of 
Arius’ shift away from an unambiguous stance on the Son’s moral contingency. There 
was the mention of will and counsel
725
 lying behind his subsistence, but it was not 
explicit to whose will and counsel Arius was referring, the Son’s or the Father’s. We 
could only surmise that it as the Father’s, because, in Arius’ thought throughout, the Son 
owed his existence to the will of the Father. With the Son being begotten and existing 
before time, the Father’s priority over him could not properly be considered temporal, 
despite the fact that, in his formula on the Son’s inexistence before his begetting, Arius, 
against the dictates of reason, persisted with the temporally charged preposition before. 
Finally, the Son’s generation “before time, and before ages, as perfect God, only begotten 
and unchangeable” clearly placed him on a different ontological level from that of the 
rest of generate being. His real concerns here were ontological, to maintain the sense of 
proper order in theology: the Son was begotten, the Father not. The Son, therefore, had a 
beginning and, before his begetting, did not exist; the Father, as unbegotten, had existed 
always. Therefore, being so ontologically different, the Father and Son could not have 
been of the same ousia. 
                                                                                                                                                 
ἀναλλοίωτος, καὶ πρὶν γεννηθῇ, ἤτοι κτισθῇ, ἤτοι ὁρισθῇ, ἢ θεμελιωθῇ, οὐκ ἦν· ἀγένητος γὰρ οὐκ ἦν. Διωκόμεθα 
δέ, ὅτι εἴπομεν· Ἀρχὴν ἔχει ὁ Υἱός, ὁ δὲ Θεὸς ἄναρχός ἐστι. Διὰ τοῦτο διωκόμεθα· καὶ ὅτι εἴπομεν ὅτι ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων 
ἐστίν. Οὕτω δὲ εἴπαμεν, καθότι οὐδὲ μέρος Θεοῦ, οὐδὲ ἐξ ὑποκειμένου τινός· διὰ τοῦτο διωκόμεθα.” 
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Arius reiterated these same sentiments in his letter to Alexander of Alexandria in 
320. Again, there was no hint of the Son’s moral contingency, or even his likeness with 
the rest of generate being. Rather, he stated, in even stronger terms than before, the 
opposite: the Father 
“begat an Only-begotten Son before eternal times, through whom He has made 
both the ages and the universe; and begat Him, not in semblance, but in truth; and 
that He made Him subsist at His own will, unalterable and unchangeable; perfect 
creature of God, but not as one of the creatures; offspring, but not as one of things 
begotten.”726 
The Son was generated before time, unalterable and unchangeable, a perfect creature that 
was unlike all other creatures. If Arius had ever held to a doctrine of the Son’s moral 
contingency and his volitive union with the Father from which he could potentially have 
fallen away in the same way that any creature could do, all this had vanished. His concern 
now was only in establishing the ontological primacy of the Father and the volitional 
initiative of the same in bringing the, at one point, inexistent Son into being. In doing so, 
I believe Arius was aligning himself more closely with the position held by his powerful 
allies abroad, with whom he by now had open communication. We already know from 
Philostorgius
727
 that the disciples of Lucian, including Eusebius of Nicomedia himself, 
rejected Arius’ axiom that the Son did not know the Father, thus depriving him of the 
crucial fundament on which to build his system of volitional union between Father and 
Son. In accordance with how I have reconstructed Arius’ theology on this point, if there 
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was no ignorance of the Father, neither could there any longer be theoretically contingent 
oneness of Son with Father by means of will. Tellingly, the earliest correspondence we 
have by Arius’ allies in support of him makes no mention of volitive unity. For example, 
in the preserved fragment
728
 of Eusebius of Nicomedia’s reply to Arius, we see the 
bishop applauding Arius for his beliefs, and affirming only that it was clear to all things 
that were generated things did not exist prior to their generation but had a beginning. 
Similarly, in his letter to Euphration, Eusebius of Caesarea too expressed similar views, 
reaffirming that that which is first and better must precede the second, both in order and 
honor, as being the cause both of its being and way of being.
729
 The Son was God but not 
true God; only the Father was true God, because only he was without another before 
him.
730
 In neither was there any mention of the Son being in a volitional union with the 
Father from which the Son could fall away if he so willed. To be sure, these were 
fragmentary or incidental evidences yet, along with Arius’ own silence on the matter, we 
can say with fairness that that aspect of the dispute seemed very early to have been laid to 
rest for Arius and his confreres. 
 
THE COUNCIL OF NICAEA 
The Council of Nicaea, convened in 325 by Constantine to resolve the deep 
theological fissures exposed by the Arian controversy, reaffirmed, over and against Arius 
and his supporters, the ontological parity of the Father and the Son, sealing it with the 
celebrated, though, for reasons we shall see below, also deeply controversial, 
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homoousion. We note that the Creed that the Council promulgated made no specific 
mention of will—neither that of the Father in generating the Son, nor that of the Son in 
maintaining volitive union with the Father. It limited itself only to denouncing those 
“who say ‘There was a time when he was not,’ and ‘He was not before he was 
begotten’ and ‘He was made from that which did not exist,’ and those who assert 
that he is of other substance (hypostasis) or essence (ousia) than the Father, or 
that he was created, or is susceptible of change.”731 
We note the denunciation of the idea that the Son was “susceptible of change,” but will, 
in any form, went unmentioned. However, besides the Creed, the Council also issued a 
formal letter to what in essence had been the party most aggrieved by the turmoil incited 
by Arius: the Church of Alexandria. Here the Council went much further. It condemned 
Arius by name, and it elaborated on the condemnations it had issued in the Creed, 
censuring 
“all the blasphemous expressions he has uttered, in affirming that ‘the Son of God 
sprang from nothing,’ and that ‘there was a time when he was not;’ saying 
moreover that ‘the Son of God, by his free will was capable either of vice or 
virtue;’ and calling him a creature and a work.”732 
In other words, the council declared heretical the notion that the Son was once inexistent, 
was of a different substance/essence from that of the Father, was a creature or work, and 
was susceptible to change. What the Council had described as susceptibility to change 
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was here clarified as “by his free will capable either of vice or virtue.”733 It was clear that 
the Council had shut the door on the notion of the Son’s moral contingency. But my 
contention is that Arius, possibly at the urging of his allies, had already shut that same 
door years earlier. Thus, one could say that the Council was condemning a position once 
held by Arius, which had come to be associated with him in the popular consciousness, 
not necessarily one that he had continued to hold throughout. Nevertheless, in all its 
condemnations, the council neither denounced the idea that the Son was generated by the 
will of the Father, nor the idea, per se, that the Son remained in volitive harmony with the 
Father, but only that the Son might choose to do evil and turn away from him. These 
were important distinctions in light of what followed. Of course, and to the enduring 
suspicion of his foes, Arius was later readmitted into the Church only after signing a 
recantation and very general statement of belief that avoided all controversial 
positions.
734
 
 
THE AFTERMATH OF NICAEA 
In the discontented wake of Nicaea, there followed an infamous though 
theologically fecund succession of councils and counter-councils that was to last several 
decades as parties tried either to overturn, defend, or improve on Nicaea. The victorious 
faction, the supporters of the Council of Nicaea, or Nicenes, consisted of a coalition that 
ranged from theologically resolute ecclesiastics, who, bolstered by their triumph at the 
council, viewed the Nicene formula and the homoousion as the only appropriate way of 
expressing the eternal faith of the Church and its gainsayers as supporters of the 
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theological vices of Arius, to those clerics who were interested simply in preserving the 
status quo and saw in the council the quickest path to closure and peace. Added to these 
were churchmen who, although initially mistrustful of Nicaea, out of weariness, as the 
turmoil dragged on, came to regard it as the only realistic basis for peace simply because 
it was the first and most prestigious of the councils called to solve the questions raised by 
Arius.
735
 
The anti-Nicene faction was an uneasy agglomeration of parties that were 
opposed primarily to the homoousion. Besides Arius himself were those hierarchs led by 
Eusebius of Nicomedia who came to his support from the first, quite probably on account 
of a common connection to the martyred Lucian of Antioch,
736
 even though the evidence 
suggests that they did not espouse a number of Arius’ key positions. Philostorgius, for 
example, reported that Eusebius of Nicomedia and others rejected his belief that the Son 
did not know the Father,
737
 which was a key element to his theory of the Son’s contingent 
volitional union with the Father. Added to these was a significant number of ecclesiastics 
that might be described as theological conservatives, who held no special sympathy for 
Arius, but were driven by a deeply-seated aversion to the homoousion. Unlike terms like 
hypostasis (Heb 1:3) and physis (2 Pet 1:4), these viewed ousia and especially its 
awkward derivative homoousion (“having one and the same ousia”) as an unbiblical 
neologism that created more difficulties than it solved. Some writers may have used it in 
the past, but it had never enjoyed universal acceptance, and its precise meaning was 
unclear. Firstly, derived from the feminine participle (οὖσα) of to be (εἶναι), it could 
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denote an individual existence, as per Aristotle’s notion of first ousia,738 in which case 
homoousion would have meant, problematically, that Father and Son were one and the 
same being or person—nothing short of Sabellianism and Modalism—a charge leveled, 
in some instances justly, at not a few of the Nicenes. Secondly, it could also denote a type 
of being, a genus, as per Aristotle’s second ousia,739 in which case, if the Father and Son 
were said to be of the same genus, the fear was that, as with the Platonic concept of the 
Ideas, a divinity genus would have been conceived as standing above its Father and Son 
instantiations.
740
 A third option was to consider the ousia of a thing its whatness. If 
Father and Son were homoousioi, the problem would have been to explain why they had 
different names, for a name was simply the verbal articulation of a thing’s whatness.741 
Finally, the problem with ousia was that it could also be used to denote physical matter, 
or the stuff from which a thing was made, in much the same way as substance is used in 
modern English.
742
 Therefore, homoousion in this instance would have suggested a 
material divinity, found both in Stoicism
743
 and theologians like Tertullian, who was, 
incidentally, an early proponent of ousia language. 
In addition to all these complications was a particular linguistic quirk that had 
developed because, in the Latin practice, ousia had come to be rendered substantia, 
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instead of its more proper cognate essentia, even though, tragically, substantia 
corresponded more exactly to the Greek hypostasis.
744
 This did nothing to simplify 
communications between East and West, and, when, during the course of the debates, 
ousia and hypostasis each began to assume its own specific technical signification, not 
few were the instances where the one side thought the other Sabellian or tri-theist 
respectively.
745
 Finally, as if to crown all these complexities, there was also the 
irrepressible fact that the term homoousion had already been rejected at the Council of 
Antioch, called in 264 to denounce Paul of Samosata, then bishop of Antioch, whose 
particular heresy combined modalism with adoptionism. Athanasius would try to argue 
that the council had rejected it back then only because it was being used in a materialistic 
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of whom we shall again speak hereafter.” 
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way.
746
 Hilary, however would understand its condemnation quite differently—an 
incongruity that only highlighted the degree of confusion surrounding the term—
remarking that it was rejected because Paul had embraced it,
747
 in all likelihood, in a 
Sabellian way. For all these reasons, the term remained, in the eyes of many, a source of 
mistrust and confusion,
748
 contributing to what Socrates famously described as a “contest 
in the dark,” in which “neither party seemed to understand distinctly the grounds on 
which they calumniated one another.”749 
In this highly volatile setting, there were also certain others who for various 
reasons—ideological, political—sought middle ground in the conflict. Eusebius of 
Caesarea could be described as such a one, at least for a time, since his shifts in line with 
the changing political winds might also betray wily opportunism. He was a representative 
of the bloc of the conservative eastern prelates. He held some common ground with the 
Lucianists, but was unbeholden to them and acted independently of them. Perplexed by 
Alexander’s position750 and instinctively against the homoousion, Eusebius was one of 
Arius’ early supporters and shared many of the concerns of Arius and his confreres. 
However, in the interests of Church unity,
751
 and no doubt swayed by his friendship with 
and admiration of the emperor Constantine and unwillingness to appear to cross him, he 
acceded to the Nicene formula only after obtaining certain clarifications from the council 
as to the intention behind the language of the creed. Following the council, he issued an 
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explanation to his flock, which has come down to us as the Epistola Eusebii,
752
 on why 
his acceptance of Nicaea’s ruling did not violate the tenets that he and they held so dear. 
His apology here reflected theological positions that he had already articulated in his 
earlier works, published well before the initial dispute in Alexandria, and provides us 
with an insight into the specific concerns of his faithful and those anti-Nicene elements 
more generally over attributing to the Father and Son oneness of ousia. It also 
demonstrated just how distant were the positions of many of the anti-Nicene party from 
those of Arius. As we will see, there was no trace here of the exaggerations associated 
with Arius himself, which had provided, and would continue to provide, so much shock 
value in the Nicene party’s rhetoric. The concern of Eusebius was not to make a 
soteriological point by emphasizing the possibility of the Son falling away from the 
Father, but to explain the divine plurality of Trinitarianism while maintaining a sense of 
the divine order at whose peak the Father was located. In this endeavor, the category of 
will as a theological factor played its own special role. 
Regarding the contentious homoousion, he began in the Epistola, Eusebius 
assured his correspondents that the special discussions that followed its introduction into 
the creed made clear to him that the term was meant to indicate only that the Son was 
“from the Father,” as opposed, presumably, to being from some tertium quid, but not that 
the Son was “a part of his essence”: the Son was “indeed from the Father, yet without 
being as if a part of him.”753 Despite the fact that there was general confusion at the time 
over the terms ousia and hypostasis,
754
 and that it appears that here Eusebius was using 
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essence/ousia in the way hypostasis would come to be used later, viz. to signify a 
concrete existence or entity, it is clear that Eusebius was offering in his Epistola an, at 
best, tenuous explanation of how he understood the homoousion. It cannot be a surprise 
to us that, as time progressed and the political situation turned, Eusebius would turn 
against Nicaea. Nevertheless, the usefulness for us of the Epistola lies in the insights it 
affords us into his overriding theological priorities, which in this instance were twofold. 
His first concern was to ensure there was no metaphysical element, besides the Father 
and the Son whom he begot, by which the Father begot the Son. Failure to do so would 
have left him susceptible either to dualism or an infinite succession of intermediary 
elements after the manner of the third man. His second interest was to emphasize the 
distinction between Father and Son because there had to be theological order and 
adequate differentiation between uncaused and caused beings. The Son as caused could 
not be “a part of the Father” who was uncaused; he had to lie outside of him. Moreover, 
the thought that the simple being of the Father could even have parts was outright 
nonsensical. 
Eusebius had already explored this line of thought in a passage in his 
Demonstratio Evangelica dealing with the image, in Heb 1:3, of the Son as the radiance 
of the Father’s glory. Of course, Eusebius could not but embrace the analogy, but he was 
quick also to point out that there were key differences between physical light and its 
radiance, and the relationship between the Father and the Son. To begin with, physical 
light was inseparable from its radiance, but the Son, however, existed in himself, “in His 
own essence apart from the Father.” Similarly, a ray coexisted together and 
simultaneously with the light, as “a kind of complement thereof.” But the Father, 
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conversely, preceded the Son in existence, because he alone was unbegotten. There was 
no complementarity here. Being perfect and having precedence as Father and cause of the 
Son, he received nothing toward the completeness of his own Godhead from the Son. 
Rather, it was the Son who received from the Father “both his being, and the character of 
his being.”755 Finally, a ray shone forth from the light because of something that was “an 
inseparable accident of its essence.” But the Son, by contrast, was the Father’s image “by 
intention and deliberate choice. God willed to beget a Son, and established a second light, 
in all things made like unto Himself.”756 
The Father’s initiating will was all-important to this theological structure. It was 
the mediating principle between the Father’s primordial uncausedness and the causedness 
of the first generate being, the Son. In an amazing syllogism, Eusebius then explained 
that the Father’s Will and Power were “a kind of material and substratum of the genesis 
and constitution of the Universe.”757 In fact, the contention that anything could have 
come from things inexistent, as Arius had later postulated of the Son, was nonsensical for 
Eusebius, who considered that the Father’s very will itself constituted the substrate from 
which the Son had his existence. It was “no longer reasonable to say that anything that 
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exists must have come from the non-existent, for that which came from the non-existent 
would not be anything.”758 There was no tertium quid from which the Father generated 
the Son; the substrate from which the Son was generated was the very will of the Father 
himself. 
Returning to the Epistola, we see that Eusebius next turned his attentions to the 
“begotten not made” in the Creed, explaining to his flock that it underscored that the Son 
was not a work resembling the things that came to be through him, but was “of an 
essence” that was “too high for the level of any work,” which the Father generated in a 
manner that was “inscrutable and incalculable to every originated nature.”759 Thus, the 
homoousion was not to be taken “in the way of bodies” or “mortal beings,” for there was 
no division of essence, affection, alteration or change in the Father’s essence and power. 
The term suggested only that the Son bore no “resemblance to the originated creatures,” 
but was “in every way assimilated”760 to the Father. He was not “of any other subsistence 
(ὑποστάσεως) and essence (οὐσίας), but was from the Father.”761 
Eusebius was again shutting-out a third thing in the relation between Father and 
Son, but was here also expressing his objection to the broader implications of the 
homoousion. Laden with its suggestions of materiality, it evoked processes of division, 
alteration etc., after the manner of analogous earthly processes. Besides its apparent 
disregard for proper theological order, Eusebius more basically saw in the Nicene 
formulation a futile attempt at delving into the mystery of the Son’s generation that could 
only produce conclusions that were entirely inadequate and misleading. The homoousion 
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framed one’s consideration of the Son’s generation in categories that were unbefitting of 
its majesty. How the Son was generated lay beyond human understanding; all one could 
know was that he was not like the creatures. Eusebius would have felt more comfortable 
with a theology more measured in its goals: one that respected order by making a clear 
distinction between Father and the Son, and which did not impose feeble human 
principles onto this relation. 
Here, Eusebius was again echoing positions he had already articulated in the 
Demonstratio, where he called on his readers to abandon, in their consideration of the 
generation of the Son, even the temporal patterns that characterize the conventional 
understanding of causality. Thus, he argued, the begotten Son was not 
“at one time non-existent, and existent at another afterwards, but existent before 
eternal time, and pre-existent, and ever with the Father as His Son, and yet not 
unbegotten, but begotten from the Father unbegotten, being the only-begotten, the Word, 
and God of God, Who teaches that He was not cast forth from the being  of the Father by 
separation, or scission, or division, but unspeakably and unthinkably to us brought into 
being from all time, nay rather before all times, by the Father’s transcendent and 
inconceivable Will and Power. ‘For who shall describe his generation?’ he says, and ‘As 
no one knoweth the Father save the Son, so no one knoweth the Son save the Father that 
begat Him.’”762 
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Again, Eusebius wanted not to confuse the ousia—which I believe can only be taken to 
denote entity, or person—of the Father, which was ingenerate, with that of the Son, 
which was generate. But he also wanted to ensure that this generative process was not 
made the object of ham-handed human prying, for it lay completely beyond the realm of 
human understanding. Eusebius was prepared only to place a perimeter around the 
mystery: the Father was the source of the Son, but the specifics of that process were 
incomprehensible. This move, namely that of placing the comprehension of the Father’s 
generation of the Son firmly beyond the bounds of human understanding as a means of 
reconciling the seemingly contradictory characteristics of the relationship between Father 
and Son, was one that future theologians would increasingly find themselves led to. 
To take stock for a moment of our findings, we can see that the idea of the 
Father’s precedent and initiating will was integral to Eusebius, and the doctrine that the 
Son was generated at the will of the Father remained intact. It had not been explicitly 
condemned at Nicaea, and Eusebius would have had no reason to abandon theological 
positions he had established well before it. The unfathomable purposes of God were not 
only the ultimate reason behind why he generated the Son, the Father’s will was given by 
Eusebius the status of metaphysical substratum from which the Son (and all being) was 
generated. It took the place of any proposed tertium quid. As it had been with others, 
having the Son as the object of the will of the Father was Eusebius’ strategy of ensuring 
that the Son would be a distinct entity from the Father. This did not mean that he was a 
creature, or that he had a beginning, or that there was a time when he did not exist, as 
Arius had claimed, but that, as begotten—and begotten through a process that was 
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inscrutable and impenetrable to created intellect—he had to be distinct from the uncaused 
Father. 
On what had shown itself to be the more controversial issue of the Son’s 
responsive, reflexive will, and whether, theoretically, he could choose to turn away from 
the Father and fall away, in the same way that humans can, Eusebius did not answer 
directly. However, the indirect evidence suggests that such a prospect was, in his thought, 
impossible. Firstly, as we saw, the Son was viewed as being unlike creation; he bore no 
“resemblance to the originated creatures,” but was “in every way assimilated” to the 
Father.
763
 This closeness to the Father, to whom the Son was in every way assimilated, 
underlined both his exaltedness, and his standing, to Eusebius’ mind, as fashioner and 
regulator of the cosmos, which left no room for the theoretical possibility of his ever 
being in volitive conflict with the Father. The universe could not have been in the control 
of an entity potentially at odds with God. Unlike as with Arius, who had propounded the 
Son’s ignorance of the Father to underpin his theory of the Son’s contingent volitive 
union with the Father, Eusebius followed the biblical lead and put forth the Son as the 
only one who knew the Father and was known by the same. There was simply no 
possibility of the Son being in disharmony with the Father. Moreover, the Son was the 
principle by which the entire cosmos was brought into being and held in union and order, 
and the suggestion in Eusebius was that the work of the Son was identifiable with the will 
of the Father. Thus would he say that the elements of the cosmos were subject to the 
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“Word of God and the Will and Power of God,” to the “awful will of God,” and “the 
power of the Word of God, Who is One and the same.”764 For, he declared, 
“Be it rhythm, beauty, harmony, order, blending of qualities, substance, quality, 
quantity, the one Word of the universe holds all in union and order, and one 
creative power of God is at the head of all.”765 
The Son had no disharmony with God; on the contrary, he was in constant volitional 
oneness. Whether this was a union of two distinct wills, or that the Son was simply the 
expression of the Father’s will is not clear. Such a level of distinction cannot be expected 
at this point. The fact was that the Son was at all times the true expression of the will of 
the Father, with whom there was never any disharmony of will. In this respect, Eusebius 
was proof of how far the rank and file Eastern position was from the designated “Arian” 
notion of a morally contingent Son. We must keep this firmly in mind now that we will 
turn to the all-important Council of Antioch, of which Eusebius was to be one of the 
inspiring forces. 
 
THE COUNCIL OF ANTIOCH AND ONENESS ACCORDING TO SYMPHONY 
Nicaea had left Arius and his allies defeated and humiliated. But its insistence on 
using the homoousion in its promulgations also produced a sense of dissatisfaction and 
unease among many of the conservative churchmen in the East. It was this sense of 
reserve, along with the political adeptness of some of the Lucianists and their allies, that 
helped to bring about a rapid reversal of fortunes for the supporters of Nicaea after what 
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should have been their moment of triumph. After issuing a colorless and very general 
acceptance of the Nicene statement,
766
 both Eusebius of Nicomedia and Theognis of 
Nicaea were able to have themselves reinstated in 328, and they began almost 
immediately to agitate against the supporters of Nicaea.
767
 The first target would be the 
see of Antioch where presided Eustathius, who had been one of the key figures in the 
proceedings at the Council. The fact that Nicaea, in its sixth canon, had also affirmed the 
prerogatives of Antioch over the entire East, including Palestinian Caesarea, brought the 
conservative Eusebius of Caesarea back into alliance with the Lucianists as he sought to 
assert his own authority against the Antiochene prelate.
768
 Internally divided, with a 
tumultuous and mixed legacy, Antioch was an easy target. It had been the see of Paul of 
Samosata, but was also the host to the council that, only some fifty years previously, had 
denounced both him and the homoousion that he preached. Later, it had also been the 
base of Lucian, who, apart from having had his own conflicts with the church 
establishment,
769
 had also served as teacher of Arius’ closest supporters and possibly 
even the man himself,
770
 before ending his life, in 312, in a glorious martyrdom that was 
respectfully acknowledged by all. Eustathius’ hold over a good portion of his flock was 
thus tenuous at best.
771
 A synod was quickly called in Antioch in 328 that saw the prelate 
expelled from his see on what Socrates claimed were charges of Sabellianism,
772
 though 
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modern observers have noted the inconsistency of the contemporary commentators on the 
charges.
773
 A schism ensued that was to last for decades. The anti-Eustathian faction in 
Antioch requested that Eusebius of Caesarea be appointed successor, but, to the 
enormous admiration of Constantine, he declined in the interests of not exacerbating 
tensions in the city.
774
 A disciple of his, Paulinus, was appointed instead. 
In quick time, attacks were also orchestrated against Alexander’s successor, 
Athanasius, at the Council of Tyre (335), and, in Constantinople the following year, 
against another prominent Nicene, Marcellus of Ancyra, the latter also being accused of 
Sabellianism, a perhaps not unfair charge in this instance. With these chief Nicenes 
sidelined—and with Arius (336), Constantine (337), and Eusebius of Caesarea (339) also 
having died—the way was clear for a new beginning, a new Council that would restart 
proceedings in a way that the conservatives and their Lucianist allies would find more 
agreeable. Facilitating the venture was the fact that, with Constantine’s three sons each 
taking rule over a portion of the empire, the emperorship in the East passed to 
Constantius, whose sympathies lay with the anti-Nicene party. Fatefully, his brother 
Constans assumed power in the West. He was firmly on the side of the Nicenes, and it 
was to his jurisdiction that Marcellus and Athanasius both fled following their exiles, 
with the latter also composing there his monumental Orationes Contra Arianos. While 
there, Athanasius was able also to convince Julius of Rome of the errors of his enemies, 
and the Roman bishop quickly dispatched a letter to the East accusing them of 
overturning Nicaea and siding with Arius. All this prompted the anti-Nicene party to 
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gather in Antioch in 341, on the occasion of the dedication of the church of the holy 
Sepulcher in Jerusalem,
775
 known thereafter as the Council of the Dedication, and to issue 
new formulations of the faith that proved its orthodoxy and thus confront Julius’ 
accusations. 
The Council issued four statements of faith in succession. The opening sentence 
of the council’s first declaration expressed the council members’ distress at being labeled 
“followers of Arius.” They declared that they had never been such, and remarked, “How 
could bishops, such as we, follow a presbyter?” Neither, they continued, had they ever 
accepted “any other faith beside that which has been handed down from the beginning.” 
On the contrary, not only had they never been Arius’ followers, rather it was they who 
had examined and verified his faith before readmitting him.
776
 The Council’s second 
statement is of enormous theological importance for our purposes.
777
 Here it pronounced, 
among other things, that the Son was begotten of the Father before all ages; that he was 
God from God, and perfect from perfect; that he was both unalterable and unchangeable; 
that he was—and here we must make special note—the exact image (ἀπαράλλακτον 
εἰκόνα) of the Godhead (θεότητος), Essence (οὐσίας), Will (βουλῆς), Power (δυνάμεως), and 
Glory (δόξης) of the Father; that he was in the beginning with God; that he came to do not 
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his own will but that of him who sent him; and that the Holy Spirit was given to believers 
for comfort, sanctification, and initiation.
778
 Then, the council declared its belief in: 
“...a Father who is truly Father, and a Son who is truly Son, and of the Holy Spirit 
who is truly Holy Spirit, the names not being given without meaning or effect, but 
denoting accurately the peculiar subsistence, order, and glory of each that is 
named [τὴν οἰκείαν ἑκάστου τῶν ὀνομαζομένων ὑπόστασίν τε καὶ τάξιν καὶ δόξαν], so 
that they are three in subsistence, and in agreement one [τῇ μὲν ὑποστάσει τρία, τῇ 
δὲ συμφωνίᾳ ἕν].”779 
It concluded by anathematizing those who taught that “time, or season, or age,” preceded 
the generation of the Son, or that the Son was a creature, offspring, or work as one of the 
creatures, offsprings, or works.
780
 
Here for the first time we had an explicit invocation of the notion of a symphonic 
oneness between the Father, the Son, and, notably, the Holy Spirit, whom it also 
identified as three according to hypostasis. The reference was brief, and in abstraction it 
is not immediately clear how exactly it was intended. It is certain that, given that it was 
included in only one of Antioch’s four statements, oneness according to symphonia was 
being put forward as but one of a number of alternatives to the controversial homoousion, 
although we also observe that it did not reject the language of ousia altogether but was 
prepared to call the Son the unalterable image of the Father’s ousia and will. 
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Nevertheless, the reactions of the Nicene party to this new formula were swift and 
scathing. The Council of Sardica, which met some two years later and represented the 
general Nicene reaction to its Antiochene counterpart, roundly denounced it as a “foolish 
and lamentable position.” To the further disgust of those gathered at Sardica, it appears 
that in the meantime certain ones had begun to connect this volitive description of the 
oneness between Father and Son with John 17:21. The council declared: 
“The words uttered by our Lord, ‘I and My Father are one,’ are by those men781 
explained as referring to the concord and harmony [διὰ τὴν συμφωνίαν καὶ τὴν 
ὁμόνοιαν], which prevail between the Father and the Son; but this is a blasphemous 
and perverse interpretation. We, as Catholics, unanimously condemned this 
foolish and lamentable opinion: for just as mortal men on a difference having 
arisen between them quarrel and afterwards are reconciled, so do such interpreters 
say that disputes and dissension are liable to arise between God the Father 
Almighty and His Son; a supposition which is altogether absurd and untenable. 
But we believe and maintain that those holy words, ‘I and My Father are one,’ 
point out the oneness of essence [lit. hypostasis], which is one and the same in the 
Father and in the Son [διὰ τὴν τῆς ὑποστάσεως ἑνότητα, ἥτις ἐστὶ μία τοῦ Πατρός, 
καὶ μία τοῦ Υἱοῦ].”782 
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Here was Sardica’s syllogism: if one followed the symphonists and took Scripture’s 
testimonies on the oneness of the Father and the Son—whom to Sardica’s horror they 
identified as distinct hypostases, hence its own response with τὴν τῆς ὑποστάσεως 
ἑνότητα—as references to a volitional oneness, namely, an agreement, an identification, a 
symphony or alignment of the wills of the Father and Son, then this meant that one really 
was espousing a doctrine not only of the distinct and independent wills of the Father and 
Son, but also of a potential volitional conflict between them, as happens among “mortal 
men.” 
Plainly, the council at Sardica was basing its thinking on human analogy. In 
people’s affairs, oneness was achieved only through concurrence and concord, and 
experience showed all too well just how frail, relative, and given to “disputes and 
dissension” such relations were. Such a possibility of conflict could not apply to the 
relation between Father and Son, and so, for the members of the council and staunchest 
supporters of the Nicene formula, any mention of will in the inner life of the Trinity 
automatically became doctrinally suspect. No thought was given to the possibility that 
willing in the divine sphere might be different from its human analogue, and one suspects 
that Sardica could only have taken even Antioch’s strenuous descriptions of the Son as 
the exact image of the Father’s will etc. as still open to contingency: the Son was the 
image of the Father’s will only as long as he chose to be obedient. Evidently, the binary 
nature of the act of willing—one either willed or not—afforded it, in the eyes of its 
detractors, a contingency that was absolute, stretching across all ontological lines. So 
much so that the council, later in this same statement, went to great lengths to show how 
John 17:21—that passage where Christ prayed the Father that his disciples be one in them 
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as he and the Father are one, and which the council clearly felt its opponents had used to 
analogize between human and divine modes of interpersonal oneness—precluded any 
suggestion of volitional harmony as the mode of union between Father and Son: 
“So great is the ignorance and mental darkness of those whom we have 
mentioned, that they are unable to see the light of truth. They cannot comprehend 
the meaning of the words: ‘that they may be one in us.’783 It is obvious why the 
word ‘one’ was used; it was because the apostles received the Holy Spirit of God, 
and yet there were none amongst them who were the Spirit, neither was there any 
one of them who was Word, Wisdom, Power, or Only-begotten. ‘As Thou,’ He 
said, ‘and I are one, that they may be one in us.’ These holy words, ‘that they may 
be one in us,’ are strictly accurate: for the Lord did not say, ‘one in the same way 
that I and the Father are one,’ but He said, ‘that the disciples, being knit together 
and united, may be one in faith and in confession, and so in the grace and piety of 
God the Father, and by the indulgence and love of our Lord Jesus Christ, may be 
able to become one.’”784 
We might find the above interpretation unsatisfying, especially given the fact that the 
very next verse, 17:22, of the same Johannine passage had Christ praying, “that they be 
one even as we are one,” which stood in tension with the council’s position that “the Lord 
did not say, ‘one in the same way that I and the Father are one.’” But all this served to 
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underscore the degree of aversion that the council felt toward any suggestion of an 
analogy between human modes of interpersonal unity, which in most social contexts were 
inevitably volitional, and divine ones. 
Athanasius, too, was hostile to the Council of Antioch, summing it up as an 
expression of the “general and lasting odium” that characterized “their heresy.”785 
Undoubtedly, much of his bitterness would have been provoked by the involvement of 
some of its key participants in his exile in 337, but it was also a fact that he was firmly 
opposed to the notion of the oneness of will that the Council preached. In an epistle to the 
African bishops written some time later, before reminding his correspondents of the most 
egregious Arian positions—viz., the Son being a mutable creature that had come forth 
from nothing; that there was a time when he was not
786—he then denounced all notions 
of volitive union between Father and Son. For him, the suggestion that the Son acted out 
of obedience, and experienced moral progress because he possessed the quality of virtue, 
presupposed mutability and compoundness of nature in the Son, which, on the basis of Jn 
10:30
787
 and Jn 14:9,
788
 would in turn impute complexity of nature to the Father.
789
 
Moreover, anyone “assimilated to God by virtue and will” was liable to change; but it 
was only originate, created things, not God, that were given to change.
790
 
However, when one compares what Antioch promulgated with the condemnations 
that were leveled against it, one cannot help but feel that this damning evaluation was 
unjustified. To suggest that the notion of symphonia entailed the possibility of internal 
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conflict in the Trinity seemed not to take seriously the great lengths the council took to 
preclude such a reading. The Son, it stated, was “perfect from perfect” and “the exact 
image of the Godhead, Essence (οὐσίας), Will (βουλῆς), Power, and Glory of the Father,” 
and came down not do his own will, but the will of him that sent him (cf. John 4:38).
791
 
Sardica must have dismissed these statements as still beholden to a fundamentally 
contingent framework. Yet Antioch had also called the Son “both unalterable and 
unchangeable,”792 and the information provided by Philostorgius793 that even Eusebius of 
Nicomedia and the other Lucianists—namely, the most extreme of the anti-Nicenes—
rejected as a “most absurd error” Arius’ thesis that the Father was unknown to the Son, 
was corroborating evidence against the possibility, in their way of thinking, of a conflict 
of wills between Father and Son. We have seen repeatedly how in the Greek mind 
volitive conflict between parties was predicated on a disparity of knowledge. 
Philostorgius’ detail, then, lends support to the general conclusion that one can reach 
from a plain reading of the Council’s second statement alone, namely that the notion of a 
symphonia between Father and Son was never intended to include the potential for 
conflict between them as a corollary that served, for example, as a soteriological 
paradigm for humans’ obedience to God. It also was true that, despite its denunciations 
by the Nicene party and, in Athanasius, by one of the most celebrated personalities in 
Church history, the Council of Antioch has nevertheless gone down in history in quite 
honorable terms. Hilary, for example, saw it as an “assembly of the saints,” whose goal it 
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was to strike a blow at those Sabellians who made “the triple nomenclature imply only 
one Person, so that the Father alone could be also called both Holy Spirit and Son.”794 
Specifically on the language of symphonia, he considered it “free from objection,”795 and 
made the peculiar observation that it was probably more fitting that the council described 
the oneness in the Trinity in terms of agreement rather than essence, because its formula 
also included the Holy Spirit.
796
 Moreover, we must also note that the canons issued by 
the Council of Antioch (and the Council of Sardica) have been included in the corpus of 
canon law, and that even the anniversary of the Dedication of the Church of the holy 
Sepulcher, in whose honor the Council was named, has continued to be celebrated in the 
Orthodox Church to this day.
797
 
Yet, a precise understanding of the term τῇ συμφωνίᾳ ἓν remains elusive.798 I have 
found it used one other time—in the so-called Macrostich Creed, which, as we shall see 
below, was essentially an addendum to proceedings at Antioch—and, to my knowledge, 
was not properly treated of by any of its contemporaries, although, given this study’s 
limitations, I cannot say that my examinations have been exhaustive. Nevertheless, 
passages in Ambrose and Gregory of Nazianzus, who were both chronologically removed 
from the proceedings at Antioch, have inspired in me a reading of the τῇ συμφωνίᾳ ἓν 
formula that diverges from the line taken by its immediate critics, and I believe helps us 
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to see the emergence of a theological line on the will that was eventually to win the day. 
Writing in 381, when the controversy was in its endgame, Ambrose, although not noted 
as one of the weighty theologians of his time, nevertheless made the poignant comment, 
regarding the relation of the Holy Spirit to the Father, that if one believes that the “Father 
wills the same that the Holy Spirit wills,” then one “must of necessity confess the oneness 
of the divine will and operation.”799 And, “If,” he added, “the Holy Spirit is of one will 
and operation with God the Father,” then “He is also of one substance, since the Creator 
is known by His works.” Thus, he concluded, the “confusion of Sabellius” and the 
“division of Arius” were avoided.800 Gregory of Nazianzus pursued a similar line, 
arguing that the unity of the Father and Son was based on the “single, self-identical 
movement and will of the divine being, if I may put it that way, and on identity of 
substance.”801 Again, the strategy was to extrapolate identity of substance from palpable 
examples of its consequences, and thus overcome the Nicene difficulty in explaining the 
ramifications of the homoousion. 
To be sure, both Ambrose and Gregory were making explicit a correlation 
between nature/substance and will that, as we saw in previous chapters, was at least as 
old as Origen and Tertullian. However, we must also make clear that, by referring to the 
Son as the “exact image (ἀπαράλλακτον εἰκόνα) of the Godhead (θεότητος), Essence 
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(οὐσίας), Will (βουλῆς), Power (δυνάμεως), and Glory (δόξης) of the Father”802 all in the 
same breath, the Antiochene Council itself seemed at least at some level to accept this 
very same association between ousia and the will too. Although, of course, the Council 
could not accept the homoousion, precisely because to its mind it made the Father and 
Son look like one and the same person—something it clearly considered that “exact 
image of the ousia” did not do—, the number of prior checks and restraints that it 
deployed in its statement on symphonic oneness lead me to conclude that the only 
interpretation left to us must have been something along the lines first laid out, at least in 
rudimentary form, by Origen and Tertullian and then rearticulated with greater clarity, 
years later, by Ambrose and Gregory. Thus, oneness according to symphonia was for 
Antioch not a means of framing the Son as an exemplar of meritorious creaturely 
obedience who was subject to the theoretical possibility of falling away from God, but an 
outward, strictly phenomenological index that pointed to a unique kind of oneness whose 
underlying ontological mechanics was otherwise unfathomable and futile to speculate on. 
All one could see and know was the perfect concord that existed between Father and Son, 
while the nature of the underlying relationship between them that created such concord 
remained unknowable. For this reason did the Council issue a condemnation of all 
analogies on the Son’s generation that were drawn from human experience of creations, 
offsprings, and works, for one knew empirically that these could not produce such perfect 
agreement between begetter and begotten. Ambrose and Gregory had the liberty of 
describing this unity as oneness of substance, because by their time the concerns 
surrounding the homoousion had been resolved. But the Council had consciously 
dismissed identity of ousia as unsuitable, because of what it saw as its unipersonalist 
                                                 
802
 Athanasius, Syn. 23 (NPNF
2 
4:461 [PG 26:721BC]). 
268 
connotations, and was left with no name for the kind of oneness it was proposing besides 
the phenomenological descriptor oneness according to symphonia. 
Still, symphonia was an unusual expression. As a composite term with a συν- 
prefix, it could easily be taken as going against the general flow of the classic models we 
have examined so far, which described a unidirectional movement of the Godhead 
outward from itself to which humans were called to turn, and taken instead to imply also 
a reflexive volitive motion from the Son back to the Father, which was generally the 
attitude one expected of creatures responding in obedience to God’s exitus from himself. 
In the worst case, it would have evoked images of a prior misalignment of two distinct 
wills that had then become unified, albeit ever and unalterably so, in line with classically 
Arian adoptionism. While it is not possible to know why the Council opted for the term, 
what sways me against the council seeing symphonia as bi-directional, and not 
unidirectional, was the assurance in its creed that the Son came not to do his own will but 
that of the Father. Symphony here simply referred to observable sameness of will and 
purpose: all that the Son does was in agreement with what the Father does. This 
“unidirectional” reading of the statement is for me confirmed by how it was reworded in 
the Macrostich Creed of 344. In order to placate the prelates gathered at the Council of 
Sardica, who were so appalled by the notion of divine symphonia, the writers of the 
Macrostich, who gathered again in Antioch to explain the faith promulgated in 341, now 
talked not of τῇ συμφωνίᾳ ἕν, but τῆς βασιλείας συμφωνίαν (“symphonia of dominion”).803 
Clearly, the intention here was to preclude any sense of bi-directionality of volitive 
action, and emphasize that it referred to unidirectional, outward action, from the Father 
through the Son. Thus, we might conclude that the Son was the product of a generative 
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process from the Father that afforded him from eternity the same infinite knowledge as 
that of the Father, and, as such, he necessarily always willed the same as the Father, for 
there could be only one way for persons with perfect, transcendent knowledge to will. 
Moreover, our assessment should include the subtle but important detail that the 
formula issued by Antioch explicitly applied the notion of symphony to all three 
hypostases, not just the Father and Son: τῇ μὲν ὑποστάσει τρία, τῇ δὲ συμφωνίᾳ ἕν. This 
was no small matter. For a buttress to Arius’ notion of the contingent volitive oneness of 
the Son with the Father was the Scriptural witness of Christ’s clearly human behavior, his 
anxiety and temptation at Gethsemane. Apparently having no doctrine of a human mind 
and soul in Christ,
804
 Arius attributed these manifestations back to the pre-incarnate 
nature of the Son himself as proof of his kinship with creation at large and his 
paradigmatically contingent volitional connection with God. With the Holy Spirit, 
however, there was no hermeneutic occasion of a temptation of the Spirit or a suggestion 
of its being united with God only as long as the Spirit wanted to be. Neither was there a 
statement on the creaturely status of the Spirit as one would later find among the 
followers of Macedonius.
805
 So the implication was again that there was no sense of a 
contingent volitional oneness between Father and Son in Antioch’s formula.806 
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To summate, we see that Antioch was motivated by fears that the homoousion that 
Nicaea had promulgated ran the risk of making, among other things, the Father and Son 
(and Holy Spirit) appear to be one and the same person. Thus it promoted the rival 
concept of τῇ μὲν ὑποστάσει τρία, τῇ δὲ συμφωνίᾳ ἕν as an affirmation of the three distinct 
persons in the Trinity who were one in concord. This was not a statement of potential 
conflict in the Trinity, but a phenomenological index of an ontological relationship that 
Antioch was unwilling to describe at more depth than simply stating that the Son was the 
exact and unchanging image of the Father’s ousia and will. To Antioch’s mind, to call the 
Son the image of the Father’s ousia was acceptable; to call him homoousios with the 
Father, however, was not, for the reasons we have described above. Pertaining to the will, 
however, it did not feel the same degree of reservation. As with the ousia, the Son was 
said also to be the unchanging image of the Father’s will. But he was also said not to do 
his own will but the will of him that sent him, namely the Father, with whom moreover, 
he was one in symphonia. So although the homoousios may have been unsavory to the 
Antiochenes, the repeated affirmation of the identity of the Son’s will with that of the 
Father indicate that it would not be unfair to suuggest that Antioch would have accepted a 
designation of the Son as homoboulos with the Father, that is, possessed of exactly the 
same will as he. Unlike with the homoousios, there would be no danger of confusing the 
two persons with an hypothetical doctrine of homoboulos. 
Finally, we note that Antioch left one particular matter unaddressed, namely the 
question of the Father’s precedent will in getting the Son. For now we must only recall 
how “cosmological” models of the Trinity typically saw the generation of the Son as the 
first step in God’s outward movement that culminated in the creation of the universe. 
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However, the Father’s willing begetting of the Son almost always was taken by many in 
this period to suggest the Son’s ontological inferiority, even though others considered it 
an indispensable safeguard against understanding the Son’s generation as an unwilled 
overflowing of divine being. How this most fundamental of issues was resolved will 
form, fittingly, our final point of focus. 
 
THE MACROSTICH CREED AND THE QUESTION OF THE WILLED BEGETTING 
The Council of Antioch failed to win hearts among the Nicenes. The Council of 
Sardica that responded to it was utterly unconciliatory,
807
 issuing a statement of faith that 
many in the East would have seen as differing in nothing from what they perceived as the 
Sabellianism of Marcellus, and condemning an “Arianism” so broadly defined “that 
nearly every easterner who had ever heard of Origen was considered Arian.”808 Still, at 
this time the politics were such that the anti-Nicenes had no choice but to offer the olive 
branch: Constantius was at war with the Persians and was in no mood for a confrontation 
with his brother in the West. Thus, in 344 the anti-Nicene prelates gathered again in 
Antioch to issue another Creed that, based on the work of Antioch, went to great lengths 
to explain the mind of that Council. Such was its extensiveness that this creed was to be 
known as the Macrostich, or long-versed Creed. As a note on the general context, we 
must also mention that this gathering also saw the ascent to the Antiochene throne of 
Leontius, who would later become the central figure of the most intractably anti-Nicene 
faction. This was not insignificant. The failure of the anti-Nicene camp to gain any kind 
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of gesture from their opposites led to tensions in the anti-Nicene camp itself, as differing 
factions became inclined to divergent responses to the defenders of Nicaea. Three 
streams were beginning to appear, which posterity has identified and named, even though 
an individual’s adherence to a particular group or groups could be a considerably fluid 
affair. The first, associated with Basil of Ancyra, the successor of the purged Marcellus, 
has become known as the party of the Homoiousionists, because in the course of the 
debates were prepared to give consideration to Nicaea’s language of ousia and concede 
that the Father and Son were like, or even same, according to substance. Their stance 
stood in contrast with that of the supporters of Nicaea’s homoousion, which denoted a 
sameness or identity of substance, or, in the eyes of the most ardent anti-Nicenes, worse, 
that Father and Son were the same substance. The difference was subtle, but their 
intention was to attempt, through the ὅμοιος κατ’ οὐσίαν formula, to extend a hand to the 
Nicenes but also close the door on the Sabellianism that some associated with the 
homoousion. 
The second party, which was to flourish under the sponsorship of the 
aforementioned Leontius of Antioch, consisted of those who came to feel that too many 
concessions had been made to the Nicene party, and promoted the more classically Arian 
position of a strongly stratified metaphysics, with the Son being declared unlike (ἀνόμοιος) 
the Father, whence their nickname of Anomoeans.
809
 As the disputes wore on, it was this 
group that came increasingly to be identified by outsiders as “the Arians.” Among their 
number arose both Aetius and Eunomius, who, we must note, were strident proponents of 
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the traditionally Arian views on the Father’s absolute volitive primacy.810 The third party, 
the thusly-named Homoeans, were the middle party which comprised those who 
generally preferred to say only that the Son was like the Father in all things (ὅμοιος κατὰ 
πάντα) and nothing more, all talk of ousia being put aside.811 Their emphasis on unity and 
amity over doctrinal exactitude and sophistication won them the favor of the emperors 
Constantius, after he had established sole rule, and Valens, with the high point of their 
influence being marked by the councils of Seleucia and Ariminum, held in 359. 
At this time, conciliation was the order of the day, and, although the Macrostich 
sought to avoid conflict by making a clear and detailed statement of its faith, it also stood 
fast on the matters its drafters considered important. Thus, it consciously avoided the 
language of ousia, advancing instead the more general ὅμοιος κατὰ πάντα formula. On the 
other hand, it reworded, as we saw above, the symphonic formula from τῇ συμφωνίᾳ ἓν to 
τῆς βασιλείας συμφωνίαν (“symphony of dominion”)812 in order, I contend, to underline the 
unidirectional nature of the volitive action—outward from the Godhead, from the Father 
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through the Son, including the divine action on the world—and preclude any notion of 
reflexive will from the Son back to the Father, as might have been construed from the 
original formula, in order to counter the accusations of Sardica. To these, however, it also 
added statements on the old theme of the Father’s initiating will, a matter left untouched 
in 341. Here the council stated that it condemned anyone who stated that the “the Son is 
Ingenerate; or that the Father begat the Son, not by choice or will [οὐ βουλήσει οὐδὲ 
θελήσει].”813 It elaborated:  
“And at the same time those who irreverently say that the Son has been generated 
not by choice or will [οὐ βουλήσει οὐδὲ θελήσει], thus encompassing God with a 
necessity [ἀνάγκην] which excludes choice and purpose [ἀβούλητον καὶ 
ἀπροαίρετον], so that He begat the Son unwillingly [ἄκων], we account as most 
irreligious and alien to the Church; in that they have dared to define such things 
concerning God, beside the common notions concerning Him, nay, beside the 
purport of divinely inspired Scripture. For we, knowing that God is absolute 
[αὐτοκράτορα] and sovereign over Himself [Κύριον αὐτὸν ἑαυτοῦ], have a religious 
judgment that He generated the Son voluntarily and freely [ἐκουσίως...καὶ 
ἐθελοντήν]; yet, as we have a reverent belief in the Son’s words concerning 
Himself (Prov 8:22), ‘The Lord created me a beginning of His ways for His 
works,’ we do not understand Him to have been originated like the creatures or 
works which through Him came to be.”814 
Here we had an invocation of precedent will to safeguard the sovereignty of God and 
against binding God the Father by “necessity” as one might find in certain emanationist 
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readings of Plotinus,
815
 where the outward movement from primordial oneness was a 
matter of a natural overflow of the ebullience of being in the Hen. The anti-Nicene 
council at Sirmium (351) would reiterate the sentiment, condemning those who held that 
“the Son has been generated, the Father not wishing it [μὴ θελήσαντος]” for “not by 
compulsion [βιασθεὶς], led by physical necessity [ἀνάγκης φυσικῆς], did the Father, as He 
wished not [ὡς οὐκ ἤθελεν], generate the Son, but he at once willed [ἠβουλήθη], and, after 
generating him from himself apart from time and passion, manifested him.” However, no 
doubt in anticipation of a Nicene protest that invoking the Father’s precedent will was 
tantamount to reducing the Son to the level of creatures, the council also took the 
additional step of prefacing this statement with another denunciation, against those who 
held that “the Son of God at the will [βουλήσει] of God has come to be, as one of the 
works [ὡς ἓν τῶν ποιημάτων γεγονέναι].”816  
 
ATHANASIUS ON THE FATHER’S PRECEDENT WILL 
None of the concessions offered in the Macrostich was sufficient to win the trust 
of the Nicene camp. Older theological systems had, as we saw, remained open to a sense 
of intentionality in the Father’s generation of the Son. But Arius had poisoned the well 
with his early insistence on the contingency of will—both in the Son’s generation from 
things inexistent by the Father, and in the Son’s volitive unity with the Father 
thereafter—and, in the eyes of the Nicene party, made the notion of the Father’s 
precedent will in the begetting of the Son a mechanism synonymous with the creative act 
that had brought all previously inexistent entities into being. It was in this light that 
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Athanasius expressed such outrage at the notion of an act of will initiating the begetting 
of the Son. We have already laid to rest the question of the contingency of the Son’s 
reflexive will back toward the Father and the possibility of him falling away from the 
Father. In fact, we have seen that this question had been largely resolved even during 
Arius’ time, with Arius distancing himself from his own previously held position, though 
the outrage his initial position provoked was to live on. But the question of the Father’s 
precedent in the begetting of the Son remained very much a live issue, and it will be in 
these final three thinkers, Athanasius, Gregory Nazianzus, and Gregory of Nyssa, that we 
will trace its path to some kind of resolution as well. 
Athanasius tackled the prickly question of the Father’s precedent will toward the 
end of the third book of his anti-Arian Orations. The notion that the Son “received his 
being at the will and pleasure of the Father” was of course widespread among the Arians 
during his time. But the expression was also being used by parties that Athanasius knew 
were not Arian, and this caused him great consternation. For this was a “new expression,” 
and supreme caution was required in using it because it was “from the heretics, and the 
words of heretics are suspicious.” To be sure, for the heretics the association between the 
Father’s precedent will and the Son’s inexistence prior to his generation was axiomatic. 
For them, Athanasius noted, “He who says, ‘The Son came to be at the divine will,’ has 
the same meaning as another who says, ‘Once he was not,’ and ‘He is a creature.’”817 
This fatal correlation was strong, and using it as their basis the Arians located in the will 
of the Father the mechanism for keeping him at an ontological remove from the Son. We 
must underline that Athanasius did not appear to have an issue with the internal cogency 
per se of the Arian argument—many Nicenes felt unease at any mention of the will in the 
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begetting precisely because they too were bound by the notions of contingency it 
implied—only with its applicability to the Trinity. For this reason, Athanasius would 
have preferred that right believers avoided the phrase altogether. However, it was 
apparent that non-Arians were using it too, so his goal in these final pages of his Orations 
became to analyze and delineate the proper boundaries of the question of will in the 
begetting and to ensure that at least the “right intention” was being applied to “that 
simple use of words” he found so distasteful.818 
For Athanasius, the Arian understanding of the precedent will of the Father in the 
begetting of the Son had its inspiration in the thought of one Ptolemy the Valentinian. 
According to Athanasius, Ptolemy had claimed that the Unoriginate was possessed of two 
attributes, thought and will (ἔννοιαν καὶ θέλησιν). The things that the unoriginate principle 
cogitated in thought required a specific act of will to be brought into existence. Without 
this act of will, they would remain just divine thoughts and nothing more.
819
 Athanasius 
charged that the Arians had simply repackaged this system of Ptolemy’s, laying particular 
emphasis on the Father’s “precedent will and pleasure” (προηγουμένην βούλησιν καὶ 
θέλησιν),820 by the power of which—and here they invoked a host of proof-texts821—all 
things had come from inexistence into being. Thus, heretics such as Asterius, whom we 
know to have been a classical Arian and the object of many of Athanasius’ critiques, 
simply included the Son among these generate objects of the Father’s pleasure and will, 
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thus putting him on a par with other creatures, with all having their origin in prior 
inexistence.
822
 
We have already seen in an earlier chapter the strongly volitional character of 
Valentinian theology. Yet in Ptolemy’s particular rendition of it, at least as Athanasius 
described it, we observe a departure from the classic understanding of will as an 
expression of knowledge that we found in the Valentinianism we reconstructed from 
Irenaeus. Instead, will was here understood to be independent from thought/knowledge, 
not an expression and natural outflow thereof, and was required as a distinct action to 
actuate and bring to fruition the objects of thought. Athanasius, clearly moved by the 
classical paradigm, found this dichotomy absurd: “I consider understanding and will to be 
the same. For what a man counsels, about that also he has understanding; and what he has 
in understanding, that also he counsels.”823 To appreciate where Athanasius was about to 
lead the conversation, we must note the enduring Nicene protestation against Arius’ 
depiction of the Son as but an image of the Father’s proper Word. From as early as 
Alexander,
824
 the Nicenes countered that the Son was himself God’s proper rational 
principle, not merely an externalized image thereof as Arius had presented him. 
Athanasius was now moving beyond this premise and arguing that if the Son as Word 
was the rational principle of the Father, then it followed that, on the basis of the 
identification of thought and will that he was advocating for on the basis of an analogy 
between humans and God, the Son was himself also the volitive principle in the 
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Godhead: the Son was God’s will, a conclusion Athanasius saw vindicated by Prov 
8:14.
825
 Only such an understanding made sense of the data. Scripture made clear that 
God brought all things into being through his Word, which, Athanasius was clarifying, 
was also his Will: 
“And as the Apostle writes to Thessalonians, ‘the will [θέλημα] of God is in Christ 
Jesus.’826 The Son of God then, he is the ‘Word’ and the ‘Wisdom;’ he the 
‘understanding’ and the living ‘counsel’ [βουλή]; and in him is the ‘good pleasure 
[θέλημα] of the Father;’ he is ‘truth’ and ‘light’ and ‘power’ of the Father.”827 
And as himself the Word and Will of God, the Son could never have been willed into 
existence, for he could not have been his own object. By separating the Son from the 
Father the Arians sought only to “call Him a creature instead of the proper Word of the 
Father.”828 Athanasius was not opposed to the Arian axiom that a thing willed was at an 
ontological distance from the willing agent. His difference with them was only that the 
Son was not among these objects of will, and therefore was not inferior to the Father. 
Rather, as God’s true Word and Will, he was of the Father’s very nature itself: “As far 
then as the Son transcends the creature, by so much does what is by nature transcend the 
will.”829 The tactic of applying “human contrarieties” to God in order, supposedly, to 
safeguard against subjecting God to necessity or purposelessness was merely a means of 
denying that there is a true Son of God. For, in his eyes, making the Son the object of will 
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in order to guard against necessity made as much sense as making God’s goodness and 
mercifulness objects of will for the same reason.
830
 
It must be made clear, however, that Athanasius was not shutting out the question 
of will completely. In emphasizing the Son’s natural connection to the Father, 
Athanasius’ specific target had been the notion of the Son’s generation as the object of 
the Father’s precedent will. For a volitive act (βούλησις) prior to the begetting of the Son 
suggested his ontological contingency, namely that the Father chose to beget the Son, and 
that he theoretically could have chosen otherwise. This was, as we intimated above, as 
illegitimate as suggesting that the Father chooses to be good,
831
 and it was this that 
Athanasius was shutting out. However, if one fully accepted a relation between Father 
and Son that was according to nature, then, Athanasius argued, one could also begin to 
see, as an inherent and necessary corollary of this natural concomitance of Father and 
Son, a mutual “good pleasure” or “wanting” (θέλησις), and love (ἀγάπη), between them as 
well. For it was “one thing to say, ‘Of will [βουλήσει] he came to be,’ and another, that the 
Father has love [ἀγαπᾷ] and good pleasure [θέλει] towards his Son who is his own by 
nature.”832 Just because the Son was not brought into existence by a prior act of the 
Father’s will did not make the Son unwanted of the Father. On the contrary, being 
naturally of the Father and proper to his essence, it was as impossible for the Son’s 
existence to be at cross-purposes with the good pleasure of the Father as it was for 
Father’s own subsistence to conflict with his good pleasure.833 Not only so, this good 
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pleasure was mutual: the Son was indeed “wanted [θελόμενος] of the Father,”834 but also, 
“by the very good pleasure by which the Son is wanted, the Son too loves, wants, and 
honors the Father.”835 This mutuality—“The Father wants [θέλει] the Son,” and, “The Son 
wants [θέλει] the Father”836—implied not precedent will, but “genuineness of nature, and 
propriety and likeness of essence.”837 Thus, Athanasius concluded, “The Father loves and 
wants the Son, and the Son loves and wants the Father.”838 
It seems clear to me that this line of thought, which came in the very last 
paragraphs of his arduous Orationes contra Arianos, was intended as an answer to those 
anti-Nicenes for whom a treatment of will in the Trinity was imperative. This sense of 
mutual will, which Athanasius described with the verb θέλω and its derivatives—and 
which NPNF consistently renders “good pleasure,” which in places I have replaced with 
“want”—stands in contrast to the βούλεσθαι and its derivatives, with their intellective 
overtones that suggest a kind of willing interwoven with knowledge and deliberation,
839
 
and which Athanasius tended to correlate with the precedent will he so argued against. 
We also note that this good pleasure was mentioned in concert with the verb “to love,” 
almost like a doublet. We have already noted how, in certain schools of thought, love was 
seen as a species of will,
840
 so I am inclined to take Athanasius’ words here as a 
description of the innate harmony that must characterize the natural relation he was 
arguing for. Because this commonality of thelesis had its basis in the Son’s being of the 
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Father according to nature and essence, Athanasius seemed in a way to portend Ambrose, 
who, as we saw, was to argue that commonality of essence meant the commonality of 
will, and who, in turn, I have claimed gives us a way of understanding the Council of 
Antioch. However, the similarity between them is superficial, because Ambrose was 
dealing with the divine will in the outward operation of the Godhead in creation. 
Moreover, this inner harmony that Athanasius talked of was peculiar because it was bi-
directional in its action, from Father to Son and from Son back to the Father, and so is 
noteworthy for its ramifications for a social view of the Trinity. Arius’ attempt at bi-
directionality had been doomed by the sense of contingency it rested on, but Athanasius 
eliminated contingency by making the harmony the inherent corollary of the natural 
concomitance between Father and Son. In this way, Athanasius was attempting to redeem 
what Sardica had rejected.
841
 We note, too, that this theletic harmony was distinct from 
God’s outward, purposive, and volitive movement in creation, which, Athanasius had 
already argued, was tied especially to the action of the Son, being himself the Will of 
God that was eternally with God. 
Nevertheless, for all its brilliance, Athanasius’ system seemed burdened by an 
unclear sense of the Son’s begetting. To be sure, he was fond of arguing for the sameness 
of essence between Father and Son by drawing analogies from human procreation in 
which children were no less human than their parents.
842
 But the presentation of the Son 
as the divine Will itself, and his likening the Son’s concomitance with the Father to that 
of the goodness and mercifulness that inhered naturally in the Father must have made the 
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Son seem to some like a property of the Father and obscured the vision of him as his 
Monogenes. Thus, if, as their opponents charged, the anti-Nicene insistence on including 
a place for will in their Trinitarian theology made them suspect of preaching an extreme 
subordinationism, in which the Son was on a lower ontological stratum than was the 
Father, Athanasius’ opponents might have taken his proposal as a different kind of 
diminution of the Son, one where the Son, likened to a property or aspect of the Father, 
was not possessed of personhood to the degree that the Father was, thus encouraging the 
view that Nicaea’s supporters were Sabellians.843 And if Irenaeus’ response to the 
Valentinians of his day appears to have been to avoid open mention of the question of 
will in the Godhead, Athanasius’ response to what he too identified as volitionistic 
Valentinianism was explicitly to shut it out from the theological conversation as much as 
possible. 
 
THE GREGORIES: RESOLUTION OF PRECEDENT WILL, AND THE OUTWARD VOLITIVE 
MOVEMENT OF THE TRINITY 
A new impetus for denouement was provided only after the peace of 362, when, 
in the face of Julian’s persecution of the Church, a synod was called in Alexandria, and 
Nicene prelates under the leadership of Athanasius were reconciled with moderate 
churchmen of the anti-Nicene party. This was a culmination of a process wherein each 
side had begun to realize that the other was not Sabellian or tri-theist respectively. It was 
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 We must be clear that Athanasius was not calling the Son a quality of the Father, only that the 
illustration he used here could be taken to undermine the personhood of the Son. As he clarified in Ep. Afr. 
8, the idea of qualities in God implied compoundness of the simple divine essence. The mysterious author 
of C. Ar. 4.2, which has been received as part of a supposed fourth book of Athanasius’ Orationes contra 
Arianos—although the consensus remains that it was neither part of the original work nor even written by 
Athanasius (See Quasten 3:27-28)—takes the same line. 
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in this context that a new generation of thinkers brought fresh eyes to the issues. Among 
these were Gregory of Nazianzus—the Theologian—, and Gregory of Nyssa, scions of 
the moderately anti-Nicene party once led by Basil of Ancyra. On the one hand, their 
approach focused on upholding the full personhood of the divine hypostases—a 
traditionally anti-Nicene approach
844
 that, after the Council of 362, as we see from its 
findings as published in the Tome to the Antiochenes, had begun to gain acceptance from 
both sides.
845
 On the other hand, in its effort to give an answer to the unresolved question 
of precedent will, it also took its inspiration from a line of thinking we first saw at 
Sirmium. This argued that, although the Son’s generation was concomitant with the will 
of God, it was so in the way as happens with “one of the works.”846 In other words, they 
sought to preserve a sense of the Father’s precedent will in the begetting of the Son—it 
had long been a part of the tradition as a guard of the sovereignty of God, and could not 
simply be jettisoned—but in a way that, because it was said not to abide by the norms 
governing causality in the created order, could be argued did not imply the Son’s 
ontological inferiority to God. 
Gregory of Nazianzus was the first to look at the burning question and to attempt 
to resolve it in a way that was respectful of the Council of Nicaea. He made special note 
of the impasse to which the debate on the precedent will of God had till his time 
continuously been led: 
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 Telling were the Tome’s efforts to play down the authority of the Council of Sardica (apud Athanasius, 
Tom. 5). 
845
 Characteristic was the statement in the Tome which said,  “...the Father perfectly exists and subsists, and 
that the Son perfectly subsists, and that the Holy Spirit perfectly subsists. Wherefore also I accept the above 
explanation concerning the Three Subsistences [ὑποστάσεων], and the one Subsistence [ὑποστάσεως], or 
rather Essence [οὐσίας], and those who hold thus. For it is pious to hold and confess the Holy Trinity in one 
Godhead” (Apud Athanasius, Tom. 11 [NPNF2 4:486—PG 26: 809A]). 
846
 Apud Athanasius, Syn. 27 (NPNF
2 
4:465 [PG 26: 740B]). 
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“He, they say, either voluntarily begat the Son, or else involuntarily. Next, as they 
think, they bind us on both sides with cords; these however are not strong, but 
very weak. For, they say, if it was involuntarily, he was under the sway of some 
one. And who exercised this sway? And how is He, over whom it is exercised, 
God? But if voluntarily, the Son is a Son of Will; how then is He of the Father?—
and they thus invent a new sort of Mother for him,—the Will,—in place of the 
Father. There is one good point which they may allege about this argument of 
theirs; namely, that they desert Passion, and take refuge in Will. For Will is not 
Passion.”847 
The dilemma for Gregory lay between two extremes. On the one side, the generation of 
the Son was seen not as a matter of the Father’s will but the product of compulsion on 
him, which, of course, suggested the existence of some third element, above both Father 
and Son, that dictated the necessity of the Son’s begetting. Not without some 
justification, this had been the perception of the Neo-Platonist position in Christian 
circles.
848
 We have already seen how, in the face of strongly volitionist Gnosticism, 
Plotinus moved, away from volitive explanations of the movement from primordial 
oneness to plurality, to a strong sense of rationalistic determinism. Gregory’s opposition 
to the necessity thesis was twofold. First, it belittled the sovereignty of God: “Let us not 
ever look on this Generation as involuntary, like some natural overflow, hard to be 
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 Or. 29.6 (NPNF
2 
7:302 [PG 36:80C-81A]): “Βουληθείς, φασί, γεγέννηκε τὸν Υἱόν, ἢ μὴ βουλόμενος. Εἶτα 
δεσμοῦσιν, ὡς οἴονται, ἀμφοτέρωθεν ἅμμασιν, οὐκ ἰσχυροῖς, ἀλλὰ καὶ λίαν σαθροῖς. Εἰ μὲν γὰρ οὐ θέλων, φασί, 
τετυράννηται. Καὶ τίς ὁ τυραννήσας; Καὶ πῶς ὁ τυραννηθείς, Θεός; Εἰ δὲ θέλων, θελήσεως Υἱός, ὁ Υἱός· πῶς οὖν 
ἐκ τοῦ Πατρός; Καὶ καινήν τινα μητέρα τὴν θέλησιν ἀντὶ τοῦ Πατρὸς ἀναπλάττουσιν. Ἓν μὲν οὖν τοῦτο χάριεν 
αὐτῶν, ἂν τοῦτο λέγωσιν, ὅτι τοῦ πάθους ἀποστάντες, ἐπὶ τὴν βούλησιν καταφεύγουσιν· οὐ γὰρ πάθος ἡ βούλησις.” 
848
 See, e.g., Enn. 5.7: “The Nous stands as the image of the Hen, firstly because there is a certain necessity 
that the first should have its offspring...” 
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retained, and by no means befitting our conception of Deity.”849 Secondly, and most 
poignantly, it clashed with the principle, dearly held by Gregory and derived ultimately 
from Origen, that things done out of necessity were ephemeral, “for what is involuntary, 
apart from its being the result of oppression, is neither meritorious nor durable.”850 His 
contrast, here, with the Nicene party’s suspicion of will as given to mutability was stark. 
The other side of the quandary saw the Son as the product of the divine Will, 
which, as a proximate cause in the service of the Father, brought about the generation of 
the Son, to the point of assuming even a kind of maternal status. We are reminded here of 
several things. First, one thinks of Athanasius’ description of the view of Ptolemy the 
Valentinian, who argued for will as an autonomous principle in the One. Secondly, we 
cannot but also recall here the way Eusebius of Caesarea parried the claim that the Son 
came to be from things inexistent by putting forth the divine Will as the substrate from 
which all things were formed.
851
 It seems some went a further step and connected this to 
Aristotle’s view that a mother provides the material substrate in procreation,852 to arrive 
at the final notion, here described by Gregory, of the divine Will as the Son’s mother. In 
any case, the inescapable sense of contingency which, in the understanding of the 
proponents of the theory of the Father’s volitive begetting of the Son, surrounded the 
Father’s generative will and naturally put this ultimately contingent Son at an ontological 
distance from the Father, of whom, thus, he could not be considered truly a part. Of 
course, Gregory rejected this side of the dilemma as well, but he commended its 
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 Or. 29.2 (NPNF
2 
7:301). 
850
 Or. 2.16 (NPNF
2 
7:208). Cf. Or. 31.25 (NPNF
2 
7:325-326): “For nothing that is involuntary is durable; 
like streams or trees which are kept back by force. But that which is voluntary is more durable and safe. 
The former is due to one who uses force, the latter is ours; the one is due to the gentleness of God, the other 
to a tyrannical authority. Wherefore God did not think it behooved Him to benefit the unwilling, but to do 
good to the willing.” 
851
 Dem. ev. 4.1. 
852
 Gen. an. 1.20 (729
a
9-11), 2.1 (732
b
1-11). 
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proponents at least for correctly not confusing will with passion.
853
 It was important for 
Gregory that this ancient and well-established distinction
854
 not be blurred, for he sought 
to overcome this dilemma and restore a sense of will in the begetting of the Son without 
this in any way embarrassing the principle of the sameness of being between Father and 
Son, as this had first been laid down by Nicaea, or there being any suspicion of affinity to 
the irrationalist and passionist systems of the Gnostics of old. 
For Gregory, the path toward a solution to this problem of will lay principally in 
maintaining the theological order in the Trinity that the anti-Nicene party had held so 
dear. To this end Gregory advanced what originally had been Plotinus’855 language of 
cause to define the nature of the Father’s relation with the Son. For Gregory, there was no 
shame in talking of the Father as the cause of the Son, or, notably, in embracing the sense 
of hierarchy that it connoted. He freely admitted that, “in respect of being the cause [τῷ 
αἰτίῳ], the Father is greater [μείζων] than the Son.”856 Gregory clearly was trying to find a 
place for the words of Christ, “My Father is greater than I” (Jn 14:28), whose 
implications others had tried to blunt by arguing that the Son here was speaking 
according to his human nature. Their explanations were unsatisfying, even banal. “To say 
that he is greater than the Son considered as man, is true indeed, but is no great thing. For 
what marvel is it if God is greater than man?”857 And yet there were also those passages 
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 Or. 29.6 (NPNF
2 7:302 [PG 36:81A]): “There is one good point which they may allege about this 
argument of theirs; namely, that they desert Passion [πάθους], and take refuge in Will [βούλησιν]. For Will is 
not Passion.”  
854
 See e.g. Aristotle (Eth. nic. 3.2). 
855
 Enn. 5.1.6.19-22: “We dare not talk of generation in time, dealing as we are with eternal Beings: where 
we speak of origin in such reference, it is in the sense, merely, of cause [αἰτίας] and order [τάξεως].” I have 
used MacKenna’s translation here, except that I have rendered τάξεως as “order,” instead of his 
“subordination” which I felt was unwarranted. 
856
 Or. 29.15 (NPNF
2 7:306 [PG 36:93B]): “τῷ αἰτίῳ μείζων ὁ Πατὴρ τοῦ Υἱοῦ.” 
857
 Or. 30.7 (NPNF
2 7:312 [PG 36:113A]): “Τὸ γὰρ δὴ λέγειν, ὅτι τοῦ κατὰ τὸν ἄνθρωπον νοουμένου μείζων, 
ἀληθὲς μέν, οὐ μέγα δέ. Τί γὰρ τὸ θαυμαστόν, εἰ μείζων ἀνθρώπου Θεός;” 
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in Scripture that talked of the Son’s equality with the Father. For Gregory this apparent 
contradiction only made sense if one understood that “the greater [μείζων] refers to cause 
[αἰτίας],858 while the equal [ἴσον]859 belongs to the nature [φύσεως].”860 Here was the key. 
The Arians had long based their argument for the Father’s ontological superiority on his 
status as unoriginate begetter of the Son. His unbegottenness, they claimed, was 
inextricably tied to his essence.
861
 Gregory disagreed. In the same way that Adam, who 
was not begotten of human parents but was directly created by God, was not 
ontologically different from humans, so too “neither is he who is unbegotten alone God, 
though he alone is Father.”862 The fact that the Father was unbegotten, but the Son was 
not, did not upset the homoousion, because unbegottenness stood “outside the Essence” 
(περὶ οὐσίαν); unbegotten was “not a synonym for God.”863 Thus, the only-begotten Son 
was not, on account of his generacy, any less God than the unbegotten Father. To 
reconcile these seeming opposites, Gregory invoked the old principle often brought up, 
especially in anti-Nicene circles, that the begetting of the Son was unlike that of “one of 
the works,”864 but was a process that lay wholly beyond human comprehension.865 How 
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 The NPNF chooses to translate αἰτίας as “origination,” instead the the “cause” that I have preferred. 
859
 Though he did not cite it, Gregory must have been referring to Phil 2:6: “τὸ εἶναι ἴσα Θεῷ.” 
860
 Or. 30.7 (NPNF
2 7:312 [PG 36:112C]): “Τὸ μεῖζον μέν ἐστι τῆς αἰτίας, τὸ δὲ ἴσον τῆς φύσεως.” 
861
 See e.g. Eunomius, Apol. 1.8: “This [i.e. the Unbegotten] must be unbegotten essence [οὐσία ἀγέννητος].” 
Arians such as Eunomius used essence, in an Aristotelian fashion, to denote the whatness of a thing. Names 
were simply verbal formulae of essences. The name Father, therefore, contained those things peculiar to 
the Father, including his status as begetter and his unoriginateness—manifestations of his unique essence, 
in which the Son had no participation. The arbitrariness of such a definition of ousia was illustrated by their 
strenuous arguments against taking the names Father and Son as suggesting, as per human procreation, 
ontological parity (see Eunomius, Apol. 1.16-18). 
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 Or. 29.11 (NPNF
2 7:305 [PG 36:88C]): “οὐδὲ τὸ ἀγέννητον μόνον Θεός, εἰ καὶ μόνου Πατρός, ἀλλὰ δέξαι καὶ 
τὸ γεννητὸν εἶναι Θεόν.” 
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 Or. 29.12 (NPNF
2 7:305 [PG 36:89AB]): “Οὐ ταὐτὸν ἀγέννητον καὶ Θεός.” 
864
 See, e.g., the Council of Sirmium: apud Athanasius, Syn. 27 (NPNF
2 
4:465 [PG 26: 740B]). 
865
 Or. 29.4 (NPNF
2 7:302 [PG 36:80A]): “He, whose existence is not the same as ours, differs from us also 
in his generation” (“ᾧ τὸ εἶναι μὴ ταὐτόν, τούτῳ καὶ τὸ γεννᾷν διάφορον”). 
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could a human dare to postulate anything about it when he could barely understand his 
own generation?
866
 It was a mystery as ineffable as the divine essence itself.
867
 
“The Begetting of God must be honored by silence. It is a great thing for you to 
learn that he was begotten. But the manner of his generation we will not admit 
that even Angels can conceive, much less you. Shall I tell you how it was? It was 
in a manner known to the Father who begat, and to the Son who was begotten. 
Anything more than this is hidden by a cloud, and escapes your dim sight.”868 
The best one could do was to hedge one’s opaque comprehension of it roundabout with a 
few privative statements that posited what it could not be. Thus, the generation of the Son 
was said by Gregory to be, unlike human procreation, incorporeal and therefore 
passionless,
869
 and not subject to time, so that there “there was never a time when he was 
not.”870 
It was within this general framework that Gregory turned also to our question of 
the Father’s precedent will in begetting the Son. As cause of the Son, the sovereign 
Father himself had willed the Son’s begetting. Against those, who had elevated will into a 
principle unto itself, by which the Son really was the Son of Will, a maternal principle, 
and not of the Father, he responded simply that a thing willed was the object of a willer, 
not of a will: 
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 Or. 29.8. 
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 Or. 29.4. 
870
 Or. 29.3 (NPNF
2 
7:301). 
290 
“...a partition is set up between the Creator and the creatures in the shape of Will. 
And yet I think that the person who wills is distinct from the act of willing; he 
who begets from the act of begetting; the speaker from the speech, or else we are 
all very stupid. On the one side we have the mover, and on the other that which is, 
so to speak, the motion. Thus the thing willed is not the child of will, for it does 
not always result therefrom; nor is that which is begotten the child of generation, 
nor that which is heard the child of speech, but of the person who willed, or begat, 
or spoke.”871 
Gregory’s purpose here was twofold. First, he placed the person of the Father, not some 
impersonal force such as Will, as the central agent in theology.
872
 Secondly, and more 
importantly for our purposes, Gregory also sought to remove all mediating barriers 
between Father and Son that had been erected by viewing divine begetting in too human, 
discrete, and sequential terms. “The things of God are beyond all this,” he maintained. 
For in the Father “the Will to beget” was itself equal (ἴσως) with generation; there was no 
“intermediate action.” There was no interval between the Father’s willing and his 
begetting, and, in this general context of the Son’s incomprehensible generation by the 
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 As an aside, we note that, in some modern Greek circles, this move has in modern times inspired an 
entire school of theology, whose leading figures include Metropolitan John Zizioulas and Christos 
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Darton, Longman and Todd, 1985], 40-41) that “among the Greek Fathers the unity of God, the one God, 
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Father, the begetting itself was such that there was no mediation, no ontological gap, no 
time lapse, and no suggestion of the Son’s ontological inferiority to the Father. 
However, at this point Gregory seemed suddenly to stop. My suspicion is that he 
was careful not to enter more sensitive territory than would be prudent for one in his 
precarious political situation. At the time of his writing, he was the minority Nicene 
bishop of Constantinople in the tense years leading up to the Council that was to be held 
there in 381. This unease was hinted at by the tempered remark, which seemed to cut 
short his train of thought: “if we may accept this at all, and not rather consider generation 
superior to will.”873 Instead of opening up a fuller treatment of the question on will he 
had touched on, he appeared rather to suggest to his readers that if one were having 
trouble accepting his thinking, then one could dismiss all that he had said and simply 
consider the “generation superior to will.” Of course, this alternative he was 
recommending was nothing other than the old position of Athanasius, the trusted pillar of 
the Nicene orthodoxy, which, as we have already seen, placed the Son’s begetting above 
and beyond all questions of will. Gregory’s caution here was understandable. His 
political position around 379 was uncertain, and, with his talk of the Father’s willing in 
the begetting of the Son, he was delving into areas that many among the Nicenes had 
long considered tantamount to Arianism. His offer of a respectable and safe fallback 
position that assured his readers of his Nicene sympathies was understandable. 
Fortunately for us, however, this crucial train of thought touched on by Gregory 
was soon picked up again by his namesake, compatriot, and friend, Gregory of Nyssa, 
who, writing only just after Gregory of Nazianzus (382) and buoyed by the triumph of the 
Council of Constantinople (381), was to provide it with a fitting coda. Gregory of 
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 Or. 29.6 (PG 36:81BC): “εἴ γε καὶ τοῦτο δεξόμεθα ὅλως, ἀλλὰ μὴ καὶ θελήσεως κρείττων ἡ γέννησις.”  
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Nyssa’s methodology rested on the same strategy as that of Gregory of Nazianzus, 
namely that of reconciling seemingly irreducible opposites in the transcendence and 
infinitude of the inner life of the Trinity. Indeed, on the one hand, Scripture called the 
Son begotten. Yet, that same Scripture would also say that “he is verily God, and 
assuredly eternal, and is never at any time found to be non-existent.”874 On the face of it, 
Gregory conceded, the one claim did not “at first seem to agree with the other.”875 In the 
eighth book of his C. Eun., Gregory sought to shed light on this paradox by examining 
the derivative problem on which we are focused: how the Father willingly begot the Son 
without this in any way suggesting the ontological inferiority of the latter. His goal here 
was to be able to “apprehend the doctrine on this point by the aid of things cognizable to 
our senses.”876 By analyzing one paradox, he would be able to elucidate the other. He 
focused on dismantling the key Arian assertion that if the Father exercised will 
(βεβουλῆσθαι) in the begetting then it followed that “the Father first willed and so 
proceeded to become a Father.” From this they then inferred the Son’s ontological 
posteriority to the Father. For Gregory, oppositely, the “immediate conjunction” 
(ἄμεσος...συνάφεια) between Father and Son, which all accepted, did not have necessarily 
to exclude the notion of the Father’s willing in the begetting, as though he begot the Son 
“without choice, by some necessity of his nature [φύσεως ἀνάγκην].”877 Neither did this act 
of willing separate the Son from the Father, as if to come “in between them as a kind of 
interval.” People had long been led to the wrong conclusions on this matter precisely 
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because they overlooked what was a fundamental difference between human and divine 
natures. In the “heavy and inert” nature of humans, the wish for a thing and the 
possession of it were always understood as separate and non-simultaneous events: “Now 
we wish for something we have not, and at another time we obtain what we do not wish 
to obtain.” However, in the “simple and all-powerful” divine nature, such fragmentation 
did not exist: “all things are conceived together and at once, the willing of good as well as 
the possession of what he wills.”878 The divine will itself was “contemplated as operating, 
indwelling, and co-existing in the eternal nature.” It neither arose in it from some separate 
principle, nor was it capable from being conceived apart from the object of will. For, he 
concluded, it was 
“not possible that with God either the good will should not be, or the object of 
will should not accompany the act of will, since no cause can either bring it about 
that that which befits the Father should not always be, or be any hindrance to the 
possession of the object of will.”879 
Thus, Gregory elaborated, it followed that, because the Son was by nature the good—“or 
rather beyond all good”—and the good never failed to be the object of the Father’s will, 
then neither was will forced out by the immediate conjunction of Father and Son, nor was 
there any separation between the two on account of the element of will existing in their 
relation.
880
 Gregory’s choice of example here was interesting. We recall how for 
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 5:202 [PG 45:776AB]): “Ἐπεὶ οὖν φύσει τὸ ἀγαθόν, μᾶλλον δὲ παντὸς ἀγαθοῦ ἐπέκεινα 
ὁ μονογενὴς Θεός, οὐκ ἀβούλητον δὲ τῷ Πατρὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν· φανερῶς ἀποδείκνυται διὰ τούτων, ὅτι καὶ ἄμεσός ἐστι 
τοῦ Υἱοῦ ἡ πρὸς τὸν Πατέρα συνάφεια, καὶ οὐκ ἐξωθεῖται οὐδὲ ἐξείργεται ὑπὸ τῆς ἀδιαστάτου συναφείας τὸ 
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Athanasius, the Father’s goodness was natural to him and therefore was not in the 
purview of his will. The Father’s nature could not be the object of his will. Rather, the 
Father’s will had as its object things outside of the Father, not things natural to him. To 
say, therefore, that the Father willed to be good was to present his goodness as 
conditional and external to God’s being. Conversely, in this illustration of Gregory’s, the 
Father’s goodness, although also natural to him, was nevertheless understood to be the 
object of his will as well. In other words, God ever willed the eternal begetting of his own 
natural and incontingent goodness. There was a tension here, to be sure. First, I should 
underline that Gregory’s presentation of the Son as the good was incidental, not a 
concerted turn toward thinking of the Son as a divine property; there was simply too 
much evidence elsewhere of Gregory’s perception of the Son as a concrete person, an 
hypostasis, and not a property. If anything, what divulged more about the substance of his 
understanding was his “or rather beyond all good.” For here Gregory was declaring that 
he had reached the very limit of human comprehension when it came to fathoming the 
interior life of the Trinity. The sense of otherness and incomprehensibility that 
surrounded the begetting was such that all one could do was to hedge the mystery about 
with truth statements that in instances such as this one may have even seemed 
contradictory, but rule that, in the unknowable divine realm, they were not opposed to 
one another. Thus, in these most transcendent instances, the Son was both willed yet not 
contingent, begotten yet without beginning, caused yet not inferior. 
Gregory’s solution, founded on the understanding that human norms could only 
ever represent but a fragmented reflection of matters pertaining to the divine nature, put 
                                                                                                                                                 
βούλημα τὸ τῇ ἀγαθῇ φύσει διὰ παντὸς ἐνυπάρχον. Εἰ δέ τις ἀνεπηρεάστως ἀκούει τοῦ λόγου καὶ τοιοῦτόν τι τοῖς 
εἰρημένοις προσθεῖναι βούλομαι.” 
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forward the transcendent, supra-intellectual nature of Trinitarian theology. Eusebius of 
old had attempted to present the divine will as a kind of substrate from which all things 
had been fashioned. What this did, however, was reinforce the Arian position of a Son at 
a distance from the Father. Gregory, however, located the divine will in the divine nature 
itself, and argued that although the Father willed the begetting of the Son, he did so 
without interval, without mediation, without remove, before all ages, and without this in 
any way implying the Son’s ontological inferiority. Moreover, given that the term nature 
was for Gregory but a synonym for ousia,
881
 it followed necessarily that the identity of 
ousia between Father and Son—enshrined by Nicaea, and, after the peace of 362, 
accepted by the moderate anti-Nicenes including the forebears of Gregory—also implied 
their identity of will. Now Gregory was in a position to give structure and substance to 
the theological precept first articulated at the Council of Antioch some forty years 
previously. There, the Council had attempted to define the relationship between Father, 
Son (and Holy Spirit) as an oneness according to symphony. I argued that, based on the 
evidence we have at hand, it was simply inconceivable to envisage this as anything other 
than a statement that the absolute commonality of will of the divine persons, in the 
observed volitive movement of the Trinity ad extra, was a phenomenological index of 
their unfathomable underlying unity which the council lacked the theological 
wherewithal to describe otherwise. Armed now with a notion of the homoousion freed of 
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 As Johannes Zachhuber notes in “Ousia,” pages 565-566 in The Brill Dictionary of Gregory of Nyssa, 
(ed. by Lucas Francisco Mateo-Seco & Giulio Maspero; trans. by Seth Cherney [Brill: Leiden, 2010]): 
“The fact that he [Gregory] unquestioningly assumes the semantic equivalence of ousia and physis is 
evinced by Graec and Abl, which develop the same argument, but do so using ousia and physis 
terminology, respectively.” Further evidence of this emergent correlation was the doctrinal epistle that the 
Council of Constantinople itself sent to the Church in the West, which equated the ousia, physis, Godhead 
(see Tanner, Decrees, 18:33-34), and power (ibid. 18:22) of the three hypostases.  
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the associations that so sullied it in the eyes of the Antiochenes, Gregory began to put 
together a theological system that brought together all these loose threads. 
Gregory took as his starting point the unfathomable and indescribable divine 
nature about which we have already made intimations. To Gregory’s understanding, the 
“unnameable and unspeakable”882 divine nature was definable only either negatively or 
by “one of its surroundings.”883 By “surroundings” Gregory made clear that he meant the 
divine operations (ἐνέργειαι)884 that flowed therefrom and which were identified according 
to humans’ “variable conceptions” of them.885 Even the notion of the Godhead (θεότης) 
itself, mistakenly taken by many as “a common name of the nature,”886 was really a term 
identifying God’s supervisory operation.887 Each divine operation, extending “from God 
to the creation,” whether referring to the “acts of His providence for us, or to the 
government and constitution of the universe,” came about through the singular “action of 
the Three.”888 It was this that constituted the basis of Christian monotheism: not God’s 
personal oneness—the divine persons were three—but the absolute oneness of the 
Trinity’s action in its operation in the world. Every operation had “its origin from the 
Father, and proceeds through the Son, and is perfected in the Holy Spirit.”889 Among 
these divine operations was included, of course, the unitary divine will that acted in the 
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2 5:332 [PG 45:121A]): “ἀκατονόμαστόν τε καὶ ἄφραστον.” 
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 Abl. (NPNF
2 
5:334 [PG 45:125C]): “κατὰ τὰς πολυτρόπους ἐννοίας.” 
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5:333 [PG 45:124C]): “κοινὴ τῆς φύσεως ἡ κλῆσις τῆς θεότητος.” 
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5:333 [PG 45:121D-124A]). In this case, the operation denoted by θεότης was God’s status 
as our beholder (θεατὴς) or overseer. 
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2 5:334 [PG 45:125CD]): “θεόθεν ἐπὶ τὴν κτίσιν...εἴτε εἰς τὴν ἡμετέραν πρόνοιαν φθανόντων, εἴτε 
πρὸς τὴν τοῦ παντὸς οἰκονομίαν καὶ σύστασιν διὰ τῶν τριῶν μὲν γίνεται.” 
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 Abl. (NPNF
2 5:334 [PG 45:126C]): “ἐκ Πατρὸς ἀφορμᾶται καὶ διὰ τοῦ Υἱοῦ πρόεισι, καὶ ἐν τῷ Πνεύματι τῷ 
ἁγίῳ τελειοῦται.” 
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world, the motion of which also flowed “from the Father, through the Son, to the 
Spirit.”890 There was “one motion [κίνησις] and disposition [διακόσμησις] of the good will 
[ἀγαθοῦ θελήματος] which is communicated from the Father through the Son to the 
Spirit.”891 The absolute unity of the action of the three hypostases declared their oneness 
of nature.
892
 Being at one and the same inscrutable level of being—or of one and the 
same ousia, as Nicaea had long-established—there could be only one way for the divine 
persons to will and act. Their will and operation had its origin and initiation in the Father, 
was brought forth in the Son, and was completed in the Holy Spirit, all these occurring 
“without mark of time or distinction,”893 for the movement was one. It was not a question 
of the divine persons being in a relation of obedience to one another, for all acted 
according to their one and same nature, a nature which had its origin in the Father, who, 
by means inscrutable and beyond understanding, bestowed this same nature on the other 
two persons before all time and age.
894
 
To expand from Gregory’s theological framework, we see him engaging the 
question of will on two levels. Inside the Trinity Gregory allowed an exploded view of its 
inner workings in order for one to arrange the data of revelation only if there was a prior 
understanding that this exploded view was at bottom catachrestic and insufficient to 
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Πατρός, διὰ τοῦ Υἱοῦ, ἐπὶ τὸ Πνεῦμα γινομένης ἢ νοουμένης.” 
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Πατρὸς διὰ τοῦ Υἱοῦ πρὸς τὸ Πνεῦμα διεξαγομένη.” 
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will of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost is one, and thus, if the Holy Spirit wills that which 
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Πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον ὅ δοκεῖ τῷ Υἱῷ, ἡ κοινωνία τοῦ θελήματος σαφῶς παρίστησι τὴν τῆς οὐσίας ἑνότητα”). 
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 Abl. (NPNF
2 5:335 [PG 45: 129AB]): “ἀχρόνως καὶ ἀδιαστάτως.” 
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 The constraints on this study do not allow us to tackle the question of the spiration of the Spirit in 
Gregory. We will simply take as a given Gregory’s obvious acceptance of the Holy Spirit’s 
consubstantiality with the Father and Son. 
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express the meeting, inside the transcendence of the divine nature, of what to human 
finitude seemed to be irreconcilable opposites. Outside the Trinity, he saw all outwardly 
directed divine action as one, and operating in the formula, again derived from revelation, 
“from the Father, through the Son, and in the Holy Spirit.” In this way, he offered an 
answer to the question that had plagued Arius of how to reconcile the plurality of divine 
persons in the Godhead, as revelation had made them known, with the philosophical need 
to preserve monotheism. More specific to our questions surrounding will, Gregory 
brought closure to what had been the vexing question of the Father’s precedent will in the 
begetting of the Son. The Father willed the begetting of the Son, without this in any way 
implying the Son’s ontological inferiority, and he also willed outwardly from himself 
through the Son and in the Holy Spirit. This divine volitional movement was 
unidirectional with the question of volitional response to the divine will being limited to 
creatures. Secondly, he also brought to final fruition the idea, first formulated at Antioch, 
of the oneness according to symphonia of the three hypostases of the Trinity. Oneness 
here denoted not contingent, and potentially fragile, interpersonal volitive oneness, but 
absolute oneness of outward volitive movement, which pointed to an ontological oneness 
that the Council of Antioch lacked the philosophical wherewithal to describe. Gregory, 
now able to cite the homoousion without this negating the concrete existence of three 
hypostases in the Trinity, was able to offer a fuller solution. The final question of the 
potential for volitional disharmony between the divine persons, which had so alarmed the 
Council of Serdica, was resolved early in the debate. Arius’ early position of a cognitive 
deficit between the divine persons had met with stiff opposition, even from his allies. In 
Greek thought, volitive action was a question of understanding. Without a disparity of 
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such between the divine persons, the question of potential discord in the Trinity quickly 
became baseless. All evidence suggests that even Arius himself abandoned this line of 
inquiry very early in the piece. From that point on, all sides held, even though it seems 
they did not realize it of each other, that the movement of will in the Trinity was 
unidirectional and outward from the Father. Any sense of response to the divine will, and 
the potential for discord therewith, was limited to sphere of those rational creatures, 
humans, who were possessed of limited powers of understanding, who made up for their 
cognitive lack through their faith in the goodness of God’s will and knowledge. 
 
CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, we have examined how the problem of will in the understanding 
of the Holy Trinity became one of the crucial questions at the center of the controversy 
surrounding the teachings of Arius. In the same way that Gnosticism of old had provoked 
the reaction of its contemporaries with its strongly volitional theology, which was 
founded on a system of cognitive disparity between the divine hypostases, so too Arius 
put forward a similarly volitionist theory of the Trinity, also founded on the belief that the 
downward gradient in ontological status as one considered the persons of the Trinity 
necessarily corresponded to a decline in knowledge. This cascade of increasing ignorance 
fueled the early Arius’ notion of the potential for volitional disharmony between the 
persons in the Trinity. Although, on the one hand, the potential for discord, which, of 
course, because of the laudable virtue of the Son, was never realized, laid the basis for a 
vision of the Son as moral exemplar subordinate to and overcoming the same 
contingencies to which humans were also subject, the sheer horror provoked by the claim 
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of an even potentially sinful Son of God forced a hasty and radical readjustment on the 
part of Arius. We have strived to show how this decisive repositioning on the part of the 
heresiarch was probably the result of pressure from both foe and but also friends who did 
not share his understanding of gradated cognition in the Trinity. Nevertheless, the sense 
of contingency that had come to be associated with the faculty of will was to linger on, 
even after Arius’ recantations. Thus in the circles loyal to the Council of Nicaea which 
disciplined Arius there reigned a leeriness to any mention of will in the Trinity, even in 
those instances where will had traditionally been considered an acceptable, nay even a 
necessary, theological element. 
In this light, the efforts of the Council of Antioch to come up with an alternative 
to the homoousion, which had been put forward by Nicaea to describe the oneness of 
Father and Son—an alternative that instead rested on the absolute oneness of volitive 
action as phenomenological index of an underlying, indescribable ontological oneness of 
the three divine persons—were greeted by loyalist Nicene circles as a re-edition of the 
early Arius’ thesis of the Son’s volitional and moral contingency. I have argued, based on 
the writings of Arius himself, but also of Eusebius of Caesarea, who in many ways 
represented the soul of Antiochene Council, that such a reading of Council’s intentions 
was simply impossible. I believe my reading is supported by the Macrostich Creed, 
which sought to explain Antioch by describing this oneness according to symphonia as a 
“symphony of dominion.” It was not until after the peace of 362, in which Nicenes and 
moderate anti-Nicenes were able to be reconciled, that a new impetus was given to 
vindicate and give theological substance to the position that Antioch had promulgated but 
briefly and without the theological means that were to be afforded to the new generations 
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of expositors by an homoousion now exorcised of the woes that many anti-Nicenes had 
seen in it. 
In like wise, the question of the Father’s precedent will in the begetting of the 
Son, so long a staple in Christian theology, had become verboten because, again, of the 
sense of conditionality with which Arius had fortified it. If the Father had willed to beget 
the Son, he could just as well have willed it not. Even the great Athanasius displayed a 
suspicion of the opinion of the Father’s will in the begetting of the Son, and it fell again 
to that new generation of theologians, which also was to form the backbone of the second 
great Council in 381 that signaled the closure to the Arian controversy, to navigate 
through the Scylla of necessity and Charybdis of contingency in positing the role of the 
Father’s precedent will in the Son’s begetting. Their solution was really the only way out 
left to such a pointed dilemma: appeal to the divine transcendence. One of the early 
advocates of such a transcendentalist understanding of the Father’s willing begetting had 
of course been the anti-Nicene Council of Sirmium, which denounced those who took the 
Father’s willing generation of the Son in human terms.895 We cannot overlook the fact, 
also, that the strategy of appealing to the non-analogy of human and divine norms was 
also to be found as early as the penitent Arius, who sought to explain that his 
controversial statements could not be taken in a creaturely way.
896
 Thus, we saw the 
Gregories make a clear distinction between what can be known about God and what not. 
Human communion with God was limited to the divine operations, which were the 
absolutely unitary outward movement of the Godhead. This was the basis of Christian 
monotheism, not the personal monotheism argued for by the early Arius. On the other 
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 Apud Athanasius, Syn. 27 (NPNF
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4:465). 
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 “...Perfect creature of God, but not as one of the creatures; offspring, but not as one of things begotten.” 
Apud Athanasius’ Syn. 16 (NPNF2 4:458). 
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hand, the inner life of the Trinity remained ever beyond the cognitive abilities of 
creatures. The most one could do was to hedge the transcendent inner life of the Trinity 
about with statements of what could not be the case, even if those statements appeared, 
on the superficial level of human cognition, to be in conflict with one another. This 
solution sought at once to find a balance between communion with the divine and 
preserving the sense of divine otherness that simply must accompany a doctrine of triune 
oneness. In this general framework, a place was also found for the questions surrounding 
the divine will that Arius had first raised. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
We opened this treatise with the furor that was provoked over what we might call 
a social understanding of the Trinity. Scriptural evidences such as the Johannine, “that 
they be one even as we are one,” became the basis of a fear in the minds of some of an 
analogy between harmonious human interactions and the relations between the divine 
hypostases in the Holy Trinity. Here, human oneness was understood as coming about 
only through the contingent meeting of minds and alignment of wills, and the same was 
argued as applying in the divine sphere. Although this view was promptly rejected by 
most quarters of the fourth century Church, our further investigation has suggested that it 
was not a widespread one to start with. Rather it can be traced with certainty only to the 
early Arius, parts of Asterius, and, if we are to believe their accusers at Sardica, possibly 
certain others such as Valens and Ursacius. 
The view that Arius articulated took its inspiration from another tenet that had had 
a long history in Christian theology, namely the idea of the Father’s precedent will in the 
generation of the Son. The importance of this doctrine lay in its acting as a check on 
notions of cosmic or rational necessity impinging on the absolute sovereignty of God. In 
the case of Arius, however, it was taken as a statement on the conditionality of the Son’s 
existence, and thus on his kinship with the creatures. Presented as a product of the 
Father’s will, he was understood as relating back to the Father only through volitional 
means, namely through voluntary submission and obedience. The voluntary and 
contingent nature of this relation was reinforced by the Son’s status as creature, and the 
concomitant belief that he was also on an inferior level to the Father regarding knowledge 
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and understanding. The Son’s deficit in understanding was made up for through his 
faithful obedience. In this way, he became the representative of creation who won 
salvation for his fellow creatures by passing the very test that they could not. 
Despite the superficial kerygmatic attractions of a Christ primarily as 
soteriological hero, who overturned the ancestral rebellion through an obedience that 
theoretically could well have lapsed, the reality was that this understanding of the Son did 
not have much antecedent in the theological tradition, at least in how it had come to be 
circumscribed in the writers that we have examined. On the contrary, the notion of the 
Father’s antecedent will in generating the Son was, as we said, a guard against 
embarrassing the omnipotence of the Father. More importantly, however, was the fact 
that it served, not as an index of the Son’s creaturely status—on the contrary—but as a 
key component in a psychological paradigm that aimed to demonstrate the closeness of 
the Son to the Father and his status as Logos generated by will from the Father as a word 
from mind. Some of the authors went as far as to describe the Son as coming forth from 
the substance of the Father. In this regard, the fact that the Father willed the Son into 
being was not seen as undermining the divinity of the Son, but as demonstrating that he 
came forth from within the Father. This was a special act of will, analogous to the 
uniqueness of the begetting and its unlikeness to anything similar in creation. 
This stress on the Son as Logos of the Father precluded any notion of ignorance in 
the Son that could have acted as the basis of a theory of merely moral union. Sin was, to 
the Greek mind, the result of ignorance. Where there was no ignorance there could be no 
sin. The omniscience of the Son meant absolute identity of will with the Father. We note 
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that in Arius, much was made of the relative ignorance of the Son; only thus could his 
system of obedience work. This was absent in the earlier authors we examined. 
The earliest writers such as Justin and Tertullian laid emphasis on Christ not as 
potentially disobedient but as the perfect expression of the Father, and thus enlightener 
and bearer of the saving knowledge that the fallen and, thanks to the demons, beguiled 
and misinformed world was called to heed. Thus having overcome ignorance, they freely 
obeyed God and aligned their own wills with his, presumably complementing their 
ontological disparity in understanding through their faith. The theodicean concerns of 
both writers were clear. This was an age where the dual sense of justice and human 
accountability were held in high regard, and the freedom of will was the means of 
establishing it. Thus their theological schemes of both Justin and Tertullian could be 
described as grand movements of will, from the Father and in the Son, outwardly from 
the Godhead—in Tertullian expressed in terms of a monarchy based on identity of 
substance and will—and back toward the divine source with those enlightened ones who 
were voluntarily obedient in tow. Of note is that in both these theologians the model of 
obedience was the Virgin Mary whose submission to God was anti-paradigmatic of the 
rebellion in Eden. 
Being the later writer, Tertullian also had the occasion to focus on the Valentinian 
Gnostics and to denounce their understanding of probole as placing the derivative 
hypostases in the Pleroma at too great a cognitive distance from their heavenly source. 
Indeed, the Gnostic understanding stood diametrically opposed to the Christian one. 
Here, apart from its infamous explosion of agents in the divine sphere, life therein was 
characterized by cognitive stratification among the divine hypostases which led to 
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volitional disharmony and discord, the by-product of which was the creation of the 
material universe. Importantly, this strong emphasis on volitional disharmony and the 
chaos in the divine estate born thereform produced among the Gnostic contemporaries an 
opposing de-emphasis of the matter of will in the divine life. Plotinus abandoned an 
earlier reliance on the notion of tolma as the explanatory device of the cascade from 
primordial oneness and put forward instead a sense of rational necessity in which any 
willing was seen as a matter of irrationality. On the other hand, Irenaeus, the great 
polemicist against the Gnostics, advanced a vision of the Trinity that left no room at all 
for a sense of will in the divine life. The three hypostases of the Godhead were presented 
as organic parts—the Son and Holy Spirit as the hands of the Father—of an always 
existent Trinity of persons. In this respect, Irenaeus stood in contrast with Tertullian, 
who, instead of avoiding the question of will, analyzed it in depth. Thus, the Gnostics, 
Irenaeus, and Tertullian mirrored the fourth century disputes: the Gnostics, with their 
theory of the limited knowledge in the Pleroma, loosely prefigured Arius, with his own 
theory of ignorance and potential lapse in the Son; Irenaeus, with his unwillingness to 
delve too deeply into the generation and the accompanying de-emphasis of the will would 
resemble some of the Nicene party who looked with leeriness at all mention of the will; 
Tertullian, moved by his desire to preserve the sense of plurality in the Godhead, would 
herald the impulse to preserve a sense of will in the Trinitarian relations within orthodox 
limits. 
In Origen we saw a strong statement on the will but not in a way that affected the 
internal life of the Trinity. There, he would follow the psychological paradigm mapped 
out by Irenaeus and Tertullian to explain the origin of the Son. In like wise, the Son 
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would become the externalized expression of the Father’s wisdom and will. The Father’s 
precedent will in begetting the Son, as an act of mind, again was not a sign of the Son’s 
inferiority, but his affinity, to the Father. The Son was of the same substance as the 
Father, a fact declared by their sameness of action, and although there was in Origen a 
strong sense of hierarchy in the Trinity, the fact that the Son willed and acted identically 
with the Father put him ontologically on the side of divinity, which was non-material, not 
the creatures, which to varying degrees material. For Origen mapped this understanding 
of the Godhead onto a bifurcated theory of reality. Here, the material nature of the 
created dominion, which was characterized by a tendency to compulsion and ignorance, 
was set against the freedom of the purely spiritual and non-material divine realm. 
Nevertheless, humans, endowed with free will, were called to overcome the stringencies 
of their surroundings. In fact, the entire motion of the cosmos was a retributive—a 
modern might even dare to describe it as karmic—interplay of free will, choice, and 
consequence. It was in this network of pre-incarnate souls, whose actions determined 
consequences and in the almost ubiquitous cases of disobedience led to various degrees 
of downward motion and materialization, that Origen placed the human mind of Christ. 
Through its meritorious, super-rational obedience, it was united with the Logos and then 
with it, put into the flesh to enlighten the world and win its free assent to obey. Again, in 
line with Greek norms, will was a function of knowledge. 
This background informed the disputes surrounding Arius. His earliest efforts, 
marked by a theological crudity that even his political allies balked at, took the fact of the 
Father’s precedent will in begetting the Son as a sign of the ontological inferiority of the 
latter, and placed the Son on a gradated scale of cognizance so that even he was subject to 
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ignorance and therefore disobedience. Yet, even Arius was to distance himself from this 
position. The statements on will and symphony in the Trinity that emanated from within 
the moderate anti-Nicene camp, specifically the formulae of the Council of Antioch 
(341), must be read in this light and not as a restatement of Arius’ early position. Rather, 
I argued that symphony could not have been a theory of contingent harmony, but an 
empirical observation of absolute and inimitable oneness of action and will in the three 
divine hypostases. In light of past correlations between essence and action, I presented 
this as an attempt by the Council at describing an homoousion without it actually using 
the problematic term. If this is in fact so, then when we look behind the disagreements 
over language, the fourth century conflicts do not appear quite so stark. By the time of the 
Second Council, however, the de-stigmatization of the notion of co-essentiality was 
complete, and the notion of oneness of action, will, and essence/substance became part of 
the standard theological vocabulary. In this context, too, the notion of the Father’s 
antecedent will in begetting the Son too was stripped of any ontologically 
subordinationist significance that some had attributed to it. In the same way as with the 
process of the begetting itself, the Father’s willing to beget the Son did not imply his 
ontological inferiority. They had reached the limits of theological speculation, beyond 
which could only be silence. 
Whither, then, the Johannine passage, “That they be one even as we are one”? By 
the Church at large, it certainly was not taken to prescribe a strict analogy between the 
oneness of the persons in the Trinity and the concord between humans. This was 
ontologically impossible, because humans are not homoousioi—neither among 
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themselves nor, most certainly, with the Godhead.
897
 Neither can we look at it, 
anachronistically as far as conciliar history goes, as a statement on the exemplariness for 
humans of the perfect alignment of divine and human wills in the incarnate Son simply 
because humans are not hypostatically united with one another. Rather, we must step 
away from the mindset of a strict analogy and look at the passage with poetic eyes. We 
must guard ourselves from the temptation of analogizing too strictly from the doctrine of 
personhood in the divine Trinity. 
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 The trepidation that the Johannine “I in the Father, and the Father in me” (14:11) inspired in Hilary 
(Trin. 3.1 [NPNF
2
 9:62]) against too firm an analogy between human affairs and the inner life of the Trinity 
deserve mention here: “This is a problem which the wit of man will never solve, nor will human research 
ever find an analogy for this condition of Divine existence. But what man cannot understand, God can be” 
(“Haec quidem sensus hominum non consequetur, nec exemplum aliquod rebus divinis comparatio humana 
praestabit: sed quod inintelligibile est homini, Deo esse possibile est” [PL 10:76AB]). 
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